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INTRODUCTION

1)

Currently, many of the most widely used theories for

systematically investigating human behavior have presuppos¬
itional bases derived from what may be termed materialisticmechanistic and material!stic-epiphenomenaliStic philo¬
sophies.

These philosophical systems are (at least)

characterized by the following presuppositions:
a)

Materialistic-mechanism is essentially the view
(whether expressed as traditional Newtonian
mechanics or more recent particle theories)
that.the universe is constituted of ultimate
particles of matter, clustering together in
determinate configurations that appear In
dynamic interrelation with one another through¬
out space and time.
Therefore, by conceiving
these indeterminately numerous configurations
of material particles (dynamically occurring
within a SPATIO-TEMPORAL framework) in conjunc¬
tion with such ancillary concepts as mass,
velocity, inertia, gravity, etc., extra¬
ordinarily fruitful mathematical and statistical
formulations can be (and obviously have been)
established as UNIVERSALLY VALID OR, at least,
HIGHLY^PRECISE STATEMENTS OP THE RELATIONS
DEMONSTRATED AMONG GIVEN GROUPS ©“MATERIAL
PARTICLES (or macrocosmically speaking,
material bodies) AT INSTANTANEOUS MOMENTS OP TIME.

b)

Although there are somewhat different versions
of this view, and even with regard to the one
presented here many additional expository
comments could be made, the primitive concepts
material particles*, *motion*, * space*, and
•time* are common to them all.
Consequently,
enough has been said to contemplate the theo¬
retical conceptualization of mental phenomena
that will logically follow from this"
philosophical position.

c)

It becomes immediately evident that mental
phenomena must necessarily be explained in
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terms of material entities occurring in
instantaneous relations with one another, as
these relations can be formally expressed in
contemporary physical and biological theories.
d)

In effect, then, regardless of how mental
phenomena may be conceived, they must, in the
view of materialistic-mechanism, be expressible
in physically quantifiable scientific statements
of dependent relations.
Stated differently, it
must be concluded that mind can be completely
reduced, in principle, to scientific statements
about physical processes.

e)

Another closely related, derivative theory from
materialistic-mechanism is materialisticepiphenomenalism.
The latter places ultimate
emphasis upon the same primitive concepts as
the former, however, with the qualification that
mental processes, in some unknown way, occur
as causally INEFFICACIOUS "biproducts”
(i.e., epiphenomena) of their underlying physiochemical (and ultimately physical) processes.
This is to say, as it is most manifestly
evident in a Behavioristic psychology, for
example, that any statements referring to the
inner mental states of a human organism can be
methodologically purged from scientific func¬
tional analysis for they unwarrantedly introduce
variables not only intersubjectively directly
INACCESSIBLE to observers, but moreover, such
statements do not refer to causal determinants
of human behavior.
Here the term ’functional
analysis* designates a systematic specification
of the contemporary environmental (stimulus)
conditions that interact with organisms'*
antecedently learned behavioral predispositions
to determinately control organism's;.* responsebehavior.
These contingencies, alleged to in
principle exhaust all possible efficacious
factors involved in producing organismic
behavior, are to be specified within.a basic
Stimulus-Response equation, utilizing other
relevant theoretical constructs such as
•reinforcement*, ’operant*, ’reflex arc’, etc.
to facilitate behavioral explanation.
More¬
over, all behavioral contingencies are said to
be directly intersubjectively verifiable, thereby
remaining consistent with the basic tenets of
materiallstic-epiphenomenalism.

-

f)

It is a principal objective of the writer (in
this paper) to refute the two materialistic

)
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theories "briefly outlined above, to the extent
that they are regarded as (in principle) capable
of providing an adequate account of human mental
processes.
The writer shall argue that a
scientific reduction of mental processes to
their underlying physio-chemical correlates is
LOGICALLY untenable; and that a Behaviorism,
investigating human behavior solely as it is
DIRECTLY ascertained through the EXTERNAL BODILY
SENSES, can in principle provide only a PARTIAL
scientific account of behavior; and last, that
Behaviorism maintains a concept of "inner" or
"mental" states that is essentially erroneous.
In addition to these demonstrations, the writer
will endeavor to propose a theory of mind both
logically and empirically reconcilable with
physical and biological scientific enquiry.
2)

To gain a better understanding of the very subtle

manner whereby materialistic-mechanistic theories profoundly
influence the thinking of both public and scientific
mentalities, hence predisposing cultures imbued with a
history of scientific achievement to generally adopt an
overly reductionistic concept of man’s uniquely human
character, let us briefly reflect critically upon certain
theoretical, methodological and evidential tenets often
(ERRONEOUSLY) regarded by philosophers,

scientists and lay¬

men as fundamental to scientific explanation.
3)

First, we will consider the materialistic assumption

which Is in one form or another basic to much natural
scientific enquiry (and hence seems to importantly influence
other areas of science, although In a far more subtle way),
that
a)

(stated in its most general form) ULTIMATELY
we will find that our universe is comprised of
basic homogeneous material particles or
configurations of particles occurring in
dynamic, relative spatio-temporal inter¬
relation with one another.
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b)

4)

In fact, all physical theories must necessarily
include hypothetical constructs positing
ultimate entities, even though in practice
theorists are not much concerned with
discovering the "real" nature of these entities.
Rather, the principal endeavor is to formulate
constructs propitious for generating OPERATION¬
ALLY FRUITFUL mathematical and statistical for¬
mulae to precisely ascertain determinate
RELATIONS among entities.
Of course this
complex, abstract process is always concretely
guided by a concern for rendering phenomenal
occurrences explanable, and by the necessity
for theoretical verification through "key”
experiments.
It is from this mode of emphasis
that the scientific aims of prediction, control,
and thereby explanation are fulfilled.
But in
all this the assumotion that ENTITIES (generally
regarded as ultimately MATERIAL: however, this
latter inference is NOT LOGICALLY NECESSARY, as
we shall discover) exist in dynamic relation¬
ships to one another in space and time is
logically primitive; for after all, if mathe¬
matics and statistics are formal scientific
disciplines that establish valid RELATIONS,
the concept of ’relation* is vacuous unless
there are ENTITIES to be related,

Even the most abstruse scientific investigations must,

however, begin with DIRECT SENSE PERCEPTION (e.g.,

in

initially becoming aware of problematic phenomena) and hence,
verificationally terminate in DIRECT SENSE PERCEPTION
(e.g., in the manifest results of "key” experiments).

(It

might be noted at this early stage of argumentation, that
the writer will eventually ascribe a more general definition
to the term ’perception* than ’that which is delivered
through the external bodily senses’.)

Thus from inter¬

sub Jectively accessible (initial) phenomenal occurrence,
contemplated in reference to previously acquired ’wisdom’
(e.g., prior relevant experimentation, theorizing, common
sense, etc.), hypotheses are formulated, appropriate
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experimental procedures are contrived and eventually
submitted to empirical test, thereby yielding results which
often enhance theoretical understanding or suggesting areas
for revision.
V

a)

In this essentially INSTRUMENTAL usage of know¬
ledge (particularly) the natural sciences have
made extraordinary advances in developing a
THEORETICAL understanding of many directly
perceivable phenomena (an understanding obviously
yielding innumerable concrete benefits in our
daily lives), to the extent that lawful, deduc¬
tive explanations are available for UNDERSTANDING
various concrete phenomenal observations.

b)

But it must be understood, that the preponder¬
ance of this knowledge is THEORETICALLY FACTUAL,
NOT EMPIRICALLY FACTUAL; that is, THEORETICAL
CONSTRUCTS, abstract axioms, postulates, their
derivative formulae, etc. (all of which are NOT
directly observable in concrete external bodily
sense perception) are PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT
adhering, primarily, to the principle of
non-contradiction.
Although the issue of fact
and theory is a highly complex, and at present,
indeterminate matter in the philosophy of science,
we can legitimately maintain the distinction that
theories (with their constituative constructs,
axioms, postulates, formulae, etc. ) are, in
principle, NOT directly ascertainable in direct
external bodily sense perception.
This is
simply to say that we do not directly see,
taste, smell, touch or hear such things as atoms,
molecules, light waves, the MEANING of formula,
etc.; rather, we IDEATIONALLY CONCEIVE them as
instruments for facilitating our scientific
enquiries.

c)

More specifically, it must be said that theo¬
retical elements exist, PSYCHOLOGICALLY, as
highly elaborate IDEATIONAL PREDISPOSITIONS for
understanding phenomenal reality as it is
directly perceived.
In essence, then, theories
have ontological existence in the minds of men;
although they may be rightfully understood to
(ESSENTIALLY) LINGUISTICALLY REPRESENT naturalworld correlates existing INDEPENDENTLY from
Individual human percipients.
However, it
cannot even be maintained that our THEORETICAL
IDEAS of, for example, atoms are in fact
ACCURATELY representative of the independently
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existing entities to which they explanationally
refer.
Rather, it is only justifiable to assume
that our theories explain the behavior of merely
those ASPECTS of independently existing "atomic"
entities that are ultimately DIRECTLY perceived
as sensory perception.
d)

e)

To make this distinction somewhat clearer let
us say that, first, we have made a distinction
between the natural realm as it is directly
perceived by individual human percipients, and
an ideational symbolic domain used by percipi¬
ents to render their perceptual content
intelligible.
In effect, these two realms a,re
mutually exclusive at least in the sense that
they are spatially separated.
But in contrast
to the more problematic issue of man's relation
to what are hypothetically conceived as, for
example, the microcosmic entities •atoms*,
•light waves’, etc,, let us consider the simple
entity, ’tree*.
A tree has DIRECTLY observable
properties that are intersubjectively ascertain¬
able, thereby rendering it a legitimate object
of empirical knowledge.
However, entities
theoretically (hence, symbolically) characterized
as ’atoms’, for example, existing independently
from human percipients, are far from being
directly perceivable in the same way that we
perceive a tree; namely, we do not have intersubjectively direct access to the intrinsic
properties of atoms.
Therefore, it is required
that theoretical concepts of the structure of
atoms be devised in accordance to the phenomenal
representations of the independently existing
entities to which we DO have direct perceptual,
access.
From this methodological approach,
highly fruitful explanations for relevant
phenomenal occurrence can be established by
developing equations rigorously demonstrating
the modes of RELATION among the theoretically
conceived constitutive components of atomic
entities, and clusters of these entities.
It may be concluded, then, that we have a clear
concrete notion of the intrinsic character of
the ENTITY termed ’tree’, for it is an object
of direct perceptual experience.
But conversely,
our concept of the intrinsic nature of the
entity symbolically characterized as ’atom’ is
very UNCLEAR for we have no direct perceptual
apprehension of its structure; ALTHOUGH the
notions we DO HAVE, as they are ultimately
grounded in the phenomenal representations of
"atomic" behavior ascertained in experimental
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conditions, ABE highly determinate for they are
of, essentially, the MATHEMATICALLY AND STATIS¬
TICALLY ascertained RELATIONS among theoretic¬
ally postulated components collectively comprising
the atomic model.
5)

The point of our line of argument thus far is that in

the modern historical development of the formal and natural
sciences, man has fabricated an extraordinarily precise
understanding of the mathematically,

statistically and

geometrically ascertainable RELATIONS existing among the
HYPOTHETICAL or THEORETICAL ENTITIES AND THEIR COMPONENTS,
alleged to constitute, microcosmically, the grossly perceiv¬
able entities of direct concrete experience.

HOWEVER,

this

is to admit a view QUITE DIFFERENT from maintaining that we
.KNOW, with the degree of certainty accomplished in estab¬
lishing the RELATIONS amongst entities of the formal and
natural sciences, the INTRINSIC CHARACTER of INDEPENDENTLY
existing entities ULTIMATELY CONSTITUTING the "substantial”
nature of the universe.
a)

6)

In fact, a major continuing problem for meta¬
physics, for example, is in attempting to
formulate a reasonably clear notion of "sub¬
stance” or a model fruitfully portraying the
essential character of "ultimate entities"; one
that is tolerably consistent with scientifically
established knowledge of the microcosm and
macrocosm (as it is subject to ultimate verifi¬
cation through direct, intersubjectively access¬
ible perceptual experience),

Simply stated, it becomes evident that our great

certainty about particular aspects of nature is grounded in
FORMALLY ASCERTAINED RELATIONS, demonstrated to characterize
the structure of natural scientific THEORETICAL (HENCE,
•t

8

HYPOTHETICALLY POSTULATED) ENTITIES.

This means, essen¬

tially, that our concepts of the many RELATIONS existing
among entities are extremely precise, while our under¬
standing of the INTRINSIC NATURE of the ENTITIES THEMSELVES
is very vague indeed (particularly with regard to microcosmic entities);

consequently our notions of the "ultimate"

nature of reality must remain commensurately vague.
7)

Nevertheless, the omnipresent danger of making an

unwarranted materialistic INFERENCE (e.g.,

that the universe

IS ultimately constituted of homogeneous MATERIAL particles
occurring in dynamic interrelation with one'another, which
in their sps.tio-temporally persisting configurations
comprise the realm of primary and secondary qualities of
sense perception) threatens constantly (and usually succeeds)
to adversely influence our thoughts about reality.

Cf course

this view, with some of its aforementioned presuppositions,
proved remarkably fruitful for viewing the universe solely
in terms of its primary qualities; hence yielding such
concepts as mass, velocity, etc.,

that in turn were

inestimably propitious for revealing many FORMALLY SPECIFI^®kE

amongst entities.

Thus the enormous historical

success of materialism undoubtedly persists in coloring our
fundamental theories about reality.
8)

But the great history of formal and natural scientific

development seems to have importantly constrained theory
construction in the psychological sciences (to cite but one
area of the human studies); a general area that appears
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never to have escaped

(at least in modern thought) the

negative or reductionistic influence of materialistic
PRESUPPOSITIONS.

This is to say that, essentially,

the

THEORY of ultimate MATERIAL particles in motion which func—
tion in dynamic interrelation with one another (regardless
of the extent to which this view is elaborated; e.g,, in
certain contemporary physical theories) possesses a
PRESUPPOSITIONAh basis that is IN PRINCIPLE INAPPROPRIATE
for systematically investigating HUMAN CONSCIOUS PROCESSES.
a)

9)

Let us not confuse the scientific study of
CONSCIOUS processes with that of PHYSIO-CHEMICAL
processes.
It is obvious that the most sophis¬
ticated physical-biological theories available
should be consulted in investigating, for
example, the structure of cerebral mechanisms
and their various modes for energy transference,
However, the writer shall maintain, primarily
in Chapters I and II, that scientifically
studying physio-chemical cerebral processes /AND
similarly, gross MANIFEST human behavioral
phenomena as (strictly) methodologically
dictated by a Skinnerian Behavioristic psycho¬
logy/ is, IN PRINCIPLE, DIFFERENT from system¬
atically investigating the!rHSUBJECTIVELY
ACCESSIBLE CONSCIOUS CORRELATES.
Hence the view
of MIND to be propounded by this writer in the
following chapters will be fundamentally an
INTERACTION!SM, designating two EXPERIENTIALLY
distinct domains of phenomenal occurrence _
i.e., perceptually ascertained through two mutually
exclusive modes of perceptual presentation
:
one NATURAL, and the other, IDEATIONAL.

Conceived differently, the writer will argue that from

materialistic-mechanistic theories presently used for
studying physio-chemical processes, it is, in principle,
IMPOSSIBLE to logically deduce any information (whatsoever)
about their correlative mental process, IF this is attempted
from STRICTLY a physical and/or biological scientific frame
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of reference.

To persist in attempting to accomplish this

end necessarily places such investigators in the position
of committing what is typically defined as an ’unwarranted
scientific reductionism*.
10)

.

.

Furthermore, the factual perceptual deliverances

constituting our personal experience do not suggest an
EXCLUSIVELY physical, biological, or even Behavioristic
approach to studying human behavior.
a)

That is, even with our extraordinary knowledge
of natural and biological phenomena, we are
nevertheless quite IGNORANT of the ULTIMATE
character of the MICR0C0SMIC ENTITIES comprising
nature.
This is true, at least' to the extent
that the tenet ’the universe IS constituted of.
ultimate homogeneous MATERIAL particles occurring
in dynamic configurational relations with one
another, thereby collectively uniting into what
individual human beings directly experience as
reality (e.g., primary and secondary qualities
as they -portray nature, and inner bodily experi¬
ence)’ MUST AT THIS TIME REMAIN AN OPEN QUESTION.
In fact, twentieth century physical scientific
enquiry has shown materialistic presuppositions
to be of diminishing importance in yielding
fruitful investigation.

b)

Since most of our knowledge of the microcosm
•proceeds from THEORETICALLY POSTULATED CONCEPTS,
REPRESENTATIVE OF independently existing ENTITIES;
and equally important, because the validity and
reliability of"these theoretical constructs are
ultimate3.y determined from DIRECT EXTERNAL BODILY
SENSE PERCEPTION, it seems evident that we ought
to practice what has so often been preached and
thereby PLACE OPTIMUM CONFIDENCE IN OUR DIRECT
PERCEPTUAL DELIVERANCES.
Our awareness of
reality must ultimately (in principle) be under¬
stood in terms of our direct perceptions of it,
regardless of how ABSTRACTLY THEORETICAL
(i.e., regardless of how intellectually removed
our hypothetical devices become, in terms of
being subject to direct perceptual verification)
are the explanations that we offer to system¬
atically comprehend phenomenal occurrence.
It is
obvious that" the writer is ascribing an IDEATIONAL
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status to theoretical formulations, and hence,
regarding as untenable any position advocating
that theoretical constructs can '’somehow” trans¬
cend the testimonies of concrete perceptual
experience and thereby comprehend the "ultimate
structure of nature” (of course the writer*s
position is in need of considerable elaboration
to specifically demonstrate the grounds for
arriving at this conclusion; a task to be under¬
taken in forthcoming chapters).
c)

But in attributing an ideational status to
theoretical formulations, and moreover, all
symbolic thought (conceived as a causally
efficacious class of human behavioral deter¬
minants that CANNOT be EXHAUSTIVELY intersubjectively, DIRECTLY ascertained through external
scrutiny; and thereby must be regarded as an
INFERRED class of INTERVENING variables capable
of significantly influencing human behavioral
modes), the writer is NOT placing predominate
emphasis upon external bodily sense perception
(a view generally unpopular in contemporary
scientific and philosophic circles).
Specific¬
ally stated, the writer will be propounding a
theory proceeding from an "expanded" concept
of ’perceptual experience'; i.e., contrary to
placing primary emphasis upon the deliverances
of external bodily sense perception, the writer
will also accentuate the function of internal
bodily perception (consisting, generally, of
"raw" feeling, emotional feeling and ideational
feeling) to an extent that seems commensurate
with its efficacity in influencing human
behavior.
Thus concomitant emphasis will be
placed upon inner bodily perception in view of
the fact that these (classes of) percepta are
NOT available to DIRECT INTERSUBJECTIVE VERIFI¬
CATION, in contrast with external bodily sense
perception.
Moreover, the writer will maintain
that our personally accessible internal bodily
perceptions are considerably more numerous, and
hence, proportionately causally efficacious as
components of human behavior, than perception
contributed from the natural world through
external bodily sensory modes.
If we do not
devote adequate systematic attention to the
STRUCTURE SUBJECTIVELY introduced to symbolic
(i7e., predominately linguistic) behavior, then
human behavioral research will be seriously
impaired.
In ultimately verifying these bold
(at least in contemporary times) assertions,
the reader will be repeatedly required to
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ponder the content of his DIRECT
EXPERIENCE, for it is essentially”
ll°m ^liS frame of reference-that ALL conscious
thought must proceed.
—~~
11)

To render the view being introduced more forceful

/and also, clearly relevant to the primary task of this
paper, viz.,

to formulate a comprehensive concept of mind

for the behavioral sciences that is concordant with the
direct (perceptual) facts of concrete experience/, let us
briefly critically contemplate (particularly) two theories
representing the major trends in modern psychology, namely,
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism.

The writer maintains that

each view is fundamentally subject to the criticism of
effecting an ’unwarranted scientific reductionism’; that is,
of theoretically asserting that mental processes can exhaus¬
tively (for the purposes of science) be explained in terms
of their correlative physio-chemical process, or their
manifest behavior as it is directly accessible to scientific
observers via their external bodily senses.

Both theories

are based on materialistic presuppositions, and hence,
contain, ultimately,

the erroneous conception that scientific

theoretical ENTITIES - e.g., atoms, alleged to be ultimately
constituted of configurations of homogeneous MATERIAL
particles in motion — actually embody the INTRINSIC struc¬
ture of their INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING CORRELATIVE OBJECTS.
The writer argues, conversely,

that the formal and natural

sciences yield extraordinarily precise knowledge of the
(mathematically,

statistically, and geometrically ascer¬

tained) .RELATIONS among HYPOTHETICALLY. POSTULATED SCIENTIFIC

ENTITIES; and further, that this knowledge of RELATIONS
yields relatively little information about the INTRINSIC
nature of their independently existing CORRELATES that
constitute the natural world /which is to say, for example,
that we have no way of knowing at this time (due to the
inavailability of any relevant direct external bodily sense
perception) whether ’atoms’
sub-particles,

"really” consist of MATERIAL

or if ’light’

"really" travels in wave-like

trains of material particles.

Actually, in pursuing this

mode of enquiry, we easily miss the fact that hypothetical
constructs are used (by scientists) INSTRUMENTALLY, to
facilitate the establishment of more determinate FORMAL
RELATIONS among theoretically postulated ENTITIES?.

But an

adequate elaboration of the problems of ’unwarranted
scientific reductionism’,

’the ontalogical status of

theories, facts, and (hence) scientific knowledge claims’,
and other closely related problems are issues that cannot
receive adequate attention in this paper due to their
enormous complexity.
analysis,

Although, merely from our brief

it is easily seen that they are problems intimately

related to the phenomenon of mind, and it is for this reason
that they have been introduced.

Since the writer’s objec¬

tive in this paper is essentially to develop a concept of
mind for the behavioral sciences (and even more specifically,
psychology), let us restrict our criticism of Psychoanalysis
and Behaviorism to simply demonstrating (in view of what has
been said heretofore) that they, are both epiphenomenalistic

I
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theories.
a)

b)

c)

Both psychological theories can be generally
regard as epiphenomenalistlc, i.e., unwarrantedly (scientifically) reduction!stic, in that
mental events are conceived as causally ineffi¬
cacious "by-products” of correlative (underlying)
physio-chemical processes which, in fact, wholly
determine the nature of mental processes, and
hereby, overt behavior.
It is necessary to
maintain, from an epiphenomenalism, that ’ideas*
constituting human thought do NOT "move" men
or more strictly speaking, (in part) determine
their intelligent behavioral modes.
Rather, it
must be held that ALL human behavior results
rom a. functional (i.e., law-like, in natural
scientific and Behavioristic terms) interaction
between a human organism’s physio-chemical and
manifest behavioral states (at a given time) as
they interpenetratively RELATE with correlative
external environmental conditions. ■

Psychoanalysis conceptualizes human behavior as
primarily motivated by unconscious drives, the
specific.modes of which are established in
early childhood, which persist in essentially
determining resulting behavior throughout the
• lives of individuals.
The contemporary Behavioristic viewpoint of
B. P. Skinner, for example, emphasizes the
(theoretical) concept of ’conditioned reflex’
as being the fundamental human behavioral
(response) unit.
Therefore it is maintained that
the nature of human behavior can exhaustively
be explained (i.e,, in principle, manifest
behavioral response-modes are capable of beino*
predicted, from specifically determinable ante¬
cedent stimulus-condition existing in an organism’s
external environment) by regarding behavior as an
exact function of antecedent (externally located)
environmental stimulus—events and resuitantly
activated (manifest) response-events, with a
’reflex arc’ (theoretical) mechanism representing
the physiological intermediary between the
stimulus and response events.
In this way, it is
alleged, ALL causally significant variables in
producing human behavior can, in principle, be
ascertained, utilizing methods and procedures
entirely (directly) intersubjectively verifiable.

d) It might be mentioned, parenthetically, that
Client-Centered theories of psychotherapy, which
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diligently attempt to avoid epiphenomenalism
;a?7 thereby accentuate the causal efficacy of
individual consciously refleetive behavior) are
primarily deficient in that they do not define
theoretical constructs and operational procedures
in terms that a.re facilitative to rigorous
scientific enquiry.
Conversely, Behavioristic
experimental procedures are, methodologically
speaking, much more commensurate with those of
contemporary natural sciences.
Behaviorism (apart
from considering certain theoretical constructs
central to this view that can be subjected to
severe criticism) emphasizes a rigorously
specified methodological approach for studying
behavioral phenomena, derived from the exact
natural sciences; e.g., intersubjactively confirm¬
able experimental procedures, statistical
analysis of experimentally ascertained data, and
so on.
Therefore in this important sense,
Behaviorism is, methodologically, a more suitable
approach to studying human behavior than through
Psychoanalytic or Client-Centered methods.
e)

f)

g)

Both Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism ae-emphasize
the role of consciously reflective behavior as
a causally eifics.cious factor in determining
human behavioral responses.
Although this point is less evident in Psycho¬
analysis, its presuppositional basis (strictly
speaking) necessarily implies an epiphenomenalism.
inis follows because manifest verbal content is
INTERPRETED as being symbolically representative
of a real” (i.e,, underlying), unconsciously
motivated sexual drive (libido).
Libido, however,
has its source of origin in physio-chemical
processes (Freud argues), therefore, any aspect
of subjective conscious meaning is necessarily
a mere symbolic reflection of a more valid
unconscious content that ultimately has ITS
ground in atomic materialistic process.
This
latter point is readily evident since Freud was
importantly influenced by Hegelian Dialectical
Materialism.
Behaviorism commits a similar unwarranted reduc¬
tion! sm in maintaining that all causally significant variables determining human behavior (whether
occurring in an organism’s external natural
environment, the organism’s manifest behavior, or
as physiological process) can be ascertained
through the EXTERNAL BODILY SENSES of scientific
observers.
This necessarily implies that the
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only causally efficacious variables that intervene
between (directly) intersubjectively accessible
tinmlus conditions and subsequent response
behaviors are physio-chemical processes; hence
rendering inner mental states epiphenomenal
(the term ’reflex arc’ is devised to collectively
portray intervening physio-chemical states).

h)

*

i)

^ iS from a basic disagreement regarding the
theoretical adequacy of Behaviorism for
providing (in principle) a complete account of
human behavior, that the writer has been promoted
to develop an alternate theory of human behavior:
one that will supplement an ’’enlightened”
Behavioristic position.
It will be argued (in
future chapters) that human behavior can be
conceptualized (theoretically) in a mechanistic
model, though one OMITTING materialistic
presuppositions.
The writer will also attempt
to show the inadequacy of the construct, ’reflex
arc , and consequently, demonstrate that it is
Phenomenon of SYMBOLICALLY CONSCIOUS
~—that distinguishes human organisms as
importantly unique from other objects of scientific
scrutiny.
Therefore, novel theoretical constructs
are required to properly (in a non-reductionist
manner) characterize this aspect of human
behavior, and subsequently promote fruitful
systematic study.
In this effort, the writer
will endeavor, also, to show that Behavioristic
viewpoints are methodologically prohibited from
directly investigating (the FACT of) consciously
reflective behavior as causally efficacious in *
determining many human behavioral responses to
stimulation.
This results from the influence of
materialistically defined presuppositions, and
moreover, from their overly narrow verificational
criteria (that lead
to the exclusion of inner
mental phenomena as legitimate FACTUAL data)
i

Therefore, a very basic problem for a behavioral
science purporting to offer (in principle) a
complete systematic understanding of human
behavior is.that a theoretical model for inves¬
tigating this class of phenomena must be
postulated "which provides due emphasis on BOTH
the involuntary and voluntary dimensions of
behavior as they are efficacious in determining
various modes of individual and group behavior;
while in addition, adhering to the strict
methodological policies of the exact sciences.
Further, a theory is needed that is sufficiently
comprehensive to include the global, integrated

1?

nature of human behavior as it occurs in a
multiplicity of environments.
12)

In conclusion, the primary point that the writer wishes

to make is that currently renewed speculations on the nature
of mind are being seriously constrained by an excessive
adherence to the highly admirable achievements of the
natural and biological sciences.

This is to say that

theorists who endeavor to conceptualize mind, generally,
are erroneously misled in contemplating mind (ultimately)
exclusively in terms of the THEORETICALLY POSTULATED
MSISES devised for the exact sciences (e.g., atoms,
electrons, material particles, etc., with their ancillary
theoretical concepts of energy, current, waves, mass, force,
synapse, etc.).

The bare fact of the matter is that,

regardless of the great experimental utility of these
theoretical entities (with their auxilliary concepts),

THEY

ARE IN PRINCIPLE DIRECTLY UNOBSERVABLE and thereby must be
regarded as .ABSTRACT IDEAS CONSTRUCTED BY TIE MINDS OP MEN
(hence designating them as possessing,
SPEAKING, IDEATIONAL EXISTENCE).

ONTALOGICALLY

This unwarranted reduc¬

tion! Stic trend achieves its extreme form in those contem¬
porary schools of psychology and philosophy professing a,
basically, epiphenomenalistic view of mental processes.
13)

It seems that these cognitively well-habituated

(erroneous) reductionistic views can be ultimately understood
to issue from, perhaps, an unwitting acceptance of certain
presuppositions leading one to regard the ultimate ENTITIES.
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Of which the universe is often alleged to be comprised, as
being INTRINSICALLY MATERIALISTIC.
.

14}

""

*"

^ taSk’ then* insofar

——

#

systematic speculation on

the nature of mind is concerned, is to carefully examine the
characteristic features and modes of occurrence of directly
•

ascertained human perception - both external AND internal ~,
for it is in direct perception of reality that the distinc¬
tive character of mind and its relation to nature is to be
understood.

Prom this analysis, it will be seen that

concepts (i.e., theoretical constructs) NOT having directly
(intersubjectly) verifiable external natural world percepcorrelates must be attributed a purely HYPOTHETICAL
(therefore ideational) status.
15)

...

But in order, psychologically speaking,

•ideas-

to conceive

(and, more generally, MIND) as having an intrinsic¬

ally (ontalogically) different type of actuality from
natural-world objects (many of which they SYMBOLICALLY
REPRESENT),

it is necessary to formulate a notion of ideas'

AS LEGITIMATE TOTIES, and further, to show how they may
determinated (intelligently) influence the behavior of men
(thereby providing a reasonable theoretical alternative to
the absurd conclusions of epiphenomenalism).
16)

Once again, a satisfactory conceptualization of idea¬

tional ENTITIES will necessarily demand that all MATERIA!,ISTIC presuppositions be purged from our formulations,
though in a way not inconsistent with mechanistic
(i.e.,

systems demonstrating contingent RELATIONS) explana¬

tion.

It is to this task that we shall now proceed.

CHAPTER I

This discourse will be concerned with the general
p

blem of conceptualizing (theoretica.lly) human behavior

such that, in maintaining scientific definitional rigor, we
do not commit the error of adopting a behavioral model which
neglects to comprehend causally efficacious aspects of human
behavior.

It has been said that of the three major

approaches for systematically investigating human behavior
within counseling and therapeutic contests, Psychoanalytic
and Behavioristic schools are, on logical grounds,
unwarrantedly reduction!stic in their comprehension of
behavioral phenomena, and Client-Centered therapies
frequently define their theoretical constructs in terms
inappropriate for rigorous scientific investigation (this
latter criticism may also be directed at Psychoanalytic
schools, over and above the criticism of untenable reductionism).

Therefore, the fundamental problem to be

considered throughout this paper is that a new model for
scientifically comprehending human behavior must be devised
retaining the positive features of current theories
previously discussed, while on the -other hand, introducing
new constructs which will include causally important
behavioral phenomena heretofore methodologically excluded
from experimentation by both former and current theories
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because of their materialistic and/or mechanistic
presuppositional bases and hypothetical constructs.
It seems reasonable that an appropriate model should
IDEALLY, at least, be predicated upon the standards estab¬
lished by the three following criteria:
1)

the constructs comprising the model should
be logically consistent with one another

2)

the model should be sufficiently compre¬
hensive so as to include all the relevant
factors which could possibly enter into any
scientific explanation of human behavior

3)

the hypothetical constructs of the model
should be defined in terms readily amenable
to exact scientific investigation,

(Note: Kurt Godel has shown that, logically
speaking, criteria #1 and #2 are ultimately
ireconcilable with one another; however, they
are used here as postulated IDEALS towa.rd which
a developing science may aspire as it theoretically
undergoes revision,)1
With the above criteria in mind it would be absurd for any
theoretician to assume that his theoretical formulations
would be qualitatively adequate to suffice as the final word
in sucn an ambitious endeavor.

Therefore, the viewpoint

proposed in this paper is primarily meant to provoke
critical reflection in those individuals who, perhaps
unconsciously, regard their cherished theories to be, in
principle (of course), quite adequate to yield an exhaustive
explanation of all human behavioral phenomena.

Considering

the present level of development of the behavioral sciences,

1Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel*s Proof
(New York: New York University Press, 1960^
7
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it is wholly unwarranted for anyone working in these fields
to be dogmatic (i.e.,

theoretically).- This is not to

discourage the practice of carrying out a long-termed
program of research stimulated from a given theoretical
framework, but rather, researchers should be constantly
willing to intellectually entertain and critically reflect
upon presuppositions and theoretical constructs of diverse
viewpoints (including their own) in an effort to at least
suggest, if not synthesize, new modes for conceptualizing
theoretical and experimental procedures.
Further, the views to be presented in this discourse
are also intended to explicate and systematically comprehend
various extremely important dimensions of human behavior
which have been heretofore obscured by reductionistic
psychological and philosophical theories.

Specifically,

now that the influence of Logical Positivism is beginning
to wane in many disciplines of study (although one wonders
about certain schools of American and British psychology),
the highly perplexing and historically problematic nature
of “private" or directly accessible mental states are again
being seriously studied by philosophers and psychologists
(e.g.,

see Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

Vol, I, II;2 and Me t aphy sical- Found at1ons^of Modern

Herbert Feigl, Michael
ted.), Minnesota Studies in
Vol. II; Conce^tSj_Theories,
\ umneapolis: University of

Scriven, and Grover Maxwell
the Philosophy 0f Science
and The llind-Bodv Problem
Minnesota Press,
-
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Science.^

In fact, although this paper will be directly-

concerned with proposing a general theory for systematic¬
ally investigating human behavior, preponderant emphasis will
be placed upon formulating a theory for comprehending the
subjective psychological form in which mental processes
occur.

This shift in emphasis from a more strictly Behav¬

ioristic position seems justified for two reasons.

First,

Behavioristic views appear to be admirably conceptualizing
what may be termed as the manifest, intersubjectively
directly accessible form of human behavior; hence, at this
time, there seems to be little need to suggest any dramatic
methodological revisions for current practices are being
steadily refined.

Secondly, contemporary Behavioristic

efforts in the last thirty to forty years, under the influ¬
ence of Logical Positivism, were devoted to placing psycho¬
logy upon a firm scientific foundation thereby creating a
discipline capable of formulating knowledge claims based
upon evidence obtained from intersubjectively valid and
reliable procedures for verification.

In this endeavor a

methodological approach for studying behavior was intro¬
duced, admitting as its evidential grounds only those
behavioral phenomena available for direct intersubjective
confirmation.

A major problem with this procedure, as it

will be argued throughout this paper, is that there are

^Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Physical Science (2d ed. rev.; Garden City, N.Y.:
DoubleTay & Company, Inc., 1955).
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other causally efficacious human behavioral phenomena which
must necessarily be excluded from Behavioristic method¬
ologies for they are not subject to direct public confirma¬
tion,

These phenomena fall into the class of mental events.

Mental events are directly accessible only to those who
experience them.

External observers can, however, have

indirect accessibility to these states if individuals who
directly experience these mental states wish to symbolically
(usually linguistically) express their meaningful content.
But Behavioristic thinkers (e.g., B. P. Skinner) may
argue that such directly accessible mental states, while
being genuinely “real“ phenomena to be sure, are actually
epiphenomena; hence, rendering them extraneous to scientific
enquiry for they do not, in their view, possess the status
of causal behavioral determinants.^

This brings us, perhaps,,

to the central issue to be discussed in this paper;

that

mental events do, in fact, have a causal status as human
behavioral determinants, and if this can be proven, Behav¬
ioristic methodological formulations must necessarily be
regarded, on logical grounds, as overly parsimonious for
they must, in principle, exclude a certain class of causally
efficacious factual phenomena entitled mental events.
Further, it must be logically granted 'from such a proof that
while Behaviorism can yield very important contributions to

h,

.

B. F, Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York:
The Free Press, 1965T7”"pP*» 23^2~.
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the scientific endeavor of explaining human behavior,

it can

never provide a full explanation; for.its methodological
stipulation that all factual data must be directly subject
to intersubjective confirmation excludes the entire domain
of directly accessible mental events which are, in principle,
incapable of direct public ascertainment.

Therefore,

working on the assumption that the above criticism against
Behaviorism can be substantiated, the way is clear to
legitimately theorize about the logical form of "private”
mental behavior which could then be subjected to experi¬
mental verification.

This subjective psychological view¬

point is by no means a new one for its origin can be traced
to the introspective methods of

Titchner,5

and thereafter in

the Gestalt^ and Phenomenological schools of psychology.7
•

j

The view to be expressed in this paper, however, will
represent an attempt to reconcile what has been termed here
as the •objective* and ’subjective* psychological view¬
points which, in themselves, are insufficiently compre¬
hensive to effect a complete explanation of human behavior.
Perhaps enough has been said at this point to suggest,
in a very general way, the nature of certain fundamental

^E. B. Titchner, A Textbook of Psychology (New York:
Macmillan, 1910),
^Wolfgang Kdhler, Gestalt Psychology (New York:
Liverright, 1929).
?Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Phenomenology and Science
in Contemporary European Thought~'~'(New York: Noonday, 1962).
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problems to be considered in this paper.

The preceding

discussion, although seemingly straightforward at face
value, actually contains an indeterminate number of subtle
and difficult ramifications, most of which have yet to be
clearly formulated, let alone resolved.

In fact, Wilfrid

Sellars, a highly respected contemporary logician and
philosopher of science, regards the mind-body problem
(which is, at bottom,

the basic issue to be grappled with

in this paper) in the following way:
-

*i

The traditional mind-body problem is... a veritable
tangle of tangles.
At first sight but one of the
problems of philosophy, It soon turns out, as one
picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the
philosophical enterprise as a whole.
Yet if, to
the close-up view of the philosopher at work, it
soon becomes a bewildering crisscross of threads
leading in all directions, it is possible to
discern, on standing off, a number of distinguish¬
able regions which, although but vaguely defined,
provide relatively independent access to the whole.
/Although in the ensuing discussion this writer
will approach the problem in a markedly different
way from SellarsV7°
Thus in the truest sense of the word, we shall be proceeding
into deep waters; an excursion which many during the long
history of philosophical thought have taken.

Traditionally

the results of these numerous enquiries have been, at best,
highly Illuminating but yet subject to incessant criticism.
At worst, however, the whole issue of mind and body has been
periodically discredited as a pseudo-problem and hence
repressed.

This attitude has been predominant within the

^Wilfrid Sellars, MIntentionality and the Mental,"
ed. Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell, II, p. 50?.
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last thirty years, particularly in Positivistically oriented
philosophies and psychologies.

(One of the increasing

number of testimonies to the fact that the mind-body problem
is still highly problematic is that the Minnesota Center for
Philosophy of Science had quite recently published an
entire volume entitled,
Body Problem.9

Concepts,

Theories,

and the Mind-

Some of the most highly respected philo¬

sophers and scientists of our time have contributed articles
to this volume.!

Interestingly enough,

several of these men

in past years had been closely associated with the famed
Vienna circle, but have more recently found it necessary to
modify their positions,

in varying degrees,

as philosophical

positivism has become an increasingly untenable position to
maintain.

In pointing this out,

it is merely to imply that

men of great ability — men who formerly regarded the mindbody problem as a pseudo-issue —— in response to valid
criticism, now find the problem to be a genuinely
substantive onel
The reader may ask why this writer, whose interests
are grounded primarily in the areas of counseling and
therapy,

should be concerned with an issue apparently of a

purely philosophical nature.

The answer,

it seems,

is that

counseling and therapy are specifically the areas in which
the full, pragmatic implications of philosophical and
psychological theories of mind are to be applied and

^Feigl,

Scriven,

and Maxwell

(ed.),

II*

°P»

*
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critically contemplated.

Those of us who are practitioners

in these areas have an excellent opportunity to carefully
observe concrete behavioral phenomena.
explicate,

In our efforts to

and then unite relevant facts -- amid the vast

number of accessible facts — into a theoretical scheme
(presumed to explain the causal conditions underlying
various important behavioral phenomena) one has abundant
opportunities to subject theoretical formulations
which are philosophical derivations)
Therefore,

(many of

to empirical tests.

acute and sensitive practitioners are in a prime

position to intelligently generate,

and hence contribute to

the construction of theories as well as evaluate their
operational adequacy.

Further, now that the sciences of

human behavior are developed sufficiently to begin to
seriously deal in systematic behavior modification,

the

mind-body problem is certainly no longer a purely specula¬
tive or discursive matter.

It is,

conversely,

imperative

that intelligent thinkers again reflect unprejudicely upon
the innumerable difficult and illusive aspects of behavioral
phenomena; to avoid reduction!stic formulations or terms so
metaphorical that they are rendered inexpedient for scien¬
tific enquiry.

Rather we must heed the words of the great

contemporary philosopher,

Alfred North Whitehead, who has
r

said that
In order to discover some of the major categories
under which we can classify the infinitely
various components of experience, we must appeal
to evidence relating to every variety of occasion.
Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and
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experience sober, experience sleeping and
experience waking, experience drowsy and experi¬
ence wide-awake, experience self conscious and
experience self forgetful, experience intellec¬
tual and experience physical, experience
'religious and experience skeptical, experience
anxious and experience care-free, experience
anticipatory and experience retrospective,
experience happy and experience grieving,
experience dominated by emotion and experience
under self restraint, experience in light and
experience in the dark, experience normal and
experience abnormal.10
Of the many things implicit within this quotation,
the most important is that in our concrete,

one of

direct experi¬

ence of both nature and our personal bodily states,
exists,

there

if only we exercise sufficiently precise reflection,

innumerable instances of stubborn fact primordially known by
us as perceptions, delivered through the internal and
external sensory modes.
facts,

Potentially implicit within these

if relevant and penetrating reflective cognition is

brought to bear upon them,

are the possibilities for

indeterminately expanding our human mentality as it
endeavors to understand the reality of which it is a part.
But if we commit the error,

termed by Whitehead as

’misplaced concreteness’, whereby deceptively abstract
concepts are erroneously regarded as concrete matters-offact,

then the full richness of concrete reality as it is

disclosed in direct experience is largely overlooked,

hence

prompting us down the path of ultimate contradiction,

for

our reasonings lack concordance with the structure of

10Alfred North Whitehead,
Macmillan, 1933)> P* 22?.

Adventures of Ideas (New York:

J

reality.
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It is upon these concepts of ‘experienced and ‘error1,

which the reader would do well to keep in mind,

that the

remainder of our discourse will be predicated.

These are

mereiy two of the notions contained within the writings of
Whitehead that we shall have occasion to utilize; many
others will be introduced as we proceed with our analyses.
Although in the introduction to this discourse it was
maintained that there are generally three schools of
thought that predominate in the field of counseling and
therapy, viz., Psychoanalytic,
ioristic viewpoints,

Client-.Centered, and Behav¬

only the latter will be specifically

considered, while the other two views will be implicated
indirectly.

The reason for this is a practical one;

it

will be very difficult achieving coherence and continuity
amongst the arguments and conceptual developments both
referring to and suggested by merely an analysis of
Behavioristic theories -- which claim as their meritorious
attributes,

clarity, parsimony and scientific propitiation _,

let alone introducing the great complexities and obscurities
of Psychoanalytic.and Client-Centered theories,

critically

contemplated from the point of view of exact science.
Therefore let us begin with a critical analysis of the
influential Behavioristic thinker,

B.

F.

Skinner.

Initially

in this task it is imperative to become clear on the
essential relevant elements of Skinner’s methodological
approach to studying human behavior;

a methodology which he

does not regard as being theoretical

(a point that we shall
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have occasion to criticize).1

The writer* s criticisms of

Skinner’s views will be delivered in two stages;
in this chapter,

the first

and the second in chapter five.

reason for doing this is twofold.

The

In the first case,

our

critical analysis will provide the basis for developing
what has been entitled a subjective psychological way of
comprehending human behavior theoretically.

In the latter

stage the criticism to be made will be largely predicated
upon the general theory being propounded.

Hence,

it would

be impractical to expect the reader to understand or
comprehend the full impact of the criticism without a know¬
ledge of the frame of reference from which the criticism
issues.

Further,

a major reason for critically analyzing

Skinner’s views — as is similarly the case with respect to
our future analysis of certain concepts Intrinsic to the
philosophy of John Dewey -- is that both of these men
suggest in their writings an importantly large number of
the fundamental constructs to be incorporated into the
writer’s theoretical position.

It would,

however,

simply

be too difficult and overly confusing to indicate in detail
all of the specific areas of commonality and differences
among the systems to be critically contemplated,

therefore,

4

the responsibility for making these discriminations will
largely remain with the-readers.
Now let us consider the "methodological" position of
Professor Skinner’s Behaviorism (which is not exactly
equivalent to various recent modified versions defined as
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Logical Behaviorism,
extreme),

a general view purported to be less

a view regarded by this writer as an adequately

representative version of the divergent schools of Behav¬
iorism.

This is to say that the writers criticisms will be

directed at those areas which differing forms of Behaviorism
share in common.

In stating Professor Skinner1s position,

only those portions that are of immediate relevance to our
purposes in this paper will be presented.

These purposes,

known only at this point as a criticism of Behaviorism with
the resultant development of a subjective psychological
theory of human behavior following largely from the theo¬
retical shortcomings of the former system, will become
increasingly more lucid as our discussion unfolds.
Skinner maintains that human behavior can be,
principle,

COMPLETELY ’described1

in

(to use his terminology,

for he would not use the term ’explain’) in terms of DIRECT,
publicly observable

(hence,

operationally specifiable)

»

stimulus and response functional relationships.-*--1according to Skinner,
genuinely objective,
established.

It is,

in this alleged possibility that a
exact science of human behavior can be

This is the basic presupposition upon which all

other postulates are predicated.

A further consideration is

that all human behavior occurs from an interpenetrative
relationship between organism and environment.
specifically,

Skinner,

More

this means that behavior can be completely

Science and Human. . , ,

on.cit. , p. 11.
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comprehended in terms of a functional interaction between
specified environmental conditions at a given point in time
as they determine,

through providing reinforcement,

the

behavior of an organism whose response capacities at that
time are limited to the previously conditioned repertoire
of behavioral

(reflex!vely activated) predispositions

developed in the organism as a result of its antecedent
.

/

experiential interaction with corresponding environments.
Organismic predispositional capacities,
from learned behaviors,
inheritance.

conceived separately

are ultimately governed by genetic

Thus a practical derivation from the former

"methodological” principles with respect to actually
experimentally verifying basic postulations is that
both behavior and environment may be broken into
parts which may be referred to by name and that
these parts will retain their identity from
experiment to experiment.
If this assumption
were not in some sense justified, a science of
human behavior would be impossible. ^
\

Now let us look a bit more closely at the concepts of
■stimulus* and ^response* and focus upon some of the necessary
implications of them.

Stimulus and response are .regarded as

EVENTS and not properties of given objects.
first,

response-events,

Considering

Skinner holds that

given a particular part of the behavior of an
organism... the investigator seeks out ante¬
cedent /environmental? changes with which the
activity is correlated and establishes the

■^B. F. Skinner, Cumulative Record (New York:
Appleton-Crofts-Century,. 1959)7 p"* 3^7-
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conditions of the correlation.
This is the
reflex nature of the behavior.-^-3
A reflex is an observed correlation of a
stimulus and a response.
Once given a specific
stimulus-response correlation, we may, of course,
investigate the psychological facts of its
mediation.
The information there revealed will
supplement our definition, but it will not
affect the status of the reflex as a correlation.-^
Thus by reflex,

Skinner is positing a theoretical category

of behavioral activity which is assumed to underlie inves¬
tigators' bare observations.

The observation of a correla¬

tion between two spatially discreet activities has led to
the inference of a series of intervening events which
establish a causal connection between the directly observed
stimulus and response events.

The construct defined as

reflex arc represents these unobserved, hence hypothetically postulated series of events.

This leads to a distinc¬

tion between reflex physiology and a psychological science
of human behavior whose differences are seen primarily in the
immediate purposes of each discipline.

For example,

reflex

physiology seeks description of reflex in terms of physiochemical events

(therefore the term synapse is used instead

of reflex arc),

and a behavioral science seeks to describe

and explain behavior in terms of the reflex.

Nov: we might

raise the questions of what is involved in the process of
describing behavior,

13lbid., p.

330.

l4Xbid., p.

331.

and how does the hypothetical construct,
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reflex arc,

function in Behavioristic psychology?

The term ’behavior* must include.the total publicly
manifest activity of an organism at a given time;

the func¬

tioning of all the behavioral components in their inter¬
relationships with one another.

Behaviorists are primarily

interested in the movement of an organism within a strictly
controlled experimental situation. ' This,

of course,

ultimately includes any INFERRED internal changes which have
an observable and a causally significant effect upon what is
generally regarded as publicly observable, microscopic
behavior.

Therefore the task of a behavioral science is to

describe events not only in their isolated particularity,
but also in their relationship with other events.

It is in

this that a science can achieve substantially valid and
reliable "expiatory and predictive power."
Contemporary science maintains a more humble
position with regard to explanation and causation.
Explanation is reduced to description, and the
notion of function is substituted for causation.
Therefore, a full description of an event is
regarded to provide a description of its func¬
tional relationship with antecedent events.
In the description of behavior we are interested
in the relationship within a regressive series
(observed response) to those energy changes at
the periphery which we designate as stimuli.
The two end events, the behavior and the stimulus,
have a particular importance because they alone
are directly observable in an intact organism, and
because they limit the series /they provide the
"cut-off points" for an event so that it can be
called a particular event7.
With the relation¬
ship of these two end terms the description of
behavior Is chiefly concerned.15

15Ibid.,.p.

338.
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Skinner then effectively incorporates the concept of
reflex arc when he states
The reflex is important in the description of
behavior because it is by definition a state¬
ment of the necessity of this relationship.
The demonstration of the necessity is ultimately
a matter of observation; a given response is
observed invariably to follow a given stimulus.
The more general statement, the hypothesis
1 the behavior of an organism is an exact function
of the forces acting upon the organism* states
the correlation of a stimulus and a response.
It is, in this sense, the broadest possible state¬
ment of a reflex, but it is not an observed
correlation and is therefore a hypothesis only.
In the next statement,

Skinner justifiably tempers the

immediately preceding postulation as a result of the
pragmatic limitations of actual experimental, situations when
he says
It is, nevertheless, solely the fault of our
method, that we cannot deal directly with this
single correlation between behavior as a whole
and all the forces acting upon an organism
stated in the hypothesis.
Quantitative state¬
ments of both stimulus and response and a
statistical demonstration of the correlation
are theoretically possible but would be wholly
unmanageable.
We are led, for lack of a better
approach, to investigate the correlation of
parts of the stimulus with parts of the response.
For the sake of greater facility of description,
we turn to analysis.
%

This last quotation is an excellent statement of
Professor Skinner’s position with respect to the problem of
privately

(directly) accessible mental events which he

regards as the middle, but causally inefficacious

16rbid., p. 338.
17Ibid., p. 339.
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(epiphenomenalistic) link (at least as the process is
interpreted by Skinner) which intervenes between stimulus
and response.

It is precisely at this point that much of

the criticism of the writer will be focused, both with
reference to Skinner and to a lesser extent with Dewey.
The objection to inner states is not that they do
not exist, but that they are not relevant in a
functional analysis.
We cannot account for the
behavior of any system while staying wholly
Inside it; eventually we must turn to forces
operating upon the organism from without.
Unless
there is a weak point in our causal chain so that
the second link Is not lawfully determined by the
first, or that the third by the second, then the
first and the third links must be lawfully related.
If we must always go back beyond the second link
for prediction and control, we may avoid many
tiresome and exhausting digressions by examining
the third link as a function of the first.
Valid
information about the second link may throw light
upon this relationship but it can in no way alter it.1®
It seems that these quotations contain the essential
elements of Professor Skinner* s position, at least with
respect to those basic principles upon which his more
comprehensive theory of human behavior rests.

Again,

this

exposition of his view is by no means intended to be
exhaustive;

rather only that portion has been stated which

is of particular relevance for the purposes of this discourse.
We shall now temporarily leave our analysis of Skinner's
Behaviorism and turn to the views of John Dewey; views that
are in certain respects markedly similar to B.

F.

Skinner's.

Dewey, a man who possessed great faith in the powers
of science as it enhances the well-being of mankind, wrote

18 Skinner, Science and Human..., oo. cit.., p. 35.
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at a time when various introspectionistic psychologies were
still influential,

thus in many of his writings there are

numerous explicitly and implicitly stated crtiicisms of such
obscurantistic schools of psychology and philosophy.
ever,

Ho;*i-

the reader is encouraged to take careful notice in the

following quotations of the serious confounding of "physicalistic" and "mentalistic” terminology which pervades many of
the relevant excerpts from his writings that we shall
consider.

This is odd, for Dewey’s philosophical position

is most assuredly intended to be essentially '•Behavior¬
istic”,

for one of his primary philosophical missions was

to emphasize the importance of hypothetical-deductive
thinking behavior.

It is not the intention of this writer

to denigrate the many valuable philosophical contributions
of Dewey;

on the contrary,

his analysis of thought processes,

contemplated as an action-oriented instrumental class of
behavior (a class which,

he felt,

could be adequately

analyzed in publicly verifiable terms) which if properly
disciplined could yield progressively increased intelligent
behavioral action (thereby leading to commensurately better
individual life adjustment) was a profound contribution to
the on-going study of human behavior.

In systematically

/

articulating this intricate process,

Skinner is very careful

to purge his works of mentalistic terminology.

This is not

the case with Dewey; therefore, many of his writings are
marred as a result of this ambiguity.
enough as we shall see,

However,

strangely

it is precisely due to this

persistent undercurrent of terminological confounding that
Dewey becomes a highly appropriate transitional figure
from strict Skinnerian Behaviorism to the theory which will
be proposed by this writer.

Dewey, while having strong

.

-

I

scientific sentiments, was equally as concerned with
explicating the full implications of personal human experi¬
ence,

and therefore was not overly reductionistic in his

characterization of man.

Reduction!sm as used here simply

means that Dewey was not preoccupied with explaining human
behavioral phenomena in strictly physio-chemical,
wise naively mechanistic terms.

As we proceed,

or other¬

then,

it

will be seen that many concepts in the theory to be proposed
in this paper are very much IMPLICIT in the writings of Dewey
although it is unlikely that he would have ever strictly
subscribed to them as they will be formulated.

A case in

point seems to be in evidence with respect to the mutual
admiration that Whitehead and Dewey, had for one another.
Many philosophers

(particularly Positivistic thinkers) have

been appalled by the strong metaphysical sentiments of
/

Whitenead, while on the other' hand regarding Dewey as
frequently compatible with rigidly empiric!stic views.
However, upon closer scrutiny,

there are numerous similari¬

ties (and of course important presuppositional differences)
between Whitehead’s Subjective Realism and Dewey’s
Instrumentalism.

It would take us far afield at this time

to explicate these similarities and differences, but the
reason for making reference to the issue at all is that the
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position to be proposed by the writer is closely related
to that of both Dewey and Whitehead.
Now we shall commence in analyzing some relevant views
maintained by Dewey.

Dewey's position with reference to

thinking-benavior is that cognition is a dynamic func¬
tional process,
behavior,

inextricably a part of total organismic

thus meaning that it cannot be a distinct consid¬

eration apart from "physical” behavior.

To separate

thinking from "physical" behavior is to necessarily commit
an indefensible mind-body dualism.

Therefore,

since

behavior is an interpenetrative process where organism acts
upon environment and then experiences the reciprocal
environmental effects of premeditated action,
certain class of operationally utilitarian,

and since a

reflectively

disciplined behavior is what Dewey conceives as intelligent
behavior facilitative to growth,
all human behavioral phenomena,
variable,

it can be concluded that
although qualitatively

can be systematically comprehended in functional

relationships involving organisms and their environment
whereby the organism must effectively adjust to their
environment or modify their environment to organismic needs
in order for the species to survive and prosper.

Skinner

would,

it seems,

agree wholeheartedly with this general

view.

The important differences between the two thinkers

occurs in their ultimate purposes and methods by which they
theoretically specify functional relationships.
simply,

Stated

it appears evident that any significant differences

40

with respect to conceptualizing thinking-behavior are due
to the fact that Skinner is a behavioral scientist and
Dewey is a philosopher,

therefore it is obvious that their

modes of theoretical expression will differ according to
their discipline.
In one place Dewey defines thinking as
the intentional endeavor to discover specific
connections between something which we" do and
the consequences which result, so that the two
become continuous.
Their isolation, and
consequently their purely arbitrary going
together, is cancelled; a unified developing
situation takes its place.19
Even the most casual of readers would conclude that this
definition contains many fruitful implications.

Obviously

the definition is antithetical to the notion of merely
random behavior.

Dewey’s definition of thinking —

intelligent thinking in this case — is a statement about
uniquely human behavior in that notions such as ’consciously
intentional’

and ’reflectively conscious* behaviors are

implicit, but moreover,
behavioral mode;
modes.

it is a specification of a particular

one quite distinct from other possible

Let us investigate HOW this proposed form of

intelligent behavior intrinsically differs from other
possible types such as sheer random behavior, -or those
which could be explained in mechanistic terms.

Dewey

defines habitual behavior as follows:

John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York:
Macmillan, 1916) ,‘^p7T43-lir^

4l

^a^^4means
an individual undergoes a
modification through an experience, which
modification forms a predisposition to easier
and more effective action in a like direction
in the future.
Thus, it also has the function
of making one experience available in subsequent
experiences.
Within certain limits, it performs
this function successfully.
But habit, apart
from knowledge, does not make allowance for
change of conditions, for novelty.
Provision
for change is not part of its scope, for habit
assumes the essential likeness of the new
situation with the old.20
Therefore, for Dewey, habitual behavior occurs (to use
Skinner’s terms) where the organism has discriminated among
only a narrow class of stimuli and as a result it can only
evoke a correspondingly narrow group of responses.

The

organism cannot adequately respond to novel stimuli; thus
established habituation will persist until a new class of
behavioral operants become effectively habituated through
proper reinforcement, and are thereby integrated into the
organism's behavioral repertoire.

This, of course, entails

that appropriate corresponding schedules of reinforcement be
maintained to firmly establish given operant behavior.

In

any case, for Dewey, the class of behaviors termed negative
habituations means that human beings cannot readily break
out of their established behavioral routines as they
necessarily occur as a function certain corresponding
stimuli, therefore, implying that individuals cannot
(generally) adequately spontaneously cope with novel
problematic circumstances.

20 IMd., pp.

339-340.

To grow beyond this constraining
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situation, Dewey proposes that greater knowledge is required
for effective problem solving.

Here knowledge has a highly

determinate meaning,
•

T

While the content of knowledge is what HAS
happened, what is taken as finished and hence
settled and sure, the REFERENCE of knowledge is
future or prospective.
For knowledge furnishes
the means of understanding or giving meaning to
what is still going on and is to be done.21
/

Thus knowledge is what is generally agreed upon as scien¬
tifically ascertained fact at a given period of time.
However, because of the incessantly changing nature of
reality and the acquisition of increased knowledge, previ¬
ously established facts must also undergo commensurate
revision, for otherwise a resultant lag in knowledge would
occur,

thus impairing future progress.

An effective way to

achieve this constant revision of factual information is to
intelligently utilize previously established facts as a
FRAME OF REFERENCE; hence as INSTRUMENTS for both suggesting
and conducting scientific investigations.

But this raises

a problem: is Dewey merely advocating that in order to
transcend habitual patterns of behavior, one has only to
provide a given individual with a greater quantity of facts?
Certainly not; and this brings us to the crucial dimension
of this problem, namely, the factor of reflective thinking
which is the essence of Dewey’s well known five-stage
characterization of the LOGICAL form of intelligent

21IMd., p.

341.

43

thinking-behavior.
While all thinking results in knowledge,
ultimately the value of knowledge is
subordinate to its use in thinking,22
This quotation contains the fundamental maxim of Instru¬
mentalism:

thinking for its own sake is of limited value,

but thinking as a KEANS to promote more thinking is the
basis of a utilitarian attitude toward life whereby human
organisms can make more effective reconciliations between
environmental demands and organic needs,

Reflective thinking

is our most potent means of realizing the Instrumentalist’s
ideal,

for when intelligently engaging in contemplating the

nature of an unfamiliar event,

*

for example,

We respond to its CONNECTIONS /with other facts
that are already known7 and not simply to the
immediate occurrence.
Thus, our attitude to it
is much freer.
We may approach it, so to speak,
from any one of the angles provided by its
connections.
We can bring into play, as we deem
wise, any one of the connections.
Thus we get
at a new event indirectly instead of immediately —
by invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness.
An
ideally perfect knowledge would represent such
a network of interconnections that any past
experience would offer a point of advantage from
which to get at the problem presented in a new
experience.
In fine, while a habit anart from
knowledge supplies us with a single fixed method
of attack, knowledge means that selection may
be made from a much wider range of habits.* 23

Reflective behavior,

then,

involves a disciplined,

habitual

(but here habit has acquired a positive meaning) attitude
and method of coping with problematic, novel situations.

22Ibid., p. 151.
23ibia., p. 340.
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Initially we comprehend a problem in terms of its particular
dimensions about which we have already some factual famili¬
arity.

Stated differently, we understand a given problem¬

atic occasion in terms of what our past knowledge has
predisposed us to comprehend in the present occasion.

Then

by means of reflection more numerous cognitive associations
are made until we have established a program for further
analysis guided by tentatively formulated hypotheses,
subject to revision as further factual information is
experimentally obtained.

Frequently during this reflective

stage, overt, action-orientated behavior is postponed until
an intelligently determined program for analysis can be
formulated.

Another very important factor which Dewey

stresses is that when we confront a problem we are not
compelled to merely contemplate those data immediately
manifested by problem; rather, over and above the
"immediately given” there is a backlogue of relevant wisdom
that has been gradually learned and incorporated as positive
behavioral habits acquired through having intelligently
reflected upon a multitude of past experience.

Therefore,

much of this previously learned information can be fruit¬
fully brought to bear upon currently available data to
enhance their meaning by suggesting novel modes for analyt¬
ical enquiry.

This is an extremely important issue and we

shall have occasion to contemplate its many implications in
greater depth as the discussion proceeds.

This cursory

account of Dewey’s concept of intelligent thinking-behavior

/
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provides the basis for our next step in which this same
topic is conceived by Dewey from a somewhat different
perspective.

He presents an analysis in terms that may more

appropriately be regarded as mentalistic as opposed to
'Behavioristic or even philosophically rigorous terms.
Dewey, in emphasizing this slight shift in analytical
perspective enables us to, in a sense, more clearly under¬
stand his conception of consciousness; a notion, it will be
argued, which is unclear.
Here Dewey is again discussing the nature of intelligent problem-solving behavior.

•

Action with a purpose is deliberate; it involves
a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing
of considerations pro and con.
It also involves
a conscious state of longing or desire for the
end.
The deliberate choice of an aim and of a
settled disposition of.the desire takes time.
During this time complete overt action is
suspended.
A person who does not have his mind
suspended does not know what to do.
Consequently
he postpones definite action so far as possible....
During the time in which a single overt line of
action is in suspense, his activities are confined
to such redistributions of energy within the
organism as vrill prepare a determinate course of
action....
All this means an accentuation of
consciousness; it means a turning in upon the
individual’s own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc.^4
Obviously, however, this surging up of personal
factors into conscious recognition is a part of
the whole activity in its temporal development.
There is not first a purely psychical process,
followed abruptly by a radically different
physical one.
There is one continuous behavior,
proceeding from a more uncertain, divided,
hesitating state to a more overt, determinate,
or complete state.
The activity at first consists
mainly of certain tensions and adjustments within

24 Ibid., p. 34?.
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the organism; as these are coord.ina.ted into a
unified attitude, the organism as a whole acts —
some definite act is undertaken. . We may distin¬
guish, of course, the more explicitly conscious
phase of the continuous activity as mental or
psychical.
But that only Identified the mental
or psychical to mean the indeterminate, forma¬
tive state of an activity which in its fullness
involves putting forth of overt energy to modify
the environment.
Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes,
.adversions are important because they represent
inchoate, nascent activities.
They fulfill their
destiny in issuing, later on, into specific and
perceptible acts.
And these inchoate, budding
organic readjustments are important because they
are our sole escape from the dominion of routine
habits and blind impulse.
They are activities
having a NEW meaning in process of development.
Hence, normally there is an accentuation of
personal consciousness whenever our instincts and
ready formed habits find themselves blocked by
novel conditions.
Then we are thrown back upon
ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before
proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course
of actions.
Unless we drive our way through by
sheer brute force, we must modify our organic
resources to adapt them to the specific features
of the situation in which we find ourselves.
The
conscious deliberating and desiring which precede
overt actions are then methods of personal read¬
justment implied in activity in uncertain
situations.26
I have quoted Dewey at length here for these statements are
a powerfully imaginative,

succinctly comprehensive express¬

ion of his conception of holistic organismic behavior;'an
integral part of which is thinking-behavior.

Conversely,

it is maintained by this writer that there is in these
quotations what appears to be a clear indication of the
e^ror (an error which is only IMPLICIT in the passages

2^Ibid., pp.

347-348.

26Ibia., p. 348.

quoted in this paper,-but EXPLICITLY stated in other
writings, i.e,,^?) that Dewey has made with regard to his
view that thinking-behavior can be ENTIRELY explained in
terms of scientific functional /NOTE: here it seems that the
term

functional* must possess a meaning similar to that of

Skinner s whereoy explanations for understanding given
observed behavioral phenomena are provided by specifying
those antecedent observable environmental conditions which
(statistically) correlate significantly with resultant
observed behaviors (hereafter referred to as a physical!
form of explanation).

This issue is discussed in greater

detail by Herbert Feigl28 and Ernest Nagel.2f7 relation¬
ships, for as this writer will argue, privately accessible
phenomena cannot be accounted for in this analytical or
objectively psychological framework /NOTE: Another important
distinction to be made at this point is that there are at
(

1

least two classes of phenomena of which human organisms can
become aware through direct acquaintance.

First,

there is

our experience of the natural world (that region expressed
through the external bodily senses) that is sensed through direct acquaintance.

Perceptions occurring as this category

of awareness will be hereafter defined as natural event-

^Zjohn Dewey, Experience and Nature (2d ed. rev.;
LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1929 V.
28
>,
Herbert Feigl, f,The * Mental * and the * Physical *, "
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp. 377-396.
^Ernest pagep5 The structure of Science (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 398-446.
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components.

These components are also directly accessible

by other human organisms and therefore- qualify as intersubjectively verifiable event-components.

But secondly,

there is also another category of event-components not
experienced via the external bodily sense,
direct experiential access to them.

and yet we have

These will hereafter be

defined as internal bodily event-components.

The unique

quality of these event-components is that they are directly
accessible ONLY to the individual human organism who experi¬
ences them;

hence,

in principle,

rendering them inappro¬

priate for direct intersubjective verification.

They can,

however, be made partially intersubjectively verifiable via
the possible modes of overt symbolic expression, but
internal bodily event-components are nevertheless only
INDIRECTLY accessible to other human organisms.3£7

A further

crucial distinction should be made at this time, viz.,
between the objective and subjective psychological forms in
which behavior can be systematically (scientific) compre¬
hended.

Briefly stated, the objective psychological form

for explaining human behavior is that crudely articulated as
Skinnerian Behaviorism,

for example.

The subjective psycho¬

logical form systematically deals with the intrinsic nature
of private events and their coherent and continuous relations
with one another as they occur in individual human organisms.
This formal characterization of human behavior will be

ed.

Herbert Feigl, "The ’Mental* and the * Physical*,n
Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp, 370-497.
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presented in moderately elaborate theoretical detail in
'Chapter Three" of this paper.

Therefore the view main¬

tained by this writer will be that BOTH psychological modes
of conceptualization are necessary for a complete (in
principle) explanation of human behavior, and further, that
the "content" embodying the subjective psychological form
must be presupposed a priori in order to have ANY kind of
scientiiic, interpersonal, or intrapersonal discourse at
all!).

In the previous quotation, upon which much of my

immediately ensuing argumentation will be based, Dewey
talks AS THOUGH all of that which he has stated could be
fully translated into observable, scientific (objective
psychological) terms.

Perhaps, he would have even argued

that a science of human behavior,

such as Skinner's,

enact this methodological explication.

could

In any case —

after several additional clarificational quotations from
Dewey in which he shifts his explanatory perspective even a
bit more to a mechanistic analysis of intelligent behavior _
we will soon proceed to develop an argument which, hope¬
fully, will reveal what appears to be a LIMITATION, NOT
NECESSARILY AN ERROR In the positions of Dewey and Skinner.
But first, let us attempt to become a bit more clear on the
organic mechanisms that underlie consciously directed
intelligent behavior (a characterization that, it seems,
Dewey would have deemed consistent with his system).
But in fact the nervous system is only a
specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily
activities working together.
Instead of being
isolated from them, as an organ of knowing from

50

organs of motor response, it is the organ by
which they interact responsively with one
another*
The brain is essentially an organ for
effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each
other of the stimuli received from the environ¬
ment ^ and responses directed upon it.
Note that
the judging is reciprocal.; the brain not only
enables organic activity to be brought to bear
upon any object of the environment in response
to a sensory stimulation, but this response also
determines what the next stimulus will be.31
... the brain is the machinery for a constant
reorganization of activity so as to maintain its
continuity; that is to say, to make such modifi¬
cations in future action as are required because
of what has already been done.32
What makes it /any given purposive activity/
continuous, consecutive, or concentrated is that
each earlier act prepares the way for later acts,
while these take account of or reckon with the
results already attained — the basis of all
responsibility.
No one who has realized the
full force of the facts of the connection of
knowing with the nervous system and of the
nervous system with the readjusting of activity
continuously to meet new conditions, will doubt
that knowing has to do with reorganizing activity,
instead of being something isolated, from old
activity, complete on its own account.33
The development of biology clinches this lesson,
with its discovery of evolution.
For the
philosophic significance of the doctrine of
evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon
continuity of simpler and more complex organic
forms until we reach man.
The development of
organic forms begins with stimulus where the
adjustment of environment and organism is obvious,
and where anything which can be called mind is at
a minimum.
As activity becomes more complex,
coordinating a greater number of factors in space
and time, intelligence plays a more and more

31Dewey,

Democracy and...,

32IM£*> p.

337.

33 Ibid., p.

337.

op.

cit., p.

336.
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f .
ro1?’ for lt: has a larger span of the
llfg® to forecast and plan for.
The effect upon
the theory of knowing is to displace the notion
unau it is an activity of a mere onlooker or
°f the world, the notion which goes
.i
Jrea of knowi^S as something complete in
i~Se*, f0?, the doctrine of organic development
means that the living creature is part of the
world, sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes, and
making itself secure in its precarious dependence
??™y as it intellectually identifies itself with
the things about it, and forecasting the future
. consequences of what is going on, shares its own
activities accordingly.
If the living, experi¬
encing being is an intimate participant in the
activities of the world to which it belongs, then
knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in
the degree^in which it is effective; it cannot be
the idle view of an unconcerned spectator.3^
Again,

Dewey presents us with a highly perspicacious

analysis of organic processes as they have relevance for
intelligent oehavior,

an adjustive,

interpenetrative process

occurring between organisms and their environments.
important,

Equally

is the fact that human organisms reflect the most

highly sophisticated manifestations of what Whitehead would
characterize as,

concrescent synthesis of organic func¬

tional mechanisms (a construct with which we shall become
quite familiar during the course of our future discussions).
These preceding quotations contain the implicit assumption
that all human behavior can be fully explained in terms of
scientific functional analysis (or physical^ terms).
tenet,

as we have seen,

writings of Skinner.
Dewey*s writings,

34rbid., pp.

This

is explicitly proposed in the

There is the further complication in

as it has been suggested,

337-338.

•

that he utilizes
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many mental!stic terms

terms thnt
v ,
terms that refer to behavioral

states which could never he scientifically verified through
direct observation - to explain his (and this criticism
applies to Skinner as well)

-wholly objective- scientific

theory for analyzing human thinking-behavior;
e.g.,

’consciousness’,

’wishes’,

’conscious deliberation’,

factors surging into conscious recognition’,

'mental

weighing’, etc,, etc.
Let us now proceed with a criticism of Skinner's
"pure" Behaviorism and Dewey's "alleged" Behaviorism,
endeavoring to reveal some of the philosophical difficulties
of these "methodological" viewpoints - particularly with
respect to Skinner - for building a theoretically conceiv¬
ably complete,

exact science of human behavior.

question is raised. Is it possible,

The

in principle, to give

a full explanation (or 'description', as Skinner would say)
of human behavior without referring to subjective psycho¬
logical event-components as being, at least in some sense,
causally efficacious in producing publicly manifest behav¬
ioral responses to antecedent environmental stimuli?

For

example, at this moment the writer is manifesting relatively
neutral overt behavior.

By this it is meant that if a group

of Behaviorists were observing, and hence, describing the
writer's behavior they would make such determinations as:
'eye lids are blinking',
verbally mute',
nnd so on.

'chest is heaving',

'subject is

'subject is sitting quietly in a chair',

From their direct observational perspective they
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could not DIRECTLY take cognizance of'the FACT that subjec¬
tive psychological, causally efficacious THINKING behavior
of a highly complex nature was occurring within the organism
positioned before their eyes.

Granted, they could make

educated INFERENCES about the nature of what was being
silently (privately) thought by directly observing the
numerous books on philosophy and psychology that lay upon
the desk near the writer, but nevertheless, this procedure
could yield little information about the specific thoughts
occurring within the head of the writer to which he has
DIRECT accessibility.

Furthermore, INFERENTIAL statements

about matters of privately accessible factual occurrence are
poor alternatives for facts that can be indirectly ascer¬
tained merely by asking the subject in question to
symbolically report (most commonly through language, for
example) on the nature of his inner or private states.
But of course it must be realized that in this line of
discussion we are criticizing the position of an outdated
extreme form of Behaviorism (namely that of Watson); one
that was entirely interested in "describing" the empirically
determined relationships, between stimulus and response
events, not in offering causal explanations of these
relations.

Now, of course, there are more tempered posi¬

tions (Skinner, Hull, etc.) which admit such behavioral
phenomena as verbal reports, but strictly deny that these
reports REFER TO corresponding trains of inner, privately
accessible events (a parallelism).

The writer is in full
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agreement with the negation of parallelism stated as such
simply because of the fact, for example, that when one is
talking aloud before a group of people, one is assuredly
not thinking concomitantly of an inner train of corres¬
ponding private events; rather, as the "liberal" Ifehaviorists maintain, the overt verbal reports, the gestural move¬
ments, the eyes blinking, etc. DO IN FACT comprise the total
behavioral occurrence — thinking included.

But this

situation is not at all analogous to the one formerly
mentioned where the subject in question was publicly
demonstrating neutral behavior, however in addition, was
also experiencing a class of behavior -- one of utmost
importance — which was in principle directly INACCESSIBLE
to the Behavioristically predisposed onlookers.

It is this

very frequently occurring and uniquely human phenomenon which
\

must be carefully scrutinized for it is out of this type of
behavior that such creative enterprises as writing poetry,
building bridges, planning and executing bank robberies,
etc., issue.

It seems as though these products of human

intelligence are something more than the fruits of
MECHANISTICALLY "BLIND" /that is, Behaviorists cannot
/
%

LOGICALLY use non-mechani s'tic terms like * mental weighing*,
’deliberating*, etc., for any phenomena which might have to
be considered as, in ANY way, referring to conscious or
Reflectively conscious states would therefore have to be
Regarded as mental phenomena, and thereby necessarily
considered as causal factors intervening between publicly
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accessible stimulus conditions and response behaviors.
But since such causal factors are not perceptually access¬
ible for DIRECT intersubjective scrutiny, their admittance
into scientific explanation would mean that a Behavioristic
methodological maxim would be violated, viz., that ALL
publicly verifiable behavioral responses are, in principle,
an EXACT function of immediately antecedent environmental
conditions AND previously learned behavioral (reflexive)
predispositions whose stimulus conditions are also, in
principle, capable of direct intersubjective confirmationT'
sequences conditioned reflexes in which mental events have
210

significant causal role.

It is for this reason that we

should spend time in carefully analyzing a ‘'methodological“
viewpoint whose logical consequences necessitate that the
reflex arc1 construct be substituted for what has been
traditionally regarded as a causally efficacious mind —
logically speaking, a very nebulous and difficult-to-define
phenomenon to be sure.

Therefore it would seem only reason¬

able to reconsider the logical grounds upon which it is
alleged that mind can be “short-circuited" from behavioral
scientific explanations, before the conclusions of such a
questionable view are uncritically accepted.
In a former illustration, this writer has posited a
situation in which his behavior was being scrutinized by a
group of Behavioristic psychologists.

Further,

it was said

the observers could make intersubjectively valid and reliable
BIRECT determinations about their subject‘s behavior
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(defined as ’neutral’) from their observational or objective
viewpoints.

But the difficulty in this analysis was that

the subject had been silently (privately) engaging in
complex thinking-behavior, the precise nature of which was
in no way publicly determinable.

Now private thinking of

this sort IS undeniably a distinctive form of human behavior,
and over and above this "stubborn fact" there is also the
fact that the subject in question WAS determining the mode of
his thinking.

He was causing (in the sense of imposing an

individually determined direction) the nature of his
thought to be what it was, and it was not the result of any
stimulus factors that could have been specified as existing
within the immediately antecedent environment.

This illus¬

tration accentuates the central problem to be faced by a
psychological viewpoint which purports to be able, in
principle,

to COMPLETELY explain,

in intersubjectively

verifiable language and procedure, human behavior as an
EXACT function of operationally defined antecedent environ¬
mental (stimulus) conditions as they are significantly
correlated with given behavioral responses.

As we shall see,

it does not increase the tenability of a Behaviorism to
admit verbal reports as an additional source of publicly
verifiable data, for the central LOGICAL CONFUSION to be
reconciled does not involve this issue!
Professor Skinner’s argument for a Behaviorism can be
stated as follows:
1)

For example, if one wants to "explain" why
a man is suffering from anxiety — if we
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iTLtl Set aVhe
SLS

still

"cause” of the anxiety -

t0 seek out "causesM in

2)
fre t0 be found in immediately
are mhi^ienVlr0nfntal conditions (that
are publicly ascertainable 'anxious'
mental°statesfeStat^°nS> and not in inner
3)

ds a directly observable behavioral
phenomenon; the inner state of anxiety is
?nfP^flCtly °bservable> therefore is an
tnfa p u eTenb; one that is of little value
to a Behaviorism.

4)

if
inner state is inferential and
H,
cause
of the anxiety is not to be
found among inner states, but rather, in
antecedent environmental conditions which
correlate significantly with manifest
anxiety, then knowing about inner states is
of no value at all in explaining the "causes"
of behavior.35

Here, obviously,
ovm private

Skinner is arguing that it is not one’s

(directly accessible) psychologically MEANINGFUL

state of anxiety that causes the anxious manifestations
(e.g., trembling, wavering of voice, etc.) directly perceiv¬
able by onlookers, but rather it is, for example, the
publicly verifiable stimulus-object ’snake’ that is placed
before a suoject’s eyes, that causes him to tremble.
this,

From

Skinner maintains that we can purge our scientific

explanations of "inner causes".

But supposing a psychologist

were to introduce a snake into the presence of a subject who,
although extremely fearful of snakes, is fast asleep.

The

Behavior!st would find, of course, that no manifest trembling
would ensue; but if the subject was awakened, trembling

35

Skinner,

Science and Human..., op. cit., pp.

31-35.
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behavior would transpire.

What is the issue here?

It is

that in the former case the subject was NOT CONSCIOUSLY
AWARE of the snake’s presence, but in the latter instance
he WAS CONSCIOUSLY AWARE,

In conscious awareness the

stimulus-object had SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING for
the subject.

This is a much different situation than in

the case of a thermostat designed to control an automatic
heating system operating necessarily as a direct (mathe¬
matically ascertainable) function of temperature variation
(under normal conditions).

We would regard it as odd to

’ask* the thermostat if it was ’fearful’ of an anticipated
temperature drop.

The illustration, although bordering

upon absurdity, embodies the distinction between scientific
objects of physics and chemistry, for example, and those of
the behavioral sciences.

At this point it must, at least,

be conceded that involuntary behavioral responses of object
of psychological concern differ markedly from those of the
present-day exact sciences; namely, by the nebulously
understood phenomenon of consciousness (this statement, of
course, is made with specific reference to the ”snake11 and
"thermostat” illustrations).
Let us consider for a moment the whole issue at hand
from an exact scientific perspective.

Supposing that from

the point of view of an extraordinarily sophisticated neuro
physiology it was possible to specify ALL of the physiochemical conditions,

stated in appropriate scientific

language, underlying an individual’s subjective psycho-
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logical state,

'I feel angry*

(a feat which is at present

a mere science fiction, although IN PRINCIPLE an eventual
possibility).

Here it would have to be conceded that there

are two logically distinct types of MEANINGFUL statements
inherent in this illustration; namely, a scientifically
meaningful one, and a subjective psychological one.

The

reasoii for this is that the former statement, in its anti¬
cipated complex and undoubtedly more rigorous form, does NOT
imply the latter type of statement, and vice
versa.

Rather, the CORRELATION of the two CATEGORIES OF

MEANING is NECESSARILY a SYNTHETIC one.
by knowing that chemicals C^,

Stated differently,

Cgj C^, for example, were

somewhat deficient in the blood of a given subject, we could
never infer from strictly this evidence that he was directly
experiencing the subjective psychological phenomenon of
thirst, for example.

This connection could only be estab¬

lished by asking the subject to report on his private bodily
states (directly accessible only to that individual) as
variables Ci, C2, C3 were systematically manipulated.
Skinner could quickly reply that we would not need this type
of subjective report for making this determination because
the subject's manifest behavior could be DIRECTLY observed,
and hence 'thirst-behavior* could be imputed to him.

This

is true to a degree as in the cases of grossly overt states .
like excessive happiness,

sadness, etc., but it must be

remembered that LOGICALLY speaking the human phenomenon of
thirst, for.example,

is a subjective psychological state

6o

Which must have NECESSARILY been directly experienced by
some individual at some time to have become meaningful at
all, for the intrinsic meaning of 'thirst' issues from a
personal experiential basis.

We do not scientifically

analyze the human physiology to formulate a meaning that is
defined as 'thirst*.

Rather, all Individual human beings

have always experienced the private event 'thirst', but only
at a much later stage in the development of man's mentality
did some men become cognizant of the fact that the private
or subjectively accessible phenomenon,
chemical basis.

thirst, had a physio-

From this it can be more generally stated

that in order to have a science of ANY kind AT ALL one must
assume a_£riori that private experiential events are factual
occurrences (as everyone, to the knowledge of this writer,
would maintain).

The reader may enquire at this point about

th^ significance of the writer having proven what most
intelligent people take for granted.

The issue is this,

that if we must presuppose A PRIORI that all modes of inter¬
sub jectively verifiable symbolic expression, and hence,
knowledge of varying degrees of certitude as well as
opinion, must necessarily presuppose DIRECTLY apprehendable
individual experience of the natural world and of one's own
subjective states, then it must also be concluded that ALL
HUMANLY EXPERIENCED EVENTS (and those that are, in principle,
capable of being experienced) — some of which possess
intersubjective as well as merely subjective grounds for
verification —are PRIVATELY (or DIRECTLY) experienced!

6l

This Is to maintain no more than the simple fact that if
there are phenomena capable of entering into human experi¬
ence, then an INDIVIDUAL MIND must DIRECTLY experience them.
But if this- is true, what are we to conclude about the
frequently maintained distinction between "public" and
private

events; viz., that public events refer to those

natural objects and their relations which are available for
direct apprehension by ANY human being via their external
bodily senses, and that private events refer to those inner
states and relations occurring WITHIN INDIVIDUAL human beings
that can, in principle, be DIRECTLY apprehended by ONLY
those individuals within whose organism the events occur?
We shall see that this distinction between public (physical)
and private (mental), until now, held by this writer for
ARGUMENTATIVE reasons, contains a fundamental epistemological
vagueness.which, although subtle, has an extremely pronounded
1

affect on our conception, and thus, theories on the nature
of the human mind.

Positivists and Behaviorists are

frequent proponents of this highly questionable distinction
(which in one way or another has been historically made in
various schools of empirical philosophy).

Also the "mental-

Physical" dichotomy has been recently articulated by Herbert
Leigi in a nose illuminating article^ on the mind-body
Problem; but here again, it seems that Feigl's view is

J Herbert Feigl, "The ‘Mental’ and the 'Physical',“
ea. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II, pp. 370-497.
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vulnerable to the same epistemological criticism to be made
/although Feigl offers a very fine argument supporting the
view that physio-chemical states have only an EMPIRICALLY
(not analytically) ascertainable IDENTITY with MENTAL
states^7
Now we must attempt to get at the basis of the alleged
epistemological vagueness.

It is difficult to elucidate

this problem for our mentalities have been predisposed to
habitually make the mental-physical dichotomy (or even more
typically,

the mind-body distinction) in our way of intellec¬

tually contemplating human behavior.
is much better portrayed in

The problematic issue

Chapter Three'5, but for now we

must attempt to become clear on this matter in order to
prepare the way for future discourse on the nature of
subjective psychological behavior.

It had been briefly

intimated in previous discussion that we could consistently
conceive of at least two ways of comprehending statements
of MEANING with respect to characterizing human behavioral
phenomena.

One category of statements encompasses those

comprising scientific knowledge claims, with its various
criteria for certitude (e.g.,

that evidence in support of

theoretical formulation be available for direct intersubjective verification to establish the validity and
reliability of knowledge claims; that the principle of
non-contradiction be observed; that hypothetical-deductive
explanations be effected in terms of axioms, postulates, and
laws — preferably as formalized statements — whenever
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possible; and so on), while on the other hand, there is the
category of meaningful statements whose primary function is
to characterize the subjective psychological, phenomeno¬
logical states of individual behavior as the EFFECTS of both
natural world and internal bodily phenomena ingress into
personal consciousness as directly accessible components of
consciousness.

This is the human state of affairs upon

which the aforementioned quotation by Alfred North VJhitehead
was predicated.
(e.g,,

This second category of statements

statements referring to bodily feelings, emotions,

and ideational states) are required to coherently explicate
the phenomenological contents of individual minds as those
contents are continually modified (via reflective conscious
INTERPRETATION) by accumulated, integrated learnings.

A

major point to be made about the intrinsic nature of state¬
ments /either silently thought via language or symbolically
expressed (thinking-out-loud) for intersubjective apprehen¬
sion/ in this category of MEANING is that coherence in
expression (whether silently to oneself or to others) is a
basic operational criterion.

These statements reflect

individual experience as it is during each moment of occur¬
rence.

They are ridden with unfactual as well as factual

assertions, value judgments, highly charged emotional
reports, and so on.

Here the obvious distinction to be made

is that in the latter category of human articulation the
criterion of coherence of expression is the one to which we
&I1 adhere spontaneously.

But in the former category (where
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V

coherence is still most assuredly a criterion), however,
over and above mere coherence there is a highly detewiined,
conscious effort made by those (scientists, logicians, etc.)

|

Wh0 are seriously

systematically engaging in generating

statements characteristic of this category to construct
‘I

assertions that demonstrate maximal epistemological certi¬
tude.

These statements result from a procedure entailing

continual logical clarification of roles governing the
processes of deduction and inference from which theories and
facts are both affirmed and related.

These rules also

facilitate a multitude of other complex, difficult construc¬
tive and clarificational operations.

Therefore, as we can

easily see, a considerably greater amount of DISCIPLINED
j

thinking is involved in generating scientific statements as
distinct from those categorically regarded as subjective
psychological.
Now that we have generally distinguished between two
separate categories of MEANINGFUL statements (it may be
noted here that scientific statements are intended to be
"value free" in their exposition of fact and theory, while
subjective psychological statements contain those references
to directly accessibly inner states including value judg¬
ments), we must consider the FRAMES OF REFERENCE from which
the two categories of statements are predicated.

It is often

said that scientific statements (including those of the
formal as well as empirical sciences) have "public" grounds
for expression and verification, but those that are

L
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subjective psychological have only "private" or subjective
grounds,

and hence, must be regarded .as inappropriate for

scientific knowledge claims that demand direct intersubjective confirmation of evidential phenomena.

We have seen _

now specifically with regard to our purposes in this paper —
that Professor Skinner has emphatically urged that state¬
ments about "inner psychological

(causal) events" are to be

omitted from a scientific psychology for methodological
reasons; namely,

that they are irrelevant to an exact

science for they refer to causally INEFFICACIOUS epiphenomena
(mental events),

and so on.

But it may be asked, What is

the specific nature of the epistemological grounds which
have so reverently been regarded as "public",

and those

apparently disavowed grounds termed "private or subjective"?
In analyzing this problem,

the writer submits,

the central

confusion of the "public-private" issue can be resolved.
From the above discussion it may initially seem as though
there are two distinct FRAMES OF REFERENCE for perceiving
and hence mailing determinations about phenomenal occurrences!
one "public" and one "private".
viz.,

In a sense this is correct,

in that INDIVIDUALS have direct access to their ovm

inner states while others have only INDIRECT (thereby
inferential) access to them,

and on the other hand,

there

are natural world phenomena that are DIRECTLY available to
^bL persons via their external bodily senses.
acknowledging this factual distinction,
important one,

But in

another very

in most cases, goes unnoticed,

and hence,

is
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not critically evaluated for its epistemological signifi¬
cance.

It can be readily granted that a "public”

(scientific) view of natural phenomena, does not have as its
frame of reference some type of universal world soul that has
a facility for viewing natural world objects in themselves.
Obviously "public" events are those natural world phenomena
directly intersubjectively apprehended through individuals*
external bodily senses; a point that has been repeatedly
made.

But in all this we may ask, Is it possible to PERCEIVE

a natural phenomenon without a human MIND to do the
perceiving?

Unless we are to admit a world.soul or the

perceptions of lower ordered organisms, the answer must be
emphatically negative, for only MIND-PERCEPTIONS are suit¬
able for subjective psychological statements of MEANING, or
those statements of meaning suitable as KNOWLEDGE claims;
empirical or otherwise.

One may object to this line of

reasoning and’demand that the definitionally vague term
fmind * be removed from the discussion for other types of
more intersubjectively precise hypothetical constructs,
as

1

such

reflex arc*, etc., may be used as more suitable alter¬

natives.

To this anticipated objection we must remind

potential critics of the formerly introduced * snake illus¬
tration* where conscious awareness was an UNAVOIDABLE
(hence causal) consideration in yielding ’tremblingbehavior* from the hypothetical subject.

So that those who

are still unconvinced of the necessity of using the term
'mind*, the writer will maintain for the moment that mind
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can be equated with ‘conscious' and
behavior.
perhaps,

'reflective conscious*'

Obis will undoubtedly be construed by some as,
replacing one vagary with another.

In any case we

must proceed with the argument if for no other reason than
"faith being higher than reason".
hand,

Similarly, on the other

it would be equally as absurd to speak of having

direct perceptual acquaintance with "private" events with¬
out presupposing a mind which perceives the phenomena.
Thus the common factor which must be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI
in BOTH the cases of "public" and "private" perceptions is
AN ISMVmML MIND WHICH DIRECTLY PERCEIVES those perceptual
phenomena.

It is for this reason that the writer concludes

that ALL. POSSIBLE HUMANLY EXPERIENCABLE EVENTS ARE PRIVATE
in that they are ALL EXPERIENCED THROUGH DIRECT

mWmSE BX INDIVIDUAL MINDS.

Apart from these consld-

.

erations it is meaningless (logically and subjective psycho¬
logically) to speak of other types of events (that could not
in principle enter into our experiential domain) if we are to
regard such discourse as meaningful at all: whether pheno¬
menologically,
etc.

scientifically,

religiously, metaphysically,

At this point it is of extreme importance to mention

that the basis for a human behavioral model has been
suggested,

that is,

of coneciving mind as standing over

against perceptual occurrences, whether the perceptions are
DIRECTLY perceived through the external bodily senses or
DIRECTLY perceived via internal bodily modes.
differently,

Stated

it is the notion of the wisdom of the past
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(occurring as predispositional symbolic learning) as it is
SIMM-OCMiX brought to bear upon a present occasion
(i.e., contemporary perceptual phenomena, whether issuing
from external natural or internal bodily modes) such that
the SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL PRESENT is in
great part determined by prior learnings.

But before we

begin to systematically explicate this view (which has a
highly elaborate metaphysical basis in the writings of
Alfred North Whitehead,37 and is a view frequently suggested
in the writings of various philosophers throughout history)
(Also, oddly enough,
implicitly by B.

F.

it is a view espoused, at least,
Skinner, although with the crucially

Important difference that he would omit as causally
irrelevant what this writer has designated as 'mind*, which
necessarily must be regarded to stand over against percepta.)
there is still much to be said with respect to the former
line of argumentation being developed.
Now that it has been shown that mind (nebulously
defined, to be sure, but on the other hand, a factor that
must be necessarily presupposed A PRIORI m order to have
subjective psychological experience at all) must be assumed
to stand over against all directly apprehended perceptions,
whether originating from external natural sources or internal
bodily sources, what sense is to be made of the "public-

„

-Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York:

Macmillan, 1929).

----
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private * dichotomy which most assuredly does have some
merit?

We may answer this by again saying that ALL events

are private to the extent that their existence,

in principle

and insofar as they have relevance for ANY MEANINGFUL human
enterprise,

is contingent upon AN INDIVIDUAL human mind to

entertain them.
that,

This simply amounts to saying on one hand,

for example,

seeing red flames,

hearing melodious

tones, feeling the roughness of asphalt,
other hand, feeling a pain,
for a problem,

etc.,

and on the

thinking of a novel solution

feeling despondent,

etc., all necessarily

presuppose that INDIVIDUAL MINDS DIRECTLY EXPERIENCE these
states, for the phenomena cannot meaningfully occur as they
do apart from Individual human beings to directly experience
them.

Thus, more specifically,

the whole concept of an

* event1 has to be more carefully analyzed to determine what
individuals,

IN FACT,

experience when they experience

natural or inner perceptual phenomena.

There are many

ramifications to this issue, but at this point let us say
that vie can again draw upon the aforementioned categorical
distinction between subjective psychological and scientific
statements.

These categorical statements are made with

reference to two distinct types of perceptual phenomena;
namely, natural world phenomena and internal bodily
phenomena.

Therefore,

two statements,

there is a CRUCIAL difference in the

fI see the tree1 and rI feel a pain*,

in

that the LOCATION of the stimulus-object in the former case
^-s in the external natural world (viz., a tree),

and in the
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latter case the LOCATION of the stimulus-object is in the
internal organism- of the subject articulating the statement
of pain (viz., from a specific bodily mechanism).

The

conclusions to be drawn from the notion of 'LOCATION' are
the following:
1)

In both categorical cases the perceptualphenomena were known via direct experience.

2)

In both categorical cases an individual mind
must be admitted to have had the perceptions;
therefore, all events are private in that
they are DIRECTLY experienced by INDIVIDUAL
HUMAN MINDS.
Also there is the obvious sense
of 'privacy*, in that no other individual
human being can experience one's personal
experiences.

3)

The basic issue of the "public-private"
dichotomy is to be resolved in determining
the LOCATION of the stimulus-object which
gives rise to the perception (or stimulusobject EFFECT), whose source of origin must
necessarily be EITHER from the external
natural environment or a percipient's
internal organism.

4)

Therefore in the logical definition of an
’EVENT' there is necessarily implied a
TWOFOLD consideration, viz.:
a)

a MIND that perceives perceptions

b) . and the LOCATION of the source of the
perception coming to mind.
Thus in the two statements, 'I see the tree*,
and 'I feel a pain", there are at least two
FACTORS in COMMON for each of these distinctly
different events: an 'I* (i.e., a MIND) that
perceives the 'pain* and 'tree* phenomena;
and a stimulus-object LOCATION from which the
phenomena issue (the stimulus-object 'tree*
located in the natural world, and the stimulusobject 'physio-chemical states giving rise to
the pain-perception* located within the bodily
organism of the individual directly experi¬
encing the pain).
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5)

The resolution of the "public-private”
problem can be achieved by saying that with
respect to ALL perceptions of which human
beings can ever, in principle, become aware
it must necessarily be presupposed A PRIORI
that an individual human mind directly
perceived them; therefore, leading us to
necessarily conclude that ALL these events
are private or mental events.
But in saying
this we must also necessarily conclude that
there are at least two factors to be
considered in our concept of mental or private
event, viz., that a mind is required to perceive
(or stand over against) perceptions, and" that
the perceptions are a (causal; result of
stimulus-objects LOCATED EITHER in the natural
world, or in the organism of the percipient
whose mind entertains the perceptions.
Prom
this, we are led to conclude that the concepts
of "public" and "private" verification must
necessarily refer to the LOCATION of the
stimulus-object which yield EVENT-COMPONENTS
(e.g., perceptions of trees, rocks, pleasurable
feelings, ideas, etc.); COMPONENTS which, by
definition, do NOT comprise a complete mental
EVENT, for this would be to exclude reference
to the individual mind which directly experi¬
ences the EVENT-COMPONENT or perceptions"
(stimulus-object EFFECTS).
Thus the concept
of 1EVENT1 necessarily implies a MENTAL event
in that a mind must be regarded to "stand over
against" percepta or stimulus-object EFFECTS
that arise from stimulus-objects residing in
EITHER the natural world or the Internal body
of the percipient.

With the above argumentation in mind (literally speaking!),
we are now in a position to criticize Professor Skinner’s
"methodological" viewpoint.
1)

Skinner wants to omit statements alleged to
REFER to events having components whose
stimulus-object location Is said to be within
the subject’s own organism such that ONLY the
subject himself has access to the causal state
(e.g., * My SADNESS CAUSED my irresponsible
behavior.’).
Also he wishes to methodologically
omit those statements referring to causal agents
which, in principle, by their intrinsic theo¬
retical nature are not directly accessible to
either subjects or observers; although trained
observers can come to understand the effects of
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these causal "entities’* indirectly (e.g., ids,
superegos, etc.).
In each case, Skinner would
maintain, the alleged causal, agents are, in
principle, not directly accessible to Behav¬
ioristic observers; hence they are inappro¬
priate subjectmatter for a behavioral science
which must ultimately resort to evidence capable
of .DIRECT intersubjective verification for
suitable knowledge claims.
Thus, for reasons
previously considered, we say that Skinner
regards such subjective psychological states
as ’sadness’, ’desire*, ’anxiety’, ’thoughts’,
etc. as epiphenomena which are, to be sure,
directly accessible to the subject in question,
but are of little value to a Behavioristic
psychology as causal agents, for they are not
directly verifiable.
Also, it will be recalled,
since ALL human behavior is an exact function
of stimulus and response -- both of which ARE
intersubjectively verifiable classes of states -intervening mental states can be omitted from
• functional analysis.
This is to say that causes
for manifest ’irresponsible’ behavior, for
example, are to be found in the immediately
antecedent environmental conditions preceding
the ’irresponsible’ response-behavior.
The data,
collected from these antecedent causal conditions
must, of course, be interpreted in light of the
subject’s history of relevant learned behavioral
(and moreover, reflexive) predispositions with
respect to given stimuli.
2)

This methodological approach to investigating
human behavior CAN legitimately be undertaken
(APART from the unwarranted theoretical
conclusion that mental events are causally
inefficacious epiphenomena, for reasons
previously stated), and it is what this writer
would define as a scientific objective (as
distinct from subjective) psychological approach
to studying human behavior.

3)

But to say that PRIVATE EVENTS are to be omitted
from a Behavioristic psychology on the grounds
of being causally inefficacious elements in
human behavior is wholly untenable for this is
to CONFUSE the logical meaning of ’private event’..
Private events must be necessarily presupposed
A PRIORI to have human thinking-behavior at all,
whether thinking occurs as subjective psychological
states consisting of personal values, feelings,
biases, emotions; or in the considerably more
disciplined subjective psychological form out of
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which scientific statements, possessing inter—
subjective confirmability, are generated, for
example.
4)

ihus it cannot be said that private events are
not causally efficacious (although it has not
been demonstrated at this point HOW they func¬
tion causally; this is the problem to be
confronted in "Chapter Three", and its resolu¬
tion in part, constitutes the subjectmatter of
a scientific subjective psychology) for the
phenomenon of intelligent human behavior
itself, for example, is a creative product of
DISCIPLINED private-event processes,

5)

Specifically, all this amounts to saying that
Skinner is advocating an objective psycho¬
logical science of human behavior that admits
only those statements into Its behavioral
descriptions (explanations) REFERRING to those
PRIVATE EVENTS of INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORISTIC
OBSERVERS containing DIRECTLY experienced EVENTCOMPONENTS resulting from natural world stimulusobjects (e.g., subject’s eye-blinks, tremblings,
veroal reports, etc,, which, contemplated from
the RELATIVE perspective of each Bahavioristic
observer, become part, of the category of
natural world phenomena that are intersubjectively confirmable).
Thus in propounding this
methodological viewpoint, Skinner is necessarily
ADMITTING only those statements articulated by
individ.ua! Behavioristic observers that refer
to each observer’s own private events having
COMPONENTS (perceptions) resulting from natural
world stimulus-objects; viz., for example, a
subject’s VERBAL EXPRESSION, the SUBJECTIVE
PSYCHOLOGICAL TEAMING of which referred to a
stimulus-object NOT DIRECTLY perceivable by THAT
(or in principle ANYT"*Behaviorist (for example,
the Behavior!stically HEARD verbal expression
by the subject that his hands were trembling
BECAUSE of the ANXIETY he was DIRECTLY experi¬
encing,
Here, the HEARD verbalization CAN be
admitted as scientific evidence, but NOT the
causal "entity" to which the verbalization is
alleged to refer, viz., the INNER state, ANXIETY).

6)

Therefore, although Skinner CAM legitimately
banish all references made by subjects to "inner
causes" and retain only their MANIFEST behavior,
he CANNOT, in principle, conclude from this that
private events are causally inefficacious for the
very possibility of even making Behavioristic
determinations about ’someone else’s manifest
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behavior1 presupposes A PRIORI the possibility
of INDIVIDUAL BEHAVI0 HI ST S having mental events
in that a mind must ”stand over against"
individual Behavior!sts* perceptions of their
subject’s behavior (perceived as natural world
phenomena because of the LOCATION of the
stimulus-object in question, namely, the subject
is located OUTSIDE the Behavior!sts* bodies).
To neglect this line of argumentation, thereby
falling into a purely epiphenomenalistic view
of mental events, would be to necessarily regard
human behavior as entirely REFLEXIVE, and
therefore', to contemplate behavioral processes
on a par similar to 17th century materialistic
determinism.
7)

From the line of argumentation being developed
by the writer, another crucially important
conclusion follows, namely, that from the bare
Behavioristic observation of ’eyes blinking’,
* hand s trembling’, etc., the INTERPRETIVE
INFERENCE (thereby going BEYOND the' bare
factually perceptual given) that there is
MANIFEST (apart" from the question of.whether
the observed subject ham the subjectively
LOCATED experience of anxiety) ’anxious*
behavior does NOT ANALYTICALLY fol1owI
Rather, it is a SYNTHETIC conclusion and
it presupposes ultimately that LOGICALLY ONE
(and no doubt ALL) individual human being,
at least, had the DIRECT subjective psycho¬
logical experience of anxiety, and took the
liberty of" subjectively reporting (in some
no doubt crude way) the. phenomenon to others.
This is also an issue with many ramifications
and will be given further attention as we
proceed with our discussion.

This completes, at least for the present time, our critical
analysis of Behaviorism and its views on "public and private
events".

The enquiry thus far has been difficult and

obscure, but at least two things are conspicuously evident
as a result.

First, as is so often the case,

considerations

which seen to be initially straightforward frequently
contain numerous,

subtle implications that, if overlooked,

• can give rise to very perplexing antinomies; e.g., as in the
case of the mind-body problem.. This admonition is merely to

reaffirm what has been frequently proven throughout an
ageless backlogue of philosophical criticism.

Secondly, it

can be seen in retrospect that the logical difficulties
inherent to Behaviorism are closely related to if not an
actual embodiment of the problem of ’philosophical rela¬
tivity*; or stated more specifically, the difficulties
revealed when individual minds begin to systematically take
account of the phenomenon of ‘’minds taking account of other
minds as well as natural objects”.
Some further points on terminological clarification
should be made before we move on.

Hereafter we shall

define objects capable of DIRECT intersubjective verifica¬
tion (viz., objects and their properties and relations
LOCATED in the natural world) as ’public event-components *
(distinct from the misleading term,

’public events’), and

those objects with their properties and relations NOT
capable of direct intersubjective confirmation (viz.,

sub¬

jective psychological inner states) as ’private eventcomponents’; e.g., pains, emotions, particular ideas,

etc.

The term ’private event*, as we have seen to some moderate
extent, is a far more INCLUSIVE term than private eventcomponent.

For example, in the statement,

’I feel happy’,

the bare feeling of happiness would be a private eventcomponent in the sense that a particular individual at a
particular time and place is DIRECTLY experiencing a feeling
°f happiness in such a way that NO other human being can
have precisely THAT experience to which reference is being
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made, for to have ’that* experience necessarily implies
'that* individual who generates the statement,
happy1'.

"’I* feel

On the other hand, with respect to the more

Inclusive concept of ‘private event*, the individual when
uttering the statement,

* I feel happy*,

is understanding

CONSIDERABLY MORE than merely taking account of a ’happy
feeling*.

This is to say that the literal words,

*1 feel

happy’ are a great oversimplification of what the individual
at THE EXACT time of experiencing the ’happy feeling* was
IN FACT experiencing.

For example, Beyond the clearly

articulated recognition of a ’happy feeling* private eventCOMPONENT there is a multitude of progressively more subtle
(hence,

symbolic elements less clearly recognized by the

subject of the experience) event-components such as "a
concept of * I
feeling1,

,

*a concept of what it means to have a

*a concept of qualitatively different feelings’,

etc., as well as a host of other ramifications that are
intrinsic to ANY given moment of subjective psychological
experience.

This stipulation with respect to the more

inclusive, far reaching implications associated with the
newly defined concept of ’private event’ may appear to the
reader at this point to be relatively insignificant because
of its rarely emphasized complex, predominately symbolic
structure.

But the writer submits that it is herein that

a penetrating understanding of the LOGICAL FORM of subjec¬
tive psychological experience is to be discovered.

In any

■case, future investigations will considerably expand the
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meaning of this statement; particularly in the next two
chapters.
The more general concept of fstimulus-object1 will be
defined as the causal agent giving rise to, or is the
necessary (but NOT the sufficient condition because of a
mind that is required to entertain perceptual occurrences)
condition for the perceptual occurrence of public and
private event-components (or what vie have termed,

STIMULUS-

OBJECT EFFECTS).
The last point of clarification to be made is that it
seems possible to schematically represent some of our
previous analysis of private or mental events and their
various possible modes for DISCIPLINED thought-behavior in
the following hierarchical way:
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FIGURE 1

LevelN

Formal scientific statements
(i.e., mathematical and symbolic logical)
with their definitional assertions and
procedures subject to the principle of
non-c ont radic tion.

Rigorously empirically verified state¬
ments with theoretical constructs subject
to the principle of non-contradiction,
and experimental evidence.

Level

j
•»
9

•
•
•

Level2

Levelp

•

Opinion statements about various matters
based on personal, pragmatic conclusions
resulting from NON-methodologicalacquaintance with reality.
Statements reporting on subjective
psychological states, e.g., feelings,
desires, values; any phenomenologically
“givenn states.
The ENTIRE'AREA within the rectangular chart would
represent all the possible kinds of assertions that
could be made from any particular person’s subject¬
ive psychological experience at a given time;
i. e., private events which must be presupposed
A PRIORI in order to have ANY type of thinking
behavior at all.
Those modes of thought at the
lower levels on the hierarchy are characterized by
their LACK of cognitive disciplining, while those
at progressively higher levels are distinctly
characterized by their rigorous cognitive disci¬
pline, viz., with respect to specified procedural
rules, evidential confirmability, etc.

The lengthy sequence of argumentation contained in
this chapter has not been intended by the writer to be an
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act of epistemological subterfuge whereby "mind has been
deceitfully smuggled,

once again, back into psychology and

some philosophical camps."
mind, as an active agent,

Rather it is better to say that
functions causally in each of us

during every conscious moment of experience throughout our
lives; thus it is the FACT of its causally efficacious role,
as it is disclosed in our concrete subjective psychological
experience of the natural and internal bodily environments,
that is frequently overlooked and obscured by certain
schools of psychology and phi1sophv.

In the remaining

chapters of this discourse vie shall endeavor to isolate the
categories of perceptual facts testifying to the efficacity
of mind, and. hence,
these facts,

formulate a theory of mind such that

occurring as concrete experience,

can be shown

to embody the LOGICAL FORM common to ALL possible subjective
psychological experience.

If this end can be accomplished,

then the principles of a subjective psychology will in great
part be provided,

thus revealing more clearly certain law-

like relations in human behavior, in addition to
suggesting many novel modes for experimental research.

CHAPTER II

THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL

Section One
Essentially the basic argument of the last chapter
was as follows:
a)

We cannot exclude private or mental events from
the realm of scientific behavioral analysis
(either in an objective or subjective psychology)
and therefore conclude that all behavior is
ultimately ''blindly" (mechanically) reflexive
in the sense that resultant human behavioral
responses are an EXACT function of antecedent
environmental conditions, hence rendering inner
mental states epiphenomenalistic, for the very
POSSIBILITY of ANY methodological and/or
rationally coherent enterprise must presuppose
A PRIORI the causal efficacity of mental states.

b)

Thus mind was metaphorically conceived as
"standing over against" perceptual phenomena
which are capable of occurring in two categoric¬
ally distinct ways: as perceptions occurring
subjective psychologically as stimulus-object
EFFECTS issuing from stimulus-objects LOCATED
in the external natural world, and as percep¬
tions occurring subjective psychologically as
stimulus-object EFFECTS issuing from stimulusobjects LOCATED in the internal organism of the
individual percipient himself.

c)

This amounts to saying that to conceive of an
individual having perceptions, and hence
executing complex intelligent behavioral opera¬
tions WITHOUT a consciousness to "stand over
against" the perceptions (i.e., to DIRECTLY
apprehend them), leads to complete absurdity.

d)

More specifically, mind has been defined, for
discursive purposes at this point, as conscious
awareness and reflective consciousness awareness
(thought- critically taking account of previously
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xpexieneed thought, entailing the utilization
of former symbolically disciplined experience
to constructively enhance the meaning of
contemporary thinking).
To deny the efficacious
role of consciousness and reflective consciousness, in the sense that they are necessary
factors intervening between antecedent stimulus
conditions and resultant behavioral responses,
is t° lead to logical contradiction.
However,
oKinnerian Behaviorism demands that manifest
human behavioral responses be regarded, in
principle, as an EXACT function of intersubjectiyely verifiable antecedent environmental conitions.
This is to say that what are regarded
as inner mental events are causally inefficacious
byproducts
or epiphenomena resulting from
s*imulus—response actualizations.
In this way
it is alleged that an entirely objective behavioral
science can be established, for all stimulus and
response phenomena are intersubjectively verifi¬
able.
But since human conscious and reflective
conscious awareness are NOT directly intersubjeetively ascertainable, and yet, their causal
efficacity in the production of human behavior
cannot be denied, it follows that Skinnerian
Behaviorism, on methodological grounds, must
purge (as it in fact does) statements referring to
inner states from its scientific domain; however,
contrary to its conclusions, it can thereby provide,
only a PARTIAL account of human behavior.
The
conclusive refutation, then, of the possibility
for Skinnerian Behaviorism (and hence ALL Behav¬
iorisms) to provide, in principle, a COMPLETE
scientific exposition of human behavior lies
in the iact that a MIND must be presupposed
A PRIORI to stand over against percepts
originating from stimulus-objects LOCATED in
either the external natural or internal bodily
environments.
Behaviorism cannot however, in
principle, incorporate statements into its system
referring to percepta originating from internalbodily regions for these data are not DIRECTLY
available for intersubjective verification.
But
the obvious fact of the matter is that internal
percepta, capable of DIRECT verification ONLY by
those individual percipients within whose organism
the perceptions arise, include such indubitably
existing phenomena as bodily feeling, emotions",
and most important, ideational, processes.
Behaviorism*attempt^to avoid this difficulty
by restating such, "alleged” internal phenomena
in terms of operational definition whose evidential
grounds are commensurate with its methodology.

However, the limitations of this endeavor can
be easily exposed by pointing out that statements
referring to subjective psychological experi¬
ential states cannot be ANALYTICALLY DEDUCED
from their operationally defined, ’directly
intersubjectively verifiable counterparts.
Thus on logical grounds this is to establish
the certainty of two distinct psychological
domains: one which manifests itself in the same
way as any natural phenomena and is thereby
available for direct intersubjective scrutiny;
and the other which refers to phenomenal states
directly accessible to ONLY those individuals
within whose bodies the perceptual phenomena
occur /the inability to establish an analytical
(logical) identity between the two distinct psycho¬
logical realms will be reconsidered in greater
detail as we proceed with our discussion/.
The
final conclusion to be drawn from the lack of
analytical equivalence between the two behavioral
domains is that, since subjective psychological
behavior is in great part thinking-behavior, it
must be conceded that BEHAVIORISM -- if we are to
regard IT as a product of intelligent, reflective
thinking -- must ITSELF presuppose A PRIORI those
subjective psychological states which it wishes
to purge from its enquiries in order to be an
active scientific enterprise; unless, of course,
Behaviorists are willing to also maintain that
their experimentally derived fruits are products
• of mere REFLEX'!VELY executed behavioral efforts!
The distinction was also male in the former chapter between
the possibility of an objective and subjective scieniliic
psychology.

The former, which is the currently established

discipline of Behaviorism, deals with human behavior purely
as it DIRECTLY APPEARS or is PHENOMENALLY "given” as EXTERNAL
BODILY PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORISTIC OBSERVERS.
Therefore, in this “methodological" (in fact,

theoretical)

scheme, reference to inner, not DIRECTLY perceivable

causes

must be omitted from their behavioral (functional) analyses.
But, as it was argumentatively demonstrated by the wuiter,
such inner causes (e.g., private event-components such as
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•my PAIN caused me to shout*, or *my IDEA of righteousness
prohibited me from engaging-in such actions*) do, in fact,
influence resultant behavior.

The argument underlying this

position was essentially that even a logically possible
COMPLETE physio-chemical explanation (stated in appropriate
scientific terms) of a particular neurological state, cannot,
in principle, ANALYTICALLY contain the concept,
angry*

*1 feel

(a directly accessible 'subjective psychological

state), for example, because the LOGICAL MEANING of the two
states of affairs involves a SYNTHETIC ‘’leap”

(they are not

logically identical with one another in the sense that one
statement contains DIFFERENT information than the other),
therefore the correlation (to be established by an extremely
advanced neurophysiology) must be established EMPIRICALLY
(see Feigl* s article^8 where he argues to the same conclu¬
sion, only from a different frame of reference).
Stated differently, Dewey*s, and without question,
Skinner* s explanation of thinking behavior basically yields
cause-effect, functional explanations.

However, cause-

effect explanations do NOT explain the intrinsic nature of
subjective psychological MEANING DIRECTLY experienced by
individuals at any given temporal duration who demonstrate
the manifest behavior available to Behaviorisms (this holds
✓

true even if we consider a less extreme illustration than
the one suggested, by the writer, where he was being

^Herbert Feigl, "The ’Mental* and the ’Physical *,"
ed. Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell, II* PP* 3?S~ t'97» _

directly observed by a team of Behaviorists who had direct
access to his manifest behavior, but not silent thinking
behavior).

To know what a given thought ’WAS A FUNCTION OF*

(stated in appropriate physio-chemical scientific terms)
DOES NOT explain the INTRINSIC SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
MEANING of the thought phenomenon; it only (and in saying
this the writer does not, in the least, wish to diminuate
the vast significance of this form of explanation) explains
HOW a. thought can occur as it does (in principle, this IS
possible) and NOT the SUBJECTIVE MEANING of'the thought
phenomenon in itself.

Granted, a trained Behavioristic

observer can hear and understand to some degree (and in
many cases even better than the individual EXPERIENCING the
private state) the verbalization ABOUT the subjectively
experienced particular state, and so on, but the observer
CANNOT, in principle, HAVE "MY" directly experienced state.
Even if the functional analysis is considerably more complex
and systematic (and it would be) than the subject’s own
description of his inner state, it is, nevertheless, NOT
LOGICALLY IDENTICAL with the SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
MEANING that Is directly accessible to the subject experi¬
encing it.

In proving these arguments, it goes without

saying that the very possibility of human consciousness is
contingent upon an extraordinarily large number of integiated
organic functions which, in effect, proviae the necessaiy
conditions for conscious and consciously reflective behavior.
✓

Stated still differently, medical science explores the
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organic "basis of pains, for example, BECAUSE there ARE
subjective psychological states of pain directly experi¬
enced by individual human beings (among other reasons, of
course).

Thus the occurrence of human pain prompted (that

is, in a sense, caused) the development of the science of
medicine.

Furthermore, the science of medicine was created

by intelligent, CONSCIOUSLY REFLECTIVE (and therefore
necessarily at least, AWARE; hence awareness must be
presupposed A PRIORI for ANY thinking behavior at all)
individuals whose knowledge, because it was in disciplined
(systematic)

SYMBOLIC form, could be personally utilized

and intersubjectively understood, and therefore shared.
All this was NOT a result of purely ,!blind'5, reflexive
behavior -- a position which Skinner must necessarily
maintain if we are to understand his words for their exact
meaning

rather, another factor has entered the "causal

scene", namely, CONSCIOUS REFLECTION.

Thus if consciously

reflective behavior is necessary for the very possibility
of high-ordered thinking behavior, then this behavioral
realm is open to scientific investigation even though
consciously reflective behavioral, processes are NOT DIRECiLY
available for scientific (intersubjective) scrutinization
(but ARE DIRECTLY accessible to the subjects which can be
used for controlled experimentation).

Therefore behavioral,

scientists will have to formulate hypothetical, constructs
designed to represent the FORM in which subjective psycho¬
logical events must necessarily occur, and then utilize
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various mathematical and statistical procedures in conjunc¬
tion with key experiments (whose evidential basis is avail¬
able to DIRECT intersubJective verification) for proving or
disproving given theoretical constructs.

It is in this

type of procedure that a subjective psychological science
may be grounded.

The objection may be raised that this

procedure would seem methodologically inappropriate because
of the logical, impossibility of direct intersubjective
accessibility of inner states by observational scientists
(for Behaviorism does not operate under this limitation);
but we must quickly recall that the science of physics, for
example, is not, by any means, a "Behavioristic" one in that
there are numerous hypothetical

(hence causally efficacious)

constructs (e.g., light waves, atoms, etc.) which are
operationally used with extraordinary utility without ever
having been directly intersubJectively observed.

In fact,

a subjective psychological, science has the advantage that
its objects of scientific enquiry (viz., the subjects them¬
selves) can provide direct testimony to their dynamic
internal states when subjected to controlled experimental,
■conditions; an advantage that is not possible in al3. other
sciences.
It will be our task, then,

in this chapter to outline a

mechanistic model which this writer regards as suitable
(i.e., free from any reductionistic constructs) to meet the
immediate needs of both an obJective and subjective psychology.
Many of the. features of the model.to be proposed are

8?

suggested in the. writings of Alfred North Whitehead, Ernst
Cassirer, John Dewey and B. F.

Skinner.

It would be much

too cumbersome to designate which portions of the model
were suggested by each theorist, thus the responsibility for
this associative task will be left to the reader.
i

We will

•

begin to develop the constructs of this model by initially
analyzing the concepts of ’consciousness* and, particularly,
the mechanism of ’reflective consciousness*; and then
progressively work toward a comprehensive behavioral model
for conceiving individual (and, if the principles are
extended, group) behavior as it occurs within given environ¬
mental contexts.
As we proceed in this paper,

it should be kept in mind

that terminological definitions will acquire meaning
gradually, in that the writer will successively qualify “key”
terms (as in the case of the definitions of ’public’ and
’private*, for example) that are initially formally stated.
Also, the over-all context in which the terms are used will,
further,

suggest (implicitly) more universal meanings to

given terms as one ponders them in various contexts.

This

is precisely the case with the concepts of ’consciousness*
and ’reflective consciousness*.

Some moderate attempt at

defining these terms has been made (viz., in roughly
equaling them with mind), and we will again attempt to
render their meaning more precise and comprehensive.

In any

case, the meaning of the concepts must be pondered within the
contextual framework of the model to be proposed ~~ even
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though,

in this' chapter, the concepts are defined,

essentially, in mechanistic terms.

Section Two
Let us.begin by maintaining that consciousness (as it
has already been said) must at least be equated with aware¬
ness.

Awareness is a phenomenon having many degrees of

subjective intensity.

For example, one can momentarily be

aware of the presence of a ’tree* and then turn one’s
attention to some other matter, hence forgetting the experi¬
ence of ever having seen the ’tree*.
have deeply profound awarenesses.

On the other hand, we

For example, there are

the complex experiences of ’feeling fully reconciled with
life’;

*a deep satisfaction resulting from the way that one

is leading one’s life (a momentary awareness to be sure)*,
or even the higher-ordered awareness of the "I-thou",
articulated by Buber,39

In any case, intensity of awareness

can be comprehended as occurring on a continuum, whereby the
intensity of understanding a given stimulus-condition
indicates the degree of an individual’s subjective psycho¬
logical awareness of a given object of concern.

Thus if

awareness is to be roughly equivalent with consciousness, it
can be said that consciousness ranges in its level of under¬
standing from bare sensory perception to (for example)
"Platonic

insight”.

Usually, however, we think of conscious_

>>

■^Martin Buber, I and Thou (2d ed. rev.; New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958)«.

ness as merely "taking account" of something.

For argu¬

mentative purposes, at this point, awareness or conscious¬
ness will be defined as minimally taking account of or
cognitively acknowledging the presence of an object of
concern; e.g,, a tree, a noise, a pain growing more intense,
etc.

/The perceptions in this case are event-components,

keeping in mind our twofold way of characterizing all
humanly perceivable events; namely, there is a "something",
of which an individual is conscious or aware (an eventcomponent )j that issues from (a necessary ASSUMPTION that
must be posited in order to have science at all) a stimulusobject; and on the other hand, there is a mind (a conscious¬
ness), that (it must necessarily be admitted) HAS the
perception.

Also it will be recalled that stimulus-objects,

OF WHICH WE DIRECTLY EXPERIENCE THE EFFECTS (viz., as
perceptions), have two possible sources of LOCATION; the
external natural world, and the internal organism of the
perceiver.

Again,

it is crucial to note that we directly

experience the EFFECTS of stimulus-objects (which ARE eventcomponents in our consciousness), for to directly experience
a stimulus-object.in ITSELF would necessitate that the
percipient must BE that stimulus-object;

e.g., a rock, a

physio-chemical.state corresponding to a pain or an idea,
another mind -- all circumstances that lead us to logical
absurdity.

Furthermore, the concept of stimulus-object is

not constrained to tangible and "intangible" objects as such
(e.g,j

stones, organic mechanisms that yield ideational
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event-components, ideas, etc.).

It may also characterize

PROPERTIES of and RELATIONS among entities which we directly
experience through internal or external perceptual modes
(e.g., the REDNESS of a rose, an object BECOMING warmer,
one object PASSING another, an INTENSIFYING emotional state,
etc.).

The above distinctions are not meant to suffice as

adequate expositions of the complex issue of stimulusobjects and their effects, but rather, merely serve as an
introduction to a more comprehensive analysis that will be
presented in a future chapter/7.

Therefore, if consciousness

refers to the phenomenon of merely 11 taking account of"
something, this must be regarded as entailing some minimal
amount of thought-behavior.

Form this, the concept of
i

reflective consciousness follows, defined as the phenomenon
of THOUGHT CRITICALLY ANALYZING FORMERLY EXPERIENCED THOUGHT.
Thought, as it has intrinsic MEANING from a subjective
psychological.perspective /one that is logically distinct
from listening to the manifest expression (if any) of
subjective psychological thought-behavior, or from a content
analysis of (let us say) a verbal report articulated by a
given subject/,

seems to be the cumulative synthetic product

(at a given point in time) of a long-termed (antecedently
initiated), reflectively disciplined process involving
innumerable learned (ideational) associations that have been
integrated into an overall, dynamically operating cognitive
system capable of being activated by a large number ox
qualitatively diverse stimulus-conditions.

Thus the

production of a given thought at a particular time is,

in

a very definite sense, an embodiment of formerly acquired
relevant wisdom.

This is to say that an indefinitely large

number of previously learned associations /some of which we
recall through a consciously reflective effort, while the
majority are either reflexively learned or preconscious in
the.sense that they have been so thoroughly habitually
learned that we cannot recall the origins-! experiential
circumstances under which these early learnings occurred
(except in some cases by hypnosis); many of which we undoubt¬
edly found to be difficult at the time, but with increased
maturity,

these basic tasks are spontaneously effected/ can

be, in a very short time,

synthetically brought to bear upon

a given contemporary stimulus-occasion.

An entire synthetic

configuration of ideational propensities, possessing a
•profound interrelationship with one another,

can often oe

delivered to a contemporary occasion (i.e., reflexively) in
a moment * s notice.

Therefore, for example, a man* s comment

on the theory of relativity *— an action requiring consid¬
erable antecedent educational preparation — embodies within
it (as subjective psychological meaning) AT THE MOMENT 0?
EXPRESSION, perhaps years of accumulated, integrated wisdom
explicitly and implicitly delivered within the comparatively
small number of linguistic symbols required to verbally
express the comment.

This is truly a remarkable phenomenon,

but one executed with ease by typically intelligent human
beings.

It is in this way that THREE time dimensions are
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synthetically actualized in one present occasion; viz., the
wisdom of the past is embodied within a contemporary verbal
utterance, for example, and in this verbalization lies the
predispositional groundwork for the next (i.e., future)
successive verbal symbol to be articulated by the same
person.

It is only in the phenomenon of MIND that such an

ontological possibility can be repeatedly actualized.

It is

this phenomenon that we shall subject to intensive analysis
throughout the remainder of this paper, for these types of
issues are the rightful subjectmatter for a subjective
psychology.
Heretofore several implications inherent to the concept
of consciousness have been explored.

The phenomenon of

reflective consciousness, over and above that of conscious¬
ness, involves (as we have formerly said) the process of
THOUGHT CRITICALLY ANALYZING FORMERLY EXPERIENCED THOUGHT.
This notion presently, however,

suggests many more ramifica¬

tions than when it was originally introduced because of our
brief discussion on how the wisdom of the past can be
brought constructively to bear upon present occasions in
producing ideational states, and thereby, prepares the way
for future cognitive activity.
thinking,

Reflective conscious

then, is the phenomenon

01

thougho turning

analytically upon itself in an attempt to generate novel,
more -profound understanding.

The terms used, to introduce

the concepts of consciousness and reflective consciousness
have been occasionally metaphorical, for we have not yet
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pursued our investigation in sufficient depth to have
developed-more precise terminology.

This task will be a

major objective in our analysis of mind.

The definitional

terms used to achieve this end must be ’cybernetic1 because
of the vast number of organic mechanisms, and hence, physioi

chemical and mental processes involved in producing human
behavior.

A quotation from W.

Ross Ashby illustrates this

point when he says
••• /cybernetics/ offers a single set of concepts
suitable for representing the most diverse types
of systems.
Until recently, any attempt to relate
the many facts known about, say, servo-mechanisms
to what was known about the cerebellum was made
unnecessarily difficult by the fact that the
propensities of servo-mechanisms were described in
words redolent of the automatic pilot, or the radio
set, or the hydraulic brake, while those of the
cerebellum were described in words redolent of the
dissecting room and the bedside -- aspects that are
irrelevant to the SIMILARITIES between a servo¬
mechanism and a cerebellar reflex.
Cybernetics
offers one set of concepts that, by having exact
correspondences with each branch of science, can
thereby bring them into exact relation with one
another.
The second peculiar virtue of cybernetics is that
it offers a method for the scientific treatment of
the systems in which complexity is outstanding and
too important to be ignored.
Such systems are, as
we well know* only too common In the biological world! •-*Thus we will have occasion to develop a small number of
theoretical terms (as it has been demonstrated in terms like
stimulus-object,

stimulus-object effect, event-component,

etc.) carefully defined to portray the SIMILARITIES in

^W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19/3T7~~P* 5**
^Tbid. , pp. 4-5.
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functioning among indeterminately numerous and complex human
organic piocesses; processes which can in principle be
explained (but only to a limited degree, as it shall be
later argued) in mechanistic biological terms (See Ernest
Nagel*s arguments for mechanism in biology.^2).
Again, it can be said that the ideational product of
the reflective thought process is an intrinsically subjec‘psychological one, therefore revealing itself as
directly accessible in its entirety to only the individual
who is engaged in reflecting.

This directly accessible

*meaning* can be rendered intersubjectively verifiable only
when it is manifestly expressed in a symbolic mode
(e.g.,

spoken verbalizations, written words, mathematics,

art, music, etc. ).

Frequently, what has been defined as

subjective psychological meaning may have (and often does
have) many accompanying objective psychological manifesta¬
tions.

Also it must be admitted, as a result of the lines

of argumentation presented heretofore, that the writer has
given no reason for any reader to conclude that silent
reflective thinking is to be regarded as what Gilbert Pyle
has termed "ghost-in-a-machine** phenomena.^3

It is perfectly

consistent to maintain that silent reflection occurs via the
same linguistic symbolic medium as does *'thinking-out-loud**
(which is, conversely, directly intersubjectively verifiable).
"*' Ml**"‘nn 1 111,111
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.Now let us diagramatically represent a basic principle
involved in the concepts of consciousness and reflectively
conscious thinking-behavior,
FIGURE 2

ASSOCIATIONS

Event *A*

(necessarily representing both a perceptual event-

component AND a mind which HAS the perception) at time-^
represents an immediately (conscious) experienced event,
i.e. , non reflective behavior, of an individual who has just
had a. subjective psychological thought (1I feel angry’, for
example).

The organic structure of the human organism is

such that it enables the organism to HAVE conscious aware¬
nesses, and more rema.rka.bly, the organism can recall having
had former awarenesses; and even beyond this, the organism
can synthetically utilize previously acquired wisdom (a term
implying constructive cognitive integration) in conjunction
with present perceptual awarenesses to transcend concemporary
levels of understanding.

Therefore, event ’A’ at tlme1

represents a temporally antecedent condition of meie
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conscious awareness, and the successive condition, at
time2» is that of reflective consciousness.

In the latter

cognitive act, where the organism is constructively recalling
having directly experienced event * A* at time^, more complex
ORGANIC as well as ideational processes are involved, for it
■*»

entails bringing to bear those previously learned relevant
associations upon the event-component being contemplated;
v

viz., event *Af at.time^.

This is essentially the reflect¬

ive process: where thinking-behavior is implemented to
analyze the implications of previously experienced thinkingbehavior.

The graphic illustration is meant to merely

demonstrate the principle of reflection in its barest form,
and is not intended to be an exhaustive exposition of the
phenomenon.
It has been a major tenet of this- paper that ANY mode
of intersubjective communication (and thereby any knowledgeclaim statements), regardless of how rudimentary or sophis¬
ticated its form, must necessarily be contemplated as
having its ultimate basis in the private or mental events of
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN ORGANISMS (and this is to be presupposed
A PRIORI for the very possibility of any kind of human
thinking at all).

Our position, as stated heretofore, has

been difficult to intuitively comprehend, therefore, rather
than attempt to (at this point) reiterate our views in more
simple terms, let us defer this task to "Chapter Three".
To be adequately prepared to accomplish this end, many
expository remarks have yet to be made.

The reason for

raising the issue at'-all is to reconsider the NECESSITY and
FUNCTION of symbolism as a means to execute BOTH INTERSUBJECTIVE and INTRASUBJECTIVE thought.

When we communicate

with others, we- must necessarily rely upon symbolic media,
and conversely,

when we communicate with ourselves

(silent

conscious and consciously reflective thinking-behavior),
its possibility is also grounded in symbolism (the most
common forms of which are language -- written,
silently thought.

spoken and

Meaning of any kind is ultimately

grounded in individually actualized symbolic thougnt,
whether the symbols are embodied in "mind" or "matter'5.
Libraries are repositories for symbols embodied in "matter ,
symbols which have no meaning whatsoever until a human mind
is brought to bear upon them.

This involves both imputing

subjective psychological meaning to the symbols,

and

reciprocally having meaningful ideational associations
stimulated by the materially embodied
perspective,

symbols (from this

the symbols function as stimulus-objects, but

from the standpoint of subjective psychological experience,
they are experienced as stimulus-object effects or e\entcomponents).

But oddly enough brains,

very broakL sense are material objects,
a capacity for storing symbols.
libraries do not.

like libraries,
and

similarly,

m a
have

However, brains think and

We may wonder there1ore,

apart from

obvious structural differences, what unique modes of behavior
are demonstrated by minds rendering them distinct entities
• from libraries

(which merely endure as relatively permanent
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objects) or other material objects.

An extremely important

initial distinction in accomplishing this end is that the
very CONCEPT of

’library*, for example,

(or any other

intelligible object for that matter) is UNTHINKABLE without
human minds to initially conceive of it as a conceptual
entity, and then proceed to provide the concept with a
physical counterpart.

In any case'symbolic behavior is the

essence of subjective psychologically meaningful behavior,
and consequently, must be subsumed to careful analysis in
this paper.
In formulating a concept of mind we will place primary
emphasis upon analyzing the subjective psychological
STRUCTURE of linguistic symbols; however,

the theory to be

propounded appears generally applicable to all types o±
symbolic expression.
REPRESENT?,

The questions, What do symbols

and secondly, What is the INTRINSIC nature of

symbols? must be considered in some detail.
yield highly speculative answers,

These questions

for little has been

offered by interested theorists that could qualify a.s even
a minimally satisfactory comprehensive theory of linguistic
behavior; hence rendering the problem very indeterminate at
this time.

The theory to be briefly introduced by the

writer is primarily suggested in the writings of Professor
Ernst Cassirer.^5
_

t

|

Professor Cassirer’s writings on this
_

_mii t

r - T-.

-,wmtm
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^Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven; Yale
University Press, 1965T^

^Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Sgaboli^Forms,
Vols. I-IH

(New Haven; Yale University Press, 19ojj.
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subject are unusually penetrating (both with respect to
scholarly and imaginative presentation).

However,

the

writer has interpreted some of these writings in light of
the general theory of human behavior expressed in this paper;
consequently, the reader should not be surprised if
Cassirer’s views have been subjected to a certain amount of
modification (although^ the writer has endeavored to
minimally deviate from Cassirer’s theory of symbolic
behavior).
Since the ability to use linguistic symbols is essen¬
tially developed at a relatively early age, the theory to
be presented refers primarily to the early childhood years.
Although there are many empirically verified studies on
symbolic development /as it is readily apparent in merely
a causal review of Professor Cassirer’s three volumes,
entitled the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (not even to
mention innumerable other references on this topic found in
books and journalsJ7, facts alone are relatively meaningless
unless associated with one another within a comprehensive
theoretical framework (actually one may legitimately argue
as this writer will ~~ that fs.cts considered in themselves
have little utility unless empirically ASCERTAINED within
the context of a clearly specified theory).

Further, there

are an indefinite number of theories that can logically
Mfit” given groups of facts.

Particularly with respect to

various theories of linguistic development and usage, it
seems evident that nearly all of those presently regarded
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as being useful are in fact founded upon rather naive
epistemological grounds
conditioning,

etc.).

(e.g.,

associationism,

operant

This point can be easily comprehended

by reading Cassirer’s chapter on "LANGUAGE*5 in his book,
An Essay on Man.^

Also this whole issue is masterfully

made evident in the first chapter of his earlier work,
Substance and Punetion.^?
justified in presenting

As a result,

the writer feels

(in very broad terms) an outline of

a general theory of symbolic behavioral development,

for

after having revealed at least the logical possibility of a
subjective psychological, science, new theoretical constructs
are needed to both accentuate the plausability of such an
enterprise,

and serve as operational instruments for

methodological enquiry.

Section Three
Let us begin by saying

with respect to the two

questions! What do symbols REPRESENT? and What is the
INTRINSIC nature of symbols? -- that language

(and in fact

all symbolic expression) develops out of early adjustive
behaviors executed by individual human organisms a.s i^hey
learn to meet the demands of their environments, and later,
through ACTIVELY exploring various comprehensible dimensions
of these environments.

^Cassirer,

Prom a subjective psychological

An Essay...,

^Ernst Cassirer,
Lover, 1953), pp.

on.

clt., pp. 109-13^•

Substance and Function (New York:

3-26.
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perspective,

at early stages of behavioral development,

this amounts to saying that human organisms

(because of

their structural nature) are able to ORGANIZE,

CLARIFY (in

the sense of subjecting personal behavioral modes to func¬
tional discipline),

and later,

the nature of primordial

COMMUNICATE (SYMBOLICALLY)

(and thereby INTENSELY FELT)

EMOTIONAL FEELINGS.

At progressively later stages

in infantile cognitive development there is a gradual shift
in emphasis in which organisms ORGANIZE, CLARIFY,
SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENT as COMMUNICATION,

and

(directly) clearly

experienced and qualitatively more sophisticated EMERGENT
ideational states,

while correspondingly less behavior is

executed representing the nature of vague internal emotional
percepta (a phenomenon which,

as it will be seen,-has both

positive and negative implications for the well-being of
human organisms).
development,

In this process of cognitive or symbolic

human organisms increase their survival

capacities by more effectively maintaining what is essenti¬
ally an interpenetrative relationship between organism and
environment.

At higher levels of development,

the human

organism adopts a progressively more ACTIVE approach to
learning efficacious behavioral modes for increasing the
frequency of qualitatively more desirable subjective psycho¬
logical experience.
obviously,

Intellectual maturation consists,

of linguistic acquisition,

and is utilized facu¬

ltatively as a principal means for promoting human intelli¬
gence.

The writer maintains that words are learned behaviors

J.U/i

behaviors that become thoroughly habituated — which,
ex feet,

tag

in

those stimulus-object EFFECTS (whether

issuing from internal or external environmental LOCATIONS)
whose nature has been REPRESENTED by particular linguistic
universals (whether this is accomplished by means of
operant conditioning,
at this time).

etc.,

is not a matter of concern to us

The point to be made,

however,

is that

ULTIMAInLY the meaning and significance of language is
grounded in individual subjective psychological experience;
similarly at very early ages, presymbolic behavior issues
directly from organic bodily and undisciplined
feelings.

emotional

At this level, bare symbolically undisciplined

consciousness is BEING-AS-IT-IS-COMPREHENSIVELY (hence
undifferentiatedly) FELT, both as emotion and organic bodily
feeling.

Stated differently,

consciousness is that dimly

illuminated subjectively experienced focal point into which
the relevant effects of inner and outer environments ingress,
hence gaining unique actualization as unsymbolized subjec¬
tive psychological experience within the organism of human
beings.

All more sophisticated conscious experience,

including the supreme achievement of reflective conscious
thinking,

entails an extraordinarily complex,

lengthy

program of progressively imposing SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE
(involving learning words,
grammatical rules,

modes of conceptual thinking,

etc. ) upon unwieldly,

sporadic emotional

feeling such that human behavior is rendered intelligent
hy proceeding through the stages of higher-grade emotional

JLUJ

feeling,

then of conscious ideation,

and finally to the

paramount level of reflectively'conscious ideation where,
ideally,

a delicate synthetic balance is achieved between

high-grade emotional and ideational feeling.

In this,

highly flexible symbolic units, demonstrating a sophisticated
rational structure

(together yielding a commensurately

profound quality of meaning) are capable of accurately
representing subtle features of complex reality as their
effects emerge in human organisms in the form of mature
perceptual experience.

The many ramifications of the

■subjective psychological phenomenon 1 experience *

(many

aspects of which are capable of symbolic representation by
critically reflecting upon its distinguishable dimensions)
are, paradoxically enough,
yet,

rendered more determinate,

and

obscured oy the explicative device that permits the

possibility their elucidation (as thought).
that symbols (primarily linguistic)

This is to say

"stand between" man and

tne immediately revealed external natural and internal
bodily worlds as a "filtrative screen" representing direct
experience .in terms of those elements that are of greatest
relevance to the percipient,
subtlety of the present,

while the extensive concrete

fleeting moment is lost.

Therefore,

oven the most, potently meaningful symbolic representations
cannot communicate the full richness of qualitatively
Mature, direct experience.

At best,

the deceptively complex

immediate experience can only be partially, expressed by those
dividuals whose orga,nisms entertain such occurrences.

>
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Even in the relatively typical experience of consuming a
steak,

for example, whom amongst; would attempt to exhaus¬

tively linguistically characterize the many intimately
pleasurable ramifications of this experience and think,
a result,

as

that the verbal description of the experience

adequately portrayed the original subjective intensity of
the occasion?
The theory of symbolic development being purported,
then,

regards intelligent thinking as a very high-ordered

behavioral process that gradually emerges out of originally
unorganized,

randomly occurring emotional feelings that are

thereafter progressively transformed into symbolically
rational behavior.

The function of language in all this,

as well as other modes of more primitive symbolism,

is to

gradually organize and explicate primordially occurring
internal and external perceptions by assigning to their many
directly accessible aspects,

intersubjectively agreed upon

linguistic symbols in order to render those meaningful
experiential components determinate, and hence,

available

for future reference in instrumental usage.

Section Four
Now that a very general outline of a theory of symbolic
development has been briefly introduced — in terms that are
unquestionably ambiguous — let us consider some of the
EVIDENCE that would seem to be compatible with such a theory.
An exhaustive exposition of an appropriate evidential basis
would take us far afield from the original line of
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discussion,

therefore primary reference will be made to the

relevant works of Ernst Cassirer^, 49,

50 which contain a

wealth of empirical studies regarding this matter.
saying this,

Thus in

the writer does not feel that his views are

importantly incompatible with those of Cassirer's;

specific¬

ally with respect to his theory of symbolic development and
its subsequent relevance for a concept of mind.
V/e will begin our evidential enquiries by considering
a quotation from Cassirer where his general impression of
contemporary psychology is expressed.
Pew modern psychologists would admit or recommend
a mere method of introspection.
In general they
11 us that such a method is very precarious.
They are convinced that a strictly objective
to eVi°?1Si‘c.attitude iS *-he only Possible approach
f scientific psychology.
But a consistent and
ladleal behaviorism fails to attain its end.
It
can warn us of possible methodological errors,
ut it cannot solve all the problems of human
psychology.
V/e may criticize or suspect the purely
introspective view, but we cannot suppress or
eliminate it.
Without introspection,~without an
immediate awareness of feelings, emotions,
perceptions, thoughts, we could not even define
■?e-iie3;d of human psychology.
Yet it must be
admitted that by following this way alone we can
never arrive at a comprehensive view of human
nature.
Introspection reveals to us only that small
sector of human life which is accessible to our
individual experience.
It can never cover the whole
rield of human phenomena.
Even if we should succeed
n collecting and combining all the data, we should

48

Cassirer,

^Cassirer,

50

^

Cassirer,

Substance and....

op_^ cit.

Philosophy of Symbolic...,
An Essay...,

op.

cit.

op.

cit.
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It can be seen,

at the outset,

philosophic outlook,

that in terms of a basic

Cassirer’s view of empirical psycho¬

logical methodology is quite concordant with that expressed
by the writer: a strict Behaviorism,

although capable of

yielding a great deal of useful information about human
behavior,
hence,

cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of it;

introspectively accessible

(i.e., where stimulus-

objects are located within individuals in such a way that
only they themselves are in a position to have DIRECT access
to t*Vie EFFECTS) reports obtained under experimentally
controlled conditions must also qualify as an acceptable
.j.c^ss of data (factual evidence when ascertained in light of
a suitable theory) if a complete psychological understanding
oi man is to be
Next,

(in principle) ascertained.

Cassirer reminds us of an extremely important

admonition made by Socrates;

one that was perhaps fundamental

to th© entire Socratio philosophy.
We cannot discover the nature of man in the same
way that we can detect the nature of physical
things.
Physical things may be described in terms
of their objective properties, but man may be
described and defined only in terms of his
consciousness.
This fact poses an entirely new
problem which cannot be solved by our usual modes
of investigation.
Empirical observation and
logical analysis, in the sense in which these
terms were used in pre-Socratic philosophy, here
proved inefficient and inadequate.
For it is
only in our immediate intercourse with human
beings that we have insight into the character

51

IMd. , pp. 1-2.

10?

of man.
We must actually confront man, we must
meet him squarely face to face, in order to
understand him.
Hence it is not a new objective
content, but a new activity and function of
thougnt which is the distinctive feature of the
philosophy of Socrates.52
Although this statement,

in its proper context, makes refer¬

ence to the philosophical dialogical method of enquiry
propounded by Socrates,

the problem of how to properly study

the nature of man (because of the unique status of mans’
intellect, i.e.,a factor that differentiate^ man from other
objects of scrutiny) was one that was given careful consid¬
eration many CENTURIES ago.
The following statement is a succinct summary of
Cassirer's view of the present situation regarding the
methodological study of. man;

one with which the writer is

in wholehearted agreement:
No former age was ever in such a favorable
position with regard to the sources of our know¬
ledge of human nature.
Psychology, ethnology,
anthropology, and history have amassed an
astoundingly rich and constantly increasing body
facts.
Our technical instruments for observa¬
tion and experimentation have been immensely
improved, and our analyses have become sharper
and more penetrating.
V/e appear, nevertheless,
not yet to have found a method for the mastery and
organization of this material.
When compared
with our own abundance the past may seem very poor.
But our wealth of facts is not necessarily a
wealth of thoughts.
Unless we succeed in finding
a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this
labyrinth, we can have no real insight into the
general character of human culture; we shall
remain lost in a mass of disconnected and disinte¬
grated data which seems to lack all conceptual unity.53

52IkL<L-> p.

5.

^^ibid.( p, 22.
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The theory of symbolic development previously intro¬
duced by this writer placed great emphasis upon the notion
that the origin of symbolic behavior was intimately related
to the primordial bodily feelings, and particularly,

the

spontaneous emotional responses of infantile human organisms
to changes in their internal bodily and external natural
environments.

Further it was maintained that the essential

utility of symbolism (a.s it is gradually developed) is that
it is the instrument by which vague,

amorphous emotional

feeling acquire successive discipline,

thereby resulting in

commensurately higher-ordered intelligent behavioral mani¬
festations.

Jacques Mari tain,

a contemporary Neo-Thomistic

philosopher /also importantly influenced by Henri Bergson,5^
a French philosopher prominent in the development of a
stream of thought generally entitled subjective realism
(a position significantly affecting the thinking of such
philosophers as Samuel Alexander and Alfred North Whitehead/,
characterizes the writer’s view (generally) in the following,
nearly poetic, fashion:
The fathomless abyss of personal freedom of
the personal thirst and striving for knowing and
seeing, grasping and expressing ---- I should call
them the preconscious of the spirit in man.
For
reason does not consist only of its conscious
logical tools and manifestations nor does the will
consist only of its deliberate conscious deter¬
minations.
Far beneath the apparent surface of
explicit concepts and judgments, of words and
expressed resolutions or movements of the will, are
the sources of knowledge and poetry, of love and
truly human desires, hidden in the spiritual

Henri Bergson,
Holt, 1911).

Creative Evolution (New-York: Henry
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darkness of the intimate vitality of the soul.
Before being formed and expressed in concepts and
judgments, intellectual knowledge is at first a
beginning of insight, still unformulated, which
proceeds from the impact of the illuminating
activity of the intellect on the world of images
and emotions and which is but a humble and
trembling movement, yet invaluable, toward an
intelligible content to be grasped.55
More specifically (with respect to the role of symbolism
in this whole matter),

the following sequences of quotations

from Cassirer embody the fundamental elements of his views
on the nature and role of symbolism as a causally influ¬
ential factor in determining human behavior.

It is

necessary to quote Cassirer at length in order to appreciate
the profoundity of his theory.
... in the human world we find a new character¬
istic which appears to be the distinctive mark of
human life.
The functional circle of man is not
only quantitatively enlarged; it has also under¬
gone a qualitative change.
Man has, as it were,
discovered a new method of adapting himself to
his environment.
Between the. receptor system and
the effector system (viz., in the domain which
Skinner would regard as the reflex arc - the writer’s
comment), which are to be found in all animal
species, we find in man a third link which we may
describe as the SYMBOLIC SYSTEM.
This new acquisi¬
tion transforms the whole of human life.
As
compared with the other animals man lives not
merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak,
in a new DIMENSION of reality.
There is an unmis¬
takable difference between organic reactions and
human responses.
In the first case a direct and
immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus;
in the second case the answer is delayed.
It is
interrupted and retarded by a slow and complicated
process of thought.56

55j acques

Mari tain, Education at the Crossroads
Haven: Yale University Press, T9^D ,' p. 27.
t

Cassirer,

An Essay.,.,

op.

cit., p.

24.

(New
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ha/n cannot escape from his own achievement.
He
cannot but adapt the conditions of his own life.
No longer in a merely physical universe, man
lives in a symbolic universe.
Language, myth,
art, and religion are parts of the universe.
They are the varied threads which weave the
symbolic net, the tangled web of human experi¬
ence.
All human progress in thought and experi¬
ence refines upon and strengthens this net.
No
longer can man confront reality immediately; he
cannot see it, as it were, face to face.
Physical
reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s
symbolic activity advances.
Instead of dealing
with the things themselves man is in a sense
constantly conversing with himself.
He has so
enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic
images, in mythical symbols or religious rites
that he cannot see or know anything except by the
interposition of this artificial medium/ His
situation is the same in the theoretical as in the
practical sphere.
Even here man does not live in
a world of hard facts, or according to his
immediate needs or desires.
He lives rather in
the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and
fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his
fantasies arid dreams.
"What disturbs and alarms
man,*1 said Epictetus, "are not the things, but
his opinions and fancies about the things."
From the point of view at which we have just
arrived we may correct and enlarge the classical
definition of man.
In spite of all the efforts
of modern irrationalism this definition of man as
an ANIMAL RATIONALE has not lost its force.
Rationality is indeed an inherent feature of all
human activities....
Language has often been
identified with reason, or with the very source
of reason.
But it easy to see that this
definition fails to cover the whole field.
It is
a PARS PRO TOTO; it offers us a part for the whole.
For side by side with conceptual language there is
an emotional language; side by side with logical
or scientific language there is a language of poetic
imagination.
Primarily language does not express
thoughts or ideas, but feelings and affections.
And even a religion ’within the limits of pure
reason’ as conceived and worked out by Kant is no
more than a mere abstraction.
It conveys only the
ideal shape, only the shadow, of what a genuine
and concrete religious life is.
The great thinkers
who have defined man as an ANIMAL RATIONALE were
not empiricists, nor did they ever intend to give
an empirical account of humai nature.
By this
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definition they were expressing a rather fundamental
moral imperative.
Reason is a very inadequate term
with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural
life in all their richness and variety.
But all
these forms are symbolic forms.
Hence, instead of
defining man as an ANIMAL RATIONALE, we should
define him as an ANIMAL SYMBOLICUM,, By doing so
we can designate his specific difference, and we
can understand the new way open to man — the wav
to civilization.57
The implications of these passages for the type of theo¬
retical formulations which we have been developing is
obvious,

hence they need no further elaboration.

Next, we begin to focus upon the precise nature of
language and its various modes of usage.
But instead of giving a ready-made definition of
speech, it would be better perhaps to proceed
along tentative lines.
Speech is not a simple
and uniform phenomenon.
It consists of different
elements which, both biologically and systematlo¬
cally, are not on the same level.
We must try to
find the order and interrelationships of the
constituent elements; we must, as it were,
distinguish the various geological strata of
speech.
The first and most fundamental stratum
is evidently the language of emotions.
A great
portion of all human utterance still belongs to
this stratum.
But there is a form of speech
that shows us a quite different type.
Here the
word is by no means a mere interjection; it is not
an involuntary expression of feeling, but a part
of a sentence which has a definite syntactical
and logical structure.^
It is true that even in
highly developed, in theoretical language the
connection with the first element is not entirely
broken off.
Scarcely a sentence can be found —
except perhaps the pure formal sentences of
mathematics
without a certain affective or
emotional tinge.5
Analogies and parallels to
emotional language may be found in abundance in
the animal world.
As regards chimpanzees
Wolfgang Koehler states that they achieve a
considerab3.e degree of expression by means of

^Ibid. ,

P. 25.

gesture.
Rage, terror, despair, grief, pleading,
desire, playfulness, and pleasure are readily
expressed in this manner.
Nevertheless one
element, which is characteristic of and indis¬
pensable to all human language, is missing: we
find no signs which have an objective reference
01 meaning.
* It may be taken as positively
proved-'*, says Koehler,
that.their gamus of PHONETICS is entirely
"subjective", and can only express emotion,
never designate or describe objects.
But
they have so many phonetic elements which
are also common to human language, that their
lack of articulate speech cannot be ascribed
to SECONDARY (glosso-labial) limitations.
Their gestures too, of face and body like
their expression in sound, never designate
or "describe" objects (Bflhler).
Here we touch upon the crucial point in our
whole problem.
The difference between PREPOSI¬
TIONAL LANGUAGE and EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE is the
real landmark between the human and the animal
world.
All the theories and observations
concerning animal language are wide of the mark
if they fail to recognize this fundamental
difference.5o

For the sake of a clear statement of the problem
we must carefully distinguish between SIGNS and
SYMBOLS.
That we find rather complex systems
of signs and signals in animal behavior seems to
be an ascertained fact.
We may even say that
some animals, especially domesticated animals,
are extremely susceptible to signs.12
a dog
vrill react to the slightest changes in the
behavior of his master; he will even distinguish
the expression of a human face or the modulation
of a human voice.13 But is a far cry from these
phenomena to an understanding of symbolic and
human speech.
The famous experiments of Pavlov
prove only that animals can easily be trained to
react not merely to direct stimuli but to all
sorts of mediate or representative stimuli.
A bell, for example, may become a "sign for dinner
and an animal may be trained not to touch its food
when this sign is absent.
But from this we learn
only that the experimenter, in this case, has

Ibid., pp.

29-30.
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succeeded in changing the food-situation of the
animal, .He has complicated the situation by
voluntarily introducing to it a new element.
All
the phenomena which are primarily described as
conditioned reflexes are not merely very far from
but even opposed to the essential character of
human symbolic thought.
Symbols -- in the proper
sense of this term — cannot be reduced to mere
signals.
Signals and symbols belong to two very
different universes of discourse: a signal is a
part of the physical world of being; a symbol is
part of the human world of meaning.
Signals are
"operators"; symbols are "designators".!^
Signals, even when understood and used as such,
have nevertheless a sort of physical or substantial
being; symbols have only a functional value.59

Some psychologists and psychobiologists have
flatly refused to speak of the intelligence of
animals.
In all animal behavior they, saw only
the play of a certain automatism.
This thesis had
behind it the authority of Descartes; yet it has
been reasserted in modern psychology.
'The animal*,
says E, L. Thorndike in his work on animal
intelligence, 'does not think one is like the
other, not does it, as it is so often said,
mistake one for the other.
It just does not think
ABOUT it at all; it just thinks IT....
The idea
that animals rea.ct to a particular and absolutely
defined and realized sense-impression, and that
a similar reaction to a sense-impression which
varies from the first proves an association by
similarity, is a myth.'^5
Later and more exact
observation led to a different conclusion.
In
the case of the higher animals it had become
clear that they were able to solve rather
difficult problems and that these solutions were
not brought about in a merely mechanical way, by
trial, and error.
As Koehler points out, the
most striking difference exists between a mere
chance solution and a genuine solution, so that
the one can be easily distinguished from the other..
That at least some of the reactions of the higher
animals are not merely a product of chance but are
guided by insight appears to be incontestable.3-°
If by intelligence we understand either adjustment
to the immediate environment or adaptive modifica¬
tions of environment, we must certainly ascribe

59 Ibid., pp.

31-32.

114

to animals a comparatively highly developed intelligence.
It must also he conceded that not
all animal actions are governed by the presence
of an immediate stimulus.
The animal is capable
of all sorts of detours in its reactions.
It may
learn not only to use implements but even to
invent tools for its purposes.
Hence some
psychobiologists do not hesitate to speak of a
creative or constructive imagination in animals.1’?
But neither this intelligence nor this imagination
is of the specifically human type.
In short, we
may say that the animal possesses a practical
imagination and intelligence whereas man alone
has developed a new form: a SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION
AND INTELLIGENCE.60
For Cassirer, a symbolic * imagination• and

’intelligence1

has two crucially important developmental stages.

He relies

heavily upon an illustration drawn from the early life of
Helen Keller to dramatically portray (as a "key" experiment)
this two-stage process, necessarily involved in acquiring
symbolic imagination and thereby intelligence.
Helen Keller had previously learned to combine
a certain thing or event with a certain sign
of the manual alphabet.
A fixed association had
been established between these things and certain
tactile impressions.
But such a series of asso¬
ciations, even if they are repeated and amplified,
still does not imply an understanding of what
human speech is and means.
In order to arrive at
such an understanding the child had to make a new
and more significant discovery.
It had to under¬
stand that EVERYTHING HAD A NAME — that the
symbolic function is not restricted to particular
cases but is a principle of UNIVERSAL applicability
which encompasses the whole field of human thought.61

The principle of symbolism, with its universality
validity, and general applicability, is the magic
word the Open Sesame! giving access to the

6°Xbid., pp.

32-33-

pp.

34-35.
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specifically human world, to the world of human
culture.
Once man is in possession of this magic
his further progress is assured.
Such ■progress
is evidently not obstructed or made impossible
by any lack in the sense material.
The case of
Helen Keller, who reached a very high degree of
mental development and intellectual°culture, shows
us clearly and irrefutably that a human being in
the construction of his human world is not dependent
upon the quality of his sense material.
If the
theories of sensationalism were right, if every
idea were nothing but a faint copy of an original
sense impression, then the condition of a blind,
deaf, and dumb child would indeed be desperate.
For it would be deprived of the very sources of
human knowledge; it would be, as it were, an exile
from reality.
But if we study Helen Keller’s
autobiography we are at once aware that this is
untrue and at the same time we understand why it
is untrue.
Human culture derives its specific
character and its intellectual and moral values,
not from the material of which it consists, but
from its form, its architectural structure.
And this form may be expressed in any sense
material.52'
The thing of vital importance is not the individual
brikcs and stones but their general FUNCTION as
architectural form.
In the realm of speech it is
their general symbolic function which vivifies the
material signs and "makes them speak". Without
this vivifying principle the human world would
indeed remain deaf and mute. With this principle,
even the world of a deaf, dumb, and blind child
can become incomparably broader and richer than
the world of the most highly developed animal.
Universal applicability, owing to the fact
that everything has a name, is one of the greatest
prerogatives of human symbolism. But it is not the
only one.
There is still another characteristic
of symbols which accompanies and complements this
one and forms its necessary correlate.
A symbol
is not only universal but extremely variable.
I can express the same meaning in various
languages; and even within the limits of a single
language a single thought or idea may be expressed
in quite different terms.
A sign or signal is
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related to the thing to which it refers in a fixed
and unique way.
One concrete and individual sign
refers to a certain individual thing.
In Pavlov’s
experiments the dogs could easily be trained to
reach for food only upon being given special
signs; they would not eat until they heard a
particular sound which could be chosen at the
discretion of the experimenter.
But this bears no
analogy, as it has often been interpreted, to human
symbolism; on the contrary, it is opposite to
symbolism.
A genuine human symbol is characterized
not by its uniformity but by its versatility.
It
is not rigid or inflexible but mobile.
It is true
that full AWARENESS of this mobility seems to be a
rather late achievement In man’s intellectual and
cultural development.
In primitive mentality this
awareness is very seldom attained.
Here the symbol
is still regarded as a property of the thing like
other physical properties.
In mythical thought
the name of a god is an integral part of the nature
of a god.
If I do not call the god by its right,
then the spell or prayer becomes ineffective.
The same holds good for symbolic actions.
A
religious rite, a sacrifice, must always be
performed in the same invariable way and in the
same order if it is to have its effect. 21
Children are often greatly confused when they first
learn that not every name of an object is a
‘'proper name”, that the same thing may have quite
different names in different languages.
They tend
to think that it “is” what it is called.
But this
is only the first step.
Every normal child will•
very soon learn that it can use various symbols to
express the same wish or thought.
For this
variability and mobility there is apparently no
parallel in the animal world.22
Long before Laura
Bridgman had learned to speak, she had developed a
very curious mode of expression, a language of her
own.
This language did not consist of articulated
sounds but only of various noises, which are
described as “emotional noises”.
She was in the
habit of uttering these sounds in the presence of
certain persons.
Thus they became entirely
individualized; every person in her environment
was greeted by a special noise.
’Whenever she met
unexpectedly an acquaintance,’ writes Dr. Lieber,
*1 found that she repeatedly uttered the word for
that person before she began to speak.
It was the
utterance of pleasurable recognition.*But when
hy means of the finger alphabet the child had
grasped the meaning of human language the case was
altered.
Now the sound really became a name: and
this name was not bound to an individual person
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but could be changed if the circumstances seemed
to require it.D-^

Another important aspect of our general problem
now emerges
the problem of the DEPENDENCE OP
RELATIONAL THOUGHT UPON SYMBOLIC THOUGHT.
Without
a complex.system of symbols relational thought
cannot arise at all, much less reach its full
development.
It would not be correct to say that
the mere AWARENESS of relations uresupposes an
inueilectual act, an act of logical or abstract
thought.
Such an awareness is necessary even in
e ementary acts of perception.
The sensationalists
theories used to describe perception as a mosaic of
simple sense data.
Thinkers of this persuasion
constantly overlooked the fa,ct that sensation
no means a mere aggregate or bundle
of isolated impressions.
Modern Gestalt psychology
has corrected this view.
It has shown that the
very simplest perceptual processes imply fundamenual structural elements, certain patterns or
configurations.
This principle holds for both the
human and the animal world.
Even in comparatively
low stages of animal life the presence of these
structural elements — especially of spatial and
optical structures — has been experimentally
proved. O
The mere awareness of relations cannot,
therefore, be regarded as a specific feature of
human consciousness.
We do find, however, in man
a special type of relational thought which has no
parallel in the animal world.
In man an ability to
isolate relations — to consider them in their
abstract, meaning
has developed.
In order to
grasp this meaning man is no longer dependent unon
concrete sense data, upon visual, auditory, tactile
kinesthetic data.
He considers these relations
in themselves*’.. . .
Geometry is the classic
example of this turning point in man's intellectual
liie.
Even in elementary geometry we are not bound
to the apprehension of concrete individual figures,
he are not concerned with physical things or
perceptual objects, for we are studying°universal
spatial relations for whose expression we have an
adequate symbolism.
Without the preliminary step
of human language such an achievement would not be
possible. 04-
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To be sure all attempts to intellectualize mvth —
to explain it as an allegorical expression of a
theoretical, or.moral truth — have completely
failed.
They ignore the fundamental facts of
mychical experience.
The real substration of
myth.is not a substration of thought but of
eeling, . hyth and primitive religion are by no
means entirely incoherent, they are not bereft of
sense or reason.
But their coherence demands much
more upon unity of feeling than upon logical rules,
inis unity is one of the strongest and most profound
impulses of primitive thought.
If scientific
thought wishes to describe and explain reality it
is bound to use its general method, which is that
oi classiiication and systematization.
Life is
divided into separate provinces that are sharnly
distinguished from each other.
The boundaries
•
between the kingdoms of plants, of animals, of
men -- the differences between species, families
genera.-- are fundamental and ineffaceable.
But’
the primitive mind ignores and rejects them all.
Its view of life is a synthetic, not an'analytic
one.
Life is not divided into classes and
subclasses.
It is felt as an unbroken continuous
whole which does not admit of any clean-cut and
trenchant distinctions.
The limits between the
dii ferent spheres are not insurmountable barriers:
they are fluent and fluctuating.
There is no
specific difference between the various realms of
ife.
Nothing has a definite, invariable, static
shape.
By a sudden metamorphosis everything may
be turned into everything.
If there is any°
characteristic and outstanding feature of the
myohical world, any law by which is is governed _
it is this law of metamorphosis.
Even so we can
scarcely explain the instability of the mythical
world by the incapacity of primitive man to grasp
the empirical differences of things.
In this
regard the savage very often proves his superiority
o the civilized man.
He is susceptible to many
distinctive features that escape our attention.
The animal drawings and paintings that we find*in
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the lowest stages of human culture, in paleolithic
art, have often been admired for their naturalistic
character.
They show an astounding knowledge of
all sorts of animal forms.
The whole existence of
primitive man depends in great part upon his gifts
of observation and discrimination.
If he is a
hunter he must be lamiliar with the smallest details
of animal life; he must be able to distinguish the
traces of.various animals.
All this is scarcely in
keeping with the assumptions that the primitive mind,
by its very nature and essence, is undifferentiated
or confused, a prelogical or mystical mind.
What is characteristic of primitive mentality
is not its logic but its general sentiment of life.
Primitive man does not look at nature with the eyes
of a naturalist who wishes to classify things in’
order to satisfy an intellectual curiosity.
Ke does
not approach it with merely pragma, tic or technical,
interest.
It is for him neither a mere object of
knowledge nor the field of his immediate practical
needs.
We are in the habit of dividing our lives
into the two spheres of practical and theoretical
activity.
In this division we are prone to forget
that.there is a lower stratum beneath them both.
Primitive man is not liable to such forgetfulness.
All his thoughts and his feelings are still embedded
in this lower original stratum.
His view of nature
is neither merely theoretical nor mere practical.:
it is SYMPATHETIC.
If we miss this point we cannot
find the approach to the mythical world.
The most
fundamental feature of myth is not its special
direction of thought or special direction of human
imagination.
Myth is the offspring of emotion and
its emotional background imbues all its productions
with its own specific color.65

Pong beiore a child learns to talk it has discovered
other and simpler means of communicating with other
persons.
The cries of discomfort, of pain and
hunger, of fear or fright, which we find throughout
the organic world begin to assume a new shape.
They are no longer simple instinctive reactions, for
they are employed in a more conscious and deliberate
W.
When left alone the child demands by more or
less articulate sounds the presence of its nurse or
mother, and it becomes aware that these demands have
the desired effect.
Primitive man transfers this

^Ibid,
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first elementary social experience to the totality
of nature.
To him nature and society are not only
interconnected by the closest bonds; they form a
coherent and indistinguishable whole.
No clearcut line of demarcation separates the two realms.
Nature itself is nothing but a great society —
the society of life.^o

The ‘’hunger" for names which at a certain age
appears in every child and which has been
described by all students of child psychology39,.,
reminds us that we are here confronted with a quite
different problem.
By learning to name things a
child does not simply add a list of artificial
signs.to his previous knowledge of ready-made
empirical, objects.
He learns rather to form the
concepts of these objects, to come to terms with
the objective world.
Henceforth the child stands
on firmer ground.
His vague, uncertain, fluctua¬
ting perceptions and his dim feelings begin to
assume a new shape.
They may be said to crystal¬
lize around the name as a fixed center, a focus of
thought.
Without the help of the name every new
advance made in the process of objectification
would always run the risk of being lost again in
the next moment.
The first names of which a child
makes conscious use may be compared to a stick by
the aid. of which a blind man gropes his way.
And
language, taken as a whole becomes the gateway to
a new world.
All progress here opens a new
perspective and widens and enriches our concrete
experience.
Eagerness and enthusiasm to talk do.
not originate in a mere desire for learning or
using names; they mark the desire for the detection
and conquest of an objective world.^0 6?

The name of an object lays no claim upon its nature;
it is not intended to... give us the truth of a
thing.
The function of a name is always limited to
emphasizing a particular aspect of a thing, and it
is precisely this restriction and limitation upon
which the value of the name depends.
It is not the
function of a name to refer exhaustively to a
concrete situation, but merely to single out and
dwell upon a certain aspect.
This isolation of this
aspect is not a negative but a positive act.
For in

66Ibid ., p. no.
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•the act of denomination we select, out of the
multiplicity and. diffusion of our sense data,
certain fixed centers of perception.
These
centers are not the same as in logical or
scientific thought.
The terms of ordinary soeech
are not to be measured by the same standards as
those in which we express scientific concepts.
As compared with scientific terminology the words
of common speech always exhibit a certain vague¬
ness; almost without exception they are so
indistinct and ill-defined as not to stand the
test of logical analysis.
But not withstanding
this unavoidable and inherent defect our everyday
terms and names are the milestones on the road
whicn leads to scientific concepts; it is in these
terms that we receive our first' objective or
theoretical view-of the world.
Such a view is not
simply given”; it is the result of a constructive
intellectual eiiort which without the constant
assistance of language could not attain its end.68
Ihe writer has found it necessary to quote Cassirer
at great length for it seemed only appropriate to conjure
this issue the considerable wisdom and scholarly research
Oi a man which, in the area of symbolic development,
perhaps knows of no equal.
in his own right,

Cassirer,

a notable philosopher’

had amassed an extraordinary wealth of

empirical and historical research to this subject,

conse-

✓

quently it would seem presumptious of this writer to attempt
to paraphrase the views of this great thinker,

for his

exactitude and clarity of expression are difficult to
surpass.

Thus it is in light of the Vast intellectual

resource contained implicitly within Cassirer1s thoughts on
symbolic development that we shall attempt to elaborate,
an increasingly precise and scientifically propitious

68
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manner,

the theory of symbolic development originally

proposed

(earlier in this chapter) by the writer.

Section Five
With the above information in mind, let us endeavor to
more clearly and systematically formulate a theory of
symbolic development appropriate for a subjective psycho¬
logy.

Three very general

stages of development

can be said to encompass this phenomenon, namely,
_

familiar divisions of
hood-adolescence,

(I) infancy-childhood,

the

(II) child¬

(III) adolescence-adulthood.

Since the

most important and dramatic developments in symbolic
behavior occur during the first stage, preponderant
analytical attention will be devoted to this period.

I»

Infancy - Childhood Stage
a)

At-the immediate outset of a child’s life,
(prenatal and shortly thereafter) anything
that could be regarded as mind (minimal
conscious awareness, or "that" which stands
over and against percepta issuing from
natural or internal bodily stimulus-objects)
is at a very minimum.
There is probably in
evidence a bare subjective world of undiffer¬
entiated, highly vague organic-feeling percepta
(of course all this is necessarily very
speculative, but some discussion of this early
period seems warranted if only to help differ¬
entiate among stages of symbolic development).
At this level, it seems tenable to say that the
purely -perceptual "world" of the infant is
GREATLY*INTROVERTED in that FELT percepta arise
from internal organismic locations as well as
from the natural world (of course no such
distinction between these two distinct realms
is realized by an infant mentality, for such
an understanding is itself contingent upon
some amount of symbolic facility).
This period
also appears to be dominated primarily by

123

pleasure-pain feelings whose intensity and
hence distinctness from one another would
seem to increase as the organism matured
both physiologically and mentally.
b)

Next it would appear that qualitatively more
sophisticated states of emotion, beyond a
minimal awareness of painful and pleasurable
feelings, would develop merely as a result of
physiological growth, and in varying degrees,
to low-ordered pre-symbolic learnings; thus,
vaguely aware experiences like FEELING the
consumption of food, and mother’s warmth, for
example, could be progressively differentiated:
still a.s predominantly introverted experience.

c)

The vague subjective emotional state of
ANTICIPATION seems to be the next significant
development.
Here we assume that after a
backlogue of important experiences have been
"neurologically recorded” (a mode of acquiring
very basic information that is pre-symbolic
and does not rely upon considerably more
sophisticated causal factors such as ’conscious
intentionality’, etc., but rather, involves
automatic reflexive behavior developed through
various modes of reinforcement that require
minimal conscious entertainment of previously
learned Information), a primordial form of
memory (wisdom) would be coming to bear upon
the infant’s ever-emerging present perceptual
awareness such that the present subjective
psychological or conscious occasion would be
CONSTRUCTIVELY QUALIFIED to some extent by
the integrated learnings from past experience.
Thus the emotional states resulting from
experiencing food and motherly caressing would,
in a very minimal way, be consciously anticipated
by the infant human organism; pleasurable
reactions would also be somewhat more intense
due to the newly achieved state of anticipation.
REFLECTIVE recognition of anticipated experi¬
ence would still remain introverted in that the
pleasurable experience, for example, would be
acknowledged as such during its actual occurrence,
but not recalled after the fact, or recognized
to have “resulted from” the external stimulusobjects, food or mother.

d)

We now move to the phenomenon of.“projecting
emotion” whereby the infant becomes aware
that there is an external world possessing an
independent existence that is capable of
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influencing • hi s experience (this corresponds
to the outset of Cassirer’s ’sign stage’).
This is simply to say that "something (mother)
yields warmth", "something (food) is
pleasurable", "something (fear) is the absence
of something (a comforting mother)", and so on.
Out of these types of vaguely conscious
discriminations, the infant begins to respond
to external stimulus-objects so as to project
his emotional states (thereby demonstrating
a more consciously active character as opposed
to former reflexive behavioral qualities) at
those objects manifested through crying, biting,
touching and by manifesting other types of
spontaneous emotional expression that promote
an increased frequency of crude exploratory
behaviors, as a.result of their pleasurably
reinforcing consequences.
e)

•

It is a result of being aware of an external
world, and from actively responding to it,
that the primordial emotion represented by
the term ’power* arises; whereby an infant
vaguely becomes cognizant of the fact that
certain behaviors that he executes tend to
increase the number of emotionally satisfying
subjective states, while minimizing the
frequency of those experienced as unpleasant.
For example, the act of crying when an infant
organism has feelings of hunger often results
in the appearance of a "something" (mother)
which relieves the discomforting states /the
words used to explain certain phenomena as,
for example, the hypothesized ’feeling of power’,
merely by the fact that they are WORDS (used
to designate and explain the phenomenon),
greatly overstates the subjectively understood
INFANTILE MEANING undoubtedly characteristic
of such vague, amorphous experiential occasions.
However unsuitable this kind of explanation may
be, some attempt at designating developmental
stages must be made to accentuate the distinc¬
tive, and hence, psychologically necessary
conditions presupposed for early symbolic,
and later, consciously reflective behavior^
Thus in this way infants have some determina¬
tion (viz., through what they experience as
pleasurable, painful, etc.) in increasing the
frequency of pleasurable states and minimizing
the unpleasant ones; this is the bare experi¬
ence of power.
(NOTE: In this whole develop¬
mental process the reader might bear in mind
the notion of a computer having data programmed
into its memory TO BE USED FOR FUTURE

12 5

OPERATIONS, rather than interpreting too
literally the connotations of the words used
to explain this phenomenon of infantile symbolic
acquisition — words that are MEANINGFUL to an
ADULT mind for .characterizing ADULT experience.
However, the limitations of the computer
analogy — and consequently a basic reason for
discoursing about directly experienced organic
feelings, bodily emotions, a.s well as conscious¬
ness and reflective consciousness
is that
the concept of programming’ does not emphasize
or even logically imply the unique SYNTHETIC
POWER of brain neurology.- The necessary
phenomenon of ‘relevant past experience coming
constructively to bear upon immediately
delivered internal and external perceptions
thereby enhancing their subjective psychological
MEANING5 is, without question, not implicit
in the computer illustration.
This is to say
that DISCIPLINED FELT AWARENESS is not a causally
efficacious intervening variable in "mechanical
intelligence".
It is absolutely imperative to
understand that the acquisition of *• FELT WISDOM5
is crucial to human mentality, in that data
from past experience is not merely massively
stored and (blindly) MECHANICALLY utilized; it
is, rather, CONSCIOUSLY ENTERTAINED, and hence, '
ACTIVELY CONTEMPLATED in its utilization as
stimulus-objects for making additional
CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGENT behavioral responses
to CONSCIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD problematic circum¬
stances.
All this is not to say, however, that
intelligent behavior somehow "exceeds", or is
incomprehensible within, systematically deter¬
minable cause-effect relationships.
f)

At this level, Cassirer’s ’sign5 stage is more
clearly evident.
Infants attempt to imitate
the verbally articulated sounds of an attentive
other person; initially to acquire and hence
sustain the emotional pleasure of gaining
attention and affection.
Consequently, infant
responses are imitative without any meaningful
understanding of the uttered linguistic
symbols, for the interpersonal exchanges in
themselves are highly gratifying for infants
even though their inner states are essentially
emotional.
At higher levels of emotional
discipline infant gratification results, in
addition, from active "reality testing"
prompted by primordial curiosity.

s)

But after prolonged, consistent exposure to
the ’sign5 mode of behavior, what Cassirer
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defines as the ’symbol* stage emerges; this
is the crucially important one for human
organisms.
Here we are presented with the
phenomenon where, for example, a mother, after
having repeatedly spoken the word "mama”
while concomitantly making self-referential
gestures, discovers that the child is beginning
to-emit verbal "mama-responses" when he
perceptually apprehends her presence or he
desires her attention.
In this, the child
becomes vaguely aware of the fact that his
entire relevant experiential backlogue
referring to ’mother stimulus-object effect*
/derived from a multitude of vaguely recalled,
but powerfully PELT previous experiences —.
e.g., ’mother-warm*, ’mother-food*, ’motherplayful*, ’mother-pain reliever’, etc/7 is
PROJECTED at mother-stimulus-object by
expressing the WORD "mama".
The relevant
past has been constructively brought to bear
upon the present occasion so as to MEANINGFULLY
transcend the bare implication of the external
perceptual apprehension delivered in the
contemporary circumstance.
The highly vague
and indeterminate EMOTIONAL configuration of
’mama-experiences * are UNITED, and hence
(intentionally), PROJECTED merely by speaking
the word "mama".
After this process has
been frequently repeated, using other words as
well, the child begins to understand that
verbally articulated sounds are more than
merely sounds expressed to attract and maintain
adult attention.
Rather, words REPRESENT
CATEGORIES of relevant emotional experience
with respect togiven familiar stimulus-objects.
Pleasurable and painful experiences can be
differentiated by subsuming them to the
inclusive, and thereby unifying, category of
emotional meaning represented by an appropriate
word.
This excites a feeling of power in young
children; they have discovered a means for
ORGANIZING and CLARIFYING their strange world
of concrete emotional experience.
As a
repertoire of words are accumulated, the
precondition for the still higher-ordered
phenomenon of SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMBOLIC
MEANING is progressively provided.
Words are
found to not only comprehend categories of
EMOTIONAL experience, but also, by expressing
them in certain sequences, emotional categories
of experience can be MANIPULATED; and more
exciting, one can "PROJECT" this process of
word manipulation to others and thereby
establish reciprocal communication!
Here we
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are at the very heart of the primordial nature
of subjective psychological MEANING, for if
WORDS encompass DETERMINATE categories of
FEELING AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE, one has the
POWER of ”RETRIEVING”, in a rapid and succinct
way, many pleasurable *mama-experiences*, for
example (fanticizing would be an elaboration
of this facility).
It is a way of CONCENTRATING
the FEELING of formerly experienced pleasure
by merely saying "mama”.
This is certainly an
extraordinary power; therefore, there is
considerable motivation for children to develop
this verbal capacity when they are initially
learning to talk.
Further, as the number of
EMOTIONALLY QUALIFYING symbols increases
/Hence enabling PAST experience to be RE-ENJOYED
Talthough less vividly) simply by expressing
the appropriate linguistic symbol/, and further,
by manipulating ordered sequences of symbols,
the phenomenon of * MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬
RELATEDNESS» develops.
This is the experience
of FEELING the UNITY of symbolically repre¬
sented objects in a vague but psychologically
meaningful, confident, and satisfying way.
Symbols not only represent global emotional
configurations of important past experience,
and moreover, provide a means for retrieving
and hence rendering aspects of the past
relatively permanent, but also, they are a
means for reducing the intensity of anxiety
resulting from indeterminate, felt complexity
of a given experiential occasion.
Thus a
symbol can SIMPLIFY complex and otherwise
unwieldly emotional experience such that the
more prominent aspects of experience can be
cognitively retained while the remaining
portions either entirely escape or fade from
conscious recognition.
In the process, then,
of organizing clearly determinate symbols
(which by their characteristic nature are
devices for simplifying and rendering permanent
IMPORTANT features of original concrete
experience, so that they may become intelligible
instruments for thinking-behavior) into a
definite order, diverse aspects of emotional
experience can be brought into novel relation¬
ships.
Moreover, symbols also have DENOTATIVE
aspects in that they can be clearly and easily
brought to mind, and thus manipulated with
reference to other symbols.
But in addition,
they have a CONNOTATIVE dimension which refers
to the vastly complex network of rich
emotionality (directly felt with greatest
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intensity particularly in infantile concrete
experience) that CANNOT, in all its ramifica¬
tions, be brought clearly to consciousness
due to the VERY FACT OF ITS'SUBTLE COMPLEXITY,
and also, because much of the original
intensity quickly fades from consciousness.
Nevertheless, some of this vague connotative
dimension is neurologically recorded as it
occurs as highly concrete, unified, barely
conscious emotional experience; in addition,
of course, to those denotative aspects which
have been intentionally (consciously)
symbolically qualified.
Thus when engaging
in the activity of symbolic thinking, symbols
are CLEARLY present in mind, specifically
relating various cognitive factors with one
another.
However, there is also the CONCOMIT¬
ANTLY occurring VAGUE, CONNOTATIVE dimension
which is EXPERIENTIALLY IMPLICIT in ALL
THOUGHT by being VAGUELY and COMPREHENSIVELY
SUGGESTED within the specifically CLEARLY
apprehendable symbols, as well as clusters of
symbols, intended to embody complete thoughts.
The CONNOTATIVE elements comprising complete
symbolic thought, considered as they are
SYNTHETICALLY united within the actual concrete
activity of thinking, is what is meant here by
the phenomenon of fMEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELTRELATED NESS* ,
This is, perhaps, the most
profoundly complicated of all"humanly
perceivable phenomena, and yet, it occurs as
a typical portion of all human thought, as a
result of individual human organisms possessing
a neurological system containing mechanisms
capable of synthesizing massive quantities of
sensory data progressively obtained from
experience and stored in millions of brain
cells.
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS
is the learned product, then, of developed
symbolic behavioral capacities in a class of
very high ordered organisms, in which the
symbols are used to SIMPLIFY the profound
complexities of the directly experienced effects
from inner and outer environments.
After
having symbolically “tagged” a small number of
the objects, properties, and their unifying
relations (functioning as stimulus objects)
in these environments (A BEHAVIORAL ACT MADE
POSSIBLE THROUGH A GRADUALLY EMERGING PROCESS
IN WHICH A SUBSTATUM OF EMOTIONAL FEELING IS
SUBSUMED TO SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE), the organism
Mas, in effect, imposed some small degree of
DISCIPLINE upon his formerly vague, amorphous
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organic and emotional feeling.
This is of
course a slowly acquired ability, hence yielding
to individual organisms, as subjective psycho¬
logical experience, a commensurate amount
reinforcing CONFIDENCE (at least until organisms
reach a high level of behavioral sophistication)
that is proportionate to symbolic mastery.
Symbolic acquisition is also a source of great
motivation for promoting further and more
precise comprehension of reality.
The FORM
which this process of symbolic discipline
(as clarified understanding) acquires seems to
be determined by the very objects and relations
that are DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED AS UNIFIED, in
their occurrence as perceptions resulting from
internally and externally located configurations
of stimulus-objects.
In any case MEANING-ASDIBECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS, at least in early
stages of symbolic development, is the way
that organisms have EXPEDIENTIALLY FELT BEING:
both as organic bodily and emotional feeling.
The term ,mama,5 for example, is heavily laden
with CONNOTATIVE meaning; the barren (clearly
conceived) spoken term occurs as merely a single
component of subjective psychological' experi¬
ential MEANING, in contrast to the accompanying
emergence of connotatively vague, emotionally
charged, symbolically undisciplined FELT
MEANING.
At the other extreme, however,
viz., that of highly developed adult symbolic
intelligence, the converse situation is in
evidence in that we can consciously entertain
many clearly understandable symbols (both in
silent thought and in intersubjectively manifest
behaviors).
To maintain (as this writer will)
that^the "substance" of thought is highly
disciplined emotional feeling —— made possible
through gradual symbolic development — is,
indeed, to express a view appearing very
peculiar at face value to mature adult
intelligence.- The rationale for this position,
although somewhat implicit in our previous
discussion on symbolic development, will be
presented in greater detail in future chapters.
Let it suffice to say at this time that /Because
the connotative aspect of symbolism refers to
the original infantile way that we directly FELT
(organically and emotionally} or experienced our
own internal and external natural states, while
the denotative aspect refers to the way that the
fullness of actual experiential occasions must
be SIMPLIFIED in order to^render it clearly
symbolically intelligible^/ at higher stages of
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intelligence, myriad symbols are acquired and
hence internalized as so profoundly inter¬
related, that they can be REFLEXIVELY conjured
to characterize experience with such great
facility that the originally C0NN0TATIVELY
(EMOTIONALLY) FELT aspect of experience is
SUBLIMATED.
As a result of this phenomenon
philosophers have come to define thought in
many diverse ways: Aristotle has characterized
thought as pure for mm 9 that can accept any
perceptual matter; Descartes considered thought
as extentionless substance or images;7° ang
Ryle conceptualizes thought as entirely manifest
behavior resulting from given stimulus and
reinforcing environmental conditions, considering
any recourse to inner states as an unwarranted
regression to seventeenth century "ghost-in-amachine” naivete; and similarly with Skinner,
(as we have seen) the problem of thought is
"resolved" by "short-circuiting over" the whole
issue via the concept of reflex arc.
As it is
the case with all theories of mind, the view
espoused by the writer (which has been
importantly influenced by Aristotle, Cassirer
and Whitehead) is also subject to criticism
as well because of the very difficult problem
of attempting to define and explicate the
experiential (hence.raising subjective psycho¬
logical phenomena to a FACTUAL status IF
properly conceived within an appropriate
theoretical framework) as well as the structural
nature of thought, as It is revealed in direct
subjective psychological experience.
The basic
justification for this obscure and difficult
theoretical viewpoint is that it seems precisely
characteristic of our IMMEDIATE CONCRETE
EXPERIENCE OF REALITY.
In this way, the writer
feels that his theoretical constructs,
particularly as they become more rigorously
defined, are quite in accord with the "facts".
As it has been said, we shall again return to
the issue of symbolic development, but in order
to make the argument more clear, new and more
precise constructs must be formulated; a task
which will be the primary focus of attention in
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in the remainder of this chapter, and al so
in the third chapter.
The^reader will have noticed at this point,
no ooubt, that we have significantly deviated
fiom our attempt to define the conspicuous
features of the developmental stages of
symbolic acquisition manifested in the
* Inf ant - Childhood" period (Stage I),
This
digression seemed justified in order to
ir2^roduce
cru-cially important concept of
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS, and to
demonstrate, in some minimal way, its
relationship to adult symbolic intelligence,
how let us return to our discussion on the
development oi symbolic intelligence in the
maturing human organism.
We have at this
point indicated the final developmental sub¬
stage of the *Infant --Childhood’ period.
As it has been said the most important stage,
by far, with respect to symbolic intelligence,
is this entire initial stage for most of the
j.undamental aspects of symbolic behavior have
been (at least) basically mastered, with the
exception of purely abstract symbolic intelligence.
Childhood -- Adolescence St am e
a)

For the purposes of this paper, let us simply
say that this period is primarily involved in
acquiring symbolic sophistication in charac¬
terizing stimulus-object effects (including
ne properties, and the relations demonstrated
by entitles in relative change with one
another), and developing an operational
facility in the active, functional usage of
symools,
Also, there is the development of
symbolic abstractive intelligence, embodied
in such behaviors as developing generaliza¬
tions about phenomenal occurrences which have
properties in common, for example; e.g., in
developing inductive-deductive" reasoning
powers, characteristic of the mathematical and
geometrical (formal) scientific reasoning, etc.

111 • J^°3lLSce^
Q-)

Similarly, with respect to the purposes of
this paper, this period involves a" final
major development in refining symbolic

intelligence, and in exploiting this ability
(in some cases) to its optimum limits.
Therefore it can be generally concluded from our
discussion on symbolic development,

that the phenomenon

initially arises out of an organism1s ability to subjectivel
experience QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT types of organic bodily
"ulu emotional FEELING — viz., painful and pleasurable
inner siaies, and hence, actively proceed (because of the
organism*s intrinsic bodily STRUCTURE) to increase the
frequency of states experienced as pleasurable

, and from

tnis to progressively ORGANIZE and CLARIFY vague, primordial.,
sporaoic organic and emotional feelings via. symbols
/HABITS also originate in the same way, in principle, but
the whole process is greatly accelerated through inter¬
penetrative relationships with other human organisms
already possessing a mature symbolic facility (who function
as agents capable of yielding feed-back responses to
symbolically unsophisticabed organisms that are ACTIVELY
enaeavoring to increase the frequency of their qualitatively
pleasurable subjective psychological experiences)?.

The

RATIONAL structural form in. which symbols acquire coherence
and qualitatively variable subjective psychological MEANING,
ALSO arises fromjorganism*s gradual understanding of the
irectly experienced structure of reality revealed in
reoccurring configurations of percepta (as they embody the
nature of entities,

their properties, and the relations

cJnons en"tities in process), as these percepta and their
tf-oaes of occurrence are progressively attributed specificity
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through precise symbolic representation,

testifying to the

predictable and distinctive features of inner and outer
experience.

Truly, then, the situation is as Cassirer has

conceived it:

tf

i1: were» discovered a new method of
thePwnS ^mself to his environment.
Between
find in
°n ?nd-,the effector system, which we
link whiai1 animal species we find in man a third
mwfo I* h we.may describe as the SYMBOLIC SYSTEM
life ne" aoqulslti°n transforms the whole of human
life.
As compared with other animals man lives
not merely in broader; he lives, so to sneak in
r nce between organic reactions and
taunm respcmses.
In the flrst oase a direct and
immediate answer is given to an outward stimulus;
n the second case the answer is delayed.
It is
proce^of thougW??fded ^ * Sl°W and

No longer can man confront reality immediately;
he
~~ -*
•
•y»
as
it
m cannot see it » —
vie re, face
to
face
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion
Of
activity advances.
Instead
f dealing with the things themselves man is in
a sense constantly conversing with himself. 72
®lde by side with conceptual language there
i an emotional language; side by side with
logical or scientific language there is a
language of poetic imagination.
Primarily
languagedoes not express thoughts or ideas,
but feelings and affections.23
Here we can clearly determine the difference between
Cassirer’s concept of human behavior in distinction from
that oi

Skinner's.

The previous chapter has, in effect,

'?1 Cassirer, An_Essay... , op. clt.. p. 24.
72Ibld.. p. 25.
73ibid., p. 25.
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been a series of arguments criticizing the Bshavioristic
conception of human behavior;

showing it to be highly useful

as a methodological way of investigating a particular class
of human behavior — namely that which is directly apparent
to external observers —, but as never being capable of
providing, in principle, a complete exposition of all
causally efficacious variables that determine behavior, for
all subjective psychological factors are methodologically
purged from a Behaviorism.

In doing this, the way had been

cleared to devote our attention to developing a systematic
concept of human behavior issuing from subjective psycho¬
logical experience (one having much in common with the
views of Cassirer and Whitehead), and in this way, laying
the foundation for a second, mutually exclusive way of
conceptualizing behavior.

Thus, BOTH an objective and

subjective psychological approach to studying human
behavior can, in principle, yield a full systematic account
of this phenomenon.

Section Six
The preceding discussion on the theories of conscious
and consciously reflective behavior, and the development of
symbolic behavior, were expressed in terms lacking in
definitional rigor.

It is the writer*s sentiment that

discussion of this sort is the "raw material" out of which
more precise formulations can be developed, for less formal
analysis is generally more in accordance'with concrete,
immediate experience — a source of indeterminate
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suggestability for theoretical construction.

To remain

exclusively within the domain of formal abstraction or
parsimonious operational definition, which often manifest
only the guise of rigorous scientific formulation, is to
purge from one’s thoughts the very elements that frequently
stimulate novel, ingeneous cognitive associations.
Particularly when devising constructs to systematically
characterize human behavior, great care should be exercised
in avoiding the frequently committed error of developing
a concept oi man that includes only those aspects of his
behavior which he shares in common with lower-ordered
organisms and mechanical calculating devices (while
omitting many dimensions that are' uniquely distinctive to
the human organism), again, under the guise of being
rigorously scientific.

Concrete human experience as it is

known through direct acquaintance provides us with an
abundance of FACTUAL data.

The key to understanding this

type of complexly delivered information is in developing
testable hypothetical constructs designed specifically to
elucidate the unique character of CONCRETE HUMAN EXPERIENCE
as it reveals itself in recurrent perceptual ways; not by
exclusively attempting to study man as though he were a
consciousness physical entity whose behavioral manifesta/

tions could be understood solely in terms of natural and
%

biological scientific concepts, for this is to exclude the
CAUSAL EFFICACITY OF MENTAL EVENTS as a powerful class of
uniquely human behavioral determinants.
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Therefore, with the above clearly in. view, let us now
begin to develop a highly abstract, comprehensive theo¬
retical model for human behavior;

suitable for systematic

scientific investigation, but carefully designed to avoid
the error of committing an unwarranted scientific reductionism by methodologically omitting important causally
efficacious aspects of human behavior.

The definitional

terms to be used to define the model are intended to
possess cybernetic universality with respect to comprehending
the physio-chemica.l processes involved in activated human
organic bodily mechanisms (or any organism!c mechanisms,
for that matter).

Hence the writer sees no serious

incompatibility between the methodological procedures used
in this paper and those demonstrated by Ross Ashby in his
Design for a Brain?^ and Introduction to Cybernetics?^
(although Ashby*s expositions are considerably more detailed,
and brilliantly elaborated, in contrast to those of the
V7riter*s).

Once again, it is the contention of the writer

that the uniquely human behavioral phenomena formerly
discussed and analyzed in non-technical terms /namely
conscious and reflective conscious symbolic (subjective
psychological) behavior?, have (IN PRINCIPLE) empirically
ascertainable, equivalent physio-chemical correlative states
that can be generally theoretically comprehended in their

74

W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (New York: John
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dynamic states by the cybernetic model to be proposed.
This cybernetic model,

then, will represent the physio-

chemical processes that are EMPIRICALLY identical with
correlative mental processes, and further,

show the relation

ship of mental events (as EMERGENT phenomena) to their
underlying physio-chemical processes.

This is not to say,

however, precisely because of the arguments propounded in
"Chapter One", that the cybernetic model to be presented
is in itself SUFFICIENT for a complete explanation of human
behavior; rather, that it is a NECESSARY theoretical
instrument for such an endeavor.
In past discussions we began our analysis of new
topics by initially considering some of their intuitively
obvious dimensions, and then gradually worked to clarify
them by carefully analyzing their basic presuppositions in
order to explicate their intrinsic implications.

This

(reflectively) critical and constructive process seems
characteristic of intelligent behavior in general.

Speaking

metaphorically, this analytical activity is the process of
moving from vague awareness in understanding to clear
understanding.

However,

stated in this manner, there is the

erroneous implication that * clear understanding* is to be
equated with *FINAL understanding*.

Rather, the process of

clear conception is a CYCLICAL one, for in having achieved
clarity of understanding at a given point in time, part of
the triumph entails coming to realize the extraordinary
SYMBOLIC RELATEDNESS of concepts; hence, the paradox that
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clarity also perpetuates vagueness.
standing can be comprehended

Thus clear under¬

(as such) only in reference

to one’s former state of vague understanding, but once an
issue has been clearly understood, we often concomitantly
become aware of our (in fact) limited comprehension of a
topic of concern.

To be unable to accept the fact of ’the

relatedness of things’ is to degenerate into dogmatism, for
this ontalogical fact demands that we incessantly subject
our most, cherished theories to intensive, persistent
critical examination; ready always to strip away their
outmoded and/or contradictory aspects, and more important,
to continually contemplate them from novel perspectives in
an effort to derive fresh meaning from concepts.

If this

general view of intelligent behavior is substantially
valid, then a critical evaluation of conventional techniques
for "measuring” intelligence seems warranted, as well as the
theories upon which they are predicated, for they generally
tend to de-emphasize the relatedness of concepts /or stated
differently, the CONNOTATIVE implications that intrinsically
define these ideational entities (which is another way of
conceptualizing the relatedness of thing sJ/j while
(erroneously) stressing ”stable” factual information.
Empirical factual knowledge is not simply "hard and fast";
its very possibility for expansion (as it is the case with
’analytical’ knowledge) issues from ’the relatedness of
things’.

The logical meaning of the. term ’human intelli¬

gence’ will, then, be worthy of further attention in future
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discussion for our present enquiries will shortly lead us
to the very heart of subjective psychological meaning in
its various qualitative manifestations (arising as a func¬
tion oi given stimulus—occasions).

But for the present,

the basic reason for raising the issue of *vague—to—clear
understanding* and the accompanying concept of * relatedness *
is that they are intrinsic to the cybernetic model to be
developed in the sense that these notions, beyond the fact
that they have relevance for conscious processes,

signify

also, on a physio-chemical level, the synthetic character
of the organic processes that underlie mental events.

We

shall now proceed to develop the model.
Human beings are constantly exposed, at any point in
time, to an incessant flow of stimulus-object effects
issuing from BOTH the external natural world and their
internal bodily organisms.

Not only are we constantly

bombarded, for example, by myriad details of manifest
macroscopic environments, but also those of the physical
microcosm.

There are colors, pains, desires,

sounds,

concepts, perceptions of solidity, relations among these
entities, etc.; and also, cosmic rays, ultrasonic sounds,
electromagnetic forces, etc. — to mention but a few of the
many diverse stimulus-object effects that persistently
affect our entire organism in varying ways throughout time.
011

the other hand, in our matter-of-fact daily activities,

°ur worlds seem to be tolerably comprehensible and well
ordered — trees are trees, duties are duties, love is love,
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and so on.

Thus amid the enormous concrete complexity of

physical and conscious processes and modes of interaction
among these processes,

the human mind,

in face of this

complexity (much of which is directly consciously ascer¬
tainable without specialized apparatus),

comprehends daily

affairs in a greatly SIMPLIFIED manner; particularly
attending to those factors of IMPORTANCE, while innumerable
other equally as conspicuous factors are left unnoticed as
they appear as potential stimulus-object effects.

The point

to be made out of all this is that we SELECTIVELY PERCEIVE,
and hence THINK ABOUT,

stimulus-object effects; we consciously

dwell upon that which is IMPORTANT to us, for whatever
reason.

More specifically,

our sensory apparatus /even

though many HYPOTHETICAL phenomena alleged to exist in our
environments are not directly perceivable by us,
thereoy regarded as theoretical constructs
waves,

ids,

egos, gravity, magnetic fields,

and are

(e.g., light
etc.)7 does

enable us to POTENTIALLY perceive considerably more percep¬
tions than we ordinarily, in fact, do.
presently engaged in writing this paper,

For example, while
there are manv
t/

external sounds of automobiles passing;
consciously heard

(by the writer)

yet they are not

(although they do affect

the ear as sensation) for predominant attention is devoted
to -che task of actively writing. Certainly the organic
mechanisms involved in hearing are operating, but CONSCIOUS
attention is focused upon another matter of greater
IMPORTANCE,

thereby gaining precedence over concomitantly

141

occurring stimulus-object effects.
with the

strange phenomenon of conscious reflection experi-

entially over-riding bare,
the POTENTIALITY of arising
tion.

Here we are confronted

unimportant sense data that have
(consciously) as sense perceu-

But apart from this specific example,

there a.re many

diverse manifestations of this SELECTIVE-perception
phenomenon.

Frequently,

for example,

during psychotherapy,

a client will exhibit certain manifest behaviors without
being aware of this fact until the counselor makes specific
reference to the occurrences.
when clients*

Illustrations of this are

hands tremble while they talk,

those who constantly smile while conversing,

or there are
and so on.

A final example of selective perception (although there are
numerous others) is in the case of a student who has care¬
fully read a poem and is quite confident that he has
mastered its meanings, but much to his surprise, when in
class, the instructor reveals an obvious, important consid¬
eration well within the studentfs realm of understanding
that he had completely overlooked.

We have cited three

rather different illustrations of the familiar phenomenon
of selective perception, varying primarily with respect to
the level of complexity of the cognitively (potentially)
perceivable component OMITTED from the cognitions that
WERE (reflectively) consciously entertained.
instance,

In the first

the perceptions of external natural sounds did

not emerge into consciousness.

The second case involved a

client who was not aware of the fact that his hands were

t
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trembling; no doubt resulting from a vaguely understood
concomitant subjective psychological feeling of anxiety that
subtly plagues the client during his reflective efforts.
And third,

there was the student who unwittingly failed to

consider a unit of interpretative meaning that he had
repeatedly entertained in prior reflections, while on the
other hand,

successfully managed to generate several

equally as complex interpretations in his conscious experi¬
ence.

Thus in all three cases something potentially capable

of perceptual or intellectual apprehension had been over¬
looked until either personally reflectively brought to
attention at a later time, or ascertained with the aid of
another person;

then the previously overlooked factors were

spontaneously understood by the subjects in question.
These manifestations of unintentional perceptual omission
could be regarded as resulting from the gradual development
of PRECONSCIOUS and CONSCIOUS modes of HABITUATION.

The

writer, when overlooking insignificant external sounds, did
not consciously and. deliberately say to himself,
going to write,

*'I am now

therefore I will NOT admit external sounds

into my conscious recognition”; nor did the client
deliberately decide NOT to be aware of the fact that his
hand was trembling while he sopke;

and similarly,

the

student certainly did NOT decide to overlook an obvious
interpretation of an assigned poem to be analyzed.

From

this, we may generalize that human behavior includes a vast
number of similar habituational modes.

Hence,

even though
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we could POTENTIALLY respond def^erently than we, in fact,
actually do respond in almost any circumstance,

such is

rarely the case, for over the years human organisms gradually
develop complex and interrelated patterns of hoth reflexive
(or preconscious) and conscious habitual modes of behavior in
accordance to FREQUENTLY REOCCURRING STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS.
For example vie see the color ’red1,
feeling 'pain*,

etc.,

characterize them;

the object

1 table ',

the

and we reflexively linguistically

hence infusing these entities with

subjective psychological meaning (i.e., rendering them
personally intelligible).

Similarly, we speak in linguis¬

tically coherent sequences, perform mathematically sophis¬
ticated calculations,
relationships,

experience personally meaningful

etc., largely from the possibility of having

developed innumerable const!tuative cognitive habituations,
in principle,

determinable as resulting from specific,

recurrent STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS /however,

the first two

selective-perception illustrations, and particularly the
latter one

(because of the arguments presented in our

preceding discussions on the limitations of Behaviorism for
comprehending human behavior) cannot be EXCLUSIVELY analyzed
in terms of reflexive phenomena;

rather, as we have seen,

conscious awareness is a NECESSARY consideration in such an
analysis.

The point that is being suggested is that

although a scientific psychology must,
behavior in cause-effect relationships,

of course, view
our notions of what

may qualify as causally efficacious agents must be expanded
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to include not only natural factors, but ideational factors
as well7.

This basic HABITUATIVE character of human

behavior will hereafter be expressed in the following
technical manner:

HUMAN ORGANISMS DEVELOP PRECONSCIOUS AND

ideational propensities for responding to given
CORRELATIVE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS.
'

Further,

it is

*

reasonable to assume that physio-chemical conditions under/

lie all possible mental events

(loosely defined as

consisting of .'a consciousness which stands over and
against percepta or stimulus-object effects*, the latter
components of which issue from stimulus-objects LOCATED in
either the concomitantly perceived natural world or personal
bodily organism of the percipient himself).
can,

Therefore we

in principle, maintain even a more general position in

theoretically conceptualizing human behavior, namely: HUMAN
ORGANISMS DEVELOP DETERMINATE ORGANIC PROPENSITIES FOR
RESPONDING TO GIVEN CORRELATIVE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS OR
STIMULUS CONDITIONS (a term defining a configuration of
stimulus-object effects); PROPENSITIES, THEN, CAN MANIFEST
THEMSELVES AS UNCONSCIOUS, PRECONSCIOUS, AND CONSCIOUS
CLASSES Of BEHAVIOR,

In.this last refinement, we have

extended our principle to include both physio-chemical and
conscious organ!smic processes.

The term 'propensity*

(whether physio-chemical, preconscious,

or conscious) will

be attributed a meaning BEYOND that conventionally intended:
i.e,,

over and above the definition *a proclivity to behave

in a certain determinate way*,

the definition will be
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extended to define the ACTUAL ONTALOGICALLY OCCURRING
PHYSIO-CHEMICAL, PRECONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUS PROCESSES
THEMSELVES IN THEIR PHEDISPOSITIONED MODE OF OCCURRENCE.
Thus the THREE basic classes of PROPENSITIES or habituations
could be illustrated as follows:

(1) a physio-chemical or

ORGANIC propensity (which is in principle unknowable as
direct experience from a subjective psychological perspec/

tive) would be,

for example, the actual secretional process

of a given bodily organ as it occurs as a function of given
determinate stimulus-conditions;

(2) a preconscious

propensity would be a reflexive behavior as in the case,
example,

for

of a given word which is spontaneously spoken

without any significant amount of consciously deliberate
effort

(in contrast to the effort expended when originally

learning to articulate words as a child);

(3) a conscious

propensity is a behavior that necessarily relies heavily
upon conscious awareness, or what has been termed DEN01‘ATIVb
and C0NN0TATIV3 SYMBOLIC MEANING: e.g. , where a person .
responds to the stimulus-object,

* Hello’ , by saying,

’'I'm

fine, how are you?”; or in the more sophisticated situation
where one's political contentions (often based on bias,

for

example, rather than reflective analysis) predisposes one
to give stereotyped responses to typical questions (func¬
tioning as stimulus-object effects).

These distinctions

shall acquire additional meaning as the propensity-mechanisms
are seen to function within the complete context of the
comprehensive theory of human behavior being presented.
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Of course it should be mentioned at this point,

that since

individual human organisms can be AFFECTED by stimulusobjects both on a sensational level /that level at which
the mode of sensory stimulation is NOT consciously perveivable as subjective psychological experience;
chemical changes occurring in the retina,

e.g., physio-

(as a function of

external stimulation) that are not‘discerned as visual
>

-

subjective psychological expertenceT",

AND a perceptual

level /i,e., that level known directly by us as subjective
psychological experience

(a phenomenon consisting of classes

of percepta that cannot in principle be analytically ascer¬
tained from scrutinizing statements of their physio-chemical
correlates.

Further,

subjective psychological experience

is that class of phenomena which in principle cannot be
adequately conceptualized in Behavioristic termsj7,

a

COMPLETE scientifically specified account of these EFFECTS
is,

for all practical purposes,

impossible,

although

important progress can be made in this endeavor by the
conjoint efforts of an objective and subjective psychology.
Further,

the many possible stimulus-object EFFECTS would also

have to be systematically conceived in conjunction with a
specification of an organisers PRSDISPOSITIONAL modes for
responding to given correlative stimulus-conditions;

a

task equally as difficult as rigorously specifying how an
organism is AFFECTED by given stimulus-conditions.

Thus in

view of these very difficult methodological and experimental
problems, wTe must conclude that our usage of theoretical
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terms such as

* stimulus-object effects1,

’propensities*,

etc., are portraying the human organism’s functional states
as they are IDEALLY conceptualized to occur within a
complete, unified system existing within a determinate
environment.

What we shall often describe,

therefore,

in

future discussion as seemingly evident relationships
demonstrated by organismic mechanisms are only dimly under¬
stood in terms of satisfactory experimental verification.
Complex functional relations among the dynamic physiochemical processes or organisms’

constituent mechanisms can,

at best, be comprehended in probability terms.

In fact,

there are many researchers who feel that the possibility of
expressing human behavior in exact scientific terms is
sheer folly (this issue is discussed in Ernest Nagel’s book,
The Structure of Science?^),
philosophical analysis,

However, for our purposes of

and further,

of attempting to better

understand the nature and interrelations among causal
determinants of human behavior,
of great theoretical value.

this paradigm model will be

Moreover its utilitarian value

will provide a practical instrument for formulating hypo¬
theses suitable for empirical enquiry.
Implicit within the bare

(theoretical)

statement

’Human

organisms develop determinate organic propensities for
responding to given correlative stimulus-object effects or
stimulus-conditions’ is the fact,

Nagel,

The Structure...,

op.

of course, that a vast

cit.
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multitude of integrated organic functional processes,
occurring LOGICALLY prior to emergent- conscious and reflec¬
tive conscious mental events as concomitant unconscious
processes,

are presupposed as necessary conditions for the

possibility of such high-ordered emergent phenomenal mani¬
festations.

Therefore,

as Skinner has partially suggested

(but for different reasons), it seems plausible to assume
that

(in principle) the physio-chemical conditions under¬

lying all types of mental events are a direct causal func¬
tion of BOTH TEMPORALLY AND LOGICALLY (a point that will be
explained as we proceed) ANTECEDENT organic functional
processes whose origin could conceivably be traced ultimately
to the effects of the stimulus-conditions that had origin¬
ally stimulated the resultant processes.

Hence, let us

think of a VERY long chain of physio-chemical functional
reactions that begin with the initial EFFECTS of any given
stimulus-condition, and frequently culminate as very highordered physio-chemical conditions, directly underlying
correlative mental events.

Typical illustrations of this

theoretically possible emergent culmination are the subjective
psychological states to which the following statements
refer:

*1 burned my finger*,

*The tree is brown',

thoughts about this issue are..,'.

'My

However, there are also

a great number of organic reactions to stimulus-conditions
never reaching the level of consciousness,
processes,

etc,;

e.g., homostatical

changes in these states are obviously not

directly accessible as conscious perception in the same way
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that \jc perceive pains or thoughts.
Now with respect to our former comments about uncon¬
scious (organic), preconscious and conscious propensities,
/including the three illustrations where the writer was
attending to his writing (stimulus-condition) and not to the
sounds of passing automobiles; when the client was concen¬
trating upon his thoughts (stimulus-condition) and not his
trembling hand; when the student was reflectively executing
certain poetic interpretations (stimulus-condition) while
unwittingly excluding others/, we may say that when a human
organism responds to the effect of a given stimulus-condition
the organism must necessarily bring to bear all of its
relevant ORGANIC PROPENSITIES upon the corresponding
stimulus-condition affecting the organism at that time.
In effect,

the stimulus-objects are “DEMANDING” the most

sophisticated response of which the organism is capable
(at a given time), and the relevant brain neurology and
other physio-chemical mechanisms are functionally activated
in order to meet the ‘'demands” posed (at that time).

Here

the writer is stressing solely the physio-chemical
MECHANISTIC aspect of human behavioral response phenomena
and omitting any reference to conscious causality and its
relationship to physio-chemical processes (it should be
noted that this mode of analysis is valid for it is being
conducted from an ’empirical identity’ frame of reference:
i

*

that is we are maintaining that mental events have physiochemical correlates that are in principle ascertainable
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through empirical procedures, and thereby arguing AS IF
this information were available).

The model a.s it is

developed heretofore bears close resemblance to the opera¬
tion of a computer (although a computer does NOT have
anything like subjective psychological states) in the sense
that (assuming the device is functioning properly) one
could equate,

in a very general way, what has been defined

as stimulus-object EFFECTS (appearing as contemporaneously
delivered data) with data cards fed into the already
programmed computer (i.e., the pre-established form to
which the stimulus-object effects will be subsumed).

The

PROGRAMMED FORM could be roughly equated to what we are
defining as percepta representing the wisdom of the past.
Thus when the computer is activated, it necessarily executes
its prescribed modes for processing the input data;
not "hesitate”,

,5choose not to perform its task”,

it does

etc.

The output information is a. result , of BOTH a product of the
input data AND the program.

Similarly with respect to

certain manifestations of human perception and thought, we
frequently perceive and think in a spontaneously MEANINGFUL
way (even though human beings COULD,

in protest,

close

their eyes, for example, or refuse to think for a short
period of time).
One may ask at this point,

if the writer WAS capable of

hearing the sounds of passing automobiles;

if the client WAS

capable of perceiving his trembling hand; if the student WAS
capable of understanding the interoretation that he over-
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looked, why did they not do so?

The answer to this Question

as it relates to neurological "blocking" of some processes
and "admittance" of others, is ultimately a matter to be
empirically resolved and cannot be answered by mere logical
analysis.

However, the phenomenon does suggest an important

hypothetical construct, viz.,
PERCEPTUAL FIELD,

one which we shall define as

•

In the three previous examples, even

though the subjects in question were entirely capable of
comprehending the ‘‘'overlooked" considerations,

the fact of

the matter was that they did NOT do so while responding to
the original stimulus-conditions.
saying that

We may interpret this by

(again speaking with a mechanistic emphasis)

the stimulus-conditions did NOT activate those organic
propensities

(a term designating ALL the relevant physio-

chemical mechanisms and processes activated by appropriate
correlative stimulus-object EFFECTS) corresponding to the
mental event-components ’sounds from automobiles’,
ness of trembling*,

’aware¬

’realization of an interpretation which

conceives the poem as...*.

Whether this situation was a

result of the insufficient intensity of the original
stimulus-object EFFECTS ‘affecting the organism,
logical "blocking" mechanisms,
settled here

or to neuro¬

is not an issue that can be

(although at present state of scientific know¬

ledge with respect to complex problems of this type,

it would

be very difficult to provide even a tentative answer for
this empirical question).

Rather we can better comprehend

the problem in terms of the construct defined, as

’perceptual

field

.

It has been said that this construct refers to

organisms’predispositioning for selective perception.

If

organisms responded to all the stimulus-object effects

-

of which they are capable of consciously entertaining as
perception, great dysfunctioning would result.

However,

because of their selective perception capacities,

they need

only conjure those organic resources that tend to facilitate
efficacious behavioral modes,

or promote those behaviors

that are deemed as personally IMPORTAMT to an individual.
Thus in the three previous examples of selective perception
1,as "e~'rj ^!lac

- subjects executed behaviors of which

they were CONSCIOUSLY AWARE;

some demonstrated behaviors

(in the first, two examples) of which they were UNAWARE
(i.e.,

at THAT time);

and in the third example,

cognitive

associations that the student was capable of making without
additional learning, were overlooked.

Therefore the

stimulus-object effects involved in stimulating each subject
activated organic propensities that (in all cases) culminated
in mental event-components, and other propensities that did
not reach the stage of- awareness.

The ones that did become

Mental event-components, precisely because the subjects DID
have conscious and reflective conscious perceptual access
to them, were available as personally accessible stimulusohjects (viz.,

as ideas) capable of causally influencing

the subjects’ behavior; but the propensities not emerging
as event-components were NOT available to the subject as
causally effective ideational instruments.

Although this

is an abstract way of stating the matter it actually amounts
to saying the following: that the client, having conscious
and reflective conscious AWARENESS of the thoughts
occurring within his head concomitant with

'

other relevant internal and external perceptions',

could

causally influence his behavioral responses to the counselor
on the basis of these ideational and perceptual data.

Ee

was not aware of his trembling, and hence continued to
tremble without realizing it.

However,

if the counselor

IHFOnfeED the client of his trembling behavior,

he would have

maae a determined effort to terminate the behavior.

The

new information, because of the client's CONSCIOUS AWARENESS
of it, would function as a stimulus-object capable of
directly influencing his successive behavior.
han, no doubt,

The trembling

developed over a long period of time as a

ERECONSCIOUS habitual or reflexive response to a particular
correlative stimulus-condition;
pemapo,

originally having had,

clearly ascertainable (conscious) anxious dimensions

whose speen icity diminished with the passing of time,
leaving as conscious remnants,
°f

only a negative habituation

trembling and a pervasive though vague subjective psycho¬

logical feeling of anxiety.

The illustration of the student

exemplified an instance of CONSCIOUS HABITUATION such that
the student may have gradually developed,

for example, a

relatively stereotyped method for analyzing poetry, without
making a determined,

reflective effort to broaden or render

more Profound, his mode of analysis.

Here we have instances

only of NEGATIVE habituation, but there are also many
typical'examples of POSITIVE habituation in Individualsdaily behavior;

e.g.,

speech, perceptual interpretations,

thought modes, walking,
thought-,

etc.

It can be. seen from this that

as we know it through direct acquaintance,

could

not be possible at all without well-established positive
habituations.

The concept of PERCEPTUAL FIELD,

then,

refers

to those stimulus-object EFFECTS which emerge into our
consciousness as PERCEPTIONS and thereby become potentially
efficacious as behavioral determinants.

On the other hand,

as portrayed in the examples on selective perception,

there

are those stimulus-object effects that we do not consciously
entertain (and hence reflect upon), thereby effectively
CONSTRAINING our behavioral responses to well established
pruconscious and conscious habituations.

To transcend the

adverse imluence oi negative habitual behaviors,

(initially)

their efficacious occurrence as behavioral determinants
musu be made generally evident to the subject who executes
the undesirable behaviors, hence,

enabling the subject to

understand the negative effects with’sufficient conscious
clarity that this recognition will act as a stimulus-object
to initiate a more suitable program for relearning an alter¬
nate pattern of response-behaviors.

This is to say (in one

sense) that a new stimulus-object, capable of producing more
desirable behavioral responses,

has entered into a subject’s

perceptual field.
Here we are very close to the essence of constructive
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therapy and learning, both of which are moderately systemati
endeavors to facilitate the development of qualitatively
more suitable responses to given problematic or unfamiliar
stimulus-object effects.

These enterprises involve (basic¬

ally) broadening an organism's perceptual field

so that

newly developed responses to novel stimulus-object effects
can become more precisely discriminative about the distinc¬
tive nature of given stimulus-object effects,

and the

relationships among unfamiliar stimulus-object effects with
those that are already relatively familiar to the subject.
By broadening individuals* perceptual field, given stimulusobject effects conjure an increased number of

(and often

qualitatively better integrated) organic propensities to
consciousness,

thereby increasing the number of ideational

stimulus-objects that cam,
information,

and so on.

in turn,

conjure other relevant

This amounts to saying that with

a broadened perceptual field, given stimulus-object effects
can conjure more wisdom to come constructively to bear upon
the effect, hence promoting the INTERRELATEDNESS between
relevant aspects of the present occasion and previously
INTEGRATED learnings.

In therapy the most difficult task

is often that of clearly revealing the precise nature of the
adverse stimulus-object effect,

and more'important, in

assisting the client to become sufficiently (cognitively)
clear about the negative effect to REFLECTIVELY initiate
t

HIS OWN program for effective relearning.
however,

.Typical learning,

differs from therapy in that less effort is

required for transcending negative modes of habituation,
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prior, to constructive learning (or relearning).

Rather,

the major emphasis in novel learning is on increasing the
amount oi wisdom that can be conjured to any given stimulus
object effect; that is, increasing the amount of INTEGRATED
OPERATIONALLY INSTRUMENTAL INFORMATION that can be brought
to bear upon a given problematic situation.

Therefore, in

broadening a perceptual field, there is an increase in the
number of qualitatively subtle EFFECTS that a subject can
CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVE in a given stimulus-situation.
an 1

01cnuly,

Stated

the stimulus~object effect activates a greater

number of organic propensities that, in turn, emerge into
consciousness as an increased amount of wisdom available
to the subject for more profoundly comprehending the
stimulus-object effects.

In progressively broadening

perceptual fields, quantitatively more potential causal
factors can enter into a decision-making or problem-solving
situation, hence generally, qualitatively enhancing result¬
ant decisions or solutions, for more variables are
considered.

In expressing this view we are merely stating,

in more contemporary terms, the Socratic - Platonic adage,
knowledge is Virtue f»

The fact frequently overlooked in

this view is that knowledge is not merely regarded as an
accumulation of unrelated facts.

Rather, the concepts of

RELATEDNESS, and HARMONIOUS INTEGRATION OF BEHAVIORAL
PROCESSES are intrinsic to this ancient Greek concent.
In short, the notion of * WISDOM1 is the only suitable term
to characterize the quality of information that is
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gradually acquired, and carefully reflectively analyzed,
to ensure maximal integration of cognitive factors in a way
concordant with concrete experience.

Similarly the term

defined as doinS something and doing it well —
accurately characterizes the functional nature of the highgrade consciously reflective processes (with their under¬
lying physio-chemical correlates) involved in executing
highly intelligent response-behaviors, through making
effective usage of contemporaneous stimulus-object effects
and Ple'vious-l-Jr acquired wisdom.

As we become more familiar

with cue unified behavioral model being developed, it will
be seen that chese classical concepts are inextricably a
part of the configuration of theoretical constructs designed
to comprehend the logical form of human behavior as it is
contemplated by a subjective psychology (a model, moreover,
not irreconcilable with an objective psychology).
Also with reference to the 'perceptual field' construct,
it is extremely important for psychologists and educators to
underotand that broadening individuals' perceptual fields
\

i- only the initial phase of a two-phase process of educa(oi

education).

Pirsc, as it has been saids formerly

unexperienced stimulus-object effects should be gradually
arid systematically introduced to an individual's perceptual
field to increase the number of .ideational stimulus-objects
tsal are personally accessible for promoting cognitive
•

j

ucerrelatedness among relevant perceptual components;
thereby predisposing the individual to yield qualitatively

better responses.

'Clearly, . however, the .mere intro¬

duction of novel stimulus-object effects into one’s percep¬
tual field does not always guarantee that these effects will
be harmoniously integrated with an organism’s previously
established configurations of propensities — in fact it
more frequently results in promoting behavioral dysfunctioning,.

Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that the

bXPmHIiiNT1AL INTEGRATIVE efforts exercised by the organism
be conducted under the careful guidance of trained, personnel.
The latter can facilitate this process by capital.!zing upon
the constructive efforts of individuals who are EXPERIEN¬
CE ALLY. INVOLVED in gradually attempting to consistently
synthesize newly acquired information with previously
established wisdom, to promote more virtuous behavioral
functioning.

Thus in conjunction with personally initiated

efforts, an observer must be careful to see that these
integrative measures are achieved in a suitable developmental
sequence such that no important phases are omitted.

There¬

fore, beyond introducing merely disruptive stimulus-object
effects into individuals* stimulus-field and hence increasing
the probability that many negative habituations will be
formed to cope with sources of novel stress, it is necessary
to see that appropriate propensities are developed to
reconcile these unique factors with organisms* established
wisdom in order that maximal functional virtue is behaviorally achieved.

When attempting to modify preconscious

reflexive behavioral modes, engineered programs for
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systematically introducing stimulus-object effects into a
subject s perceptual field will be more successful for
modifying behavior, because the mechanism of reflective
consciousness is often not a causally potent instrument for
changing spontaneous (reflexive) behaviors.

This type of

problem lends itself well to the conditioning procedures of
an objective psychology.

In any case, whether systematic

behavior modification entails the predominate usage of
sub jests

reflective capacities, conditioning techniques or

a combination of both approaches, undoubtedly the most
important consideration is that subjects be deeply EXPERTENTIALLY INVOLVED AS ACTIVE INSTRUMENTS ON THEIR BEHAVIORAL
CHaNGu.,

Similarly, those individuals facilitating this

change should be vicariously involved, keeping in mind,
however, that the ultimate locus of cognitive integration
resides within the experiential efforts of the subjects
desiring behavioral change.

Since it is not the purpose of

our discussion to analyze systematic means for behavioral
modification, our aforementioned comments on the topic were
undeveloped and are^ thereby necessarily inadequate.
It should be noticed, before we extend our investiga¬
tions to formulating additional constructs, that in much of
what has been recently said, the formerly introduced
metaphorical characterization of intelligent behavioral
growth as being a cyclical process of moving from vague-toclear understanding, was pervasively implicit.

Most of the

preceding discussion of constructs for the behavioral model

l6o

have been primarily intended to serve as an INTRODUCTION to
a more elaborate and precise ensuing exposition.

The

reader is, in fact, being asked to make a significantly
import an u ‘’conceptual shift’5 in contemplating human behavior,
in contrast to most current behavioral theories.

A task of

this nature is unquestionably difficult and further complicated by the fact that a position such as the one presently
being propounded cannot satisfactorily be understood until
the system is pondered (at length) in its entirety, and then
compared with other competing theories.
When a human organism is affected by an internal or
external environmental change (or experiences the Ingression
of suimulus-object effects), all relevant physio-chemical
organic mechanisms or propensities react to the change (or
are brought to bear upon the stimulus-object effects).
Involved in this phenomenon, are an almost incomprehensibly
large number of physio-chemical sensory and neurological
process, in addition to a multitude of 15supportive” relevant
organic mechanisms and processes (e.g., homostatical mech¬
anisms and processes, etc.) not directly involved with highordered behaviors (e.g,, emotional and ideational activity).
In the sequential execution of these organic processes,
beginning with the original stimulus—condition, we may in
principle conceive of relevant organic mechanisms whose
thresholds for activation have been exceeded hence causing
their unique function to be executed, which in turn provides
the necessary conditions for the activation of other

Ir¬

relevant mechanisms, and so on.

Here we 'begin to appreciate

y

the cybernetic "flavor'* suggested by -a massive, highly
integrated or interconnected organic-functional system
comprised of organic mechanisms existing in crucial prox¬
imity with one another; each mechanism conceived as operating
individually and with a society of similar mechanisms,
(individually or collect!vely) capable of executing a
specific "task", given the appropriate stimulus-conditions.
Also, in turn, each or the society of mechanisms, upon
having performed its "task*5, will yield stimulus-object
/

effects (or "notification of completed tasks*5) ingressing,
as stimulus-conditions, into the constitution of successive
mechanisms and societies of mechanisms, hence promoting
sequential activation.

In all this, there are the implicit

notions of transmitted activation and hence progressive
propagation of physio-chemical processes, that synthetically
coalesce to a stage of unconscious integration; then to a
preconscious reflexive stage; to a directly (but vaguely)
consciously experienceable level of organic bodily and
emotional feeling; and finally to the two highest-ordered
stages of clear consciousness and conscious reflection.
This developmental coalescent process will hereafter be
technically defined as CONCRESCENCE.7^

The phenomenon

^Whitehead, Adventures of,,_, op. cit., p. 237*
?8Paul Oppenheim and Hillary Putnam,
Science Working Hypothesis,*' ed. Feigl,
Maxwell, II, pp. 3-* 3& •

"The Unity of
Scriven, and
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could' be described cybernetically as the CONCRESCENCE OF
ORGANIC PROPENSITIES IN RESPONSE TO THE INGRESSED EFFECTS
Oi: OIIEULUS-OBJECTS.

This characterization represents a.

terminologically simple, yet highly flexible and precise
vray of (in principle) comprehending vastly complex organic
processes.

Implied within this novel descriptive mode are

such central scientific objects and constructs of physio•

\

j

logy and mechanistic biology as 'threshold*;

’binary "GO

or NO GO” cerebral mechanisms’; organic mechanisms such as
’cells* and other vital bodily organs;
and so on.

Further,

'neurons*;

'synapse*;

since it is presupposed that the

nacure of these entities and their relational processes can
be exhaustively explained in mechanistic biological terms,
they are hence rendered amenable to mathematical and
statistical modes of formal relation.

However, it is the

view of this writer that the theoretical model being
proposed in this paper, while defined in terms that are
concordant with and complimentary to traditional mechanistic
(though not materialistic) scientific theories, is by no
means completely explicable in terms of these theories, due
to the reasons stated in. "Chapter One".
When organic concrescence reaches the level of develop¬
ment where primitive emotional feeling occurs, the first
necessary condition has been satisfied for the resultant
organization of what has been generally described as emergent
mental processes.

This initial emergent stage, as well as

those higher-ordered succeeding stages, provide us with

striking evidential proof of an ontalogically unique realm
of phenomenal being*
jlfij-t-j-. .gWODUCT o

Mental phenomena are the emergent,

sn indeterminately complex human physio¬

logy as they are successively disciplined through inter¬
penetrative relations with inner a/nd outer environments,
When it is said that a highly complex, integrated human
physiology generates an ontalogically distinct class of
phenomena, we are in a sense lead to an interaction!stic
viewpoint of the relation between mind and body, but one of
a special type.

When considering a single mind we may think

of a SINGLE train of physio-chemical processes occurring in
a brain, BUT A SERIES OF PROCESSES (FUNCTIONING AS STIMULUSOBJECTS) YIELDING EFFECTS THAT ARE DIRECTLY PERCEIVED
THROUGH TWO LOGICALLY DISTINCT MODES OF PERCEPTION, BOTH OF
WHICH ARE NECESSAHLY GROUNDED IN WHAT HAS BEEN DEFINED AS
MENTAL OR PRIVATE EVENTS.

First there is the (directly

perceivable) intersubjectively verifiable way of observing
natural neurophysiological phenomena, viz., through the
external bodily senses.

Secondly there is the direct mode

of perceptual apprehension available to only the subject
within whose head the neural processes occur, viz., by
consciously perceiving his own mental states as they emerge
as stimulus-object EFFECTS from the neurophysiological
processes occurring in his head (emerging as disciplined
symbolic feeling as a result of their enormous complexity
and integration).

However, as it has been formerly argued,

BOTH perspectives are ultimately contingent upon A MIND for
their very possibility as intelligible percepta; hence,

mind must be an A PRIORI presupposition in any discourse
on the matter.

The conclusion to be .drawn from this is tha

ALL HUMANLY PERCEIVABLE EVENTS MUST, IN PRINCIPLE, BE
PRIVATE EVENTS.

Thus the statements,

*This is the electro¬

encephalograph wave pattern representing those physiochemical states empirically correlating to subject A*s
feeling of sadness* and ,fI (i.e,,

subject A) feel sad” are

both statements that refer to two distinct categories of
EVENT-COMPONENTS, both of which necessarily presuppose a
mind for the possibility of their perceptual apprehension.
The first category refers to directly perceivable phenomena
which are intersubjectively verifiable.

The second

category, however, can be directly verified only by the
subject within whose physiology the event occurs.

But the

ontological train of physio-chemical occurrences to which
both categories of statements ultimately refer are those
transpiring within subject A* s brain neurology.

In saying

this we will not have to submit to the position of idealism
for reasons to be introduced in vChapter Three”.
To return once again to the topic of those first
infantile, primordial mental states, viz., undisciplined
emotional feeling, let us say that these are indicative of
an organism*s first, most primary reaction to a given
stimulus-object effect.

These feelings are spontaneous,

symbolically unclarified in their original mode of occur¬
rence, and not generated by or contingent upon thought.
Included in this lowest emotional stratum are such primitive
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phenomena as “fight or flight” states.

We might speculate

that feelings on this level are the amorphous psychological
states that constitute the vague,

sporadic emotional

consciousness of infants (not that infants entertain only
"fight or flight" states that are intrinsically spontaneous
and intense, for there would be other emotionally more
tempered and Qualitatively different types of experience
as well).

.

The next level of spontaneous emotional reactions,
however, become — at least when symbolically mature
mentalities experience them -- progressively colored by
former intelligently comprehended (hence retained as
memory) experience.

For example, our initial immediate

reaction to a loved one presupposes a multitude of prior
learning, e'.g., a knowledge of the loved-one^ personality,
the meaning of the term flove's the concrete experiential
information derived from prolonged interaction with the
loved person, and so on.

The highest manifestation, perhaps,

of this form of spontaneous emotional - intellectual experi¬
ence would be in asthetic intuition, or the "1 Thou" experi¬
ence about which Martin Buber speaks.
ticated levels,

But at less sophis¬

spontaneous emotional reactions are,

generally (though vaguely), indicative of the way our
entire (unconscious-to-conscious) relevant organism responds
to a given stimulus-object effect.

Throughout our conscious

and reflectively conscious awarenesses, these emotional
reactions concomitantly accompany all ingressed stimulus-
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object eifects.

Their topology is highly variable.

Most

frequently, our emotional reactions to stimulus-conditions
as they present themselves in daily life are relatively
neutral.

However, as in the cases of "fight or flight", -

intense intellectual involvement with some matter of
interest, romantic experiences, and so on, there is consid¬
erable topological variability in emotional substrata.
But in most cases, however, the emotional dimension of
experience,

subtly persisting throughout conscious and

consciously reflective experience, remains unscrutinized.
The previous example demonstrating selective perception,
where the writer was unaware of the sounds of passing auto¬
mobiles, bears some moderate analogy to our infrequent
reflective examination of subtle emotional event-components
that concomitantly accompanies ideational activity (although
the former example dealt with natural world perception as
distinct from internal bodily percepta).
for example,

Some therapists,

(as in the case of this writer) emphasize

counselor-client scrutinization of mutually occurring
emotional-intellectual reactions to reciprocal stimulation
while in therapy as an extremely valuable practice, for it
is hypothesized that in developing a personal facility to
clearly discriminate among dynamically emerging emotional
states in their intense spontaneity as a direct function of
predetermined and undetermined ingressed stimulus-object
effects, individuals can progressively better understand
their modes of preconscious and conscious habituation.
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Thus from making these reflective discriminations, many
formerly unnoticed and/or unclarified stimulus-object
effects — effects to which (perhaps) undesirable responses
were unwitting habitually made -- are raised to the level
of conscious experience; hence broadening individuals'
perceptual field.

Beyond this, with additional innotative

reflection, more appropriate, harmoniously integrated and
personally fulfilling behavioral responses can be developed
with respect to given stimulus-object effects.
The next successive extension beyond the notion of
spontaneous, primordial,

symbolically undisciplined emotional

feelings is the cybernetic view that these primitive mental
emergents are the synthetic culminants of an ORGANIC
concrescent, almost instantaneously reflexive process,
beginning with the ingressed effects of stimulus-objects
that activate (as sense data) relevant organic perceptual
mechanisms.

The mechanisms thereby transform the effects

into physio-chemical equivalents or analogues which are then
synthetically united, in an extraordinarily complex
concrescent process, with physio-chemically stored ’’wisdom’-;
the synthetic product resultantly emerges as a conscious
experiential (perceptual) event-component.

It is nearly

impossible to conceive of an organism whose structure is so
complex and integrated that it can yie3.d mental phenomena,
apart from the fact that years of disciplining are required
for developing the functional harmony among organic mech¬
anisms to the extent that their collective functional inter-
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relations acquire sufficient refinement to produce high-grade
intelligent,

innovative mental events'.

All this,

of course,

is not even to mention the many millennia required for the
development of the human organism.
Through exercising conscious reflection, we can to a
great extent symbolically (linguistically) explicate the
directly perceived experiential nature of our subjective
psychological states.

In light of this possibility let us

specify some of the universal characteristics intrinsic
to the emotional sub-strata of our personal, inner ideational
experience.

At this point in our discussion,

four major attributes may be determined.

essentially

First it can be

said that emotional feeling is the basic medium for the
eventual development of higher-ordered cognitive processes
in that sophisticated ideational experience IS disciplined
(hence greatly sublimated) emotional feeling.

A brief

argument for this position was presented in our former
analysis of symbolic behavioral development.

Second, that

emotional feelings considered in their own right are
essentially vague and undisciplined; however, they can be
gradually symbolically disciplined

(defined, organized and

clarified) via the mechanism of conscious reflection.
Third, feelings are the vaguely conscious manifestations of
organism’s spontaneous reaction to stimulus-object effects.
Implicit in this statement are some very important indica¬
tions of organism’s functional virtue as this is demonstrated
by the kind of qualitative response that a human being
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elicits with respect to given stimulus-object effects.
This is to say that individuals’ immediate emotional
reaction to certain types of stimulus-object effects are
often indicative of the "best" and "worst" organic
(unconscious physio-chemical), preconscious (reflexive),
and conscious (ideational) propensities that are HABITUALLY
brought to bear upon given stimulus-occasions;

hence

providing an index of the over-all functional, efficacity of
an organism’s harmonious response-capacity.

From this,

those of us who are psychologists and educators, for
example,

can come to make determinations about the breadth

of client’s or student’s perceptual field.

Thus we may

conclude on many given occasions that an individual’s
perceptual field is insensitive (hence overly exclusive)
to certain determinate stimulus-object effects, whose
probable Ingressional influence,

if properly incorporated

into an individual’s relevant scheme of positive behavioral
habituations, would increase his overall behavioral
efficacy in solving problems;

hence,

specific schedules

for stimulus-object ingress!on could be planned that would,
in effect,

increase the PERCEPTUAL SENSITIVITY (with

respect to given predetermined effects) of the individual’s
perceptual field.

As a. result of being better able to

discriminate amongst various relevant stimulus-object
effects,

the subject in question is rendered more capable,

with a determined reflective effort,
(and perhaps, initially,

to reconcile novel

functionally disruptive)

stimulus-
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object effects with his already operationally established
behavioral modes,

for he possesses an INCREASED CONSCIOUS

AWARENESS of those factors (effects) that had been
adversely controlling his behavior without his realization.
Fourth, feelings are the initial manifestations of any
phenomena that could be minimally defined as mind /this
designation would apply,

also, to lower-ordered organisms,

which are said to experience similar primordial emotional
states.

.However,

this claim must be essentially inferential

for we have no way of directly verifying such a claim
(i.e.5 perceptually) in subjective psychological experience?.
Let us- consider,

once again,

the nature of habits.

Our

conception of habits and their formative development has
much in common with John Dewey's view of■ habitualive
\

behavior.

In certain formerly considered quotations

extracted from Dewey *s writings,

it was seen that he argued

that reflective thinking occurs when previously established
behavioral habits are no longer adequate to meet the
•'demands’5 of novel stimulus-conditions.

For example,

a

factory worker who has repetitiously performed a particular
task for several- years generally experiences some difficulty
when he is required to work at a completely different job.
He must,

in effect, develop an importantly different set of

preconscious and conscious habituations to effectively
perform the tasks of the new job.
much more sophisticated level,
Kant,

Another example,

on a

is in the case of Immanual

the famous 18th century German philosopher, where he
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personally remarked that basis for having written the
monumental Critique of Pure Reason was predicated upon the
fact that after having persistently contemplated the major
philosophical problems of his time in a relatively conven¬
tional manner,

(Quite)

suddenly as a result of formulating

a novel approach to conceptualizing various problematic
issues

(in consequence of PROLONGED, INTENSIVE REFLECTION

on these matters),

Ka/nt was able to transcend what he

regarded as his ’’dogmatic slumber”. 79
his novel perspective,

Re was ab3.e, from

to contemplate traditionally conceived

philosophical problems within a dramatically new theoretical
framework,

thereby transcending the constraining cognitive

habituations of his less innovative philosophic contempor¬
aries by casting new light on these issues.

These illustra¬

tions accentuate our view that as new stimulus-object
effects ingress into one's perceptual field,
varying degrees,
efficacy,

thus,

in

disrupting an individual's habitual response

CONSCIOUS REFLECTION must be invoked in order to

supercede formerly established, but presently dysfunctional,
modes of habituation.

Contemporary problematic circum¬

stances require that expanded, more efficacious modes for
satisfactorily meeting the “demands” of present stimulusoccasions be developed as correspondingly new positive
habituations,

in order to maximize functional virtue.

Dewey

argued that if it were not for an organism's capacity to

'9Norman Kemp Smith, Immanual Kant s Critique of Pure
Reason (New York: St. Martin's Pr O O u
19651, PP. 7-37. ~
O O
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synthesize novel cognitive associations,

intelligent

thinking-behavior could not proceed to achieve increasingly
higher levels of understanding.
With reference to the behavioral model being developed,
a view maintained by this writer is that all conscious
thought has its origins ultimately in vague,
emotional feeling,

amorphous

and that over a long period of symbolic

(primarily linguistic) disciplining, the originally
unorganized,

sporadically intense emotional experiential

character of primitive mentality is lost or dissipated
merely because experiential recollection fades as a function
of temporal passage; but more important,

the experiential

intensity is gradually SUBLIMATED essentially for the
reason stressed by Cassirers
No longer can man confront reality immediately;
he cannot see it, as it were, face to face.
Physical reality seems to recede in proportion
as man's symbolic activity advances.
Instead
of dealing with things themselves man is in a
sense constantly conversing with himself.80
To use the metaphysical terminology of Aristotle,

symbols

impose 'form1 on primordial, unorganized experience corres¬
ponding to

'matter'.

Thus as ideational development

proceeds, there is a marked increase in the sheer number of
forms or symbols, and hence in linguistic sophistication,
because the necessary conditions for MEANING-AS-DIRECTLYFELT- RELATEDNESS -- namely,

consciously understood symbolic
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RELATEDNESS — are progressively being fulfilled.

The web

of linguistic interconnections is being rendered increasingly
elaborate as unrestrained, raw emotional experience is
steadily subsumed to symbolically discipline.

This.means

that in mature, adult Intelligent behavior, our thoughts are
constituted by predominately linguistic symbolic * forms*
that can be clearly consciously conceived.

The "pure

matter", or originally unorganized experience,
forgotten.

In fact,

has been long

it could never be clearly recalled for

symbolic disciplining is a necessary prerequisite for such
clear comprehension and hence recall.

But in a very

definite sense the ’form-matterf distinction still applies
to human experience regardless of how symbolically sophis¬
ticated our experience may become: that is,

regardless of

the extent to which our experience may undergo formaliza¬
tion

thus emotional sublimation -*■>, unsymbolized, emooional

elements or ’matter* will suill be experlen.uia.lly present in
ideational processes.

This is to say that all private or

mental events are directly experienced UNITIES.

The basic

fact of private events, is that all their possible eventcomponents are experienced in their UNIQUELY FELT
as well as in CLEARLY PERCEIVED SYMBOLIC RELATIONSHIPS to
one another.

Among other relevant ramifications

point that will be developed as we proceed,

oj.

this

the preceding

conclusion indicates that many of these event-components can
be readily linguistically comprehended, while other, more
•subtle and inextricably unified emotional components cannot

1?4

be adequately symbolized clue to their nebulous conscious
nature.

This fact was made clear in a previous illustra¬

tion, proving that regardless,

for example,

of the precision

and eloquence exercised in one’s attempt to fully charac¬
terize the experience of savoring a fine steak, the verbal
.characterization of the pleasurable direct experience could
not be as concretely informative as the actual experience
of consuming the steak itself.
applicability of the

This illustrates the

’form-matter* distinction in that in

any private experience, particularly a highly sensuous one,
there are many aspects of it that can be symbolically or
formally comprehended, but also there are other dimensions
which because of their emotional primitiveness and intui¬
tively unitary nature are perceivable only as direct,
dynamically ephemeral experience.
involving a subtly concrete,
certain event-components,

This latter dimension,

emotional understanding of

can occasionally (though

inadequately) be linguistically clarified.
Also there is a less nebulous,

vaguely symbolic aspect

to human experience referring to the CONNOTATIVE SYMBOLIC
MEANING implicit within the LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS, used to
reflectively clarify, and hence discipline our experience
nt all levels of development.

Both the purely emotional

and vague symbolic aspects of mental events embody those
portions of human experience demonstrating the quality of
consciously pervasive,

though nebulously profound famili¬

arity of one’s intimate relation with components of reality;
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this has been technically defined as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLYFELT- RELATEDNESS,
of the

’matter*

This is an extremely important portion

of experience.

Beyond the fact that this

dimension of linguistic symbols introduces the substantive
EXPERTENTIALLY MEANINGFUL QUALITY to subjective psychological
awareness,

it (in distinction from denotatively clear-

symbolic components) provides a resource for suggesting
novel modes of thought that can be ascertained and hence
developed through reflective analysis.

The point of this

present discussion is that BOTH the substrata of presymbolic
emotional and vague symbolic experience,

considered together,

ARE those ASPECTS of subjective psychologically meaningful
linguistic symbols formerly defined as CONNOTATIVE symbolic
components or MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS,

Further,

this synthetically compounded domain contains all. of the
relevant learned wisdom of the past as it has been permanently
recorded in given cerebral mechanisms,

awaiting conjuration

to a contemporary conscious occasion whereupon it will
constructively unite with denotative symbolic elements in
meaningfully characterizing the occasion.

Thus the develop¬

ment of complex symbolic phenomena, with their extraordinary
capacity for meaningfully enhancing the intrinsically
barren perceptual deliverances of the ever-emerging present
through synthetically introducing the symbolically embodied,
wisdom of the past, leads to precisely the condition that
Cassirer had designated when he said,
confront reality immediately....

"No longer can we

Instead of dealing with

1?6

the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing
viith himself.*’^1

Now it may be asked, When vie engage in reflective
thinking, what sort of cognitive resources do we have to
draw upon in our effort to effectively engage in problem
solving? . One certainly does not always analyze primordial
emotional feelings when engaging in reflection.

This whole

topic, intrinsic as it is to the very essence of human
thought,

can only be briefly discussed at this time in an

introductory manner for the necessary theoretical constructs
appropriate for rigorously analyzing this process have not
yet been presented.

An elaborate discussion ox

will transpire in “Chapters Three'7 and '‘Pour".

this proolem
However,

let us say at this point that our responses to stimulusconditions can obviously be of variable quality in terms o±
effective problem solving.

It has been said that there are

unconscious, preconscious and conscious inodes of habituation,
only the last mode of which we typically regard as including
conscious and reflectively conscious thinking.
habituations involve,

Conscious

it will be recalled, generally stereo¬

typed thought modes in response to familiar stimulus-object
effects? for example,

the usage of linguistic symbols in

spontaneously executed verbalizations; and in such standaid
expressions as 'good morning',

'my name is...’,

'Republicans comply to the sentiments of big business while

Ibid

• 5

p.

25.
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Democrats attend to the needs of the common man1,
are naturally inferior to Whites*,
formula is

= b^ + c^*, etc*

’Negroes

1 the pythagorian theorm

In short,

conscious habit¬

ations are standard repetitive ideational responses conjured
by frequently reoccurring stimulus-object effects,

that

individuals have learned to spontaneously execute without
ever really having seriously subjected the (often naive,
deceptively profound,

or

or erroneous) implications of these

cognitions to analytical reflection.
Beyond the domain of conscious habituation there Is the
general,

qualitatively variable

(although it should be noted

that these categories are obviously highly relative to an
organism’s maturational level) realm of consciously reflec¬
tive habituation.

An example of this is in the case of many

academicians who have been comprehending their areas of
intellectual enquiry in terms of a set theoretical viewpoint
year after yearn without ever seriously questioning the
presuppositional

(or axiomatic) grounds upon which their

theory is predicated,

or Seriously considering the logically

compelling features of other competing theories that are
addressed to similar areas of concern.

Granted, these

individuals do frequently consult relevant personal experi¬
ence in problem-solving, and often "academically” entertain
various other types of hypothetical explanations (and more¬
over, frequently have access to considerable factual infor¬
mation that can be quickly conjured to vindicate cherished
nodes of enquiry), but nevertheless,

there remains a basic
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insensitivity or apathy (with regard to submitting logically
primitive premises or given theoretical constructs to
critical scrutiny)

to revising theoretical formulation

that more concordantly fit the directly .perceivable facts
delivered in concrete experience.

Similarly,

the situation

j.s basically the same in disciplines where individuals work
in accord to often well-defined

"mental sets1’ that delineate

the problematic areas to contemplated and the methodological
manner in which problems are resolved, while theoretical
and methodological presupposition (or the far reaching
implications of given disciplinary enterprises for other
areas of human affairs) remain reflectively unanalyzed.
However, the writer does not wish to imply that this mode of
high-ordered habituation is necessarily (or even frequently)
perverse.

Actually,

the substantial portion of all intelli¬

gent human productivity can be subsumed to this category of
habituation;

one involving intelligent thinking,

to be sure,

in that the IMPLICATIONS OP ALREADY ESTABLISHED principles
are pragmatically and systematically carried out in innumer¬
able fruitful and tangible ways.

This is,

in effect,

an

"engineering*3 level of intelligence.
However,

there is still a higher,

optimally productive

level of intelligence in which the human mind exercises the
depths of its rational resources in order to increase its
understanding of the fundamental features of perceptually
given aspects of reality.

This most advanced level of

understanding is one where the human mind adopts a HABITUALLY
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CRITICAL, CONSTRUCTIVELY REFLECTIVE ATTITUDE toward
problem-solving.

Here, great reflective sensitivity is

demonstrated in attempting to understand the precise
implications of concrete experiential deliverance.
mind, with extraordinary exactitude, is able,

The

in reflection,

to symbolically discriminate between those concepts which
P^c± uv.,1 ^

characterize given aspects of perceptual experi¬

ence, and those that only partially or even seriously
misrepresent experiential testimony.

Of course,

in

EXPLAINING phenomenal occurrences in terms of functional
relationships, we quickly transcend the cognitive act of
mere description? habitually implicit

(i.e.,

those that are

often not clearly understood) and explicitly stated THEORIES
are, in most cases, utilized to INTER?RETATIVELY account for
that which is phenomenally perceived to be the case, while
in addition,

conjuring various types (and qualities) of

EVIDENCE to support interpretative explanations of observa¬
tional reports,

A thorough analysis of the phenomenon of

EXPLANATION (itself) would take us far afield.
a more appropriate place

However, in

(in later chapters), a great deal

of attention will be devoted to this issue.

Again, with

respect to describing mental activity at its highest level
of perspicacity, let us generally say that the mind has
achieved an ASTHETICALLY satisfying reconciliation between
emotional feeling and connotative symbolic meaning, as they
k°uh concomitantly accompany their denotatively clear and
distinct counterparts to form complete (usually linguistic)
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symbols,

and configurations of symbols, used to accurately

represent given directly perceived aspects of reality.

An

absolutely minimal number of relevant data are sacrificed
in the resultant conceptually representative formulations.
The rich suggestibility of emotional feeling in its initial
spontaneous occurrence to a problematic circumstance,
later, its function as a primitive

and

(intuitive) criterion

logical basis for evaluating the degree of concordance
demonstrated by conceptual formulations in their represen¬
tation of concretely experienced facts

(that is, we have

intuitive FEELINGS that vaguely inform us of how well or
badly given formulations "rest with or fit the facts"),
provide a very fruitful, though subtle,

resource

101

developing eventual hypotheses and/or explanations.

At this

primordial level of spontaneous reaction (to the ingressed
EFFECTS of given stimulus- objects).,

the "best"’ wisdom that

an organism has to bring to bear upon the stimulus—ocCession
is delivered to the scene;

in all its unclarified, difiicult

and indeterminately rich nuances ox
meaning.

Next.,

subtle emotional

synthetically unified,

symbolically connota-

tive MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS is reflectively
invoked to seize upon some of the ephemeral potentiality of
highly refined disciplined emotional feeling (very vaguely
felt wisdom) in order to cognitively grasp implications
capable of emerging into consciousness as clear,
symbolic formulations.

distinct

From this synthetic process,

concepts are ideationally genera/ted , bearing remarkaoly
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exact FIDELITY with directly perceived aspects of reality —
experienced directly in their inextricable unity as
stimulus-object EFFECTS.

In this creative process, maximal

organ!smic FUNCTIONAL VIRTUE is in evidence.
reaches its highest transcendent stages,

Concrescence

as innumerable

relevant organic propensities synthetically unite to meet
the “challenging demands1* of ingressing stimulus-occasions.
The initial,

consciously perceivable testimonies of this

process intuitively emerge as richly suggestive, amorphous,
comprehensive emotional feelings, followed by connotative
or vague symbolic meaning, manifesting the distinctive
quality of profoundly FELT-RELATEDNESS;

.

the most eminently

relevant aspects of which are simplified and hence projected
into clear consciousness as clear and distinct eventcomponents.

Little of this, perhaps,

incomprehensibly

complex process is directly governed, by conscious deter¬
mination,
tion.

or directly ascertained through conscious reflec¬

The entire process can, however,

(as we shall argue

in our ensuing analyses) be given IMPORTANT DIRECTION BY
MENTAL OR PRIVATE EVENTS;
stimulus-objects.

themselves functioning as

But more fundamentally,

it is the

unconscious physio-chemical constitution of the human
organism (as its multitudinous organic mechanisms have been
subjected ~~ through unconscious, preconscious and conscious
modes of causal determination

to gradual disciplining)

that provides the operational foundation for the extra¬
ordinary functional harmony intrinsic to high-grade human
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behavior;

hence providing the ultimate basis for generating

novel, powerfully efficacious,

entities that emerge into

consciousness as ideational symbols.

Perhaps the most

recent, dramatically important examples of intelligence
which habitually come reflectively to bear upon foundational
presuppositions — maintaining always an acute sensitivity
to the precise deliverances of concrete perceptual!, experi¬
ence, and intuitively-emotionally felt contradiction or
conceptual departure from experiential facts — was the
revolution that occurred in theoretical physics during the
first quarter of the twentieth century.

The period that

George Garnov has described as uthe thirty years that shook
physics” began with the theory of relativity,
quantum theory.

and later,

the

These theoretical innovations required a

fundamental change in "mental set”

(when dealing with

certain classes of macro and micro cosmic phenomena, by
ceasing to contemplate natural phenomena in terms of the
time-honored materialistic-mechanistic Newtonian theory,

and

hence adopting the recently conceived spatio-temporal
framework of relativity theory and the atomic physical model
of quantum theory.
In positing the four very generally characteristic
levels of cognitive functioning,

the primary intention of

the writer was to accentuate the distinctive features of
each categorical level of habitual thinlcing-behavior.

In

terms of individual behavior, most human organisms at one
time or another manifest the first two levels of habituation
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while a smaller percentage,
the third level.

only upon occasion, behave at

Only a very small percentage of human

beings ever demonstrate all four levels of habituation with
any significant frequency during their daily lives.
It is important to mention in passing, from a thera¬
peutic and educational point of view,

that high-level

reflective cognition (stages three and four)

seem greatly

contingent upon how "free" an organism is in his capacity to
respond to

stimulus-conditions.

* Freedom*, as it is used

here, has a mechanistic implication in that the term refers
to freedom from personal anxiety, which is,
speaking,

organically

a functionally disruptive factor in executing

functionally virtuous response-behaviors.
constraining influence of dogma,

bimilarly tne

convention, mental sets,

situations promoting bureaucratic nefficiency", many out¬
dated cultural mores, and so on,

subtly impose varying

amounts of closure upon perceptual fields.
specifically,

* Freedom*, more

characterizes the degree of functional virtue

that an organism can embody in harmoniously and spontane¬
ously bringing to bear all of its relevant,

concreo^enc

organic propensities upon a given stimulus-object effect, or
stimulus-occasion.

This process involves,

among other

things, the functional virtue of INTRARELATED components of
particular organic mechanisms as they operate

(cellularly)

in executing their unique "task", as well as INTERRELATIONAL
functional virtue manifested among societies of mechanisms
(as it has been said, functional virtue is defined in the

184

classical Aristotlean sense of “doing something and doing
it well".).
Beyond considering unconscious and preconscious func¬
tional virtue as they refer to the operation of an organism’s
constitutive organic mechanisms,

and. also assuming that the

possibilities for ’freedom.’ are maximal,
addition,

there is,

in

the degree of reflective virtue which an organism

can exercise in exploring the vast possibilities within
emotional feeling and.vague symbolic meaning in perceiving
novel ideational suggestions for future enquiry*

Certainly

this ability is greatly contingent upon unconscious physiochemical process with respect to the functional virtue of
organic mechanisms, but beyond this,

reflective virtue is

significantly determined by the quantitative and qualitative
acquisition,

and hence integration,

of positive habituations

which an organism has developed in the process of symbolic
discipline or education.

Positive habituations (behaviors

that were given important consideration in the writings of
Plato, Aristotle,

Dewey, Whitehead, and others) play a

crucial role in the overall functional virtue
demonstrated, in individual behavior.

(or harmony)

When this global

attribute is developed to a high degree,

the organism can

both spontaneously and habitually conjure its unconscious
organic resources,

as well as its habituated (discriminative)

powers of reflection to given stimulus-occasions.

All the

potentially lucrative organic and conscious resources that
organism possesses for ’’meeting the demands’' of a
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stimulus-occasion,

harmoniously concresce as sharp, denota¬

tive components of symbolic clarity, -concomitantly accom¬
panied by an ideationally profound and richly suggestive
(although consciously vague) periphery of vague symbolic
and emotional felt meaning.
Much of what has been previously said was stated in
universal concepts as they apply to human behavior (and to
some extent that of lower organisms),

hence rendering them

necessarily abstract and, no doubt, difficult to comprehend
by the reader.

Although from the writer5s point of view,

there are- too many possible ramifications to be inferred
from the former constructs to cite concrete examples of each
however, let us consider several that embody some of the
more conspicuous principles of the theory being developed.
Let us initially turn our attention to the concept of
perceptual field.
and T2,

Figure 3 represents two instances,

in a time series.

of perception (i,e.,

1^

In each case there is an object

a stimulus-object,

ARE our perceptions of the object),

the EFFnCTo oi which

and. a percipient.
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FIGURE 3

The cross-hatched section of the percipient-symbol represents
the "width" of the subject’s perceptual field with respect to
the number and quality of ideational associations that are
conjured to consciousness resulting from the ingressed
EFFECTS of stimulus-conditions

, as measured, for example,

by a specially constructed achievement test

(crude as this

instrument may be for the purpose of determining the nature
of this phenomenon).

Now let us further assume that during

the temporal interval transpiring between Tj and Tp5

the

subject was exposed to a specific short-termed, well
specified program of education, and was later retested at
^2 by & highly reliable alternate form of the test originally administered at 11 ;

the results showing that the

subject’s perceptual field had

’’broadened" or increased in

both cognitive and emotional sensitivity.

We could validly

conclude from this,

that at T-j

the subject was less percep-

tively sensitive than at T2, as measured by our psycho¬
metric device.

Mow the question is raised, What might be

the possible ORGANIC difference, with respect to the func¬
tional virtue of the organism’s physio-chemical mechanisms,
in the subject at Tn

and T2?

Little is actually known in

physio-chemical terms about this manifest change in behav¬
ioral state,

so in the present discussion we shall avoid

difficult and scientifically indeterminate neurophysio¬
logical problems.
suggest that,

However,

in principle,

it seems perfectly tenable to
either MORE organic mechanisms

are activated by stimulus-object

at T2 than

, or that

the organic processes activated were more complex or
INTEGRATED,

or a combination of the two former possibilitie

If this view is generally correct

(and it IS ultimately an

issue to be empirically verified), we may inferentially
conclude that the increased "width" of the subject’s percep
\

tual field at T2 represents a Quantitative and qualitative
increase of integrated learning

(this conclusion would rely

heavily upon a well conceived experiment designed to
measure INTEGRATED or OPERATIONAL learning- effective for
concrete problem solving, as opposed to mere diverse ana
impersonal fs-ctual recall).

Further,

it can oe concluded

(inferentially) that at T2 the subject’s consciously reflec
tive behavior was being influenced, by quantitativcly more
and/or qualitatively better internalized stimulus-objects
' than at T-, .

Finally,

and this is a more daring but,

in
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principle, possible inference, we can maintain that a higher
degree of ORGANIC SYNTHETIC CONCRESCENCE is in evidence at
T2 than

.

This is to say that at Tp the organism brought

his ‘'best1, relevant organic propensities to bear upon the
stimulus-object effects, but at Tg

(primarily as a result of

the intervening period of formal instruction which,

in

effect, gave the subject a greater resource of consciously
integrated ideational stimulus-objects hence increasing his
power of conscious reflection), more organic propensities
were available to participate efficaciously in concrescence.
This enabled concrescence to be more integrated,

and thus,

high-ordered«
Another example of the varying “width" of organisms*
perceptual field as determined, by their response-behaviors
resulting from the ingression of stimulus-object effects into
their organic (and hence conscious) constitution,

is the

following situation.

It can also be noted that the illus¬

tration will portray,

to some extent, the preconscious as

well as the consciously accessible phases of many behavioral
responses.

The reduction of environmental temperature is a

stimulus-object effect that can conjure qualitatively quite
different

(possible) response-behaviors from various

individuals;

each response of which demonstrates different

levels of intelligence or consciously reflective delibera¬
tion,

At the lowest level, perhaps, all individuals share

in common the fact that their physiology automatically, and
therefore apart from conscious considerations, responds to

189

the drop in temperature by an increased rate of blood
circulation;
shivering,

this is manifested overtly in the organisms

or rapidly moving their limbs.

Another possible

response is that in sensing the temperature drop,

the

organism may merely put on a coat and not give the matter of
a reduced environmental temperature any further thought.
If the experiential impact of the temperature drop has
impressed an organism as being significantly IMPORTANT
(assuming that all the individuals cited in the illustrations
now being presented had experienced the SAME temperature
drop under similar circumstances),

he may,

after having

taken short-termed measures to insulate his body from the
cold, appropriate time to cut firewood for the anticipated
winter.

Still a higher-ordered response may be elicited

from a more ingenious fellow who, as a result of having been
caught "off-guard" by the sudden, unexpected drop in
temperature, decides to develop long-ranged,

carefully

formulated plans as an elaborate preventative measure
against such recurrent instances of uncomfortable temperature
variation.

This' man thus contrives a plan entailing the

procurement of various necessary commercially made heating
system components such as thermostats, motors,
high-limit temperature controls,

etc.

a blower,

Beyond this, he

investigates elementary considerations about hea/t-loss,
Proper distribution and location of radiators, and so on,
an effort to gather the necessary information needed to
design an efficient and economical heating system for his

in
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home.

Finally,

materials,

he utilizes the relevant information,

and comprehensive plan for construction,

and

actively proceeds to fabricate the conceptualized heating
system.

These four examples of qualitatively different

responses to a given stimulus-condition illustrate the
profoundly different cognitive IMPACT that a given stimulusobject effect can have upon individually unique minds,

AS

DETERMINED BY the number and quality of relevant C'CNN0TA¬
TI VELY MEANINGFUL PERCEPTIONS that were conjured to consciousness when the original stimulus-object effect (e.g.,

the

perception of cold) ingressed into the individual’s percep¬
tual fields.

Also the examples demonstrated the VARIABLE

TEMPORAL influence that the conjured CONNOTATIVELY MEANINGFUL
PERCEPTIONS (FUNCTIONING LATER IN REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
AS IDEATIONAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS) FAD UPON RESULTANT BEHAVIORAL
PROGRAMS FOR ACTION.

In the first two examples only very

short-termed, measures were taken in responding to the
temperature drop,

and then the problematic occurrence was

promptly forgotten.

But in the latter two examples,

moderately to extensively long-termed measures were taken
as preventatives against future, unexpected decreases in
temperature.

The last illustration portrayed an admirable

utilization of previously learned positive habitations as
they were sequentially and harmoniously implemented,
accordance to a premeditated plan,
ideational resources for solving,

in

as relevant emotional and
over a long period of time,

u problem whose origin occurred with the original sudden

decrease in temperature.
Next, a simple example will be given demonstrating the
hypothetical process of progressively higher-ordered
transcendent) concrescent synthesis.
the therapeutic technique of

(or

We shall refer to

* reciprocal inhibition * as

being illustrative of concrescence,

although the originators

of the procedure would NOT THEORETICALLY INTERPRET IT AS
SUCH.

Reciprocal inhibition is a methodological procedure

more recently adopted by Behavioristic researchers, but one
also having amorphous and occasionally unsavory historical
roots.

Albert Bandura describes a specific version of this

procedure, viz.,

'desensitization', as follows:

On the basis of historical information, interview
data., and psychological test response, the
therapist constructs an anxiety hierarchy, a
ranked list of stimuli to which the patient
reacts with anxiety.
In the case of desensiti¬
zation based on relaxation, the patient is
hypnotized and given relaxation suggestions.
He is then asked to imagine a scene representing
the weakest item on the anxiety hierarchy and,
if the relaxation is unimpaired, this is
followed by having the patient imagine the next
item on the list, and so on.
Thus, the anxiety
cues are gradually increased from session to
session until the last phobic stimulus can be
presented without impairing the relaxed state.
Through this procedure, relaxation responses
eventually come to be attached to the anxiety
evoking stimuli. 2
Wolpe,83 one of. the most recent proponents of this thera-

82Albert Bandura, "Psychotherapy as a Learning Process,"
Psychological Bulletin, 58 (1961), p. 144,
8^John Wolpe,
therapy., by Reciprocal Inhibition
(Stanford: Stanford University Tress] 19^
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peutic technique, would INTERPRET the theoretical dynamics
(over and above the manifestly observable behavior) involved
in this process in the Behavioristic

(though association-

istic) learning theory propounded by Clark Hull

(as distinct

from the operant conditioning THEORY of Skinner which is
purported to deal exclusively with manifestly observable or
wholly intersubjectively confirmable phenomena; a possibilit
that has been disproven in “Chapter One’5),

There are

critics0 r of such techniques of behavior modification who
would conceive the MANIFEST process within a theoretical
framework whose presuppositional bases, and hence
constructs, markedly differ from those of Bandura and Wolpe,
The point to be made is that in the concrete process of
desensitization,

for example,

there are innumerable

behavioral phenomena directly manifested by both client and
counselor as the counselor systematically introduces
stimulation to the client.

In fact,

there are so many

directly perceivable phenomena in evidence that if
researchers attempted to deal with them simultaneously,
mere confusion would result.

Hence,

in order to isolate

only those r^henomena that are regarded to function effica¬
ciously in bringing about positive behavioral change, an
instrument entitled

rtheory1

is introduced in order to

clearly designate WHICH phenomena shall be deemed relevant,

^'Edward Murray, “Learning Theory and Psychotherapy:
^iotropic vs, Sociotropic Approaches,“ Journal of
Counseling Psychology, X (Fail, 1963)* 250-255*
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in contrast to those alleged to be irrelevant for experi¬
mental purposes.

A theory,

then,

enables researchers to

methodologically select relevant phenomena for scientific

investigation, and therein achieve carefully controlled
conditions for valid and reliable research procedures.
But although this appears to be a rather straightforward
methodological format,

serious confusion,

and hence,

problems and errors frequently arise in experimental enquiry
for in dealing with phenomena, we must SELECT some phenomena
for theoretical and evidential purposes and REJECT others as
being irrelevant;

and also,

theoretical constructs, devised

for EXPLANATORY purposes, are in most cases (IN PRINCIPLE)
incapable of direct intersubjective verification.

Further,

those directly ascertainable phenomena alleged to serve as
evidence for confirming given theoretical formulations are
nearly always subjected to INTERPRETATION; here defined as
an intellectual contribution to sensory perceptions, not
directly confirmable via direct external sensory experience.
With regard to our former consideration of desensitization,
Bandura and Wolpe would maintain that permanent positive
behavioral change, brought about as a function of using a
stimulus hierarchy (or a reinforcement schedule as the
resolution would be conceived by Skinner),

is achieved,

through the removal of ”anxious" behavioral symptoms that
are capable of direct intersubjective confirmation by
observers;

thus the removal of manifest adverse symptoms

would serve as the evidential grounds for confirming their
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theoretical formulations.
interpret,

for example,

Other theorists,

however, would

the same behavioral phenomena within

different theoretical frameworks that would yield vastly
different conceptions of basic problems and procedures for
constructive reconciliation.
terse analysis,

Even in this indirect and.

it is easily seen that many deceptively

profound and difficult philosophical and methodological
uroblems are inherent within the seemingly obvious distincA

tion between facts and theories.

We have done little more

at this point than merely suggest that the ’fact - theory*
dichotomy has many problematic ramifications.

The writer

would maintain the somewhat extreme view that the inter¬
pretative symbolic contribution of mind,
causally efficacious entity,
with the

conceived a,s a

is inextricable associated

'fact - theory* distinction.

Therefore, before we

consider the latter problem, a. concept of mind must be
rigorously formulated.
The writer had specifically selected Bandura* s
description of a particular type of reciprocal inhibition
for it clearly illustrates,

on a rather elementary level,

the principle of systematically introducing stimulus-object
effects into a subject's perceptual field in order to
increase the subject's consciously reflective discriminative
sensitivity to those effects.

Consequently, from increased

sensitivity, which enables the organism to conjure quali¬
tatively better connotative symbolic meaning or wisdom to
on occasion, newly 1earned 1inguistic discriminations and
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conceptual formulations generated by an individual

(which

facilitate precise characterization his personal and
externally perceived states)

thereafter acquire the status

of ideational stimulus-objects that can be used by the
individual for executing more efficacious behavioral
responses to formerly problematic stimulus-object effects.
In saying this,

of course,

the writer*s theoretical senti¬

ments are at odds with those of Wolpe and Bandura,

Ultimately the grounds for dissent lie in the mind-body
issues that were discussed in "Chapter One", and in the
initial portion of the present chapter.
writer had formerly maintained that,

However,

the

although he disagrees

with proponents of Behaviorism on epistemological grounds,
that this was not to disrepute their concern for sound
methodological procedure.

The quotation from Bandura*s

writings is an excellent example of this area of agreement,
insofar as methodological practice is capable of scientific¬
ally precise specification.
More specifically,

the characterization of

'desensi¬

tization* would be INTERPRETED from a subjective psycho¬
logical viewpoint by saying, first,

that the client*s

anxious (manifest) behavioral symptoms with their directly
experienced subjective psychological
Representative of a dysfunctional

(anxious) basis are

(unintegrated) repertoire

°f unconscious and preconscious habitations,
the effects of certain stimulus-conditions.
subject cannot readily,

activated by
Thus the

through conscious reflection,
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alleviate the adverse experience of anxiety.

He is unable

to do so for the stimulus-object effects causing undesir¬
able anxious responses primordially ingress into the
subjectTs organism;

i.e.,

they stimulate organic mechanisms

which are not under the direct control of conscious reflec¬
tion (for they are unconsciously and preconsciously
activated).

For example,

an athlete who is attempting to

perfect a particular sequence of bodily movements is
confronted with the task of rendering constituent components
of the comprehensive movement,

HABITUAL,

and moreover,

collectively habitual in a developmental order, as a
precondition for spontaneously executing the ultimately
desired comprehensive behavior.
our hypothetical anxious subject,

Similarly,

in the case of

certain previously

learned behavioral responses to corresponding stimulusconditions were initially improperly learned.

At the time

of origin, the negative responses no doubt had a. consciously
perplexing effect upon the subject in question, but as time
passed, other competing stimulus-conditions demanded
satisfaction,

such that over a long period of time,

the

original experiential intensity of anxiety accompanying the
dysfunctional response had been forgotten; however,

the

negative physical behavioral habituation still persisted
in adversely influencing contemporary behavior.

The

behavioral analysis of the causal conditions underlying
both the direct experience and symptomatic manifestations
°f anxiety does not differ significantly from various other
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INTERPRETATIONS that may be offered,

even though they issue

from importantly different theories. • The area of signifi¬
cant discrepancy begins to appear as we

carefully consider

the therapeutic measures -- which are stimulus objects,
regardless of whether they ingress into the client as
electric shocks or as metaphorically charged verbaliza¬
tions — used to alleviate anxious subjective psychological
experience,

or extinguish undesirable manifest symptoms.

To define the cause of anxiety as an excessive dependence
on an improper maternal relationship during the first year
of life may accurately designate the original stimuluscondition causing the development of an early-life negative
habituation.

But if an inappropriately learned behavior

still spontaneously arises as a function of a given
stimulus-object effect that ingresses into a subject’s
consciousness twenty or thirty years hence,

it seems

ludicrous to introduce a long program of stimulus-objecu
effects, alleged to be therapeutic,

corresponding to

’regressing to the original conflicting early-life staue of
affairs evidenced between infant ana mother',

FOR iHESi_.

STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS (as they manifest the form of
highly sophisticated and abstract linguistic symbols, whose
meaning,

at best,

is typically very far removed from the

contemporary concrete subjective psychological expelience
of anxiety) ARE NOT AT ALL IDENTICAL WITH THOSE BH^nWTLY
CAUSING ANXIOUS EXPERIENTIAL AND MANIFEST SYMPTOMATIC
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES.

When we stress this point, H is
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merely to reiterate,
frame of reference,

though from a different theoretical
a criticism that Professor Skinner

has vigorously advocated for many years.®5»
The question may be raised,

86

then, What is the specific

nature of contemporary stimulus-conditions that yield
anxious responses?;

and further,

What are the dynamics

involved in modifying anxious behavior as it is directly
experienced,

and symptomatically manifested?

It has been

logically demonstrated that a strict Behavioristic analysis,
in which human behavior is regarded as purely reflexive,
and mental events are causally inefficacious epiphenomena,
is untenable for the view fails to recognize that MIND,
defined minimally as consciousness and reflective conscious¬
ness, must be presupposed A PRIORI in order to have MY
meaningful, intelligent thinking behavior at all.

A mind

must be supposed to HAVE perceptions if anything resembling
human behavior is to be in evidence.

But how do we

reconcile the fact that in circumstances where a subject is
experiencing anxiety,

he is both consciously aware of and

even reflectively aware that certain stimulus-object effects
are causing his anxiety; yet on the other hand,

he cannot,

from his own subjective psychological frame of reference,
actively nullify the efficacy of the undesirable effects?
These disruptive effects ARE within his perceptual field and

or i

JSkinner,
8kinner,

Selenee and Human,,,,
Cumulative,.,,

op.

op.

cit.

cit.
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they can be,

therefore,

reflectively analyzed.

However,

concomitantly on a more prirnordially efficacious level,
there are preconscious (reflexive) stimulus-object effects
to which the individual's organism is responding -- hence
yielding the feeling of anxiety, an uncomfortable state
that cannot be positively modified merely through a reflec¬
tive understanding of its causal conditions — that do NOT
enter his perceptual field.

Stated differently, how can it

consistently be maintained that there are certain stimulusobject effects of which the subject is aware and therefore
can consciously (determinately) ulitize as ideational
stimulus-objects to influence future behavioral modes, while
conversely,

there are other effects that exceed his conscious

control in that they influence his behavior despite his
consciously determined efforts to control their adverse
influence.

First, it can be said that if

conscious auaie-

ness were NOT a necessary condition in executing uniquely
human behavior, no ANXIOUS experience and manifest symptoms,
for example, would be possible at all.

Inis is simply to

reiterate that if a subject was not consciously aware of
the effects

(e.g., the sensed presence) of the stimulus-

object 'dog', no
transpire.

‘trembling behavior (symptom)' would

Therefore we may conclude that on some occasion

in the past the client had LEARNED (although not inten¬
tionally) to be fearful of dogs (with its manifest
•trembling*

symptom) as a result of, perhaps, a former

unpleasant experience with a particular dog,.

Di^regc^din0

200

the appropriateness of such a response
manifest trembling),

(i.e.,

anxiety with

let us say that, later as an adult,

the phobic reaction to clogs is of such severity that it
significantly impairs the subject’s daily behavior.

More¬

over, the client is able to rationally conclude that the
vast majority of dogs are not to be feared,
when a ’dog*

stimulus-object effect ingresses into his

perceptual field,
results.

and so on, yet

excessive anxiety (and hence trembling)

It is clear”- that the example now demonstrates the

condition defined by the two former questions, in that the
subject has conscious control of some stimulus-object
effects, but there are other effects,

causing trembling and

the subjective psychological state of fear,
consciously uncontrollable.
been said,

that are

These latter responses,

it has

can be defined as negative preconscious habita¬

tions, previously learned under (perhaps) fully
(consciously) determinable circumstances, but as time
passed, the habitations (with its directly experienced
anxiety) had remained efficacious, while recollection ox
the original experiential occasion had faded from memory.
Now assuming that we subject the client to the previously
defined, program of desensitization suggested by Bandura,
vihat organismic behavioral changes can be expected as the
therapeutic process is explained by the behavioral model
being developed?

The solution to the global problem of

developing more harmoniously integrated, functionally
virtuous positive habituations that supercede former
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dysfunctional habituations,

involves developing systematic

programs of stimulus-object effects that,

over time,

sequentially ingress into the subject’s organism in such a
way that the subject can EXPEHIENT IALLY FEEL HIS OWN
ORGANIC, MECHANISMS, THROUGH THEIR PRECONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUS
EFFECTS, EFFECTIVELY MEETING THE "DEMANDS” OF EACH STIMULUS#

i— iinntiiiiii '

-

—

-

OBJECT EFFECT AS THEY ARE PROGRESSIVELY INTRODUCED INTO IHS
ORGANISM.

IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT RELEVANT ORGANIC /HID

IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES CM BE DISCIPLINED TO SYSTEMATICALLY
AND CONSTRUCTIVELY COME TO BEAR UPON STIMULUS-CONDITIONS
SUCH THAT INCREASINGLY HIGH-ORDERED CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS
IS ACHIEVED.

This procedure is effectively utilized in the

type of therapy (at least as INTERPRETED by this writer)
suggested by Bandura and Wolpe, as it is designed to help
clients transcend the constraining influence of certain
kinds of negative

(primordially reflexive) habituation.

It enables the organism to gradually RELEARN responses to
given stimulus-object effects,

that were previously

consciously uncontrollable because of their primitive mode
of preconscious ingression, by progressively introducing
increasingly more intense stimulus-object effects in
succession to immediately preceding, less intense effects
that have been successfully (behaviorally) mastered.
this way,

In

formerly problematic responses are gradually

subsumed initially to unconscious,

then preconscious,

finally at higher stages of concrescence,
symbolic functional discipline.

and

to linguistic

When dissipating the
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influence of negative preconscious habitations, which are
usually intrinsically presymbolic,

emotional feelings are

typically the phenomena to be construed,

and hence

positively disciplined.

Thus as an anxiety hierarchy is

presented to the client,

he MUST LEARN to carefully

DISCRIMINATE among the vague,
emotions,

amorphous feelings and

NECESSARILY DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED AS COMPREHENSIBLE

AND CONTROLLABLE, PROM THOSE THAT EMBODY DYSFUNCTIONAL
ANXIETY,

In this way* a gradual discipline is imposed upon

the vaguely conscious substratum of primordially FELT,
spontaneous emotional reactions to given stimulus-object
effects.

As these feelings are more precisely symbolically

comprehended AND EXPERIBNTIALLY ACCEPTED as "legitimate
human13 responses,

they successively emerge with increased

(disciplined) clarity into the subject’s perceptual field.
When this precondition has been fulfilled,

the formerly

vague, dysfunctional anxious feelings can be constructively
reconciled with the organism’s relevant comprehensive mode
of behavior, and furthermore, acquire the status of
stimulus-objects capable of efficaciously functioning as
b e havio ral de t e no inant s.
Therapists, when attempting to modify HIGHER-ORDERED
levels of negative habituation, may ulitize increasingly
frore abstract symbolic

(linguistic) stimulus-objects (over

aud above the concrete and even physically tangible
stimulus-objects required for dealing with preconscious
neSative habituations) to generate effects that will ingress

into the client as NOVEL, PROVOCATIVE DIRECT EXPERIENCE of
such a nature as to NECESSARILY elicit complex emotionalintellectual responses that will be subjected, to client’s
earnest, critical reflection.
"honest5',

This therapeutically more

frank and aggressive approach to behavior modifi¬

cation becomes considerably more complex,
ential concreteness,
Presently,

in its experi¬

than most traditional types of therapy.

though in a rather unwieldly fashion,

such

stimulus-object effects (communicated linguistically, and
in other manifestly perceivable ways) as accurate empathy
in understanding client responses,
regard for their client,

therapists’ positive

concreteness of therapists’

communications to clients, and so on, have been subjected
to experimentation.

Many of the results issuing from this

program of investigation appear to possess numerous
promising implications for understanding the process of
therapeutic interaction, both in individual and group
situations.

It would seem that such IMPLICITLY embodied

qualities in therapists’ behavior as positive regard,
concreteness,

therapist congruence,

facilitate concrescent synthesis,

etc,, would effectively

specifically on the level

of emotional awareness, and perhaps to a lesser degree on
those levels corresponding to connotative and denotative
symbolic meaning.Promoting increasingly high-ordered

Charles B. Truax, ’’Effective Ingredients in Psycho¬
therapy: An Approach to Unraveling the Patient-Therapist
Interact*! on, ” Journal of Counseling Psychology, X (Fall,

1963), 256-2637

-----

"
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concrescence at these more advanced levels would appear to
be largely a function of accurate empathy.

Traditionally,

accurate empathy in psychotherapeutic circles has involved
INTERPRETING client's frequently confused and/or overtly
deceptive verbalizations in an effort to reveal the
ESSENTIAL MEANING of client’s most genuine sentiments about
given objects of concern.

It is an effort to expose what

the client csrea3.1ytJ means as opposed to accepting the mere
naively manifest, literal verbalizations.

This technique

reaches its extreme form in Psychoanalytic therapies.
But we shall expound a less extreme conception of accurate
empathy.

Let us now, with reference to our model, begin

by saying that in any given counseling session many phenomena
are directly in evidence.

There are innumerable gestural

responses, bodily movements, predispositional behaviors,
etc.,

to be considered in BOTH the actions of client(s) and

counselor.

On a more sophisticated, level, there are the

highly complex implications of client-counselor verbaliza¬
tions with their myriad connotatively meaningful nuances.
In short,

counselors are deluged with many data from which

to formulate interpretative inferences.
becomes,

The question

then, What sort of theoretical guides or constructs

should a counselor utilize in making inferential determina¬
tions?

With respect to the model being developed, we can

partially answer this question by saying that the multitude
of phenomena manifested in the client's global behavior
ingress into the therapist's consciousness as mental event-
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components

that are hence critically (through reflection)

subsumed to the therapist’s backlogue of wisdom.
phenomena, perceived as event-components,

Thus the

are directly

experienced in their UNIFIED mode of occurrence throughout
given temporal durations.

It is the cardinally important

task of counselors to take this often complex UNITY of data,
critically reflect upon the essential SIGNIFICANCE of the
client’s complete behavior -- whether the significance is
overtly manifest,

or at the other extreme, behaviorally

covert, for example (e.g., a client may verbally indicate
that he is not fearful of an anticipated counseling session,
yet the therapist perceives the client’s hands trembling) —*
and finally,

BE-STATE OR INDICATE to the client, with

CONCISE CLARITY,

the SIMPLIFIED, ESSENTIAL INTERPRETED

MEANING of his unified behavioral response.

This is the

process that we shall define as expressing accurate empathy.
The term ’simplify’ must not be confused with unwarranted
’oversimplification’.

Simplification, properly conceived,

is one of the most valuable products of reflective analysis,
for it presupposes a. profound and accurate understanding of
the subject matter (i.e,, personal states as well as those
of client’s) to be essentially characterized.

One has only

to recall his past efforts in formulating operational
definitions,

or precisely defining various phenomenal

occurrences and procedural methods to appreciate the
difficulty involved in generating simplified essential
meanings that effectively fulfill an objective.

Therefore,
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when a therapist has• effectively (i.e.,

accurately and

meaningfully) informed a client of a previously unknown,
concretely relevant fact about his behavior,

the accurate

empathic (simplified) communication is potentially capable
of becoming a causally efficacious stimulus-object in the
client’s perceptual field.

The interpretative utterances

of counselors can be utilized by clients for conceptually
understanding,

and thereby integrating,

formerly ill-

conceived dimensions of their personal behavior.
comprehended,

Vaguely

thus fearful and dysfunctional feelings can

be harmoniously reconciled with one’s over-all behavior
once they can be subsumed to linguistic,
tional-emotional discipline.88

and then, idea¬

There is also a more

nebulous but characteristically human by-product resulting
from having successfully engaged in therapeutic selfdiscipline,

It is the profoundly humane asthetic satisfac¬

tion derived from PERSONALLY INITIATED (with the aid of a
counselor) BEHAVIORAL INTEGRATION.

WE NAY CONCLUDE BY

SAYING THAT AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANDING OF FORMERLY PR03L5NATIC FEELINGS IS A RESULT OF TRANSCENDENT CONORSSCENT
SYNTHESIS.

INTERPRETED AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERI-

THIS CORRESPONDS TO THE GRADUALLY EMERGING AWARENESS
THAT UN CON TROLLABLE, ADVERSE FEELINGS CM BE TRANSFORMED
INTO CONSTRUCTIVE SOURCES OF ANIMATION IF THEY ARE ALLOWED
TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES WITH FULL CONSCIOUS INTENSITY UNDER

oo

cNicholas Hobbs, "Sources of Gain in Psychotherapy,"
American Psychologists, XVII (1962), 741-74?.
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APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THEN
UNDERSTOOD IN TERNS OF THEIR ESSENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE.

THAT

IS, FROM INTENSE, FRANK THERAPEUTIC INVOLVEMENT, A CLIMT
CAN COME TO UNDERSTAND. VAGUE, FEARFUL SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬
LOGICAL STATES THROUGH A CYCLICAL PROCESS OF EXPERIENT^ALLY
ENTERTAINING TIE FULL EMOTIONAL IMPINGEMENT OF DYSFUNCTI^AL
FEELING;

AND USING THIS AS A BASIS FOR DEPARTURE, PROCEED TO

REFLECTIVELY EXPLICATE AND HENCE SUBSUME INTELLIGIBLE
PORTIONS OF PRIMORDIAL EMOTION TO LING-UISTIC

•

THUS CONTINUING IN THIS CYCLICAL MANNER, AN INDIVIDUAL CAN,
WITH INTIMATE CONJUNCT ASSISTANCE FROM A TIgPJOTST,

SYSTEM-

ATICALLY TRANSMUTE HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE FROM A QUALITY OF
OPPRESSIVE ANXIETY TO SENTIENT AUTONOMY.

PERPLEXED EMOTIONAX

FEELING ORGANICALLY CORRESPONDS TO CONDITIONS VMUSRg
IMPORTANT ORGANIC PROPENSITIES ARE NOT SYNTKBTICALLY
INTEGRATED INTO HIGHER-ORDERED' CONCRESCENCE.

COUNSELING,

THEREFORE, BECOMES AN ENTERPRISE DESIGNED TO SYST5&AT3X ALL Y
PROVOKE TRANSCENDENT CONCRESCENCE BY SUCCESSIVELY INTRO¬
DUCING STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS INTO CLIENT * S PERCEPTUAL
FIELD THAT WILL CONJURE MODERATELY PROBLEMATIC EMOTIONAL.
EXPERIENCE TO CONSCIOUSNESS FOR EXPERIENTIAL ENTERTAINMENT,
AND HENCE, REFLECT PTE DISCIPLINE, IN ORDER TO DEVELOP MORE
EFFICACIOUS PROPENSITY-REPERTORIES IN RESPONSE TO THE
EFFECTS.

In all this,

however, investigators must begin to

pay much closer attention to the specific nature of the
stimulus-object effects that they,
educators,

as therapists and

introduce into client*s and student*s perceptual
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fields,

for in many Instances the effects are so diffuse

and/or irrelevant that they have little COGNITIVE IMPACT
upon client’s behavior and, perhaps frequently have evendeleterious influence!it is not the purpose of this
paper to formally explicate and hence systematically analyze
the therapeutic process as it is comprehended by the model
being developed, for this task would entail a major and
lengthy effort.

Rather, we can consider only the mere

unelaborated fundamentals of the therapeutic process as
certain of its phenomenal aspects have utility in meaning¬
fully enhancing our theoretical endeavors.

With this point

in mind, we must now again devote our attention to
developing additional theoretical constructs.
Generally speaking,

the human organism has, heretofore,

been conceived as an almost incomprehensibly complex system
of harmoniously integrated functional mechanisms,

capable of

responding to given stimulus-object effects whose categorical
modes for Ingression can,

in principle, be only twofold,

namely, as effects from the external natural world,

and as

effects arising from organism’s internal bodily environment.
At unconscious levels of Ingression (where EFFECTS ingress
as sensation,

as distinct from consciously ascertainable

direct perception),

an indefinitely large number of deter¬

minate response-processes (defined as organic propensities)

an E. Bergin, "The Effects of Psychotherapy: Negative
Results Revisited,Journal of Counseling Psychology, X
(Fall, 1963), 244-250.
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are elicited by societies
organic mechanisms,

(and groups of societies) of

in response to determinate reoccurring

stimulus-object effects.

These response-processes are

QUALITATIVELY contingent upon the FUNCTIONAL EFFICACY
VIRTUE demonstrated among the constituent components of
organic mechanisms operating as discreet cellular units,
and among cells as they function cooperatively as societies
and multiple societies.

This functionally harmonious,

progressively integrative,
processes,

coalescent character of organic

arising purely from the INTRINSIC STRUCTURE of

cells as they exist in STRATEGIC PROXIMITY to one another
within the' domain of an individual organism living in a
propitious environment, has been defined as CONSCRESCENCE.
As propensities achieve greater organic synthesis, they
(in effect) promote concrescence.

When cerebral processes

become synthetically conjoined with (relatively) uniformly
enduring

supportive13 organic processes,

levels of concrescence are approached,

so that optimal

the sheer CONCOMITANT

INTEGRATION OF MULTITUDINOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL PROCESSES,
EXISTING THROUGHOUT GIVEN TEMPORAL DURATIONS, provides the
necessary condition for an ontalogically unique class of
emergent phenomena that we have defined as mental events.
These emergent mental phenomena can be conceived to occur
upon three distinctly perceivable experiential levels of
sophistication; the lowest being organic bodily feeling,
then emotional feeling,

and the highest, ideational feeling.

The latter two levels constitute the domain of symbolic
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behavior,

rendering conscious and reflective conscious

(intelligent) behavior possible.

One fundamentally important

implication of this fact is that stimulus-object effects
acquire,

over and above their unconscious occurrence as

sensation,
experience,

the ontalogically superior status of PERCEPTUAL
capable of intelligently aware acknowledgement.

Stimulus-object effects,
minable causal agents

ingressing as CONSCIOUSLY deter¬

(as distinct from UNCONSCIOUS physio-

chemical causal conditions) can appear as external bodily
perception originating from the natural world., and internal
bodily perception occurring as organic feeling,
feeling and ideational feeling.

emotional

Ideational feeling,

as it

has been said, is a high-ordered symbolic derivative,
resulting from gradually subsuming emotional feeling to
discipline.

Symbolic acquisition,

the preponderance of

which (in mature intelligence) is linguistic, permits

(and

necessarily entails) an extensive increase in human
organism’s behavioral FLEXIBILITY.
term 'behavior’

In its usage here,

the

is to be regarded in a broad senses as that,

(in principle) comprehensible by an objective and subjective
psychological science.

Concretely speaking, behavior

includes manifest bodily movement and (usually verbal)
sound; and dynamic inner feeling,
and ideational actuality.

and moreover,

emotional

Because of the human organism's

greatly increased capacity for behavioral flexibility (and
hence adaptability),

there arises the possibility for an

indefinite elaboration of intelligence.

Intellectual
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development is a function of conscious reflection.
ideational synthetic phenomenon involves,

This

HAVING consciously

symbolic experience, and then attempting to logically
explicate some of its indeterminately complex dimensions
through the necessary medium of linguistic symbols,
to render original vaguely understood experience

in order

(linguis¬

tically) clear and distinct.

Once a backlogue of general

information has been learned

(as propensities established

among societies of cerebral physio-chemical mechanisms),
this in effect transforms vague undisciplined conscious
experience'into MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.
Reflection, defined as the learned capacity to bring
formerly acquired relevant wisdom analytically (critically
and constructively) to bear upon present experience,
develops increased explicative potency as numerically MORE
symbolically precise discriminations are ascertained within
concrete experiential phenomena,

and then integrated into

organism’s SPONTANEOUS conscious awareness.

In this way,

higher-ordered, concrescence is achieved because of the
greater information (-if integrated) infusively as connotative
meaning) contained within organism’s reflective wisdom as it
is exercised in problem-solving behavior.
develop cyclically,
hence,

Reflective powers

that is, experience is entertained, and

critically pondered in light of past wisdom in order

to effect novel ideational synthesis; then the two-fold
operation is repeated indefinitely.
mental process,

of course,

This cyclical develop¬

commensurately broadens
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individuals* perceptual field.
synthesis,

Transcendent concrescent

contemplated from a subjective psychological

perspective,

IS novelly established cognitive relations

among concepts whose former, vaguely understood conscious
character rendered them disassociated.

It is (conceived in

a different way) the instrumental acquisition of novel
(positive) ideationations,

and thereby,

stimulus-objects;

ones that will be spontaneously embodied within the connotative symbolic meaning (wisdom) of future ideational activity,
oriented at still higher-ordered concrescence.

Implicit in

this ideally postulated progression for intellectual growth
are some important considerations that must be now more
carefully contemplated.
In our line of argumentation, it becomes evident that
ALL conscious thoughts and their consciously intelligible
modes of association (or HELATIOH with one another) EMERGE
into awareness typically as linguistic symbols manifesting
denotative and connotative components.

The denotative

component and the innumerable factors that collectively
constitute the connotative symbolic component could,

each,

be regarded as consisting of IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES or
stated differently, as consciously ascertainable dimensions
of what we have defined as an organic propensity.

Thus any

possible complete (unified) idea is consciously entertained
as a determinate configuration of inextricably unified
denotative and connotative ideational propensities.
issue to be contemplated,

then,

The

is that IDEAS and CONSCIOUSLY
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PERCEIVED RELATIONS AMONG IDEAS (which when novel, promote
concrescence) EMERGE from highly complex,

integrated

(empirically identical) correlative organic propensities
as mental events.

For example,

reflecting on a problem,
tion.

at timeq man 'A*

is

endeavoring.to discover its solu¬

But at time^ he has no solution.

The man is emotion¬

ally and intellectually involved with the problem,

thereby

bringing his best cognitive resources reflectively to bear
upon the matter.

Then at last, at time2» man 'A*

discovers the solution to the problem!

CONSCIOUSLY

What were the

considerations involved in this consciously intelligible
novel awareness?

We are required to EXPLAIN the causal

basis of a typical act of synthetic intelligence where an
individual discovers a solution to a problematic circum¬
stance; a solution that he had never before contemplated.
We may begin by saying that consciousness and reflective
conscious awareness were necessary conditions for the novel
discovery,

in that a MIND is required to INTELLIGENTLY

UNDERSTAND and HENCE ENTERTAIN the problem.

Further,

reflective consciousness was required in order to analytic¬
ally bring the organism's relevant emotional and ideational
wisdom upon the problem.

However,

the novel solution was

ACTUALLY SYNTHESIZED INITIALLY ON AN UNCONSCIOUS PHYSIOCHEMICAL LEVEL, THE NECESSARY CONSCIOUS PRECONDITIONS OF
WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED THROUGH A DETERMINATE REFLECTIVE
CONSCIOUS ACT, AND THEN,

THE UNIQUELY SYNTHESIZED UNCONSCIOUS

PRODUCTS EMERGED INTO AWARENESS AS A CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIG-

214

JBLE.SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM.

AS A RESULT OF A SUBJECTIVE

PSYCHOLOGICALLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS EFFORT,
THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR (INITIALLY)
UNCONSCIOUS (PHYSIO-CHEMICAL) CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS OF
RELEVANT ORGANIC PROPENSITIES were provided.

This is to

say that a reflective conscious mental event (a phenomenon
i

which, in itself, presupposes a sufficient level of organic
concrescence to yield the event)
concrescent synthesis.,

CAUSES transcendent

in that reflection,

as an ontalogic-

ally existing subjective psychological phenomenon,
necessary prerequisite

is a

(PERCEPTUAL) ORGANIZATIONAL condition

needed to establish PROPITIOUS PROXIMITY among physiochemical states so that they may unite in novel synthesis.
*

Stated again,

the sequence of EMERGENCE is as follows;

(1) Conscious reflection (which is itself dependent upon
sufficient organic concrescence to render the conscious act
possible at all) involves bringing the stimulus-condition
(the problem, understood in linguistically (DENOTATIVELY)
meaningful terms) and relevant wisdom (embodied as
C0NN0TATIVE linguistic meaning, including vaguely conscious
DISCIPLINED concepts AND emotional feeling) CONCOMITANTLY
into a consciously intelligible IDEATIONAL PROXIMITY.
This intelligent behavioral act,
chemical correlative level,

on an underlying physio-

has the net

(unconscious) effect

of conjuring relevant organic propensities to come synthetic¬
ally to bear upon (because of the physio-chemical PROXIMITY
of organic processes) those organic propensities which
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correlate to the CONSCIOUSLY ascertainable stimulus-occasion.
(2) When this NECESSARY PRECONDITION is fulfilled, novel
ORGAN!C concrescent synthesis can occur /again,

as a result

of the UNIQUE physio-chemical PROXIMITY established among
participating processes, which,

in turn,

occurred BECAUSE

of a LOGICALLY (NOT TEMPORALLY) PRIOR (mental) precondition,
whose validity is secured through the EMPIRICAL IDENTITY
thesis; namely,
(PROXIMATE)

that CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE, RELEVANT

IDEATIONAL RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED AMONG THE

STIMULUS-CONDITION AND RELEVANT WISDOM AS A RESULT OF AN
INDIVIDUALLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS EFFORT7.
(3) When transcendent concrescence has UNCONSCIOUSLY
occurred,

(THEN) its subjective psychological correlate

emerges into conscious experience

(thereby constituting a

component of conscious experience) as an intelligible
(NOVELLY SYNTHESIZED)

solution to a problem.

We may conclude that the phenomena of consciousness and
reflective consciousness are EMERGENT RESULTANTS from
preconditioned organic concrescence, and yet reciprocally,
transcendent concrescence is necessarily contingent upon
reflective consciousness for its continued promotion.
Transcendent concrescence is a three-stage cyclical process.
Most of this extraordinarily complex synthetic process
occurs at an UNCONSCIOUS level;

that is,

one which is IN

PRINCIPLE inaccessible to direct reflective consciousness.
This is merely to say that we cannot, for example, directly
experience, as subjective psychological perception, a
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localized neural synthesis (here functioning as a stimulusobject).

Rather we can only experience the resultant

stimulus-object EFFECTS of this physio-chemi cal synthesis
as it provides the preconditional grounds for an emergent
(perceptual) component of a subjective psychological event.
Private or mental events are themselves a unique class of
ontalogical phenomena, in that they are emergents of synthetic
concrescence.

Stated in more concrete terms, mental events

are subjective psychologically direct perceptual experi¬
ences of given,

enormously complex configurations of

integrated cerebral states,

concomitantly activated through¬

out given temporal durations.

They ARE what it is to BE

those physio-chemical states in their ACTUALIZED UNITY, a
unity so profoundly complex that an ontalogically unique
class of phenomena EMERGE,
experience.

termed subjective psychological

Mental events, in their inextricable perceptual

unity, are all that we can ever mean by the notion of a
thing (stimulus-object)-in-itself.

In this sense,

every

reflectively conscious human being is a thing-in-itself that
directly (PRIVATELY) knows some of its own behavioral states
by BEING those behavioral states.
The essential issue that we are presently considering
is,

How can private,

subjective psychological events CAUSE

transcendent organic

(physio-chemical) concrescence, while

concomitantly being emergent products of the physio-chemic
organismic system which it is to (transcendently) modify?
It has been said that mental events function causally in
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the sense that they bring stimulus-objects or conditions
/"which we directly experience as,

over and above barren

external natural or internally felt perceptual deliverance,
a symbolically (interpretively) elaborated and hence
subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL problem,

ontalogically

existing as clearly intelligible, linguistically disciplined
1HOGGHI.
oj

This thought,

it will be recalled, is constituted

three classes of ideational components; clear denotative

symbolic meaning, and a more vague connotative meaning
directly experienced, as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNiloo, having both a vague symbolic and even more vague
emotional dimension? into a clearly conscious,
focus.

intelligible

But we must ask. What is the intrinsic nature of a

clearly conscious,

intelligible focusf

CAUSE organic synthesis,

such that it can

occurring in a fact, for example,

that when chemical element X is combined with element Y,
a resultant synthesis of the two elements occurs, producing
a unique compound,

Z (of course RECOGNITION of the factual

phenomenon does not presuppose an ability to theoretically
EXPLAIN its basis for synthesis;

rather it merely entails an

understanding of contingent relations,
X follows).

e.g., given X and Y,

It can be concluded that, in the loose sense

of defining 'cause* in terms of contingent relations as
distinct from "creatively bring into being",

the introduction

of X to Y caused the resultant compound,

However, a

2.

subjective psychological thought is not generally regarded
as a tangible causal agent similar to that of,

for example.
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chemical X or a physical object transmitting force.

There¬

fore how can mental event 1% (comprised of the following
directly perceivable event-components: denotative and
connotative symbolic meaning,
cause

and stimulus-object effects)

(in the sense of contingent relations) the trans¬

cendent concrescent occasion Cjj?

If it is concluded,

as it

must be if we are to remain consistent with the presupposi¬
tions of scientific enquiry,

that the innumerable mental-

event components constituting the conscious and reflective
conscious dimensions of mental event

have physio-chemical

correlates, then it can be said that these correlates
comprise a substantial portion of the RELEVANT organic
propensities participating in concrescence C^~.

Further,

it

has formerly been proven that we must presuppose A PRIORI
the causal efficacity of mental events in order to have,
principle,

in

ANY kind logically and subjective psychologically

MEANINGFUL discourse at all.

It was proven that linguistic

reports referring to directly experienced subjective psycho¬
logical phenomena ARE NOT LOGICALLY (ANALYTICALLY)
EQUIVALENT to,

in principle, possible scientific statements

or physio-chemical correlative underlying conditions;
rather this correlative determination must be established
EMPIRICALLY, thereby yielding SYNTHETIC knowledge.

This is

to say that since an analytical identity CANNOT be estab¬
/

lished between statements referring to DIRECTLY PERCEIVED
subjective psychological experience and scientific state¬
ments referring its underlying physio-chemical correlates.
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we must admit the existence of two logically and hence
ONTALOGICALLY distinct domains of phenomenal occurrence,
one physio-chemical or natural and the other, mental.
Concretely speaking,

this means that what each human being

diroctly perceives as INEXTRICABLY UNIFIED subjective
psychological experience is a phenomenon whose intrinsic
meaningful nature could not possibly be LOGICALLY deduced
from an analysis of the meaning of scientific statements
rei erring to its physio-chemical correlates, and vice versa.
From these considerations, we have been led to conclude that
mental events are an ontalogically unique class of
phenomena; emergents of high-ordered concrescent physiochemical processes.

Since these private, mental events

embody the intrinsic general property,

FEELING, with its

three modes of occurrence, viz., organic feeling,
feeling,

and ideational feeling,

emotional

SYMBOLICALLY DISCIPLINED

EMOTIONAL-IDEATIONAL FEELING (usually occurring as typical
linguistic symbols having denotatively and connotatively
meaningful components) is in fact AN ONTALOGICALLY UNIQUE
CLAS.S 0F PHENOMENA (gradually developed by individuals in
accordance to the 1 theory of symbolic development') that
INTERVENE AS INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUS AWARENESS IN WHAT OTHER¬
WISE WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY UNCONSCIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
A PERCEPTIONLESS ORGANISM AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT,
THE STIMULUS-OBJECT EFFECTS OF WHICH WOULD INGRESS INTO THE
ORGANISM AS BARE MEANINGLESS SENSATION.

In this later sense,

the subhuman organism would, be operating' on a level of
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reciprocal ingression among stimulus-objects similar, for
example, to that of chemical elements engaged in synthesis;
a phenomenon hardly to be regarded as involving consciou
awareness.

Moreover, this INTERVENING SYMBOLIC DOMAIN, as

we have seen, acquires a highly determinate CAUSALLY
MICACIOUS STATUS in influencing the behavior of human
organisms.

This is to say that. NON-PHYSIO-CHEMICAL as well

as typical physio-chemical factors causally operate between
ingressed SENSATION and MANIFEST BODILY BEHAVIOR.

Non-physio-

chemical factors are wha.t we have been designating through¬
out our discourse as complete (usuafLly linguistic) symbols,
synthesized from denotative and connotative symbolic
components, that are concomitantly united as inextricably
unified moments of private subjective psychologically
MEANINGFUL experience.

These disciplined units of meaningful

experlence embody the power to SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENT
innumerable s timulu s-ob j e ct effects, perceived

(generally)

as ENTITIES, PROPERTIES, AND STATIC AND DYNAMIC RELATIONS
AMONG ENTITIES AND PROPERTIE S.

Therefore intervening mental

phenomena, while on one hand emerging from correlative
physio-chemical states, can also concomitantly (causally)
promote transcendent organic concrescence through consciously
reflective efforts.

Specifically, this means that since all

mental events have EMPIRICALLY identical correlative states,
such that from scientific statements of physio-chemical
correlates no statements of corresponding subjective
psychological experience could ever in principle be deduced,
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it must be concluded,

that not only do mental events

constitute an ontalogically unique class of phenomena, but
also they are a similarly UNIQUE DOMAIN OP CAUSALITY,
PRINCIPLE) DISTINCT FROM PHYSIO-CHEMICAL CAUSALITY.

(IN
A

great part of subjective psychological experience occurs as
connotative and denotative symbolic meaning which is
concomitantly actualized with other contributed perception,
as inextricably related mental events.

These are,

then,

the DISCIPLINED PRODUCTS of a long process in which PURELY
AMORPHOUS INFANTILE EMOTIONAL FEELING (ITSELF A PRIMORDIAL
EMERGENT FROM ENORMOUSLY COMPLEX AND INTEGRATED CEREBRAL
PROCESSES) IS GRADUALLY TRANSFORMED INTO INTELLIGENT
CONSCIOUS AWARENESS, ENTITLED MENTAL EVENTS,

MENTAL EVENTS

HAVE NUMEROUS EVENT-COMPONENTS PARTICIPATING (DIRECTLY
INGRESSING INTO) IN CONSCIOUSNESS AS NATURAL AND INTERNAL
BODILY STIMULUS OBJECT EFFECTS.

SINCE A LARGE PORTION OF

THESE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY EXPERIENCED (i.e., intern¬
ally located) EFFECTS ARE SYMBOLIC (HENCE INDICATING THAT
THE RELEVANT WISDOM OF THE PAST, SYMBOLICALLY STORED AS
MEMORY, CAN CONSTRUCTIVELY ENTER CONTEMPORARY OCCASIONS AS
THE CONNOTATIVE MEANING NECESSARILY ACCOMPANYING DENOTA¬
TIVELY CLEAR EVENT-COMPONENTS), EVER-EMERGING CONTEMPORARY
NATURAL-WORLD AND INTERNALLY FELT PERCEPTUAL OCCASIONS ARE
NOT MERELY UNINTELLIGIBLE:

RATHER THESE PERCEPTA ARE

RENDERED SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL.

THU o

WITHIN THE INEXTRICABLY RELATED DOMAIN OF MENTAL EVENTS,
INCESSANTLY EMERGING REALITY CAN BE INTELLIGENTLY UNDER-
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STOOD; A PHENOMENON CAPABLE OF BEING GENERATED ONLY BY
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN MINDS.

MENTAL EVENTS, THEN, ARE ONTALOGIC-

ALLY UNIQUE CAUSAL DOMAINS IN THE SENSE THAT ALTHOUGH
EVENT COMPONENTS ARE EMEHGENTS FROM UNDERLYING PHYSIOCHEMICAL CONDITIONS,
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THEIR CONCOMITANT COLLECTIVE EMERGENCE

INEXTRICABLE UNITIES EMBODYING INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUS AND

REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS AWARENESS,. IN EFFECT, ARE ONTALOGICALLY
UNIQUE FRAMES OF REFERENCE FROM WHICH IDEATIONAL STIMULUSOBJECTS MAY BE .SYMBOLICALLY SYNTHESIZED, AND THEREBY
UTILIZED AS CONSCIOUS (CAUSAL) BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS.
ALL THIS IS SIMPLY TO SAY THAT TO CONSCIOUSLY MANIPULATE
INTELLIGENTLY MEANINGFUL SYMBOLS (i.e.,

TO THINK)

IS ALSO

TO CONCOMITANTLY MAMPULATE THEIR UNDERLYING CORRELATIVE
PHYSIO-CHEMICAL STATES.

SINCE PHYSIO-CHEMICAL STATES CAN BE

LLLJLLLAT5D FROM A PERSPECTIVE OF INTELLIGENT CONSCIOUSNESS,.
THIS IS ALSO TO SAY THAT NOVEL PROXIMATE RELATIONS CAN BE
ESTABLISHED AMONG ORGANIC PROPENSITIES, DEMONSTRATING THAT
CENTAL EVENTS CAN CAUSALLY PROMOTE TRANSCENDENT ORGANIC
CONCRESCENCE.

THE EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENT, SPONTANEOUSLY

MEANINGFUL UNITY, INTRINSICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF MENTAL
EVENTS, OCCURRING IN CONTRAST (DURING REFLECTION) WITH ITS
MASSIVELY COMPLEX AND NUMEROUS CONNO TATIVELY MEANINGFUL
IMPLICATIONS,

SUGGEST INNUMERABLE POSSIBILITIES FOR SYMBOLIC

PERMUTATION AND THEREBY INNOVATION.

ENSUING COGNITIVE

SYNTHESIS, AS TRANSCENDENT CONCRESCENCE, THEN EMERGES AS
(CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE) NOVELLY PERCEIVED RELATIONS AMONG
GIVEN OBJECTS OF CONCERN.
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The problem of ideational causality is, without ques¬
tion, very difficult to theoretically comprehend.

Our

present effort to explain this phenomenon may be regarded as
a preliminary to “Chapter Three", where, a considerably more
systematic and ultimately fruitful argument regarding the
same issues will be propounded within the context of .a
general theory of mind.

But in any case, ideational

causality in contrast to natural causality (i.e,, demons¬
trating contingent relations).is truly a remarkable and
profound phenomenon.

That stimulus-object effects,

initi¬

ally ingressing into an. organism as sensation, and then
concrescing to the level where they emerge as conscious
percepta, participating thereby as private event-components
which denote a small

(personally relevant) aspect of

reality that has been consciously (symbolically) illuminated
through becoming intelligible,
least.

However,

is remarkable to say the

how much more astounding is the phenomenon

of conscious reflection (again in contrast to natural
causal processes), whereby consciously (symbolically)
intelligible stimulus-object effects — effects that are
intrinsically different than any that could possibly ingress
into any lower-ordered organism —function within the unity
of mental events to conjure relevant, previously learned
wisdom (which constructively comes to bear upon the present
occasion) to enhance the present occasion by rendering it
subjective psychologically meaningful.

In this,

conscious

reflection provides the necessary preconditions for emergent,
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noveily conceived ideational relations, which in turn,

can

later function as stimulus-objects to establish additional
unique cognitive relations.

It is in this manner that

conscious reflection can be understood as the principal
mechanism for intellectual development.
Another cybernetic generalization that could be inferred
from the previous discussion is that the human organism can
be conceived,

theoretically,

as an immensely complex,

integrated organic functional system, predisposed

(because

of its intrinsically interconnected structure) to maintain
physio-chemical equilibrium amongst its organic mechanisms
despite the continually disruptive influence of stimulusobject effects ingressing into its constitution via external
and internal perceptual modes.

Here,

of course, the notion

of ‘disruptive‘ types of stimulation must be expanded to
include consciously (symbolically) provocative stimulusconditions as well as natural conditions.

Also the term

* disruptive‘ is not defined, for our purposes, with its
typically negative connotation;

rather, we shall contemplate

‘disruptive stimulus-object effects’ as merely those capable
of provoking changes of state — whether physio-chemical or
subjective psychological -- relative to former antecedent
states

(of equilibrium,

or otherwise).

Further, it seems consistent to proclaim that the
intrinsic structure of the human organism renders it capable
of reconciling its constitutive states

again whether

physio-chemical or ideational ~~ with reasonably normal

external and internal stimulus-object effects,

Such modes

of behavioral reconciliation regularly entail "degrees of
complexity" ranging from executing unconscious organic
mechanistic functions;
to long-ranged,

to consciously reflexive behaviors;

highly intelligent,

programs of purposive behavior.

reflectively constructed

It follows,

however,

that

those stimulus-object effects NOT reconciled with overall
functional harmony, yield a dysfunctional influence upon
behavior.

The organism,

in this situation (now assuming

that the adverse stimulus-object effect determinately enters
an organism’s perceptual field), attempts to co-exist with
the difficulty until a resolution can be effected; whether
from dissipation of disruptive experiential intensity merely
through temporal passage, as a result of reflective resolu¬
tion,

etc.

effects,

Therefore,

when problematic stimulus-object

or those for which no previously established

habitual repertoire is suitable,

ingress into organisms,

all relevant organic propensities come to bear upon them;
reflective consciousness,

in its most effective manner,

persistently endeavors to establish facilitative conditions
for transcendent concrescence,

in an effort to synthesize

a novel efficacious habituation.

If none is forthcoming,

the organism must coexist with the problem,

and if func¬

tional harmony becomes seriously impaired, therapeutic
assistance, for example,

is needed in an effort to restore

behavioral integration.

However, from the viewpoint of

educational methodology and learning theories,

some amount
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of functional disruption is necessary for motivational
purposes.

But obviously this means that sufficient dysfunc¬

tion is required, to have a stimulus-object effect appear in
a subject * s perceptual field with adequate intensity to
piovoice constructive reflection;

i.e,,

a cognitive impact

designed to be commensurate with an individual's intellectual
and emotional capacities.
This concludes our formal endeavor to provide a
mechanistic ba.sis for the concept of mind to be developed
in the next chapter.

The writer does not

(by any means)

maintain that the constructs introduced in preceding
discussion exhaust the possibilities for such fomrulations
or modes for exposition, because many additional constructs
could be fruitfully added.

Rather,

only those theoretical

instruments were introduced which specifically enhanced our
understanding of the mind-body problem as it has relevance
for scientific psychology.

It seems,

then,

that regardless

of how unrelated the constructs of divergent schools of
psychology may APPEAR when initially subjected to scrutiny,
it is necessary upon more careful analysis, that they must
at least be concordant, whether explicitly or by implication,
with the scheme being developed, for the writer contends
that this model consistently reconciles "mind" with ,!bodvt!.
It is, perhaps, premature to assert this view without
having yet considered the far more rigorous conceptualization
of mental experience presented in ,fChapter Three”;

essen¬

tially a refined derivative from the arguments propounded
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in the previous two chapters.
say,

obviously,

The writer does NOT mean to

that the “last word” has been said on the

problem of !mind and body’.

Moreover,

there is the genuine

possibility that some of the aforementioned arguments may
be subject to important criticism; and undoubtedly various
arguments will need additional clarification and elabora¬
tion.

But it is the writer's sentiment that the general

philosophical psychological theory proposed in this discourse
more effectively and systematically

(at least in terms of

the next chapter) confronts the full factual breadth of
uniquely human experience

(over and above the behavioral

modes that man demonstrates in common with lower-ordered
organisms) than other contemporary psychological theories
%

o f human behavior.
Figure #4 schematically represents the bane mechanistic
structure of the theory presented in this chapter.

However,

the schematization can be more of a hindrance to careful
understanding than a facilitative instrument
difficult preparational work,

if the

entailing a careful reflective

consideration of each successive argument as they collec¬
tively constitute a unified human behavioral theory,

is

neglected.
Before this chapter is terminated an important position
on the mind-body problem articulated by Herbert Feigl must
be critically analyzed in terms of the subjective psycho¬
logical theory presently being developed.
interest to that of the writer's,

His view is of

for the two theories yield

CON C RE-SC ^A/
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FIGURE 4
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a fundamentally common conclusion, namely,

that mental events

are identical with correlative physio-chemical states only
t 11 ~ c 1 o. e t i t y is ascertained through
EMPIRICAL means.

This thesis has been entitled the

15Identity Theory of Mind and Body. "9°
Professor Feigl, who has written a penetrating,
comprehensive article on the mind-body problem,
that the resolution of this issue
have seen,

has concluded

(one containing,

as we

a CONFIGURATION of difficult ramifications) must

ultimately follow from the tenet that mental

("raw feels")

events and physical (physio-chemical states) events refer to
t*"]e SAME process.
i\rays oi

This means that there are two distinct

studying mental phenomena.: we may investigate the

cerebral states underlying given mental events, and also,
the person who directly expediences the mental states may
provide verbal reports about his inner states,
by researchers.

for scrutiny

From this, Feigl concludes that there is an

EMPIRICAL IDENTITY between mind phenomena contemplated on
one hand as physio-chemical states, and while on the other
hand, experienced through direct acquaintance by individuals
themselves.91
mental state,

This is to say,
"I feel sad.",

as we have argued, that the

is not logically or analytically

equivalent to its corresponding physio-chemical states St,

90.

V, C„ Chappell (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hallj" 19^1, pp. 19-21

91Herbert Feigl,
ed. Feigl,

Scriven,

"The ’Mental’ and the 'Physical’,"
and Maxwell, II, 370-A97/
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Further,

Feigl argues that mental events

ARF CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS:
Any solution of the mind-body problem worth
consideration should render an adequate account
of the EFFICACY of mental states, events, and
processes in the behavior of human (and. also
some subhuman) organisms.
It is not tender¬
mindedness or metaphysical confusion, I trust,
which impels this repudiation of a materialis¬
tically oriented epiphenomenalism.
Admittedly,
the testimony of direct experience and of intro¬
spection is fallable.
But to maintain that
planning, deliberation, preference, choice,
volition, pleasure, pain, displeasure, love,
hatred, attention, vigilance, enthusiasm, grief,
indignation, expectations, remembrances, hopes,
wishes, etc. are not among the causal factors
which determine human behavior is to fly in the
face of the commonest of experience, or else to
deviate in a strange and unjustified way from the
ordinary use of language.
The task is neither to
repudiate these obvious facts, not to rule out
this manner of describing them.
The task is
rather to analyze the logical, status of this sort
of description in its' relation to behavioral
and/or neurophysiological descriptions.
In the
pursuit of this objective it will of course be
necessary to avoid both interaction!sm and
epiphenomenalism; and it will moreover be desir¬
able to formulate the solution in such a way that
it does not presuppose emergent!sm,; although
the door to a scientifically formulated emer¬
gent! sm need not be closed.
In this same connection justice should be
rendered to what is meaningful and scientific¬
ally defensible in the notion of free will and
choice.
If our personal!ty-as-it-is at the
moment of choice experiences itself in the choice
made; if our choices accord with our most deeply
felt desires, e.g,, if they are not imposed upon
us by some sort of compulsion, coersion, or
constraints such as by brute physical force, by
other persons (or even only by components of
our personality we do not acknowledge as the
"core11 deemed centrally our "self”), then we are
’’free” in the sense that we are the doers of our
deeds, the choosers of our choices, the makers of
our decisions.
In other words, it is in this
case that our central personality structure is
a link in the causal chain of our behavior,
predominately, even if not exclusively,
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effective in the determination of our conduct.
This sort of freedom (in the superb formulation
of R. E. Hobart-Dickinson Miller) "INVOLVES
DETERMINISM AND /lS7 INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT IT."92
It is the writer1s personal contention that the general view
suggested by this quotation is representative of an unusu¬
ally well-balanced philosophical position on the mind-body
problem.

Generally speaking,

the writer does not feel that

his view as it has been heretofore developed seriously
contradicts that of Feigl’s.

It appears that even the

concept of {concrescent synthesis’ is reasonably consistent
with what Feigl regards as a "scientifically formulated
emergent! sm",

However,

this Is by no means to say that

Feigl would be enthusiastic about the general theory being
proposed in this paper,

for his overall philosophical out¬

look seems considerably more in accord with an ’objective
psychology’

rather than what the writer would define as a

Subjective psychological science’.

Feigl would undoubt¬

edly criticize the writer’s position as unwarrantedly
speculative, and hence vague.

The writer,

on the other hand,

would criticize Feigl'for not referring to any scientific¬
ally appropriate theoretical formulations satisfactorily
demonstrating,

in detail, how subjective psychological

states (or what Feigl defines more narrowly as "raw feels")
could function in a causally efficacious manner,

although

(if his article is carefully studied) he does regard the
relevant constructs of contemporary psychological theories

t>.,

92

Ibid,,

338-339
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as suitable for investigating human behavior (again a point
about which the writer would take issue).

But current

typical psychological theories persist in avoiding the
problem of mind and its causal efficacity,

in relation to

correlative physio-chemical process; a limitation which
subjective psychological theory can reconcile.
For both clarificational and constructive purposes let
us now briefly examine some of the more important areas of
DIFFERENCE between Feigl’s Identity Theory and that pro¬
pounded by the writer.

Generally stated, even though Feigl

maintains that we must acknowledge the necessity for an
EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE between "mental" and
events,

"physical*5

the writer wishes to extend this view by arguing

that physio--chemical states,

in addition to providing the

necessary conditions for "mental events",

can also BE

MODIFIED BY THEIR MENTAL EMERGENTS (i.e., mental events can
promote transcendent concrescence).
intrinsic structure of

Because of the

* mental events’

(a term defined by

the writer in a way importantly different from Feigl’s
definition) /namely, as inextricably related units of
perceptual components, portraying reality throughout given
temporal durations, as they have relevance for (and are
hence actualized as consciousness and reflective conscious¬
ness within) individuals during particular occasions/,
inner and outer environments can be consciously FELT
(recalling, now,

the complex and technical manner in which

this term has been defined for subjective psychological

233

theory) in such a way.that progressively higher-ordered
concrescence can be achieved.

In fact,

it is contradictory

to conceive of ANY type of subjective psychological or
logically MEANINGFUL discourse without necessarily
presupposing A PRIORI this ontalogically unique mode of
disciplined feeling,

as its causal basis.

To FEEL REALITY

in the technical way defined'in this discussion, is to
engage in what is normally (though typically unclearly)
conceived as thinking-behavior.
process,

for the moment,

But to characterize the

as FEELING reality is to suggest a

considerably more comprehensive way of contemplating the
profound complexity of typical concrete experience.
Disciplined feeling is the medium through which stimulusobject effects can be meaningfully felt in their full,
clear, profoundly (though vaguely apparent) related
symbolically represented character.

It involves the active

process (whether occurring as conscious awareness or
reflective consciousness) of the relevant symbolically
characterized past coming constructively to bear upon
present perceptual
ance,

(i.e„,

stimulus-object effects) deliver¬

such that the formerly learned WISDOM CAUSES the

barren perceptually contributed present to be intelligently
INTERPRETED as subjective psychologically meaningful.
Thus in its fully actualized state, disciplined feeling is
the denotative and connotatively felt symbolic components
as they synthetically unite to render a natural or internal
bodily stimulus-object effect intelligible.

In any case,

without pursuing the matter further, private mental events
ARE individual human organisms*

ever-emerging spatio-

temporally successive understanding of relevant reality,
which undergoes revision and development primarily as a
function of accumulated wisdom.
Therefore,

as it has been argued in the first chapter

although an empirical identity between "mental" and
"physical"

(to use Feigl*s distinction)

states can be

established, BOTH CATEGORIES OF PHENOMENA, AS THEY ARE
CONCEIVED AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND/OR LOGICALLY
MEANINGFUL* ARE GROUNDED IN PRIVATE MENTAL EVENTS IN THAT
MENTAL EVENTS MUST BE NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI IN
ORDER TO HAVE ANY INTELLIGIBLE DISCOURSE ABOUT EITHER
CATEGORY OF STATES.

Thus the ultimate basis for the dis¬

tinction between "mental" and

"physical",

it will be

recalled, was in determining the LOGATI ON of stimulusobjects yielding what we directly perceive as ingressed
effects or perceptual event-components.
characterization ’"mind"

(i.e.,

Finally, the

in the "narrow" sense of

denotative and connotative feeling, united as symbols)
CONCOMITANTLY standing over against percepta* was used to
portray the human organism’s relation to stimulus-objects.
The difference between Feigl’s and the writer’s
’Identity Theory’

can be somewhat more rigorously demons¬

trated in the following way:

FEIGL'S VIEW
1)

Feigl argues FOR AN EMPIRICAL IDENTITY between
"raw feels" and their underlying correlative
physio-chemical processes.

2)

"Raw feels" are mental events or the REFERENTS
which are symbolically character!zable; those
phenomena which are the direct intersubjac¬
tively INACCESSIBLE objects of verbal reports
(e.g. , pains,' etc".7.

3)

Therefore, mental events can be systematically
studied from a neurophysiological viewpoint
and/or that of a psychology admitting, as
suitable evidence, verbal reports REFERRING
to directly accessible inner states occurring
wit hin individual sub j e c t s.

4)

Feigl, then, ADMITS that individual verbal
testimonies referring to inner, inter¬
sub jectively INFERRED states as legitimate
evidence for scientific psychology PROVIDING
such data are gathered under rigorously
specified, experimentally controlled conditions,

5)

Also, Feigl 'maintains that current molar
psychological constructs (id. ego, self,
ope rant c onditioning, etc.) are suit able
theoretical devices for systematically
understanding "raw feel" phenomena byestablishing operational definitions
between given constructs and correlative
mental events.

THE WRITER'S VIEW
1)

An empirical identity is wholly satisfactory
for correlating what the writer defines as
mental events with, their underlying physiochemical processes (see also Zener's article^),

2)

However, in Feigl*s distinction between "mental"
and."physical", the fact that a MIND (loosely
defined by the writer as denotative and
connotative symbolic meaning) must be
presupposed A PRIORI to "stand over against"

93Karl Zener, "The Significance of Experience of the
Individual for the Science of Psychology," ed. Feigl,
Scriven, and Maxwell, II, 354-369.
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BOTH "raw feels" (what Peigl defines as
mental states, e.g., pain, emotion, etc.) and
"physical" (what Feigl defines as intersubjectively directly perceivable states, or
what the writer defines as external natural,
stimulus-object effects) EVENT-COMPONENTS
in
CLEARLY EVIDENT FROM JflJ ARGUMENTS,
It is highly questionable whether he would
admit to the BIPOLAR notion of 'mind standing
over against percepta* at all.
Therefore
it seems that Feigl*s "mental-physical"
distinction suffers from the same ‘epistem¬
ological vagueness* as the problematic
'public-private' dichotomy.
3}

Further, since Feigl does not mention HOW
"mental" states may function in a causally
efficacious manner, and moreover, since
current psychological theories, which he deems
suitable for scientific enquiry, all appear
to be vague, simply avoid, or resort to an
unwarranted reduction!sm (see "INTRODUCTION")
when confronted with this problem, it seems
as though he would still like to ultimately
maintain that all human behavioral states
can be most satisfactorily understood and
hence modified through dealing with physiochemical or manifestly apparent behavioral
states; and that "mental-event" reports are
merely psychologically expedient as eviden¬
tial "check-points" for conventional
theories, or as sources of data in neuro¬
physiological experimentation.

4)

Therefore, it appears that although Feigl
has effectively argued in support of an
empirical identity thesis, the serious
difficulties cited in steps #2 and #3 above
impose important limitations upon his position.

This compendious analysis of Professor Feigl s article,
entitled "The

'Mental* and the 'Physical'",

only minimally

suggests the superb quality of argumentation embodied in his
mature consideration of the mind-body problem.

Unfortun¬

ately, a more extensive critical review of Feigl*s position,
although unquestionably warranted, would both interrupt the
continuity of our argumentative progression, and moreover,
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merely entail substantial repetition of foregoing material.
Because his article is so highly relevant to the mind-body
problem considered in historical perspective,

it seemed

absolutely necessary that the writer (at least) briefly
comment on the alternate Identity Theory.
Before this chapter is terminated,

the essential

cogency of subjective psychological theory may be importantly
enhanced

(beyond the realm of sheer philosophical analysis)

if we refer to responsible speculations on the nature and
function of mind as conceived from a strictly empirical
discipline.

Also such a measure may be somewhat comforting

to those who still perhaps wonder if the issues being
considered are, in fact, genuinely problematic or conversely,
’•mere” philosophical sham.

Therefore,

as an additional

source of evidential support, vie shall avail ourselves to
the unusually imaginative comments of J.
eminent contemporary bio-chemist.

A.

V. Butler, an

The writer will quote

Professor Butler’s writings at length and without elabora¬
tion, in an efiort to preserve the inherent continuity in
his mode of exposition.

The quotations will be taken

exclusively from the sixteenth chapter in his book,

The Life

of. the Cell.94Initially, with reference'to the fundamental theoretical
constructs of our “enlightened” mechanistic model,
e.g.,

organic propensities,

concrescence,

etc., let us

94
J- A- V. Butler,
Basic Books, 1964).

The Life of the Cell (New York:
--
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consider the following passages.
The most important characteristics of the brains
of humans and similar animals is the ability to
receive a composit message from a large number of
sensory nerves.
The part of the message received
carried by a single nerve or even by a small group
of nerves means nothing by itself, (p. 127)
Into the brain comes most of the nerves from sense
organs and out of it go most of the nerves which
control the muscles.
Can we discover what happens
in between what paths are taken by the impulses
which enter the brain through excited nerves, and
how a coherent pattern is constructed from the
messages arriving down many nerves? (p. 128)
Millions of brs,ih cells may thus be concerned with
receiving a single visual impression.
How do they
cooperate to produce the total instantaneous
impression? (p. 128)
There is undoubtedly a great deal of electrical
activity going on in the brain at all times....
With this instrument (an electroencephalograph the writer’s comment) an overall rhythm of
electrical activity can be detected.
This must
be due to many circuits between neurons oscillating
in unison.
The reason for this is not clearly
known.
The oscillations may be similar to a
’carrier wave’ on which the sensory imput
produces modulations.
The character of the
oscillations varies with the mental state, (p. 128)
The brain deals with the innumerable sense
impressions by producing a ’picture’ which we
perceive ~~ for example in the use of our visual
sensations, this is the ’picture’ we are aware
of when we look at our surroundings, (p. 129)
This ’picture’ which we perceive is not like
a photograph -- a mere projection of what we are
looking at.
It is itself an interpretation of
the actual visual experience, which involves our
previous knowledge and therefore our memories of
similar scenes...,
Infants also learn to interpret
their visual impressions similarly and only slowly
build up an understanding of the sensory informa¬
tion which reaches them.
The visual information which is received at
any one time is therefore not interpretable by
itself.
The ’picture* we make of it is an
amalgam of the present and past experience, (p. 129)
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... the sensory impressions of the moment take
their place with the memories of those which have
previously been interpreted, and have become part
of our store of knowledge.
They become of a
record which has been continuously built up since
birth, (p. 130)
But the main purpose of memory is not the
recollection of the past, but the recognition of
the present.
Memory is used mainly to recognize
and identify the images of our present experience
and for this purpose it is usually sufficient only
to notice the salient features, unless there are
some details of urgent interest, (p. 130)
We might ask ourselves how the composite amalgam
of sense data and the memory data... is presented
as the ’picture’ or perception we become aware of.
It is possible that the whole matrix of impulses
from the sense organs, now united wTith and inter¬
preted by comparison with the memory record pass
into a further echelon of cells in which the
perception we are aware of is produced, i.e., it
enters our consciousness.
This level is very
selective in its ability to attend to certain
parts of the whole sensory imput and to ignore
others.
This is probably achieved by lowering
the critical barrier necessary for the passage
of impulses for some groups of sensations and
raising it for others, (p, 132)
Next,

Dr.

Butler deals with the problem that vie have

described as emergent consciousness and conscious reflection.
It is.,, possible to give some sort of account of
the physical events which produce sensations,
but what are the sensations themselves? We could
say that this is how the physical events are
experienced, but we must ask then, experienced by
what and what is the nature of experience.
The
perceptions themselves are not capable of being
described in physical terms.
Thus we cannot
describe our experience when we see a.green
object in say physical terms.
It cannot be
described in physical quantities like length,
velocity, force, orbit, wave length, temperature
or even in the language of the quantum theory.
Our only knowledge of it comes from our own
experience, or from the description of others of
their experience.
Must we discuss it as an
illusion and pseudo-phenomenon, which has no
reality because it is only a description of how
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things appear to us subjectively and not as they
are,
I think perceptions ought to be related to
the rest of scientific knowledge; but we have no
means, other than investigating the physical
background, of dealing with them and this only
tells us how they are produced and not what
they are. (pp. 134-135)
As I have said above, the (sensory) information is
organized into a kind of picture, which includes
both the present experiences and those remembered
from the past.
But how is this picture used in
producing actions?
There must be a stage at which
all the information is reviewed in light of past
experience and decisions are reached to act or not
to act, and orders are then issued to the muscles,
(p. 134)
Much of this (nervous) activity is entirely
unconscious.
All we are aware of is an intention
to perform a certain action and the brain and
central nervous system do the rest. (p. 134)
>

The important feature of voluntary actions is
that the necessary muscle operations have to be
LEARNT.
We are not born with the ability to
perform complicated voluntary actions, (p. 135)
So we see from all this that the connections in
the brain between sensory information and the
muscles is not direct.
The sensory information
is built up into a continuing record of sensation
and experience, (p. 136)
All that is required for the whole sequence to
be "triggered off" is a stimulus or order from
the higher level of cells in the brain whose
decisions are made and it appears to be at
this level that the connections between the
'sensory picture’ and the muscular stimulation
are made. (p. 136)
The last sequence of quotations will deal with Butler's
concept of symbolic behavior.
What are the characteristic features of human
intelligence?
There is undoubtedly a greatly
increased power of discriminating, remembering
and interpreting sense impressions.
The human
being connects his immediate sensations to a
much greater extent with his past experience,

and the result is an enormous structure of
experience accumulated throughout life.
His
* intelligencef is a measure of t-he skill and
ability with which he uses the accumulated
experience.
But this is not all -- or even the most
characteristic feature of human life, which is
the ability to replace the sensory experiences
themselves by symbolic equivalents which can be
manipulated in the mind.
This involves associa¬
ting one kind of experience with something
totally different in character, (p. 137)
Some physiologists and psychologists find in the
conditioned reflex a sufficient explanation of all
kinds of behavior which are not completely instinc
tive....
This may be so in some sense, but it
overlooks the enormous amount of experience and
its organization which human beings bring to the
task of discrimination.
The important characteristic of human beings,
which is almost completely lacking in all other
animals is the fact that accumulated experience
(= knowledge) is organized and stored mainly in
the form of symbolic equivalents.
This can be
supposed to be a consequence of the case with
which the human brain makes associations beti-jeen
even unlike things.
This has given rise, for
example, to human language, which is the
necessary basis of human society.
In language
there is an association between particular
experiences and particular uttered sounds.
The sounds are produced by muscular movements
in the chest and throat, and like all other
complex movement, have to be learnt.,..
There
is nothing necessary about these associations —
in many cases the sound has little in common
with the experience it represents — it is
purely conventional association.
But in one way
or another particular sounds have come to mean,
for groups of people, specific types of experience
The ability'to replace actual experiences
by symbolic spoken equivalents has led to all
the features which distinguish human life from
that of the higher animals, because when
experiences have been converted into spoken (and
later, written) equivalents they can be
communicated from one person to another and they
often acquire a. greater amount of permanence than
the actual memory of experience, because it is
often easier to recall the symbolic expression
of an experience (in words) than the experience
itself.
It is easier to remember that you were
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tired on a certain occasion than to remember
just what being tired felt like.
In this way it came about that besides their
rather fragmentary simple memory of events,
human beings have a memory of their symbolic
expression.
The latter is easily communicated
frora^one individual and provides a means of'
sharing experiences, which can never or only
rarely be shared directly, except by the actual
participants.
Human knowledge is in fact the
shared experience of the community, expressed
symbolically, (p, 139)
See also another book
by Butler, Science and Human Life.95
The writer feels that the views of Professor Butler are
generally concordant with the philosophical psychological
position developed, in this paper.

The numerous quotations

extracted from Butler's writings served as a highly
appropriate,

intuitively intelligible summary for this
r

chapter.

9^J,

A. V.
Basic Books,

Butler,
195?)*

Science and Human Life

(Hew York:

CHAPTER III

Section 1
Let us briefly recapitulate our developing train, of
argumencacion, to more effectively facilitate a compre¬
hension of the major problem to be considered in this
chapter.

In an overly simplified fashion, our investiga¬

tions heretofore may be essentially stated as follows:
1)

In the “INTRODUCTION" it was argued that both
Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism had to resort
to explaining human behavior in terms that
were unwarrantedly reduction!stic.
That is,
in both cases, the theoretical systems logic¬
ally reduced to a material!stic-mecbanistic
epiphenomenism,
Thus each theory comprehends
man in terms of those dimensions shared in
common with lower-ordered "substance" and
organisms, hence relegating mental events to
s. causally inefficacious status.
ClientCentered theories, on the other hand, tended
to place excessive emphasis upon the
"uniquely human" dimensions of man (or his
stream-of-consciousness), thereby devoting
insufficient attention to the mechanistic
aspects of human behavior.
More imoortant,
however, is that-Client-Centered theoretical
constructs tend to be definitionally vague,
and therefore relatively problematic for
rigorous scientific investigation (this
criticism also applies to Psychoanalytic
theories).

2)

The first chapter dealt with a more precise
analysis of Behaviorism, conceived as a
"methodological" enterprise.
Vfe discovered
that its reduction!stic proclivity resulted
from what was termed as an * epistemological
vagueness’, in effect, discounting -- even
avoiding -- mind as a necessary causal factor
in AMY humanly conscious or reflective conscious
behavior.
However, in our critical analysis
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1

of Behaviorism, it was seen that with regard
to ALL human perceptions (both of internal
bodily phenomena or external natural phenomena),
MIND must be NECESSARILY presupposed a priori
as a causally efficacious factor in human
behavior (or what has been more rigorously
defined as subjective psychological experience).

3)

Also in the first chapter, Dewey’s concept of
intelligent behavior was briefly considered,
and it was discovered that he frequently wrote
“as if" he had Behavioristic inclinations, but
actually, much of his terminology contained
innumerable "mentalistic" connotations.
Thus
Dewey, fop:* our purposes, became something of
a transitional figure in that we capitalized
upon his highly important Instrumental!stic
and "mentalistic" views, later incorporating
some of these concepts into what the writer
considered to be a more comprehensive, and
logically adequate model for human behavior.
In this way we were able to incorporate several,
of Skinner’s and Dewey’s methodological and
theoretical concepts into our model.

4)

“Chapter Two’5, beyond introducing what the
writer contends to be an "enlightened"
mechanistic model for human behavior, dealt
with the crucially important problem of
symbolism as a uniquely human class of causally
efficacious behavioral determinants, facilitating
organisms’ interpenetrative relationship with
their co-existent environments.
Here, for a
partial theoretical framework, we draw upon
the penetrating wisdom of Ernst Cassirer.
Cassirer clearly maintains that the human
capacity to symbolize, essentially introduces a
NEW DIMENSION to reality in that man no longer
deals directly with his environment; rather a
symbolic "screen" intervenes — hence
organizes — our perceptual experience such
that man becomes, to a great extent, conversant
with himself through a personally innovated
version of the internal and external worlds.
Since the writer propounds a view concordant
with a scientific emergentism (specifically
with regard to the emergents, * consciousness’
and the higher-ordered mechanism ’conscious
reflection’, causally operating as factors in
human behavioral determination), it appears
quite conceivable that Cassirer’s basic
philosophical orientation is not seriously
discordant with that of the writer’s.
At least

\
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it seems that Professor Cassirer*s thoughts on
the development and function of symbolism can
have great relevance for the theory beingdeveloped in this paper.
Thus, working upon
this assumption, we proceeded to demonstrate
how it was possible, from a subjective
psychological theoretical viewpoint, to
explain the development of thought (defined
as ideational feeling) from emergent, originally
undisciplined emotional feeling; phenomena
which with their higher-ordered disciplined,
cognitive derivatives, must be assigned FACTUAL
STATUS is the scientific (psychological) study
of human behavior.

5)

This last issue brings us up to date in that
we must devise a scheme
theoretical model which permits us to attribute a factual status
to causally efficacious mental or subjective
psychological phenomena.
In the chapter on
“Facts and Theories’1, it will be argued that
it is impossible to isolate what may be ideally
regarded as a ’pure” or uninterpreted fact,
for 1 fact’ NECESSARILY implies a configuration
of explicitly specified or implicitly present
(conceptually) INTERPRETIVE information, thereby
confounding bare perceptually “given” fact with
a cognitive element NOT directly implicit in
the independent phenomenal ’’given” (beingconsidered at a particular time).
In essence,
this is a difficulty whose problematic basis
resides in the same confusion vie had encountered
with respect to the logically contradictory
notion of “pure percepta”.
It was proven, in
the former case, that it is UNTHINKABLE to
conceive of pure percepta without a mind which
“stands over or against them”.
This is to say,
regarding both facts and percepta, that there" is
an additional (necessary) concomitant factor
which must synthetically accompany the 'pure
givens”, namely the element of SYMBOLIC
MEANING — an entirely subjective psychological
phenomenon Intrinsic to human cognition of any
kind.
With respect to the problem of facts and
theories, the Interpretative element IS the
MEANING which cognitively illuminates the bare
“given” percepta.
Here, meaning is definitionally understood to be the subjective psycho¬
logical symbolic element necessarily presupposed
a priori in ALL possible factual assertions.
The point to be made at this time, however, is
that the subjective psychologically meaningful
or interpretative element concomitantly, hence

synthetically uniting with contributed external
(and this view shall be broadened.) perceptual
deliverance, is what we mean by mind.
There¬
fore the central problem to be comprehended,
and hopefully partially resolved, is to
precisely define the intrinsic nature of mind,
and to rigorously designate its function as a
necessary condition for human experience of
ANY kind.
This completes the hasty recapitu¬
lation of our discursive progress heretofore.

Section 2
Thus far we have defined mind in a very indistinct way,
but one adequate for argumentative purposes.

This tactic

was vised to clearly differentiate between the two major
divisions intrinsic to the process of intellectually under¬
standing anything whatsoever, viz., mind as an entity which
generates subjective psychologically meaningful interpre¬
tations AND that which is subject to interpretation,
i.e,, percepts..

Also this division was emphasized to reveal

the vital importance of what is generally regarded as aware¬
ness,

or consciousness and reflective consciousness in that

they are indicative of distinctive mind functions, and more
generally,

refer to the structure of ontalogically unique,

emergent ideational feeling.

Ideational feeling is a

general term referring to a particular class of disciplined
emergents within the more comprehensive domain of emotional
feeling.

Emotional,

and thereby,

ideational feeling ARE the

directly experienced stimulus-object EFFECTS of underlying
or correlative physio-chemical mechanisms (stimulus objects)
which yield these unique ontalogical emergents.

Finally,

the ’’mind .standing over and against percepta” distinction

was used to critically evaluate those theoretical systems
methodologically predisposed to an unwarranted scientific
ieductionisni because of their materialistic presuppositional bases.
In our constructive theoretical endeavors we have laid
a firm i ounci at i on,

however,

one in need of considerable

elaboration in order to develop a definitionally precise
system of theoretical instruments suitable for highlighting,
and hence,

embodying the LOGICAL FORM in which subjective

psychological experience can be scientifically comprehended.
In effect,

then,

the task that lies before us is to develco

a theoretical model which can universally characterize the
">

demonstrating *}rnind‘! coming constructively (psycho¬

logically meaningfully or interpretatively)
percepta (the "given*').
entities,

"mind" and

to bear upon

Such a scheme must define the

’percepta’,

relationship to one another.

as well as demonstrate their

This enterprise must surely

impress the reader at this point as far more problematic
and difficult than it,

in fact,

actually will be, when

pondering the matter in retrospect.

The chief merit of the

theory to be presented — -one which is in varying degrees a
modified version of that articulated by Whitehead96 — is
its RESULT AM1, far-reaching simplicity.

More specifically,

it is the view that concrete experience is the ultimate
ground from which ALL cognitive ENTITIES and their MODES OF

96

Whi tehead.,

Process and . , . ,

op.

ci t.

2 48

(SYNTHLI1C)

RELATION are essentially derived.

The task,

then, becomes one of designating the LOGICAL FORM intrinsic
to our subjective experience of the natural world and our
bodily oiganism,

such that it will be appropriate for a,

subjective psychology.
Now we shall once again briefly reconsider the preparational measures previously elaborated,

so that additional

constructs may be resultantly developed to characterize mind.
At the outset, an important definitional modification must
N

be made.

Throughout the paper, mind has been loosely

deiined as “that which stands over against percepta”,

Also

it was said that mind and percepta must necessarily occur
•concomitantly in a synthetic union.
careful critical analysis,

the vagueness of these distinc¬

tions becomes readily evident.
legitimately

When subjected to

First,

one is tempted —

to ask about the nature of 1 THAT* which

'stands over against percepta’5.

Also,

one may rightly argue

that the original formulation implies that there should be
a more comprehensive term which includes BOTE components of
the synthetic union;

e.g., the definition implies something

more1, occurring than merely mind, namely, the CONCOMITANT
ACTUALIZATION of mind AND percepta..

Therefore these antici¬

pated criticisms demand a revision in our definition of mind.
The writer shall consequently propose the following: mind is
that subjective psychological process in which percepta come
to bear upon other percepta,
synthetic union is achieved.

such that a concomitant
At face value this definition

may appear more problematic than the one it was designed
to replace,

therefore,

further explication is needed to

render it logically tenable,
the definition of

First it will be seen that

•mind* has been renovated to include BOTH

dimensions of the two-aspect process of ’percepta coming to
bear upon other percepta*.

But now we ask, is it not

tautologous go maintain the definition, ’percepta coming to
bear upon percepta*?

This criticism may be countered by

saying — although it' is not analytically evident from the
N
J-'

bare definition as it is thus stated

that implicit

within the definition is the possibility for FOUR distinct
classes of percepta.

To make this issue more intelligible

we must recall our d iscussion on symbolism.

It was said

that there are three separate aspects to meaning for every
linguistic symbol.

For example, with respect to the

symbol

’red*, there is first the clear and distinct word

1 red *,

in its bare p articular!ty as a distinct natural

world

(i.e,, verbal1 y uttered)

sound.

Second, we move to

the less determinate level of subjective psychological
meaning when we contemplate the vaguely conscious substantive
linguistic symbols, which in their relatedness,
to the ’’bare-boned” symbol,
’sight’, ’light wave ’,

’hue’,

’red’.

add ’’flesh”

The concepts ’color’,

etc, might concomitantly be

implicit in our notion of ’red’.

Third,

it will be recalled,

there is an even more vaguely conscious emotional periphery
of subjective psychological meaning embodied within
linguistic symbols.

It is possible that contained within
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the concept

’reel’, for example,

are such highly unspecific

primordial recollections as ’a particularly pleasing experience of having perceived a special red object’,
red glow of a fire on a winter’s evening’,

’the warm

and so on.

These last two levels of meaning are what we heave defined
as MEANING-AS-DIRE CTL Y-PELT-RELATEDNESS.

Therefore,

an apparently simple symbol such as ’red*,
levels of ’■ storedexperience,
been highly (i.e.,

even in

there are three

ranging from that having

denotatively) symbolically disciplined to

that which was emotionally grasped in a comprehensive but
symbolically unclear manner during past experience.

These

levels of subjective psychological meaning occur concomit¬
antly when we think the thought,

’red',

for example.

This

is the uniquely human phenomenon defined as subjective
psychological experience.

Consequently, with respect to our

mosc recent definition of mind as
upon otner percepta’,
example)

’I see red’.

’percepta coming to bear

we may contemplate the event

(for

Here there is a subject-object

dichotomization equivalent to the notion ’percepta coming to
bear upon other percepta’.

Hence the first class of percepta

would include what we have defined as MEANING-AS-DIHECTLYIELT REL AT LDN£ o o AND the DENOTATIVE symbolic component,
’red’, while the second class of percepta would include the
natural world stimulus-object EFFECT,
of a red color’.
mind

Therefore,

i.e., 'che perception

our most recent conception of

now possesses considerably more cogency than when the

revised definition was initially introduced.

The reader
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must, however, be cautioned that although the present
definition of mind is more internally consistent than the
original one, there is a great deal yet to be said about
the nature of mind; thus the definition will be subjected
to subsequent revision as we proceed with our enquiry.
This necessity, for expositional reasons,

is rather

unfortunate because the task of comprehending the ensuing
subject matter becomes importantly more laborious for the
reader.

The writer (regretably) has conceived of no more

simple method for presenting his views without sacrificing
important aspects of the evolving overall argument.
engaged,

as it has been formerly mentioned,

We are

in a cyclical

process of moving from vague understanding of problematic
circumstances to a more clarified understanding.
paradoxically,

But

although our more profound comprehension not

only yields us greater (relative) clarity in comparison with
our previous level of understanding,

it conversely places us

in a position to raise more compelling questions as well!
It is evident from our preceding discussion on
developing an adequate conception of mind that symbolic
thought constitutes a predominate portion of what can be
understood by the concept, mind.

This fact is manifestly

clear in our deceptively simple example,

* I see red1.

It

was seen that through MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-BELATEDNESS
with its (denotatively)

clear symbolic focal point,

complete intelligible symbol

'red'

the

came CONSTRUCTIVELY to

bear upon the perception 'a red color' -- to the extent that
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it J£4^§S2 the

subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL
*»■»%•

experience,

* I see red'!

phenomenon,

so we

scrutiny.

— •»'—

L i

This is an extremely important

shall subsequently subject it to careful

This is precisely what is meant by the statement,

the wisdom of the past coming constructively to bear upon
the present,

hence rendering the present occasion personally

meaningful.

But before we proceed to develop this basic

notion,

a further clarificational comment must be made.

In the second chapter a somewhat speculative theory of
symbolic development had been presented.

Beyond

constituting

a moaelately determinate analysis of the developmental
stages that a human organism undergoes in learning linguistic
behavior,

the presentation was also intended to be an

argument demonstrating the possibility that emotional
feeling can be subjected to such extensive discipline that
it is gradually transformed

(through learning) into what we

subjectively experience as human thought or ideational
feeling.

More specifically,

the writer has maintained that

the development of symbolism can be explained as the
individual human organism’s endeavor (made possible by the
intrinsic STRUCTURE of the organism)
and

CLARIFY originally primordial,

undisciplined emotional

states.

to ACTIVELY ORGANIZE

directly experienced,

Therefore as a consequence

of such an extraordinary program of discipline

(a program

greatly facilitated by interpenetrative relationships with
other organism already capable of executing symbolic
behavior),

phenomena defined as ideational feeling are
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generated.
states,

Further it was argued that these ideational

whose intrinsic substantive nature is disciplined ~~

hence sublimated

emotional feeling,

possess a unique

ontalogical status among other types of. being.
ontalogical emergent,

ideational feeling,

The unique

is an extra¬

ordinarily sophisticated emergent product of an organism
whose physio~cneraical

structure manifests indeterminate

complexity and integration among its numerous organic
mecnanisms,

Nevertheless,

there

seems to be no evidence to

suggest that IN PRINCIPLE the phenomenon of ideational
feeling should not be regarded as a scientifically deter¬
minate emergent occurrence.

The intrinsic,

substantive

nature of ideational feeling seems to indicate that its
originally undisciplined,

vague experiential quality is

gradually sublimated to the extent that a clearly conscious
symbolic precision is resultantly in evidence.
say that former,

This is to

spontaneously arising, unwieldly,

highly

vague emotional states undergo subsequent symbolic AT'ONIEA01x1 so that primordial emotional
characterized as- primitive urges,
symbolically characterized.
simplified,

states,

essentially

progressively became

As a result,

many precise,

distinctions amongst experienced entities,

properties and their relations evolve,

hence
their

as their perceived

EFFECTS ingress into our subjective psychological awareness,
and are therein actualized as concrete unified experience.
Where once personal experience consisted merely of chaotic,
undifferentiated externally delivered perceptual flux,
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co-existent with sporadic emotional feeling,
arose,

after considerable disciplining,

system of

symbols,

forms,

These

as we have seen,

levels of meaning,

a vastly complex

transforming personal experience from

amorphous percepta into succinct,
ideational forms.

there later

highly flexible,

(denotative)

meaningful

clearly conscious

also have two additional concomitant

together termed MEMING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬

RELATEDNESS containing both vaguely understood linguistic
symbols and relevant

(highly subtle) emotion;

these latter

two realms of meaning embody the wisdom of the past.
Therefore symbolic development necessarily entails that the
individual can no longer respond to internally or extern¬
ally located stimulus-objects with the full uninhibited and
comprehensive emotional vigor,
intellect.

Rather,

characteristic of primitive

he must respond,

and now ACTIVELY

approach his environments within the breadth and limits of
his symbolic capacity — a. power that,

in effect,

the intelligible domain of his species.

defines

We have only to

recall the penetrating words of Cassirer to understand the
revolutionary effect that symbolic acquisition has had on
the mentality of mankind.

It is impossible to over-state

the significance of this achievement,

especially in an age

in which preponderant systematic attention is devoted to
the LOGICAL coherence and PHYSICAL properties of symbolic
expression,

distinct from the subjective psychologically

MEANINGFUL PASIS WHEREBY THE FORMER GAIN THEIR EXISTENTIAL
POSSIBILITY IN THE MIND OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS.
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Consequently,

it will be one of our primary objectives in

this chapter to SYSTEMATICALLY investigate,
the intrinsic nature and function of symbols

in some depth,
(particularly

linguistic) for,

as we have seen,

they constitute a major

portion of mind,

conceived as a coherent and basically

consistent subjective psychological process.
Before we begin our systematic development of theo¬
retical constructs for comprehending the logical form of
subjective psychological experience,

there is am additional

topic on symbolism that must be considered in order to
accentuate the great POWER of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬
RELATEDNESS in its capacity for illuminating both the
emotional and intellectual dimensions of our directly
perceived,
1)

and hence reflectively clarified,

experience.

In our previous discussion on the develop¬
mental process of symbolic acquisition
presented in "Chapter Two", it was seen that
at the PRESIGN state, infants’ initial
experience of reality (and this, of course,
is quite hypothetical) seems to be primarily
introverted, in that neurological processes
necessary for organizing percepta have not
'yet.been sufficiently integrated.
An indica¬
tion of this would be the incapacity to differ¬
entiate between internal and external environ¬
ments, for consciousness would, undoubtedly, be
constituted of vague or imprecisely discernible
perception, whether occurring via external or
internal bodily senses.
Thus it appears that
the most conspicuously comprehensible states
would be internal bodily pleasure and pain in
their gross, sporadic deliverance.
These
states would be enjoyed by the organisms within
their durational occurrences, but nothing like
the higher-ordered phenomena of recollection
(i.e., of formerly experienced states) or
anticipation (i.e., of pleasurable states as
distinguished from painful ones) would yet be
in evidence.
Similarly, an infant awareness
that states of pleasure or pain are,,
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attributable to causal factors will also be
absent.
This is merely to say that during the
particular experiential occasion of actually
consuming food, for example, an infantile
consciousness is comprised of many pleasurable
perceptions; however, the infant will not yet
REALIZE that it Is the ’mother appearance*
that causes the deliverance of food, which in
turn, causes the pleasurable internal experi¬
ence.
It is unlikely that infants, at this
stage, could adequately discriminate amongst
visually perceived objects with sufficient
accuracy to have established a recollection
of a visual mother-image.
Probably, primordial
recollections of formerly experienced states
would originate from being physically held, and
affectionately comforted.
In this, the
emphasis would be upon highly concrete physical
interaction with a substantial externality.
These types of perceptual experiences have
immediate bearing upon infant emotional states
as they occur in great frequency.
2)

Next it was said that, as a result of increased
neurological integration and storage of new
experiential data, infant mentality develops
to a point where a vague emotional under¬
standing (issuing from an ACTIVE concrete
interpenetrative relationship with a tangible
world of solidity that can be bitten, grasped,
etc., with reciprocal correlative EFFECTS
consisting of pains, tastes, etc. — all of
which are emotionally realized to have a
consciously enduring, coherent perceptual
nexus in a peculiarly intimate region becoming
progressively more clearly understood as a
self) of the fact that there is an "out there" -a domain that is independent of a more personal
region.
Further, there is the realization that
externality does have a very real quality of
indeterminacy, in that merely because the
personal urge for satiation or pleasure may be
projected to the exterior realm, commensurate
gratification does not necessarily follow.
An infantile notion of causality can develop
out of such concrete experiences as ’motherwarmth*, ’mother-pain reliever', 'motherfood provider’, ’food-pleasure’, etc.
From
these bare emotional (recognitional) predis¬
positions, the higher-ordered behavior of
PROJECTING emotion arises in relation to an
entity residing in an external region.
Similarly such behaviors as anticipation, for
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example, emerge out of former variable
conditions of satiation and deprivation.

3)

The next important advance that was stressed
occurs when the infant develops the primordial
sense.of POWER, discovering that his internal
experiential states are not wholly contingent
upon the whims of externality.
During early
infancy, cries issued spontaneously from
painful or importantly uncomfortable experi¬
ences,
But later, after a gradual, vague,
reflective recognition that personal vocal
outbursts frequently brought motherly atten¬
tion, some moderate element of premeditation —
facilitated by such causal factors as recently
acquired emotional predispositions for a sense
of the internal and external; a sense of
projection; a sense of causal relationship,
etc. -- begins to regularly operate as a
causally efficacious infant behavioral deter¬
minant.
This is to say no more than the
wisdom from an experientially RECORDED past
is now beginning causally to determine
organism’s responses to stimulus-object effects
in a way TRANSCENDING mere mechanicality.
Meaningfully intelligible, consciously
REFLECTIVE awareness is beginning to appear
as a minimally disciplined emergent, succeeding
former emotional urges whose causal potentiality
remained unutilized for lack of concentrated,
disciplined conscious SPECIFICITY.
Thus the
nebulous recognition of POWER is one of the
first manifestations of an organism’s INGENE0U3
or INNOVATIVE ability for ACTIVELY dealing with
reality.

4)

The SIGN stage makes its appearance from
children’s desire to, perhaps initially,
secure the attention of other human beings,
thereby yielding the primitive subjective
psychological experience of SECURITY.
For
example, in the development of speech, a child
will reflexively mimic the vocal sounds
expressed by a mother; not out of an intellec¬
tual understanding of the rational MEANING and
power of verbalizations, but rather, out of
the concrete fact of being given ATTENTION,
and as a matter of CURIOSITY — a factor crucial
for promoting a discriminatory attitude toward
perceptual deliverance.

5)

As the SIGN stage persists, during which a rich
backlogue of PRErational experience is acquired
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(e.g., learning how to duplicate sounds,
learning to "exchange" sounds with other human
beings, etc.), children gradually develop the
realization that spoken sounds REPRESENT
external entities (marking the onset of the
‘SYMBOL* stage).
The illustration formerly
used referred to the term, 'mama*.
Whereas
at the outset of perceptual recognition, the
word was merely meaninglessly repeated; but
slowly as a result of highly subtle bits of
learned information, a child comes to UNDER¬
STAND -- to make emotional associations
between previously established recollections
and newly ascertained information — that the
spoken word REPRESENTS all of his * MAMA-experi¬
ence'.' ■ Hence an entire backlogue of infantile
experiences with mother can be CONCISELY
CONJURED and subsumed to the sound, 'mama*.
Moreover, in this, all of the vaguely felt
emotional affection, Issuing from an urge to
immediately and comprehensively communicate
a history of intense, but highly amorphous
emotional meaning, can be PROJECTED at the
externally located mother-entity.
In fact,
apart from the physical presence of mother,
the spoken word 'mama' is a powerfully
concise way of promoting self-initiated,
consciously pleasurable experience, for the
verbal utterance is a means for RE-ENJOYING
the relevant past.
6)

Once this power has been recognized, the process
is frequently repeated with different verbal
symbols, thus building up a verbal repertoire
REPRESENTING categories of vivid emotional
experience.
From this, children derive the
enormously gratifying recognition that the
strange world of experience can be UNDERSTOOD
and symbolically retained for future reference,
by characterizing objects -- objects with
curious, suggestive and enjoyable properties -with spoken words.

7)

Finally we saw how children make their final
triumphant linguistic discovery, namely, that
spoken words can be RELATED to one another,
thus providing the possibility for arranging
sequences of words into desired rational
configurations; a condition necessary for
coherent thinking.
Now, upon having attained
the 'symbol* stage, a basic understanding of
the RELATEDNESS of things is achieved.
Not
only are words used as instruments for
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organizing (hence "storing" for future refer¬
ence; similar categories of personal emotional
experience with respect to particular external
oejects of importance and curiosity, in
addition to being means for satisfying basic
urges and desires, but now they become devices
personal ideational experience to
CHARACTERIZE CHANGING RELATIONAL STATES as
they are perceptually apprehended.
Even more
important, at a higher level, symbolically
defined ENTITIES and PRINCIPAL, MODES OF
RELATIONSHIP AMONG ENTITIES can be IDEATIONALLY SYNTHESIZED into many PERSONALLY DESIRED
configurations!
These sophisticated levels of
operation are made possible through conscious
reflection, a phenomenon about which we will
have much to say.
Since the 'symbol* stage
enables DYNAMIC experience to be characterized whether it occurs as natural or ideationally
synthesized phenomena -- the IMPORTANT elements
of original experience, as symbolically
simplified, can be recalled at a later” time
with relative ease.
Here a fundamental
difficulty in evidence at the 'sign' stage
(viz., that the wTord 'mama', for example,
concisely represented a large number of accumu¬
lated, EMOTIONALLY VAGUE recollections of
'mama-experience', but ones whose original
experiential qualities lacked symbolic
discipline, and thus precision, and were there¬
fore, forgotten because of the organism's
.inability to clearly symbolize important
attributes of those occasions) is effectively
transcended.
8)

Thus as more words are learned and INTEGRATED
into an increasingly complex symbolic frame-~
wo.rk. (a cognitive structure whose intrinsic
quality is INTERRELATEDNE SS AMONGST LINGUISTIC
SYMBOLS), language Thence ideational feeling)
becomes correspondingly less emotionally charged,
and steadiiy acquires a more disciplined quality.
y his.. we mean that the experiential nature of'
sophisticated thought or ideational feelins: is
steadily transormed into what we have defined as
mature MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.
Here primordial emotional experience has under¬
gone, extensive symbolic atomization, thereby
dissipating its intense somatic quality through
its.SUBSEQUENT (NUMEROUS) SYMBOLIC QUALIFICATIONS.
To illustrate this point, we need only compare
the behavior of a young child vjhen confronted
with severe disappointment with that of a mature
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adult encountering commensurate disappointment.
In the former case, intense emotional feeling
arises within the child*s organism, followed°
by an uncontrollable period of crying.
The
adult, however, although similarly experiencing
intense emotion, dissipates this felt state,
frequently, through symbolic (MEANINGFUL)
expression, consequently retaining his
rational composure.
Symbolic proficiency also promotes an
increased awareness of the infinite detail
manifested by the natural world (therefore
stimulating a desire to symbolically charac¬
terize this detail), consisting basically of
objects, both the static and dynamic relation¬
ships among objects, and the properties of
objects.
Finally, internally experienced objects and
relations are symbolically designated.
At this
higher level of development, consciousness
consists, primarily, of sophisticated systems
°f symbols, the linguistic forms of which are
clearly comprehensible because of their
disciplined denotative quality.
Therefore
these can be fashioned into quite precise and
unique patterns.
At this stage, the
unsymbolized periphery of emotion, intrinsic
to every linguistic.symbol, has been exiled
to, at best, a status of infrequent and
obscure comprehension.
However, vague
as its character may be, it is this element"
in symbolic thought that provides the basic
"substance" of consciousness.
This is
demonstrated by the fact that human organisms
have a secure FEELING about the orderliness
and consistency of things; they FEEL at home
amongst the world community; they 'FEEL that life
can be meaningful; they FEEL primitive urges,
compulsions, drives motivating them to establish
determinate programs of action, very often
proceeding well into the future; finally, at
their highest levels, a profound, acutely
sensitive aesthetic FEELING is experienced, as
harmonious functional "virtue is achieved when
an organism’s symbolic and emotional resources
ha.ve been efficaciously embodied "within creative,
action-oriented behavior.
9)

This particular argument, as it has been hereto¬
fore presented, is predominately a concise
restatement of the "Theory of Symbolic Develop¬
ment" advocated in the second chapter.
There
are three reasons for having done" this:

261

a)

It is important to refamiliarize the reader
with the fundamental complexity of concrete
experience; a complexity so subtle that its
philosophical and scientific implications
are easily overlooked in an age when our
mentality is constantly exposed to symbolic
abstractions, very often mistakenly
construed as concrete fact.

b)

The discussion of early life symbolic acqui¬
sition stimulates a sensitivity to the great
inadequacy of naive mechanistic theoretical
constructs for revealing and elucidating
causal behavioral determinants, because of
the intrinsic disparity between the realms
of materialistic mechanism and conscious
experience.

c)

Finally, the argument, as presently developed,
provides an introductory basis for'illustra¬
ting the bewildering complexity of even
simple learning tasks -- tasks which, for a
typical adult mentality, can be executed
with such ea.se that their accomplishment
goes completely unnoticed.
The significance
of this illustration will be. in demonstrating
.the enormous symbolic QUALIFICATIONAL POWER
of what we have defined as iTEANlNG^TSDIRnCTLY— FELT-RELATEDNESS (or the 1 wisdom
of the past'), as this symbolically and
emotionally vague domain comes CONSTRUCTIVELY
(and concomitantly) to bear upon denotatively
•symbolized perception, thus ACTUALIZING what'
we directly experience as subjective
psychological meaning.

10) A forceful example, meeting the conditions
specified in ,!c", above, is the process'in which
an individual assigns a symbol to REPRESENT a
given phenomenon.
Therefore, we shall face the
problem of how an individual symbolically
characterizes a particular perception.
Rather
than make any pretense of capturing the experi¬
ential ''fullness" of a particular "real-life"
circumstance, let us adopt the more humble
approach of merely elucidating several essential
fa.ctors that would seem to be involved in such
a task, during at least some occasion(s) in
early life.
Of course, in mature life, the
phenomenon that will be analyzed is executed
with great ease because numerous ideational
propensities or habits -- a large number of which
are so well established that they are unconsciously
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and reflexively implemented, for their func¬
tional virtue has been promoted over the years — —
that were not available in early life are auto¬
matically invoked almost as soon as stimulusobject effects ingress into the human organism
as sensation.
11)

It. has repeatedly been said that all symbols,
in varying degrees, have a CONNOTATIVE and
DENOTATIVE directly experienced aspects.
The
connotative aspect is defined as MEANING-ASDIRACILY-PELT-RELATEDNESS, containing a highly
vague, but powerfully meaningful, concretely
emotional dimension; and also an implicit symbolic
periphery that contains the entire relevant net¬
work or web of ideational interrelationships
which any (given) individual has incorporated
into his verbal repertoire.
Thus this vae-ue
symbolic RELATEDNESS, with its even more w
consciously remote emotional.substratum, as they
concomitantly appear with their clear and
distinct conscious focal (i.e,, denotative)
point of organization, is the essence of human
intelligence; for it is from this highly Comdex
symbolic UNIT that CONSCIOUS REFLECTION is
rendered possible.
In reflection, NECESSARILY
USING A CLEARLY CONSCIOUS UNITY OF PERCEP^UAlT
EXPERlWCE AS AN INITIAL FRAME""0F~RE'FERENCgT"'
the myriad element s of relevant past wisdom,
concomitantly implicit in the clearly conscious
perceptual unity as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬
RELATEDNESS, can be, metaphorically speaking,
traced-out" in successive temooral durations,
and^hence, be RESYNTHESIZED as* NOVEL ideational
configurations of symbolic meaning.
It is in
this ,!tracing-out“ process that the full
potentiality (or the creatively synthetic
possibilities) of human cognition can be
appreciated, for out of this, NOVEL MODES FOR
SUGGESTING FUTURE IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS EMERGE
FROM PRIMORDIAL, UNCONSCIOUS ORGANIC CONCRESCENCE.
This, is to say that a.n individual human organism
can intellectually and emotionally “prepare”
himseli for tne EMERGENCE of idea/tional 11 sugges¬
tions” for novel modes for cognitive synthesis
(recalling now, that ideational synthesis begins
in unconscious or consciously inaccessible
organic regions, defined as occurring in trans¬
cendent emergent concrescence).
This creative
phenomenon is not as mysterious as it may aopear.
The writer is maintaining that a CONSCIOUSLY^
REFLECTIVE human organism can increase his func¬
tional virtue through a moderate-to-great
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deliberate effort to succeed at a given task
of interest.
This entails a determined effort
to acutely familiarize one's self with as many
relevant ramifications of an issue as possible,
therefore increasing the amount of wisdom that
can be brought to bear upon the stimulusoccasion at any point in time, if the informa¬
tion is gradually integrated into one's under¬
standing through a careful reflective effort.
Therefore it can easily be seen from this that
the process is not merely determinable in terms
of "blind, unconscious (or reflexive) mechanistic
determinism", for a state of REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS¬
NESS — an ontalogically unique mod*e of existence
must necessarily be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI in order
to have the intellectual circumstances intellig¬
ible at all;, hence an intrinsically different
type of "mechanism" is involved.
This is to say
that we are NOT discussing a process which some¬
how transcends the realm of pausal relationships
amongst entities, but rather we must conceive
the INTRINSIC NATURE of the ENTITIES and their
RELATIONS differently.
Since MEANING-ASDIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS and its denotative
concomitant ARE subjective psychological experi¬
ence in its mature form, we are provided the
necessary conditions for a consciously reflective
frame of reference from which the "implications"
of symbolic ideational states can be "traced out".
Assuming that a high degree of functional virtue
has enhanced the potency of this reflective
process, then conscious intention has done its
utmost in establishing fruitful ideational
preconditions for ideational innovation.
Beyond this, any suggested modes for novel idea¬
tional synthesis that -may (or may not) emerge
into consciousness will be synthesized in ORGANIC,
hence in principle not consciously accessible,
physio-chemical regions as high-ordered novel
concrescence.
As the writer presently under¬
stands the creative ideational process, it can
be said that this highly valued mode of behavior
does not transcend, in principle, causally deter¬
minable formulations, but rather, that the
variables capable of possibly entering into such
phenomenal occurrences are so numerous and, very
often, only vaguely accessible to direct reflec¬
tion (if they are symbolically specifiable at
all, as in the case of extremely nebulous
emotional feeling, which although vague, is FELT
to be causally operative), that any attempt to
specify the causal conditions giving rise to
particular classes of behavior will encompass
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only a small number of the possibly efficacious
variables*
However, on the other hand, if LARGE
quantities of data can be collected (pertaining
to these investigations), together with
appropriate statistical procedures and elec¬
tronic computing devices, the situation need
not seem so experimentally dismal, by any means.
12)

Thus when mind comes to bear upon an object of
concern, all of its relevant emotional, vague
symbolic, and clear symbolic resources are being
conjured by the ’'demands'1 (ingressed effects) of
the stimulus-occasion, in their full synthetic
potentiality.
The simplified, denotative
symbolic component clearly (consciously)
REPRESENTS the perceived object as its intellig¬
ible nature is synthesized from the resources of
symbolic connotation; those realms which symbolic¬
ally enhance the barren denotative clarity with
a substance of meaningful feeling.
Let us
consider an example of a. SINGLE component of
this 'substance of meaningful feeling1 which,
when compounded with a multitude of other
'contributed* components (thus producing the
FEELING of RELATEDNESS) would comprise the
experiential "substance" of subjective psycho¬
logical meaning.

13) Some of the pertinent implications of the simple
act of perceiving a table and UNDERSTANDING it
as such are the following (here we will deal
primarily with linguistic- symbols):
a)

Linguistic symbols, logically separated from
their subjective psychological meaning ■ (i.e,, roughly speaking, from their CONNOTATIVE), are, generally, particular spokensounds, or particular ideational (silently
thought) feelings (of course, there are
exceptions as in the case of those with vocal
disorders, and so on).

b)

Learning symbols is contingent upon percep¬
tions delivered through at least one mode of
external bodily perception if they are to
possess an intersubjective basis for communi¬
cation (note the case of Helen Keller).
Usually BARE DENOTATIVE symbols (apart from
connotative symbolic meaning) can be
perceived by another in observing movements
of lips, feeling the vibrations in a throat,
as well as hearing the particular linguistic
sound.
Although seemingly trivial, these
"uncommon" ways of coming to understand

265

symbolic usage ARE data occurring often as
preconscious perception and, therefore in a
subtle way, comprise a portion of the domain
termed MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS.
c)

In learning a symbol there are roughly three
stages to the process:
1)

First, the "raw" perception -- the
stimulus-object EFFECT, as it is
INDEPENDENTLY CONTRIBUTED to the
consciousness of an organism from a
stimulus-object residing in the indivi¬
dual's own organisin' or located in the
natural world -- must be concretely
experienced by the conscious individual.
For example, the table must be seen
and/or felt.

2)

Next, the word 'table' as typically heard
from another, and hence personally arti¬
culated -- including the internally felt
vibrations of the sound, the felt muscular
movements, hearing one's own voice, and
so on -- all constitute (although perhaps
not clearly appreciated) IMPORTANT
.substantive data for (learned) symbolic
acaui sit. ion.

3)

Finally there is the stage, expressed in
the writings of Dewey, where vie come to
understand an unfamiliar experience
(including, for our purposes, the percep¬
tion, but primarily the SYMBOL):
"We respond to its CONNECTIONS /with
other facts that are already known7 and
not simply to the immediate occurrence.
Thus our attitude to it is much freer.
We may approach it, so to speak, from
any one of the angles provided by its
connections.
We can bring into play,
as we deem wise, any one of the connec¬
tions.
Thus we get at a new event
indirectly instead of immediately — by
invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness.
An ideally perfect knowledge would
represent such a network of inter¬
connections that any past experience
would offer a point of advantage from
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which to get at the problem presented
in a new experience. ”9?
d)

The previous three stages of symbolic acqui¬
sition as they are embodied in the example
of characterizing the perception of a table
could be PARTIALLY schematized as follows:
Stage #1
a)

The basic perception as SEEN:
1) various patches of color in their
fixed relationships
2) the forms which define the color
patches
3) the observed texture of surfaces
4) the unified object of concern as it
exists in relation to other contiguous
objects
5) the unique shape of the table as it
is perceived from the observers
perspective
6) etc.

b) ' The basic TACTILE perception:
1) the felt smooth surfaces
2) the felt straightness of its exterior
edges
3) the felt flatness of its surfaces
4) the feeling of solidity
5) etc.
Stage #2
a)

The CONCRETE EXPERIENCE of learning the
symbol ,~‘vt able'1’":
1) the uniquely heard articulation of the
word ’table1 spoken by another

9 n De wey,

Democracy and
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2) the sound of hearing one’s own voice
. as the word ’table* is spoken
3)

the feeling of the muscular activity
in one’s ovm body in expressing the
word ’table'

4) the experienced, difficulty in
correctly formulating the sound

’table’

5) the subtle emotional excitation that
is felt when attempting new learnings;
also the urge to learn
6) etc.
Staged

a)

The establishment of COGNITIVE RELATIONS:
1) the profoundly subtle experience of
realizing that previously learned
information is synthetically coming to
bear upon the present occasion
2) the felt power of being able to
rationally UNDERSTAND a problem as such,
and hence the ability to execute a
solution
.3) the feeling of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLYFELT- RELATEDNESS
4) the felt power of imposing direction
upon one's thought processes
5) the enjoyment experienced in
synthesizing ideas into novel
configurations
6) the experienced excitement of discovery
7)

the feeling (and strange experience) of
thinking, in that thoughts are FELT to
occur in one’s head

8) etc.
e)

Thus the significance of presenting the above
schematization is in explicating but a FEW
of the explicit (clearly consciously
perceived) and implicit CONSTITUATIVE FACTORS
that are TYPICALLY CONTAINED WITHIN CONCRETE
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVENTS.
These
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qualities are, no doubt, consciously more
clearly in evidence during less symbolically
mature stages of life, for many basic
cognitive functions are then being developed
and refined, thus occurring in subjective
psychological experience as relatively
difficult learning tasks.
However, immature
minds rarely — if at all — reflectively
take account of these phenomena, hence it is
only later that they can be rendered subject
matter for psychologists and epistemologists
who can, through a determined reflective
effort, recall these earlier experiences or
recognize them in a more mature form, in their
personal contemporary ideational
states.
f)

Moreover, and now we are approaching an issue
of CRUCIAL importance, these often subtle
aspects of subjective psychological experi¬
ence
primarily embodied in MEANING-ASDIRECTLY-PELT-RELATEDNESS as the acquired
(learned) wisdom of the past coming to bear
upon present occasions, thus MEANINGFULLY
ENHANCING an UNDERSTANDING of their nature —
have, in principle, physio-chemical correlates.
This is simply to understand one of the many
important implications of an ’empirical
identity thesis’ as it pertains to the mindbody problem.
Specifically, it must be
>
understood that considerable amounts of
SENSATION (stimulus-object effects of which
we have no conscious awareness) and
PERCEPTION (that which can qualify as eventcomponents, regardless of its degree of
subtlety; hence, being reflectively access¬
ible) have been (in the past, and will
continue to be in the future) "stored" by
ate physio-chemical mechanisms of
the brain.
This can be reduced to saying,
that a great many phenomena /occurring as
ENTITIES (with their many characteristic
qualities) and RELATIONS AMONG ENTITIES'/
issuing from both internal organ!smic environ¬
ments, have been physio-chemically "stored" or
recorded within the constitution of human
organisms, as the EFFECTS of these STIMULUSOBJECTS have ingressed as SENSATION and
PERCEPTION.
It is from this fact that
CONCRETE EXPERIENCE can be said to possess
an indeterminate profoundity.
Futher, because
of this fact, the writer maintains that no
cognitive product can be cited which does not
have its ultimate basis in concrete experience,
whether it be the notions of ’causality’,
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1 value1, (mathematical) ’modes of relation¬
ship*, and so on!
But the important point
to he understood here is that'numerous
perceived phenomena are physio-chemically
recorded which are not raised to clear
conscious apprehension via critical reflec¬
tion.
In fact, our entire discussion in
this paper could be regarded as a modestly
careful exposition of various relatively
conspicuous dimensions of concrete experience.
Whitehead * s concept of ’misplaced concrete¬
ness* is based precisely upon this issue, in
that he argues that many philosophical and
scientific theoretical errors can be attributed
to an insufficient consideration of the
perceptual deliverances of concrete experi¬
ence.
For example, his criticism of Hume was,
in part, that if we critically reflect upon
our perceptual apprehension of the external
world it can be easily understood that senseperception does NOT come to us in clear and
distinct atomic units; this is an error
resulting from having accepted a high intellec¬
tual abstraction, viz., the notion of a clear
and distinct atomic unit termed ’sense datum*,
as being a concrete fact of perception,
thereby committing the error" of ’misplaced
concreteness’.98, 99
g)

98

Therefore, in our former example of a simple
act of perceiving a table, our cursory
analysis of this phenomenon revealed a
multitude of experiential and theoretical
ramifications of this apparently simple human
act (one, however, actually requiring a great
deal of preparational learning; e.g., acquisi¬
tion and functional usage of a language, etc.):
an-act expressed in its. bare linguistic (and
presently understood, as an extraordinarily
SIMPLIFIED) form as "I see the table'5.
But
in this simple statement (from a subjective
psychological viewpoint), in addition to its
DENOTATIVE form, there is an accompanying
extensive CONNOTATIVE realm that we have"
defined as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬
NESS; containing such implicit notions as,

Whit e he ad,

Process and. „ ,

op.

cit., pp. 198-217.

99 J. V/, Robson, "Whitehead* s Answer to Hume," Alfred
North .Whitehead: Essays On His Philosophy, ed. George"L.
Kline (Englewood Cliffs, N. J7: "Prentice'-Hall, 1963)",
PP. 5 3-62.
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„v*? individual identity', 'an experiential
and theoretical (even if only naive) know¬
ledge of natural world and innumerable
personally learned notions about entities,
properties, and their relations as they are
collectively conceived as reality', as well
as a multitude of additional relevant
information.
Anyone who reflects on this
uniquely human cognitive phenomenon will
appreciate the Profound significance
ann strangeness of ideation as an extra¬
ordinary ontalogical existent among other
lower-ordered existants.

h)

Before we terminate this particular argument
here aie several other issues with respect
percent?™*6^ ?f symboll°ally characterizing
hp™ fthat we ought to consider.
It has
ald
various places, that symbolism —
particularly linguistic, and surely mathemauica! symbolization - is a.triumphant
achievemenu oj. high-ordered intelligence
.where the complex particularity of any single
perceptual occasion can be greatly SIMPLIFIED

of wordsPr°?h-ate word, (universal) or sequence
1 words.
This capacity enables human
S-?? *° comprehend reality with great

cr«tP tlf.®
precision; and moreover,
create their own ideational entities, many of
menta^mod?Jansbatable int° physical

environ-

ideationaliy-creative' process ^ 0f.this
way that is not IN PRINCIPLE DIRECTLY inter¬
mediation^ yarifiable- namely, as SILENT
meditation.
Of course, almost everythETg~

that has been previously said in this
discourse has had direct relevance to the
process of tnought, whether occurring ir. an
!rieCtlTC^ determinate manner°or in a
Topics’such0a-Mthy parsonally accessible mode.
ment or the
tbe stages °f symbolic developent or the denotative and connotative elements
logi^f^t,t^Uflde?1
With
the Processed
ogicai lorm oj. subjective
nsycholomicai
bein^dTh
Bf in the argument presently
being developed, emphasis has been placed upon
focusing SPECIFICALLY on certain logical and
"process" dimensions of thinking-behavfor ?n
order to more fully appreciate the valt
^
complexity of concrete experience; and
ESThCU^ar’,'y’ bbe great significance of
hEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS for in
fact, contributing its necessary event-componentto subjective psychological experience, thus
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rendering it phenomenally possible.
In the
preceding step of this a.rgument, i\rc saw the
vast complexity involved in even the simple
act of symbolically characterizing a familiar
object in experience.
From this we saw that
considerable data, ingressing into an
organism through several sensory modes, are
utilized by being synthetically converted
into MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELAXeDiTESS.
Thus, much of this data is preconsciously
implicit as vague yet powerfully efficacious
connotative meaning, as the wisdom of the
is brought CONSTRUCTIVELY to bear upon
r
.
—so a,s
— to
-- enhance
“- their
present occasions
All this
subjective psychological meaning,
is rendered consciously lucid only through
the prolonged and intense usage of analytical
reflection".
Therefore, in keeping with this
emphasis upon specificity of exposition m
explicating the nature of ideational
phenomena, let us now focus more precisely
upon the EXPERIENTIAL characteristics of
single, silently entertained thought^
components which, collectively considered,^
comprise complete UNITS of symbolic thougne.
We have heretofore defined these ideai/ional
entities as highly cisciplined emotional
feeling whose original intensely somatic,
primordial nature had been sublimated as a
result of sophisticated symbolic atomization,
thus leaving* only a vaguely comprehensible
emotional element — but one crucially
important to the domain of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLYFELT- RELATEDNESS.
Linguistic symbols, as u
has been seen, REPRESENT given perceptual
occurrences via spoken words.
But now the
ouestion is raised, in silent thought no
sounds are uttered, therefore what is the
experiential nature of that which remains as
npure11, particular thought components? We
~
eventmost assuredly do not experience these
components in the same way that we entertain,
throbbing bodily pains, for example.
As the
problem is posed, we are attempting to charac¬
terize the EXPERIENTIAL nature of.a particular
silently entertained (highly disciplined)
thought-component within an ordered sequence
of other symbols that collectively constitute
a complete symbolic thought.
In the complete
thought-in-process, both the denotative and
connotative aspects of symbolic experience
can be, to a great extent, reflectively,
ascertained.
But such is not the case inattempting to reflectively analyze the
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"substantial" experiential nature of a
particular thought-component~in-process, for
due to its ephemeral temporal duration, only
its denotative element is reflectively
accessible (although we must LOGICALLY assume
tnat its concomitant connotative components
are present, for the denotative element,
conceived by itself, is nevertheless
meaningless).
Therefore it seems tenable to
say that at the specific time in which a
particular thought-component occurs as
silently executed ideational feeling, its
intrinsic EXPERIENTIAL "in-process" nature
possesses a symbolic FORM identical with its
intersubjectively verifiable correlate
(e.g., a word or musical note that is capable
of being HEARD, as distinct from their SILENTLY
THOUGHT correlative sta.tes), but, obviously,
the intersubjectively verifiable perceptual
element is absent from the. silentiy thought
symbol.
This fact, considered in conjunction
with the additional fact that MEANING-ASDIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS is generally a
phenomenon only directly experiencable in a
SERIES of particular thought components
(because of its longer temporal duration),
leaves us — with respect to the EXPERIENTIAL
nature of a SINGLE transitory thoughtcomponent -- with a strange phenomenon indeed.
We have as a remainder, it seems, the "purest**
experiential manifestation of ideational
feeling attainable, for it is devoid of any
perceivable EMOTIONAL feeling.
It is a
paradigm of cognitive clarity and distinctness-at-a-moment,
This organismic capaxity
for producing such clear and distinct modes
of ideational feeling — now conceived for
expository reasons a„s LOGICALLY separate from
connotative elements ~~ can be attributed to
the extraordinarily sensitive physio-chemical
perceptual RECORDING MECHANISMS which RECORD,
with great FIDELITY, the perceptual deliver¬
ances from the internal and external modes of
perception.
This is to say, as the physiochemical recordings can be conjured to*
consciousness as correlative subjective
psychological event-components, that elements
of past experience can be recalled in silent
thought with remarkable FIDELITY.
For
example, most of us can SILENTLY THINK the
various FORMS of pieces of music, of sounds
of words, of former experiences at given
places, etc.
WITH OFTEN GREAT REPRODUCTIONAL
EXACTITUDE,
Of course these cognitive
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reproductions are expertentially not as
vivid-as their original counterparts, but
nevertheless, they are necessary for the
possibility of any type of ideational
process, regardless of its mode of occur¬
rence.
In fact, it seems obvious that it
is this capacity to precisely REPRODUCE
certain former experiential elements in
silent thought that importantly contributes
t°<the essential structure symbolic thought.
Ihis is to say that if our organism was not
capable of faithfully recording and then
storing the perceptions of words, for example,
as they are HEARD aloud, SEEN as lio movements,
or PELT through the tactile sense, then
thinking as we know it would be impossible!
thus within the theoretical framework we have
been.developing it can be said that the
physj.o-chemical organic mechanisms for
recording perceptual experience are so acutely
sensitive to a stimulation that percepta
initially occurring through external sensory
modes (it seems as though either sight,
hearing or the tactile sense are the necessary
ones)
a necessary condition for developing
intersubjectively usable symbols — are
occasionally recorded in their entirety, as
in the cases of certain pieces of music; but
more frequently, CONCISE, SIMPLIFIED, svmbolic
TAT1 ON s of original circumstances are
physio-chemically stored” as organic
propensities.
Once this has been achieved,
their original forms, as ideational reproduc¬
tions (symbolically represented or situationally remembered), can be conjured to conscious¬
ness as manifestly expressed or silently
entertained thought-components.
For example,
if an individual HEARS the word ’perspicacity*
for the first time, he is able to silently
THINK the word at a later time.
However, if
he could not HEAR the word, see the lip move¬
ments of another person pronouncing the word,
or have the word communicated to him through
the tactile sense, he could have no concept
of the word (or symbol to represent it) for
there would be no original Physio-chemical
recording of.it.
Now if an individual had
been both blinc and deaf, the only remaining
mode for communicating with him would be
through the tactile sense.
We may assume that
in this way the person could silently enter¬
tain a thought-component equivalent in MEANING
to the symbol (which most of us HEAR as)
’perspicacity*, but a symbol perceived as a

direct experiential derivative from the sense
He would» in effect, Silently
HBK the TACTILE perception, 'perscapacity'.
All of us have observed children playing

various games in which through voiced utter¬
ance they attempt to duplicate given natural
would sounds: gunshots, hoofbeats, sounds of
fisticuffs, etc.
This is an effort to
recreate a portion of formerly experienced
reality.
Brain mechanisms permit recall of
such natural world sounds with remarkable
iidelity,
We could imagine a rude culture,
perhaps having developed no system of sophis¬
ticated symbolism, effecting some minimal
degree of communication merely through
articulating natural world sounds.
But even
in.this, the process of abstraction and
universalization WOULD be a,chieved for even
a primitive mode of“thought requires some
degree of intentional rearrangement of voiced
utterances, in effect, establishing those
utterances as universals.
The illustration,
apart from its inadequate elaboration,
demonstrates a principle also manifested in
highly sophisticated linguistic thought.
It is simply that the particularity of
original occasions fade quickly from our
memory, but some elements of those occasions
remain with us as universa.ls that ca.n easily
be recalled.in reflection.
Instead of
remaining within the realm of mimicking
natural sounds, man is physically capable of
creating his own symbolic systems,
expressible as determinate sounds in the
natural world yet incredibly transcendent of it.
This.argument will be terminated by briefly
drawing together some of the previously
developed constructs in order to provide us
with a somewhat clearer notion of*mind.
This
last step is not intended to be an adequa.te
statement on the nature of mind, by any means.
Rather it will merely bring some of our
formerly developed notions into a modestly
clear proximity with one another in order to
better prepare the way for future discussion,
eventually becoming based upon constructs
considerably more amenable to precise concep¬
tualization.
Mind has been loosely defined as rpercepta
(class A) concomitantly coming constructively
to bear upon other percepta (class B)?.
Also
this definition had been qualified, to avoid
tautology, by indicating that fclass A’
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percepta. are phenomenally distinct from
* class B' percepta.
Now we may ask, based
upon our preceding discussions, What is the
nature intrinsic of these two classes of
percepta? In effect, this is a request for
a specification of the possible CLASSES
of mental event-components necessarily understood to constitute subjective psychological
experience, or MIND, IN ALL ITS POSSIBLE
i t has been generally "stated
throughout this discourse (and will continue
to be developed in detail in future discus¬
sions) that there are'components of our
experience which are 1 CONTRIBUTED* to our
consciousness, hence not "created by'1
individual consciousness, defined as
stimulus-object EFFECTS.
These effects can
be classified as 'class B' percepta in the
f ol1owing way:
1)

external bodily sense data:
a)
b)

c)
d)
e)

2)

colors
sound s
tastes
odors
tactile feels

internal organic bodily feelings.

The second class of percepta, i.e., 'class
percepta, which concomitantly come to bear
upon 'class B’ percepta are the following:

1)

A'

ideational feeling:
a) emotional feelings
b) symbolized ideational feelings (usually
linguistic).

This

latter class ('class A' percepta) was
defined to include the three basic levels of
meaning intrinsic to linguistic symbols,
viz., denotative meaning, and connotative
meaning (MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS,
consisting of vaguely perceived symbols and
emotional feeling).

Therefore, these two classes of percepta,
as they are concomitantly synthetically
united, are equivalent to the phenomenon of
'percepta concomitantly coming constructively
to bear upon other percepta’.
This is to say
that as stimulus-object EFFECTS ingress into
a human organism's consciousness, the EFFECTS

rendered PERSONALLY INTELLIGIBLE by being
INTERPRETATIVELY subsumed to disciplined^
linguistic symbols.
It is important to
mention, at this point, that the above
schematization of ’class A' and ’B’ percepta
is NOT sufficiently comprehensive to include
the situation in which ideational feeling
concomitantly comes to bear upon ITSELFi
Tliis consideration has been omitted to
prevent premature confusion, for additional
constructs are needed to understand the
phenomenon.
A major point to be understood at this
time is that a concept of mind is being
developed whereby the CONSTITUTIVE CONTENTS
of subjective psychological states, which we
designated as external sensory percepta,
bodily feeling percepta, and ideational
feeling percepts, are such that, IN PRINCIPLE,
an exhaustive understanding of the * " ..
INEXTRICABLY UNIFIED nature of mind, in any
of its possible cognitive states, can be
ascertained through carefully analyzing the
nature of the CONTENT’S of various particular
mental states.
In this way, it can be shown
that mind is a phenomenon which by the
NATURE and FUNCTION of its PERCEPTUAL CONTENTS,
can achieve (the contents, that is)
*
* ..
ORGANIZATION and SELF DIRECTION: the CONTENTS
can achieve SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING!
This is obviously a complex and difficult
statement to comprehend, hence, the
.remaining portion of the chapter will be
devoted to elucidating its meaning.
Section 3
Throughout our entire discussion, we have repeatedly
referred to our internal and external DIRECT perceptual
deliverances as the ultimate ground for verifying the
theoretical constructs presented heretofore.

Also our

criticisms of various theoretical viewpoints with respect to
the mind-body problem and, in general, the whole problem of
scientifically investigating human behavior have had their
evidential basis in the concrete perceptions comprising our

conscious experience as sequentially appearing unities of
percepta.

The assumption underlying all this is that

intelligent behavior arises from individuals having learned
to understand, with progressively increased precision, the
nature of entities and their relevant properties and
relations (i.e., specifically with regard to INTRINSIC
properties and. relations among properties of particular
entities, as well as relevant EXTRINSIC properties and
relations among entities) as they are ALL DIRECTLY experi¬
enced as PERCEPTUAL UNITIES throughout spatio-temporal
passage.

This assumption is fundamental to the philosophy

of Alfred North Whitehead and its far reaching implications
»

are developed in great detail in most of his works.

In

this paper we can only superficially elaborate several
conspicuous dimensions of this profound assumption.

The

concepts to be introduced in the remainder of this chapter
are quite concordant with the views of Whitehead.

However,

the terminology to be developed by the writer is NOT
strictly interchangeable with that of Whitehead’s; an
attempt to accomplish this would inflict unwarranted and
serious damage upon his rigiously unified system of thought.
On those occasions when quotations are extracted from
Whitehead’s writings, the reader may legitimately contem¬
plate them from the point of view being developed in this
paper.
The above assumption, that direct experience of the
external natural’world and our internal bodily phenomena
consists of consciously apprehendable synthetic UNITS of
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percepta, disclosing the inner and outer worlds in terms of
entities, their propert ies, and the relations among these
elements of experience,
concrete awareness.

is one that clearly characterizes

Although stated as such, i.e., in a

highly abstract manner,

its meaning is not likely to be

intuitively clear to the reader; therefore, appropriate
attention will be given for elucidating the assumption.
Let it suffice to say, in our introductory remarks, that the
implications of this assumption permeate ALL areas of human
endeavor, for human activity IS experience and experience
fundamentally consists of unitary configurations of inex¬
tricably related percepta occurring in relatively deter¬
minate temporal sequences.

From this, the conclusion can be

drawn -- now specifically with reference to the purposes of
our discussion — that as our theoretical constructs
urogressively approximate the logical form manifested in our
subjective psychological experience (keeping in mind now
that perceptual deliverances, disclosing the nature of
entities, their properties and the relations among these
two factors, are. to be regarded as the CONSTITUTIVE CONTRifTS
that are necessarily understood to occur within the logical
form of subjective psychological experience), our theories
will acquire greater validity and reliability in explana¬
tion, for they are conforming more closely to the nature of
concrete experience.

Stated more geneially, it Cr<.n b..

that our knowledge of external natural phenomena as well as
subjective psychological phenomena will become more valid
and reliable as our theories achieve greater fidelity with
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the indeterminately profound ramifications of concrete
experience.

In saying this, we are remaining strictly

within the limits of mind defined as 'percepta concomitantly
coming constructively to bear upon other percepta*.

This

ip to say that if all possible percepta capable of
constituting subjective psychological experience or mental
events must occur as external bodily sense perception,
internal bodily feeling, or ideational feeling -- or more
precisely speaking, as a combination of these categories
°f percePtlon —, then all opinion and knowledge of any
kind can be subjected to ultimate factual verification by
consulting concrete experience, for it is from this
ontalogical mode of existence that every factual and theo¬
retical assertion arises.

Hence error can be regarded as

the degree to which knowledge claims deviate from our
DIRECT experience of reality.

Here we must remember, of

course, our unique definitions ascribed to the terms * event*
and

* event-component *

(theoretical concepts which are in

need of greater elaboration),
It will be our task, then, in postulating basic principles for a subjective psychology,

to develop constructs

that will best enable us to determine the LOGICAL FORM in
which all subjective psychological experience must be
conceived to occur.

In doing this, we will be better able to

understand the CAUSAL conditions that give rise to parti¬
cular modes of human behavior.

Further, a better under¬

standing will be achieved for comprehending the methodological,
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logical and evidential grounds upon which

’fact - theory'

distinctions are predicated, for our theory of mind will
enable us to distinguish those dimensions of knowledge
claims referring to directly contributed natural world
percepta and subjective psychological states (viz.,

facts),

from those ideational elements referring to the INTEBPBETA—~ contri’outions of constructive mental activity
(viz.,

theory), over and above "bare" factual deliverance —

that is, of course,
theory'

if so strict a dichotomy as 'fact -

can legitimately be made at all.

Throughout this

particular enquiry, which will include the remainder of the
chapter,

it is absolutely imperative that the notion of

mind as

pejcepca concomitantly coming constructively to

bear upon other percepta' is kept clearly in view.
In our introductory remarks, the highly ambiguous term
'experience' has frequently been used with little attempt to
clarify the meaning that it is to possess in order that a
crucial distinction be established.

Hence, we shall begin

our analysis of the logical form of subjective psychological
experience by initially establishing a concept of experience,
or what has previously,
an event.

though inadequately, been defined as

Concrete experience is that which CONSTITUTES

every consciously aware moment in our lives.

It IS that

which fills out all subjective psychological awareness,
regardless of its level of perspicacity.

To better appre¬

ciate the profundity of this concept, we need only recall
Whitehead's striking definition of experience.

231

Nni'hfnCe lelatlnS to every variety of occasion
experience11 ^ °mitted’ exp^»- dLnkand
e5^l
sober, experience sleeping and
enco wi"renn>enS’

’

eXpfrience drowsy and exneri-

e^eriencc sS?’reXPefien°e ^-conscious and
t-noi
?C6 slf-forgetful, experience intellecand e^eriSce1 skeptical1Ca1’ e?Perienoe religious
experience
?kePtlcal, experience anxious and
experience ®afeiree* experience anticipatory and
exocrienee *.l,ro?pectlve» experience happy and
eStfon enfl®
V1?S’ exPerience dominated by
emotion and experience under self-restraint
da?rie^er-n ^ light and exPerie«oe in the
’ exPerience normal and experience abnormal,!00
potation, considered within the framework of Whitehead's
philosophical system, has a rather precise meaning, but
since it is not our purpose to engage in an exposition of
his views, we shall merely be content in pondering the
definition of experience in light of that which has been
previously maintained in this discourse.
Thus systematically speaking, experience includes all
our awarenesses of the natural world as it is directly
perceived through the external bodily senses, in addition to
those directly perceived awarenesses of internal bodily
states including' bodily feeling, emotional feeling, and
ideational feeling in their myriad modes of occurrence.
It is important to note that our concrete experience is
directly apprehended as UNIFIED.

This unity, most funda¬

mentally, has its basis in the fact that the external and
internal ENVIRONMENTS are disclosed to us as unified
100
V/hitehead, Adventures of_ op. cit., p. 22?.

■
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configurations of percepts or stimulus-object effects.
This is to say that the entities, their properties, and
their relations with one another participate as ideational
event-components in our consciousness in such a way that
their appearance — as entities, properties, and relations -.
is NOT created by mind; rather, mind takes account of and
hence records some of these phenomenal representations.
There is, however, another dimension of the unity of experi¬
ence which is CAUSED by mind's active,

synthetic role in

apprehending unified perceptual deliverances from the
ternal natural and internal oodily environments.

This

phenomenon was to some modest degree discussed in our
previous analysis of 'perceptual field',

it was seen that

our understanding of any given stimulus-object effect was
constrained, generally,

to the meaning yielded as a result

of the number of organic propensities that could be conjured
to a given stimulus-occasion, in addition to the extent to
which the propensities were interrelated, thereby yielding
even qualitatively greater meaning.

Stated differently
«✓

5

the unity of individual experience at concrete levels is
also (over and above the intrinsic unity of inner and outer
environments, as they logically ana empirically exist
distinct from other minds), in varying degrees, determined
by the extent to which the wisdom of the past comes
constructively to bear on present occasions so as to enhance
the MEANING of those occasions.

We have seen that in this

latter way of conceptualizing unity, much of the primordial
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complexity of intuitively (whether vaguely or clearly)
apprehended experience eludes clear conscious understanding
largely as a result of the human organism*s ability to
(intellectually) SIMPLIFY the indeterminate complexity of
immediate experience, hence achieving conscious symbolic
clarity and precision in comprehending reality.

The

importance of this point cannot be over-stated if we are to
truly appreciate the magnificence and ontalogical peculiarity
of MEALING-AS--DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.

The extraordinary

synthetic and/or interpretative power of mind is difficult
to conceptualize unless one achieves this understanding
through using the extraordinary complexity of concrete
experience as a basis for analysis.

In this way it can be

readily seen that ideational feeling represents a striking
instance of ontalogical phenomenal transcendence beyond the
bare givenness of natural world representations and those
occurring as bodily and emotional feeling.

This unique

emergence is nothing more nor less-than the commensurate
illumination of subjective psychological understanding as
it steadily (intellectually) transcends the bare, intrinsic¬
ally subjective psychologically MEANINGLESS deliverances of
stimulus-object EFFECTS conceived IN-THEMSELVES.
On most occasions of which we are consciously aware,
wnether through mere conscious apprehension of percepta or
in penetrating critical reflection, both modes of experi¬
ential unification are in evidence.

The first level could

nearly be exclusively experientially approximated in those
rare moments when one’s consciousness is filled
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predominately with sheer immediately presented, unpondered
configurations of percepta.

In these- fleeting moments,

reflective thought is almost totally absent.

In fact,

this endeavor to perceive bare percepta, and consequently
achieve a connotative apprehension of the subtly enduring
complexity of concrete experience, requires a deliberate
intellectual effort.

In this, we are attempting to achieve

a state of affairs in which intellectual interpretation is
at a minimal, thus entertaining a FEELING- OF- COMPLEX RELATEDMESS AMONGST MENTAL EVENT-COMPONENTS.

It would seem that

artists have developed this.facility for directly appre¬
hending concreteness with unusual exactitude.

But the first,

level of unified conscious apprehension of internal or
external concrete states is rare3.y attained, for In the
vast majority of instances, this primordially unified
deliverance is concomitantly superceded in intellectual
clarity by simplified., precise denotative understanding.
Here we have the typical circumstance where during a given
temporal duration, one is concentration upon reading the
content of a book, for example, while simultaneously, the
low murmur of voices can be heard, accompanied by the quiet
hum of a ventilating system, the solidity of the table and
chair can be felt, the deliberate effort to focus attention
on a page can be felt, the intellectual effort to comorehend printed symbolic meaning can be experienced, and so on.
Thus over and a.bove the particular clearly conscious act of
comprehending the printed content of a book, there are
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numerous OTHER CONCOMITANTLY OCCURRING perceptions that are
often, at best, only vaguely conscious.

If this vast

complex of perceptions can be conceived in their collective
unity, then the full richness and multidimensionality of
concrete experience will become more apparent.

Stated

differently, our concept of * experience ’ encompasses two
levels of perceptual unification, initially, primordial3.y
occurring as those continuous infusions of (CON-^.Rj-lLUj^ED)
percepta which are (both vaguely and clearly) consciously
recognized as entities, properties, and relations; and
secondly, as the higher-ordered concomitant source of
perceptual unification, i.e.,

simplified, clearly deter¬

minate INTER?RETATIVS COGNITION.

It is these experientially

integrated perceptual units, when occurring in their
particular ontalogical sequences in the organisms of all
individual (conscious) human beings, that constitute the
conscious life or personality of men.

Experience, then,

has a far more inclusive character than that which any of us
can exhaustively explicate at a given time.

For beyond the

clear understanding of our thoughts at a particular time
(viz., that aspect of experience defined as the second level
of unification), there are the more primitive perceptual
deliverances whose recognition in most cases is sacrificed in
order to establish clear, simplified, linguiscicall,y
meaningful organization, whether actualized as voiced
expression or as silent thought.

Here the point to be made

is that concrete experience is far too subtle and intricate

I
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to be given complete symbolic explication, for vie live in
the ever-emerging, hence transitory, present.

The future

is upon us before we are done with its immediately
preceding relevant occasions.

So it is with human experi¬

ence; our clear conscious thoughts capture only the most
conspicuous glitterings of fleeting present occasions.
Thus all linguistic universals are as slender threads of
continuity, regressing into a rich experiential history of
learned wisdom that would be essentially lost from clear
comprehension if it were not for these powerfully meaningful
remnants of the past.

Therefore, each UNIT of individual

experience must be regarded as ultimate fact, for it truly
embodies 'that which is the case'.

But since man's lin¬

guistic capacities enable him to only partially charac¬
terize those portions of immediate experience contemplated
as personally IMPORTANT, that are hence subjected to
simplification, it is not difficult to understand that any
notion of "pure" fact is necessarily relegated to the
status of an IDEAL, for so many elements of experience are
denied precise conceptualization, and thereby, are lost
forever.

Moreover, the very act of linguistically charac¬

terizing a PORTION of experience entails ABSTRACTING this
important element from its original experiential context.
This, of course, becomes a source for much human error.
Even the most acute mentalities are constrained to this
condition.

In stating the circumstances this way, it can

be easily seen that man's intellectual powers are greatly
overshadowed by the profound structure of reality.

JL

We must
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come to this conclusion if our concept of experience is
to be taken seriously, for it follows that ’experience'
logically demands the inclusion of EVERY PERCEPTUAL element
of natural and bodily stimulus-object effects, regardless
of their subtly and. vaguely conscious status, collectively
actualized as a temporal unit of subjective psychological
experience.

We may conclude by once again stressing the

fact that experience,

in its full comprehensiveness and

deep compelling unity, is far broaxler than our intellectual
capacity to symbolically characterize this human occurrence.
Perhaps it is only through intuition, exercised by minds
well disciplined in understanding the nature of what has
been termed in this discourse as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELTRELATEDNESS, that the indefinite pervasiveness of unfathom¬
able complexity can be appreciated.
Now that the profoundly complex Quality of human experi¬
ence has been briefly contemplated, it is necessary to
develop theoretical constructs suitable for providing us
with the means through which this uniquely human phenomenon
can be systematically comprehended.

The nature of these

constructs has been frequently suggested throughout i ormer
discussions; however, it is now appropriate for our purposes
to attempt to define the concepts with some precision.
The concept of an ’EVENT’ could, in a sense, be
regarded as identical to our definition of 'experience’,
but the term ’experience’

seems to implicitly suggest an

overly subjectivistic view of the world.

As it has been
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said,

the definition of * event* demands a twofold distinc¬

tion, namely,

’percepta concomitantly coming constructively

to bear upon other percepta*.

However,

stated in this

abstract manner, it is easy for one to forget trie deep,
intimate experiential quality of the percepta cited as
definitionally polarized.

With this in mind, let us proceed

to develop a rather specific definition of * event’,
emphatically incorporating the fact that powerfully
informative experiential factors are suggested by the
theoretical construct; one developed to enhance and hence
facilitate an understanding of our experience.

In defining

an event we shall attempt to designate LIMITS that will
denote the domain of each possible particular event
perceived by the mind of any given human being.
this.

By doing

It becomes possible to delineate determinate indivi¬

dual atomic units of experience.

Since mathematics is the

exact science of establishing precise, universally valid
RELATIONS among ENTITIES,

SIMULTANEOUSLY OCCURRING DURING

INSTANTANEOUS MOMENTS 0? TIME, it shall be possible (as a
result of our ability.to rigorously denote the particular
ENTITIES of subjective psychological experience) to utilize
mathematical and statistical techniques for ascertaining
relations among EXPERIENTIAL ENTITIES to be carefully
defined as events.

This theoretical approach for system¬

atically comprehending phenomena was carefully explored
and developed by Whitehead,

In these enquiries his

principal interest was in comprehending NATURAL
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phenomena, -^1 » -^2, -^3 but a similar approach (with
modifications)
behavior,

seems highly feasible- for studying human

for the theoretical viewpoint resulting from this

mode of understanding is capable of encompassing a great
number of subtle and transitory subjectively experienced
phenomena.

Its chief advantage is precisely what is

lacking in current psychological theories, viz.,
utilize, in principle,

it can

every possible component of subjec¬

tive psychological experience as factual evidence for
eva.lua.ting given subjective psychological hypotheses, and
this end cam be accomplished within a definitionally
rigorous framework;
statistical,

one not incompatible with mathematical,

or geometrical modes of formalization.

The

ultimate criterion to which we shall attempt to tenaciously
adhere is that our constructs must remain concordant with
the way that external and internal bodily percepta constitutively participate in our personal consciousness as everemerging, unique configurations of percepta, each in their
unified totality being a directly experienced particular
mental event.
Mind is an ENTITY, and here the term entity is used in

^^•^iO-fred. Worth Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the
Principies of Nat •ural Knowledg£*~TCambridge: at the
University Press, 19197V
■^^Alfred North Whitehead, Concept of Nature (Cambridge:
at the University Press, 1920).
^^^Alf red North Whitehead, The Principle of Relativity
(Cambridge; at the University Press, 1922IT.
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the general sense that it is a "something" (our arguments
in "Chapter I" have demonstrated this necessity),

capable

of being distinguished as intrinsically distinct in bind
from other entities comprising the world
sounds,
objects,

rocks,

(e.g.,

colors,

other men as they are perceived as natural

etc.); hence mind gains ontalogical particularity.

More specifically,

individual minds are entities that stand

in unique empirical relationships with their relevant
coexistent natural world throughout given temporal dura¬
tions; a process which is cognitively unidirectional.
the term■‘mind1

Thus

suggests sophisticated concrescent processes

yielding particular mental events,

sequentially emerging

within individual human organisms and manifesting an
intrinsically inte3.1igible meaning that persists throughout
long series of these events (e.g., a complete life).

Thus

particular events are a nexus of percepta or stimulusobject effects constituting the only valid and reliable
factual representation of reality that is available to man.
These percepta,

in their unique, transitory patterns of

deliverance, ABE the way that the relevant natural world
ingressed into the constitution of individuals, hence
achieving an actualization of conscious experience within
individual persons.

As we have seen, the complexity of

this fact of intersection or mutual environmental synthesis
is far broader than an individual mind’s capacity to
symbolically characterize the extraordinary phenomenal
occasions defined a.s complete mental events.

Determining

the definitive limits of an event is wholly contingent upon
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an individual mind at a given time.

TIME ELAPSES during

acts of perceptual apprehension and thinking,
of their ephemeral!ty.
concrete experience.

regardless

This is an unavoidable fact of
Thus the time transpiring while

thinking a complete thought, designates the temporal limits
of an event.

Further,

it is from the phenomenon of

* completeness* that the notion of an ATOMIC event is
suggested.

Cur thoughts in the vast majority of instances

OCCUR AS COUPLETS IDEATIONAL UNITS,
that,

This is merely to say

‘I see' the red table’, not 'I see the.’;

’That racing-

car accelerates more rapidly than its competitors’, not
’Accelerates more.’.

Here we have a fundamental criterion

for designating particular events.

The ideational phenomena

concomitantly actualized throughout these temporal dura¬
tions ARE unique entities,

coexisting with innumerable

other possible entities which simultaneously constitute
reality throughout those durations; therefore,

their

ontalogical status must be recognized as legitimate.

Tm

s

conclusion is particularly important for a subjective
psychology whose principal thesis is that these ideational
entities are in fact causally efficacious.

The problem of

defining the ontalogical particularity of events will be
further developed when we embark upon our analysis of space
and time.
To understand the full importance of the view that
consciousness is the actualized synthetic product of the
' WAY in which the internal and external environments ingress
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into individual organisms, we must recall our former
discussion on the unification of experience as it is
perceived on the first level of representation.

This is to

emphasize the fact that our experiential events possess a
highly sophisticated unity (LOGICALLY) PRIOR to the nearly
automatic or reflexive functioning of mature intelligence
at the second level of unification (i.e.,
cognitive SIMPLIFICATION).

in effecting

It is imperative to understand

that cognitive modes of thought have their primordial basis
in properties of and relations among entities as their
effects are experienced at the first level of unification.
Ketaphorically speaking,

intelligent behavior arises from

and hence acquires its ultimate discipline through primitive
perceptual representation.

This is to say, for example,

that for even the most immature intelligence the world is
not experienced as sheer, unfathomable perceptual flux for
very long because, as we have seen, physio-chemical storing
mechanisms are operating considerably prior to the develop¬
ment of reflective consciousness.
lated without the organisms’
stages of growth.

Wisdom is being accumu¬

conscious realization at early

Amid the apparent kaleidoscopic (percep¬

tual) flux there is the over-riding, but vague, recognition
of permanence within perceptual processes, and soon thereafter, that the permanence can be even more distinctly
understood as entities manifesting certain characteristic
properties.

In fact,

the essence of intelligent behavior

is the ability to make these phenomenal distinctions and
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then.incorporate the information into one’s backlogue of
similarly acquired wisdom in order to increase one’s
behavioral efficacy.

This is the power of establishing

IDEATIONAL RELATIONS among entities and their properties as
they are in process.

Relatedness is intrinsic to concrete

experience a.t the first level of unification, and the second
level, is a way of extrapolating beyond the implications of
the first level through the constructive,
symbolic reflective consciousness.

creative usage of

We can know nothing

beyond the appearance or effects of entities and relations
as thev ingress into consciousness from infernally and
externally located regions of reality.

Yet in syaing this,

there is the possibility'for intellectually penetrating the
mysteries of the microcosm and macrocosm,

for as Whitehead

has often said, the relations implicit in various ’’given"
portions of our natural experience, for example, hold true
for all entities throughout the universe even though the
intrinsic nature of many of these entitles can be only
indirectly ascertained by using theoretical constructs.
This principle, when comprehended within a rigorous spatiotemporal framework, is a cornerstone for the theory o±
relativity.
As we have seen,

another extraordinary characteristic

of mental events is that relevant past wisdom enters into
every emergent, ontalogically unique present occasion in
such a way as to greatly increase the subjective psycho—
• logically meaningful comprehension of contemporary occasions.
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Not only the bare

(intrinsically meaningless) percepta of

the printed words of a poem are
and above this,

seen,

for example,

but over

a more powerful qualifying class of cogni¬

tive percepta infuse the appearance of printed words with
a deep meaning that reaches far into an individual's past
experience,

often stirring emotion and

primordial bases.

From this,

intellect at their

profound moments of indef¬

initely complex units of understanding fill out consciousnes
and provoke the limits of analytical reflection.

Anyone who

ponders the'phenomenon of the past constructively entering
into the fleeting present occasion,

whereafter both classes

of percepta as synthetically united prepare the way for
future novel emergence,

cannot avoid

ibility of this possibility.

Mental

recognizing the incred¬
events in their inex¬

tricably unified perceptual atomicity during the present
moment,

in effect, portray their relevant universe in a rude

type of

symbolic suspension while the

process,

"FACTS" of the

e.g., generally defined as its relative permanence

amid incessant change,

and its possibility for apprehension

from a single unique mental perspective,

are ascertained by

the mentalities rendering this extraordinary action possible
V/hat mechanistic scheme may we contrive to explain this
unfathomable fact of experience?
proposed in "Chapter Two",

One

such theory was

developed from the notion of

concrescence as a physio-chernical synthetic coalescence of
discreet,

yet interdependent,

systems of organic mechanisms

each of which was necessarily understood to be a selfcontained unit comprised of components whose functional
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presence is required for the organism to behave as a complete
unit.

In this view,

our concept of organic bodily mech¬

anisms leads us into the microcosm.

For example,

that

discreet organs such as the heart are comprised of vastly
complex systems of cells; the cells in turn each have their
own necessary components; but the components can be still
subdivided further;
regression.

and so on,

demonstrates this pattern of

On the other hand, we may proceed up the scale

of concrescence where organic mechanisms function as
societies, and discreet societies interpenetrate with other
relevant societies, and so on,

such that holism becomes

increasingly evident at progressively higher stages of
organic concrescence.

The optimum levels of concrescence

culminate in consciousness and reflective consciousness
where the ORGANIC,

empirically ascertainable equivalents

(and again we see a logical consequence of the Identity
Theory developed in

Chap ter One1') are those levels of

concrescence providing the preconditions for cognitive
emergence.

It was formerly said that this model seemed

compatible with a scientific emergen'tism in that, for
example, while mental states are not predictable a priori
from their physio-chemical correlates,
rendered

they can, however, be

(in principle) scientifically determinate

aposteriori.

Feigl’s Identity Theory affirms a similar view

in that mental events are not analytically derivable from
their physio-chemical correlates.
In a different type of analysis ~~ i.e., of subjective
psychological perceptual content

the phenomenon of past
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wisdom entering into the present occasion was explained in
terras of connotative and denotative symbolic meaning.

This

mode of explanation has its analogical grounds in mechanistic
notions such as organic

1

storing1 mechanisms which when

activated in concrescent processes occur as organic propens¬
ities!

Thus it can be seen that our mechanistic model, is

compatible with both an objective and subjective psycho¬
logical view of man, while our subjective psychological
model

(dealing with such notions as connotative and denota¬

tive symbolic meaning,

for example) can (moreover) yield

information about the subjective psychological a.spect of
human behavior; a dimension of human behavior that must be
methodologically purged from a strict behaviorism, for
example.

A more basic fact in all this is,

however,

that

BOTH psychological viewpoints must LOGICALLY PRESUPPOSE what
has been defined as subjective psychological experience,
and more specifically what we are presently defining as
atomic mental events delivered, thereby perceived directly
as concrete experience.
Our concept of mental events demonstrates that conscious
life is primitively revealed as apparent permanence
concomitantly contrasted with a backdrop of process.
conscious present is, moreover,

The

invariably tinged by the

color of past wisdom, as contemporary moments incessantly
slip into the future.

The characterinational power of

symbolism ~~ particularly linguistic symbolism

obscures

the transitory quality of experience arising as natural and
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bodily perceptual components,

and hence,

tive recognition of enduring stability.

favors the

selec¬

This illusion is

both facilitative and necessary for a full enjoyable life,
but it is also a frequent source of important error as
man’s scientific enquiries proceed in understanding the
lawful dimensions of reality.

As we have seen,

our immediate

awareness of experiential events greatly exceeds our ability
to symbolically characterize the full implication of experi¬
ential occasions.

The ever-emerging present constantly

fades from our cognitive grasp,

thereby leaving us only the

opportunity to symbolically SIMPLIFY those elements of
experience that impress us with their IMPORTANCE;

they

resultantly become candidates for immediate contemplation,
and often,

even for future recollection.

symbolically simplify our experience is,

The capacity to
without question,

a necessity for attaining conscious precision in under¬
standing;

this capacity is certainly sufficient reimburse¬

ment for the commensurate loss of experiential concreteness.
But nevertheless,

there is much variability in our ’’precise"

characterization of things
sure,

(although it is minimal,

in disciplines such as mathematics,

For example,

to be

for example).

no two individuals agree EXACTLY on ’the verbal

definition of happiness’,
directly witnessed

'a phenomenon that they have both

concomitantly’,

etc.

This is to say,

discrepancy in understanding given matters results from not
only differences in spatial or temporal perspectives of
apprehension,

but more importantly,

from the great
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incongruence in the subjective psychological domains defined
as connotative symbolic meaning or MEANING-AS-DIRn-CTLY-Fu.LTHELATEDNESS.

This significant discrepancy can occur even

though identical components of denotative symbolic meaning
may be articulated.

Two people observing a flower,

giving identical verbal testimonies to the fact,
different conceptions of the flower if,

and

will have

let us say,

individual is a poet and the other a botanist.

one

This illus¬

tration effectively portrays our previous distinction
between “Toublic” and

‘’private1’ events made in

Chapter One

It will be recalled,

the writer maintained that ALL events

«

we re private or mental insofar as an individual human mind
is necessarily presupposed a priori to
perceptions of given phenomena,
could not,

in principle,

experience.

“stand over against

otherwise the phenomena

enter into the domain of human

From this the distinction followed that-

public

events” were actually mental events that contained EVENT—
COMPONENTS whose corresponding stimulus-object was LOCATED
in the natural world;

hence they are capable of DIRECT

INTERSUBJECTIVE verification by OTHER minds,
Similarly,

‘subjective states*

notion that

(which is a less misleading

’private events’) were mental events containing

EVENT-COMPONENTS whose corresponding
inferred)

as well.

(scientifically

stimulus-object was LOCATED in the body of the

individual experiencing the mental event;

hence,

the event-

component is capable of DIRECT verification by ONLY that
individual,

and occasionally capable of INDIRECT detection

by other individuals IF there are MANIFEST behavioral
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indications of the

subjective state.

only WE AS INDIVIDUALS can,
do in fact experience,

Thus it is clear that

in principle,

REGARDLESS of

experience what we

the LOCAJICON of the

stimulus-objects under consideration.

Therefore the

important conclusion follows that the term

* OBJECTIVITY*,

over and above the necessity that u3.timate procedures and
evidence be directly intersubjectively confirmable,

refers

to the degree to which individuals can achieve CONCORDANCE
among their DENOTATIVE AND (more important)
domains of symbolic understanding,

CONNOTATIVg

given that percipient’s

spatio-temporal and environmental circumstances are
sufficiently alike to yield
standing.

such a similarity in under¬

This is the only concept of

’objectivity’

we can have if we are to take into account
the ontalogical

that

as we must

status of mind as a component of

reality.

Thus we are lead to the abstract concept of mind as

’percepta

concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other
percepta’, presupposing all that has been said heretofore
and that yet remaining in future chapters,
within this bare definition.

Again,

as implicit

as it has been stated

in various places throughout this paper,

the most object¬

ively valid and re3.iable knowledge is that stated in
symbols possessing maximally determinate denotative and
connotative domains.

Stated more specifically,

the type of

knowledge has an experiential basis capable of precise
symbolic specification such that the nature of its entities
and particularly some, of their R^AMCNS can be rigorously
conceived in formal terms.

This statement appears to be
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verified by the exactitude achieved in mathematics and
physics,

for example.

The former science is in great part

a, product of ideational feeling as it derives its axioms,
postulates,

etc.

ultimately from the perceived relations

among objects in nature.

Physics relies more heavily upon

symbolically conceptualizing the nature of its natural and
hypothetical entities,

but the principal rigor is neverthe¬

less derived from the ability to establish mathematical and
statistical RELATIONS amongst its entities.

These are

methodological disciplines where individuals,

viewing the

relevant universe from their private, unique perspectives,
can come to achieve relatively great concordance among their
symbolic characterizations of those portions of reality
(event-components) which they choose to scientifically
scrutinize.
them,
J

Thus all events,

insofar as humans can know

are necessarily private for phenomena are directly
ti

S.

perceived by individual minds.

Jl.

But,

v

a.s we shall see with

increased specificity in ensuing discussions,
no means compels us to a solipsism.
this point,
must,

this view by

Let us merely say at

that since all our knowledge about anything

in principle, be grounded in mental events, whose

components are delivered via the'internal and external
senses as determinate experiential UNITIJ5S,

any object of

knowledge must necessarily enter into our subjective psycho¬
logical experience as' an event-component,

directly

disclosing the object as an entity with properties and
knowable relations,

or revealing at least some manifestation

of the object -- which in this case relegates the object to
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a hypothetical status (for example, an atom) -- from which
mathematical or statistical formulations may comprehend its
relations with other entities (and/or theoretical entities).
In this latter instance,

scientists, in effect,

take the

data that are available for any given object of concern,
develop a theoretical model to fit the data,

establish

formal statements of relations among relevant factors, and
finally, design ,?key" experiments

(or proofs) to test the

validity and reliability of the model for explaining the
phenomenal occurrence.

In this way, deductive explanations

can be given, proceeding from axioms, postulates,

etc.,

and

finally demonstrating the lawful relations hypothesized to
underlie phenomena through carefully constructed “key"
experiments.

This process is fundamental to rigorous

scientific explanation and hence prediction; achievements
originally proceeding from and ultimately verified in
subjective psychological events.
Although the topic shall later be covered in greater
depth, we have seen that mental events, as atomic experi¬
ential unities capable of being ascribed particularity in
spatio-temporal coordinates,
into event-components.

can be indefinitely subdivided

These components may occur as

entities, properties of entities,
properties and entities. - Further,

or relations among
entities, properties, and.

relations may represent the natural, bodily feeling, or
ideations.! domains as they are directly perceived through
the inner and outer senses.

The concrete perception (by
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mature minds) of these myriad

event-components in their

inextricable unity throughout given temporal durations
(complete events)

is a primordial and

complex fact of

reality for man.

It is through this mode of understanding

that all possible knowledge of man.and nature must issue.
The spatio-temporal components of mental events ARE the way
in which we experience

(through direct acquaintance)

the

EFFECTS of stimulus-objects that participate in our being;
at least those of which we can become aware.

Perhaps the

most extraordinary fact is that these event-components,
collectively comprehended as events,

and necessarily

conceived as dipolar classes of percepta,

can synthetically

interact in such a way that one class can impose discipline
and hence direction on the other class.
(although the process is very complex),

Out of this
subjective psycho¬

logical experience gains its meaning and intellectual
potency; man acquires a self and the possibility for a
creatively human life.

Finally,

to conclude our introductory

analysis of the concept of mental event,

let us generally

say that these events can occur as experience in four
distinct ways:
1)

as intuitive (immediately experienced) subjec¬
tive psychological events, where the stimulusobjects are organismically LOCATED in uncon¬
scious physio-chemical states, or are previously
learned ideational feelings.
Here, because
of the IMMEDIACY of this type of phenomenon,
conscious awareness is restricted primarily
to C0NN0TATIVE symbolic understanding while
the denotative element is minimal

"2)

as intuitive subjective psychological events,
where the stimulus-objects are LOCATED in the
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natural world, ingressing into consciousness
as external bodily sense perception.
Here,
because of the IMMEDIACY of.this type of.
phenomenon, conscious awareness is restricted
primarily to CONNOTATIVE symbolic under¬
standing while the denotative element is
minimal
3)

as subjective psychological events, where the
stimulus-objects are organ!sraically LOCATED
unconscious physio-chemical states, or are
previously learned ideational feelings.
Here,
simplification has occurred, thus symbolically
characterizing this type of phenomenon through
both connotative and denotative symbolic means

4)

as subjective psychological experience, where
stimulus-objects are LOCATED in the natural
world, ingressing into consciousness as
external bodily sense perception.
Here,
simplification has occurred, thus symbolically
characterizing this type of phenomenon through
both connotative and denotative symbolic means.

More will be said about these types of mental events as we
proceed in developing additional constructs to rigorously
elucidate their logical form.

Also,

it will be recalled,

in our former discussion on the two levels from which
mental events acquire their intrinsic unification,

that

they were conceptualized in the following way:
Level 1:

Level 2:

the unity of inner and outer environ¬
ments disclosed as:
a)

external bodily sense perception
contributed from the natural world
as entities, properties and relations

b)

internal bodily feeling contributed
by.the bodily structure as entities,
properties, and relations

the unity actively and constructively
promoted by ideational feeling, ultimately
deriving its form from sources ,:a" and
"b", above.

In our analysis of mind,

it is becoming unquestionably

clear that the most indubitable starting point for this
enquiry is that of concrete experience because,

after all,

concrete experience -- in our comprehensive definition of
this term --is the intrinsic '‘medium" for conscious life.
We cannot "somehow" transcend
experience,
death,

or otherwise escape concrete

except in those unconscious states of sleep,

and. so on.

But it must be cautioned that the

concrete facts of internal and external perception can be
importantly distorted through careless cognitive INTERPRE¬
TATION that subtly and often in an unnoticed way unwarrantedly elaborates our perception of "stubborn facts"'.

Well

known instances of these types of erroneous determinations
are,

for example,

the notions of

elements of clearly evident,
percipient and. object;

1 sense data*

as intervening

atomic sensation between

the notion of substance as a

substratum underlying and hence providing the basis of unity
for perceived qualities of objects,

etc.

Here we have

examples of very high abstractions unwittingly accepted as
concrete facts of experience,

the results of which promoted

many perplexities in philosophy.
own cognitive

One never knows when one’s

(presuppositional) habituations are so well

established that similarly erroneous misconceptions are
unintentionally perpetuated.
through prolonged,

In any case,

it is only

careful philosophical analysis that these

problematic conceptions can be exposed.

The FACT,

at the bottom of difficult errors of this sort,

however,

is that

ideational feeling introduced an INTERPRETATIVE element of
cognition over and above that which is warranted by the
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contributed perceptual organizations delivered through the
MODES OP EXTERNAL/ BODILY PERCEPTION,
IDEATIONAL FEELING.

BODILY FEELING, AND

We have said repeatedly,

that

stimulus-object effects occur through these perceptual
modes,

symbolically characterized as ENTITIap,

AMONG ENTITIES,

RELATIONS

AND THE PROPERTIES OF ENTITIES.

Therefore,

it is from analyzing the percepta delivered via the three
distinct modes of perception,

as these percepta embody an

intrinsic FORM independent from mind,

that vie can come to

understand the subjective psychological form in concrete
experience,
task for us,

and hence,
then,

ideational processes or mind.

ihe

is to achieve maximum FIDELITY between

our theoretical constructs and experiential deliverances,
for their degree of discordance

(resulting from unwarranted

cognitive INTERPRETATION) will yield a commensurate amount
of erroneous formulation.

This is not to say,

however,

that

all we are required to do is to represent "pure" perceptual
fact purged of interpretation,

for as we recall,

immediate

experience is too broad for complete exposition by
intellect.
of concrete,

Thus mind

simplifies certain important aspects

transitory experience through symbolic

representations,

and in so doing necessarily subsumes-

experience to INTERPRETATION, which,

in effect,

lead us to

the conclusion that man is incapable of articulating "pure"
factual statements,

for this act would necessitate

symbolically representing the complete original factual
moment of experience.

Consequently, man contents himself

with the more humble endeavor of "factually" characterizing
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particular event-components that tend to reoccur throughout
moments of human experience in a comparatively uniform way;
but it must be understood,

as we shall

apparently ’'bare” factual statement

see,

that even the

* the grass is green’

is permeated with cognitive presuppositions and thereby
interpretations!
Again to briefly recapitulate our developing argument,
it has been said that an ultimate,

indubitable

(and obvious)

fact of human existence is that mind JIS the consciously
intelligible perceptual elements of individual' concrete
experience occurring in their inextricable unity and
profound complexity.

Also,

it is from the contributed

independent structure of concrete experience that mind
essentially acquires its subjective psychological mode of
understanding — ultimately derivable from the FORM of
contributive perceptual deliverances — eventually enabling
human organisms to MEANINGFULLY SYMB0LICALLY REPRESENT
THEIR PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE,
human understanding,
SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE.

and at the highest levels of

to PROGRESSIVELY DEVELOP AN EFFICACIOUS
This is to say that a class of

natural organisms have achieved the symbolic capacity for
intelligently reflective self-consciousness;

a phenomenon

whose meaning we are presently attempting to understand.
To better understand the notion of subjective psychological
experience,

the theoretical concept

for it emphasizes both the

’event’

was formulated

(temporal) durational longevity

of particular units of cognition,

and also,

complexity of these experiential occasions.

the far-reaching
Thus

’event’
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and similarly the term ’experience'

refer to the ontalogic-

ally concrete mode of successive occurrence entitled
PROCESS,

From the perspective of sheer process,

there is

no possibility for delaying the temporal advance of
phenomenal emergence in order that certain dimensions of
reality may be subjected to reflective examination;

rathe),

mind must acquiesce to the relative permanence of its
objects.

The terms,

’event’

and

’experience’,

then,

also defined to comprehend the phenomenon of process,

are
for

implicit is the fact that reality, is far broader than man’s
capacity to symbolically characterize even its momentary
nature.

Also the term ’event’,

regarded as a particular

spatio-temporal atomic epoch in the complete life of an
individual human mind,
of the concept

is seen to include all ramifications

’percepta concomitantly corning constructively

to bear upon other percepta’.
frequently imp3-ied,

And finally,

the concept of

analyzed into that of
\

’event’

'event-components',

as it has been
can be further

each of which is

the EFFECT of corresponding stimulus-objects.

By means of

symbolization, many of these event-components or stimulusobject effects can conversely be transformed

because of

the causally efficacious symoolic nature of mind —— into
stimulus-objects;
intelligent,

hence providing a necessary condition for

innovative thinking.

With these thoughts in

view, let us now proceed to more carefully examine the
logical grounds upon which the RELATION of mind to the
natural world and internal bodily states is based.
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In “Chapter One”,
concept

1 event*

for argumentative reasons,

the

was loosely defined as having two aspects

that were necessary in order for subjective psychological
experience to occur at all; namely,

percepta,

from external and internal environments,
conscious awareness that

and a mind or

“takes account of,!

This was later refined to the notion of

originating

these percepta.

*percepta

concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other
percepta*.

A3.though there are numerous ramifications to

this latter definition,

some of the more important ones are

the followingJ
1)

There is the implication of at least two
distinct classes (e.g., issuing from distinct
perceptual modes as external bodily percep¬
tion, internal bodily feeling and ideational,
feeling) of percept a. being concomi tantly
actualized in a synthetic union; a union
which emerges as subjective psychological
states (or events).

2)

One class of percepta in this (at least)
dipolar union is a class that must be
regarded as uniquely * CONTRIBUTED* by the:
a.)

natural world as entities, properties,
and relations (i.e., as stimulus-object
effects)

b)

the bodily organism as:
1)

bodily feeling as entities, properties,
and relations

2)

ideational feeling as symbolic entities,
properties, and relations.
But these
ideational percepta must be contemplated
as PREVIOUSLY formulated ideas, thereby
ingressing into mind as the 'CONTRIBUTED*
component (or stimulus-object EFFECT of
previously synthesized ideas that have
acquired the status of stimulus-objects)
of the (at least) dipolar ideational
synthesis.
Although this phenomenon is
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easily executed in “pure" REFLECTIVE
thinking (in that there is no immediately
* contributed ' natural or bodily feeling
component), an exposition of the LOGICAL
grounds of this ideational occurrence is
a very difficult task; particularly at
present, for we have not yet introduced
the appropriate constructs needed to
effect an adequate explanation.
There¬
fore a rigorous analysis of the
phenomenon must be postponed to a later
occasion.
3)

The other class of percepta in the (at least)
dipolar union is what has been termed, SYMBOLIC
percepta; a special class termed disciplined
ideational feeling.
Symbolic percepta are
comprised of the following components:
a)

denotative meaning

b)

connotative meaning or MEANING-AS-DIRECTLYFELT- RELATEDNESS, having two components:
1)

vague symbolic meaning

2)

emotional feeling.

The above outline presents a rough description of the
LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience at ANY'
possible moment.

It indicates the LOGICAL FORM OF MIND,

AN EVENT THROUGHOUT A GIVEN TEMPORAL DURATION.
as we shall see,

or

Of course,

there are other discriminations that can

be made with respect to logical form of mind, but they all
in effect follow from this essential formulation.
Next we will consider the relation of mind to nature
in the act of perception in order to enhance the epistemo¬
logical clarity of our theory.

The reader would find

it

helpful to consult Chapters I and III of Whitehead’s
Concept of Nature,

for a more comprehensive and precise

exposition of the theory to be presented.
noted,

however,

It should be

that the writer’s position slightly differs
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from that of Whitehead's with respect to a somewhat greater
emphasis upon the

"uniqueness" of mind as a creative func¬

tional component of nature.

It is for this reason that we

shall not remain strictly within his terminological frame¬
work (as it has been the case in the past).
be noted that in Concept of Nature,

Also,

it should

Whitehead1s arguments

are generally delivered within a context that he defines a,s
homogeneous thought:
Thus in a sense nature is independent of thought.
By this statement no metaphysical pronouncement
is intended.
What I mean is that we can think
about nature without thinking about thought.
I shall say that then we are thinking- 'homo¬
geneously' about nature.104
However,

in our discourse we are not,

Whitehead,

as it is the case with

investigating the theoretical basis of the

natural sciences.

Our purposes are directly predicated

from the objective of analyzing the nature of mind;

thus we

will be engaging primarily in what Whitehead has defined as
heterogeneous thinking:
Of course it is possible to think of nature in
conjunction with thought about: the fact that
nature is thought about.
In such a case I shall
say that we are thinking ’heterogeneously' about
nature. ^-^5
Nature will be defined as that externally located region
directly perceived through the external bodily senses of
individuals.
comprise,

The percepta derived from this region would

during any given experiential event,

■^■''V/hitehead,
10hbid. , p.

Concept of. . . ,
3.

op.

cit. , p.

3*

one class of
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percepta involved in actualizing the
phenomenon of conscious thought.

(at least) dipolar

These percepta could also

be regarded as stimulus-object EFFECTS (although this is a
concept which is more inclusive than merely encompassing
natural percepta),

and certainly as event-components.

external sense perception,

as Whitehead has clearly indicated,

we are aware of something that is NOT thought.
say,

Iii

This is to

that if we carefully scrutinize our natural perceptual

deliverances it is easily understood that human minds do
not ”think into being” the phenomena of trees,
sounds,

other human beings,

passing one another,
Rather,

rocks,

sounds growing louder,

cars

felt increases in temperature,

etc.

all possible natural stimulus-object effects are

UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS to mind;

hence they are LOGICALLY

distinct from denotative and connotative event-components.
But strictly speaking,

this mode of characterization is

suitable primarily for discursive purposes

(as stated

Chapter One) because it clearly portrays the
notion.

The concrete fact is that natural

in

* contribution'

stimulus-object

effects CANNOT be EXPERTENTIALLY separated from those
percepta NECESSARILY CONCOMITANT with them for this would
violate the dipolar definition of mind

(while also,

course, being discordant with direct experience).

of
Although

it is possible for an individual to perceive a red object,
for example,

and not CLEARLY consciously (DENOTATIVELY)

conceive the object as being

’RED',

the person cannot

divorce himself from the fact that there IS a vague
(CONNOTATIVE) perception that COULD be characterized as

’RED’
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IF he intended to clearly
ness.

(symbolically) define the aware¬

The point to be made is that to be consciously aware

at all necessarily means that vague
or even more minimally,
efficacious,

symbolic connotation,

emotional feeling,

is causally

for to be conscious or minimally aware at all

logically demands the efficacity of these vague symbolic
or presymbolic domains.

In fact in mature intelligence it

is perhaps impossible to experientially divorce vague
symbolic connotation from emotional feeling.

This point

will become more clear as we proceed.
A distinction to be clearly made in the present
discussion is that natural stimulus-object effects ARE
event-components,

and therefore,

are elements of mind.

The exact meaning of a stimulus-object EFFECT can be defined
as the WAY that the natural world AFFECTS us as perception;
it is HOW the natural world

(and of course,

this distinction

applies also to the internal bodily organism functioning
also as a stimulu.s-object),

functioning as a stimulus-object

capable of yielding perceptual EFFECTS,

PARTICIPATES or

INGRESSES into our individual consciousness.
components of consciousness itself.

This leads us to the

equally as important fact that ~~ first,
of mind,

and then,

Effects are

the natural world ~~

speaking in terms
stimulus-object

EFFECTS ('contribution*) have as their TERMINI,
objects,

stimulus-

TERMINI are the entities that comprise the

natural world.

They exist independently from mind.

minds can know stimulus-objects only as they DIRECTLY
appear,

hence participate,

within consciousness.

We

Thus
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reiterate, rnind

can only know stimulus-objects through

their EFFECTS.

Thus the concept of stimulus-object as a

thing-in-itself is,

in all cases except those regarding

individual human beings,
a * relativity’

a LOGICAL POSTULATION facilitating

spatio-temporal view of things.

LOGICALLY speaking,

Hence,

it is possible to say that we may

participate in the purely subjective being of a rock,
example

(if we were to crack the rock,

striking it),

just as a rock is capable

let us say,

for

by

(as a stimulus-

object effect) of participating in our being as an eventcomponent

(or even,

in an 'unconscious’ way, using the

example of a child who has swallowed a substance EVENTUALLY
having a disruptive effect on certain physio-chemical
processes,

although provoking no immediate subjectively

ascertainable ill effects at the outset of the assimila¬
tion).

The possibility of this reciprocal ingression of

stimulus-object effects among stimulus-objects does not
sound nearly as absurd when the stimulus-objects are
exclusively human beings engaged in complex discussion,
for example!

Thus the only thing-in-itself that any

individual human being can experientially know — one that
is remarkably sophisticated,

having

(logically speaking)

vastly superior subjective experience than that of lower
ordered organisms --is one's own conscious states;

emergent

phenomena made possible through the complex structure of
one's physical organism.

We may conclude,

then,

by saying

that the nature of stimulus-objects cannot be intellectually
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conceived beyond the way in which they AFFECT us,

for any

further understanding would demand that we somehow BECOME
those stimulus-objects,
conclusion.

However,

therefore,

leading us to an absurd

this is no source for perplexity

because stimulus-object effects reveal a great deal about
the nature of stimulus-objects;
as entities,

namely,

their occurrence

having properties and internal and external

relations with other entities.

More will be said about the

perceptual process of perceptually apprehending external
and internally located stimulus-objects in'a forthcoming
section entitled,

"Stimulus-Objects and

Their Effects",

for although a brief introduction to this topic has been
presented,
issue,

there are many additional ramifications to this

thereby warranting a more precise analysis of the

basic notion.
We have briefly analyzed the way in which mind stands
in relation to nature in the act of perception.
of mind's (as a unified entity)
ideational states

(i.e.,

The problem

relation to its own (purely)

event-components)

has been post¬

poned for a short time in order that necessary preparational
measures be taken to introduce the matter with minimal
confusion.
defined;

Previously,

the concept of experience had been

at that time the term

'event* was introduced

provide the more exact notion of UNITS of experience.
as it has been repeatedly suggested,

to
Next,

it will be seen that

UNITS of experience can be further analyzed into elements
defined as EVENT-COMPONENTS.

It was said that the concept of

’ event’ was possible

for it coincided with all conceivable concrete acts oi
experience.

human

This means that by reflecting upon how we

conceptualize any given matter of concern it can be seen
that we think in atomic units or complete thoughts,
structure of linguistic expression demonstrates this fact
in that thoughts are expressed in COMPLETE sentences;
although this need not always be the case,

for occasionally

a mere spoken or silently thought word has the same effect
upon us as an entire sentence.

For example,

utterance

can yield an atomic unit o±

’freedom’,

as stated,

the single

meaning whose implications can extend from a clear
(denotative), liters,!

symbolic meaning to the depths

compelling subjective emotional feeling;

01

our

all this occurs in

the single unitary moment required to express or silently
entertain the concept.
illustration,

Thus the stubborn fact of this

as well as that of

sentence structure,

is

merely to recognize the inextricable ATOMICITY of EVENTS.
All the indefinitely subtle elements of these two types of
occasions

(i.e.,

complex sentences,

or single words)

ontallogically occur as a novel complex of ideational
factors whose spontaneous mode of meaningful emergence is
ACTUALIZED as FACT when the phenomenon occurs as it does,
hence gaining particularity.

Also,

all possible perceptual

elements involved in each event must necessarily be
classifiable into the

(at least) dipolar equation of

’percepta concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon
other percepta’.

Thus the elements participating in these
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t,,0 events are technically defined as event-components.
But,

over and above this is the extremely important fact

that the event-components are intrinsically bound to their
unique mode of appearance during the original, unitary
event.

This,

as we have said,

is the only type of phenomenal

occurrence that could be conceived as "pure" FACT of
nature,

for in the truest sense,

(or is)

the case'.

it WAS 'that which was

The EVENT of an individual expressing

and hence experiencing the full implication of the utterance
'freedom;

IS the FACT for "THAT" individual throughout

“THAT*5 TEMPORAL DURATION and LOCATION of occurrence.
However,

from what has previously been said about the

nature of fact,
and perceptual

it was concluded that the sheer complexity
subtlety of any type of factual occasion is

far broader than mind's capacity to symbolically grasp the
comprehensive experiential moment.

The problem is further

compounded by the transitory character of nature, i.e., the
present moment is "perceptually perishing", never to be
retrieved in its original particularity.

Even in the act of

REFLECTING upon the immediately preceding moment when
having thought the concept

'freedom'

(thus endeavoring to

symbolically explicate some of its connotatively embodied
meaning),

the conditions have been met for defining two

cognitive acts (viz.,

thinking and then reflecting upon

past thinking) as separate successive events.

irus is

necessarily the case for the original atomicity of the
'

antecedent occasion had been destroyed by the subsequent
ideational act of critically reflecting upon the immediately
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preceding concept of
ramifications.

* freedom’

with its numerous MEANINGFUL

Therefore the notion'of event-components is

a theoretical device for facilitating analyses of atomic
units of experience termed

’events’.

The point to be made

is that it is logically impossible to directly experience
an event-component in its particularity,

for what we experi¬

ence are EVENTS; unities comprised of event-components.
Thus event-components are entities isolated through the
usage of analytical reflection.
To illustrate the extensive implications of the concept
'event-component', let us consider the
the white .bird flying’.

simple event.,

’i

see

In this example we begin with the

dipolar discrimination of an ’I*

or a particular mind at a

particular time and place directly perceiving or ’’standing
over against” a particular configuration of natural
stimulus-object effects ingressing into consciousness and
corresponding to a particular natural-world stimulus-object.
Next,

there is the denotative symbolic characterization

'I see the white bird flying’,

considered in its barren

literal form or contemplated as logically distinct from its
connotative symbolic elements or event-components.

Here the

notion of denotative barrenness must be understood.
Considered in itself as,
sound /that is,

for example,

a mere natural world

the bare uttered or thought concept stripped

of its connotative meaning.

It should be noted,

however,

that it is IMPOSSIBLE for a mature intelligence to ENTIRELY
divorce connotative meaning from its denotative element

during a subjective psycho3.og.ical experiential act, for the
human mind reflexively attributes an inferential

(connota-

tive) meaning to every perception achieving the status as a
denotative thought-component.

This assertion can be

affirmed, apart from considering the accuracy inaccuracy of
conceptualized inferences.

For example, a strange sound

may enter our consciousness unexpectedly.

Although we may

not clearly (denotatively) symbolize the phenomenon as a
’bell ringing* or ’branches cracking’, two things can be
said:
1) the perception of a sound is apprehended by
a consciousness as an event-component
2) an individual’s connotative symbolic resources
are spontaneously (non-intentionally) scanned
to yield an appropriate denotative symbolic
characterization of the sound (also eventcomponents )
From this,

SOME minimal

(at least) connotative subjective

psychological meaning comes constructively to bear upon the
distinguishable perception of a sound.

We may conclude,

then, by saying that EX PE RIENTIALLY speaking,

it is

impossible for a mind to entertain bare denotative meaning^
in a similar sense as, for example,

the HEARD articulation

of an unfamiliar foreign language or nonsense syllables,
the constitutive symbolic elements of a denotative assertion
ARE event-components,

Further,

the extent to which the

denotative expression SIMPLIFIES the ACTUAL natural world
perceptual deliverances of the original event is extra¬
ordinary.

It has been said that ’contributed* perceptions

are known in their FORM as entities, properties of entities,
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relations among properties of entities, and relations among
proximate entities as they are directly perceptually
apprehended.

The following analysis of the perceived

phenomenon — now placing emphasis upon the * contributed'
element -- will give us some idea of the extent to which the
verbalization *1 see the white bird flying1 actually
SIMPLIFIES the perceived occasion.

Let us preface the

PARTIAL analysis by saying that the notion of an ENTITY
refers to ANYTHING

object, property,

comprehended as a PHENOMENAL UNITY.

relation — that is

This is to say that the

V

“something”

(the entity) is perceived with sufficient

clarity and distinctness that it is, at least, minimally
understood to be a. “something” amid a consciously apprehendable CONTRASTING background of perceptual “otherness”.
The incomplete analysis of the perceptual * CONTRIBUTION1 is
as follows:
1)

2)

possible perceivable entities:

a)

the white form as distinct from a blue
(sky) background

b)

the blue background streaked with
(relatively) stable brownish-black lines
(tree limbs, for example)

c)

innumerab1e shapes of objects

d)

brownish-black lines distinct from a
blue background

e)

etc.

possible perceivable properties of entities:
a)

whiteness

b)

blueness

3)

4)

c)

browni si:i-blackne

d)

texture of bird

e)

texture of trees

f)

texture of sky

g)

etc.

possible perceivable relations among properties
of entities?
a)

wings move in relation to body of bird

b)

head is smaller than body

c)

etc,

d)

branches tape'r in shape

e)

branches are thinner than trunk

f)

branches "fan out" and upward, in relation
to trunk

g)

etc.

possible perceivable relations among entities:
a)

bird moves in relation to trees and sky

b)

trees are permanent in relation to bird’s
flight

c)

sky is permanent in relation to bird's flight'

d)

sky and tree are both relatively permanent
in .relation to bird’s flight

e)

flapping wings moves bird into flight

f)

etc.

Without becoming tedious,
entities, properties,

this BRIEF listing of possible

and relations provides us with some

idea of the myriad implications of the contributed percep¬
tions in the phenomenon 'I see a white bird flying’,
considerable simplificational power of symbols.
are,

in effect,

event-components.

and th

All these

From this, it is not
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difficult to understand that' the elements of experiential
events can be far more numerous than mind’s capacity to
symbolically represent or fully comprehend them (although,
conversely, much data is neurologically stored without the
necessity of clear consciousness as a precondition).
So far, we have presented a cursory analysis of the
many possible event-components IMPLICITLY suggested in
denotative symbolic meaning and the

’contributed1 natural

\

world perception involved in the simple conscious phenomenon
'I see the white bird flying’.

We have yet to mention the

enormously, greater number of possible event-components that
are concomitantly IMPLICIT within such assertions, assuming
the form of connotative meaning.
has often been said,

Connotative meaning,

as it

fills-out the bare distinct percepta

of mental events with subjective psychological meaning as
connotative percepta synthetically come to bear upon
’contributed' and denotative symbolic perception.

One who

has understood this synthetic process will have comprehendedthe logical and psychological nature of subjective psycho¬
logical experience of mind.

A mere hint of this extra¬

ordinary human phenomenon is contained in the following
brief exposition of the statement

’I see a white bird

flying
1)

ALL the learned associations IMPLICIT within
the percipient’s self-concept (viz.,
vague as they are) as they are concentrated
in the moment of time needed by the percipient
to meaningfully utter the word ’I’ as the
initial word of the entire sentence.
ALL the learned associations IMPLICIT within
the percipient’s apprehension of the natural
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world phenomenon, ’see the white bird flying’.
This entails an active, operational under¬
standing of a language system such that
phenomenal components like those occurring in
our analysis of the perceptual contributions
of the natural world (above) can be nearly
automatically (symbolically) characterized,
and understood as subjective psychological
meaning.
Our analysis of the event,

'I see a white bird flying’,

has demonstrated the incredible number of possible eventcomponents that are either explicitly discernible

(e.g.,

the

denotative symbols used to articulate the perceptual
\

apprehension, and those contributed percepta that are clearly
consciously perceived) or implicitly present

(the vast

implicit symbolic domain necessary to fill-out the
denotative symbols with MEANING-A-S~DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬
NESS, and the large number of unciearly apprehended
contributed perceptions that are omitted by the simplified
denotative utterance) in ANY SINGLE MENTAL EVENT.
in full concordance with the concept of mind as

This is

’percepta

(denota;tive and connotative symbolic percepta) concomitantly
coming constructively to bear upon other percepta
(contributed natural world and internal organism!c percepta).
It has been repeatedly mentioned that ideational or
symbolic event-components are a product of high-grade
organic concrescence and transcendent concrescent synthesis.
In this process primordial emotional feeling is subsumed to
extensive DISCIPLINE,

tne net result being the development

of a highly complex, INTERRELATED symbolic system, each
symbol of -which possesses three peripheries of subjective
psychological meanings denotative meaning and connotative

323

meaning,

the latter of which is further subdivided into

vague symbolic meaning and vague emotional feeling.

Through

the acquisition of symbolic behavioral capacities the human
organism is able to characterize innumerable entities,
properties and relations contributed from natural and
internal bodily environmental states throughout time.

But

this is to say far more — specifically, now with respect
to INTERNAL bodily perceptual contributions — than,
perhaps, the original statement literally implies because
we have seen that the human organism can TRANSCEND mere
organic bodily and higher-grade emotional feelings,

for the

acquisition of symbolic capacities necessarily implies that
(as Cassirer has said) a new PIMEN SION of reality is
achieved.

This third dimension of reality is a NOVEL

CAUSAL DOMAIN (a point that will be developed in greater
detail, later) having been defined as subjective psycho¬
logical awareness,

consciousness or experience.

In this

uniquely human domain, because of symbolic acquisition,
conscious experience can attain denotative clarity, and
therefore,

cognitive precision.

The ba.sis for these

capacities is grounded in the fact that the human organism’s
STRUCTURE is such that it can experience perceptions, and
moreover,

ones that are IMPORTANT (whether in che primitive

sense of mere CONTRAST — e.g.,

the glitter of a trinket —

or in the most souhisticated form, of asthetic understanding),
thereby submitting them to symbolically meaningful simpli¬
fication (and frequently,

oversimplification),

but
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immediately we must 'remember in conjunction with this view
that simplification refers primarily to the denotative
element of symbolic characterization while the simplified
element is concomitantly constructively infused and thereby
extraordinarily enhanced by the WISDOM of the past occurring
as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.
this reason that

It is precisely for

'simplification1 must not be confused with

the notion 'oversimplification1.

The latter,

in a sense,

refers to what Whitehead has defined as 'misplaced concrete¬
ness' where, in fact, a very high abstraction is erroneously
regarded as a concrete fact of experience when it is ideationally utilized in characterizational and constructive
thinking.

Therefore,

the point to be made is that the

"third dimension" of reality, disclosed as a class of eventcomponents occurring in conjunction with contributed
natural or organic bodily perceptions, or as it can also
assume the mode of contributed percepta (stimulus-object
EFFECTS resulting from previously formulated ideas which
acquire the status of stimulus-objects merely because they
are PAST OCCUESNTS) concomitantly "standing over against"
other symbolic percepta,

is a truly unique realm — distinct

from natural world stimulus-object effects and those
resulting from organic bodily states — in that conscious
awareness and reflective consciousness, with their intrinsic
symbolic nature, are now CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS BEHAVI0RAL
DETERMINANTS over and above brute materialism or reflexive
(epiphenomenalistic) mechanism.

Identity theory bears out
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this conclusion in that statements representative of the two
latter theoretical positions CANNOT DERIVE, ANALYTICALLY,
statements designating the subjective psychological realm.
In fact,

statements of the subjective psychological domain

must be PRESUPPOSED A PRIORI in order that discourse in the
other two (or ANY meaningful) realms may ensue AT ALL!

The

reasons for this were elucidated in “Chapter One”.
If event-r-components are perceived I NT RIN SI C ALL Y as
entities, properties and relations contributed from the
natural world and internal organic bodily stimulus-object
effects (that ingress into mental events and are subsequently
symbolized, or unsymbolized in the sense that a person may
experience the event-component

’red1 without denotatively

defining It as such), and if event-components may also
include the entities,

properties and relations of idea¬

tional (symbolic) feeling — occurring as contributed
components f rom MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS
(a concept that is in need of further elaboration)

it

can be seen that we have a theoretical framework capable
of yielding an EXHAUSTIVE account OF ALL POSSIBLE COMBINA¬
TIONS OF PERCEPTA /occurring in (at least) dipolar organi¬
zations/ that are capable of CONSTITUTIMG ALL POSSIBLE
i

MENTAL EVENTSI ' Further,

the equally important conclusion

follows that because of the definitional meaning of each
category of percepta capable of being (at least) dipolarly
actualized as a mental event /viz.,

external bodily percep¬

tion, organic bodily feeling, and ideational
feeling/,

(symbolic)

conditions -- ones that can be DIRECTLY ASCER-
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TAINED AS COMPONENTS OP CONCRETE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EXPERIENCE — are such that mind can be seen to be an
incredibly complex, dynamic system of synthetically actu¬
alized percepta which,

in their perceptual unification

throughout temporal durations (viz., as mental events),
can SUBSUME THEMSELVES (within the context of complete
events) to PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE.

This is a phenomenon

which most of us intuitively understand

(although, perhaps

vaguely) as the creative or innovative povrer of mind.
Subjective psychological experience as a unique CAUSAL
dimension of reality (over and above a materialistic
mechanism,

for example) means that CONTEMPORANEOUSLY

occurring ideational event-components, as intrinsically
non-natural entities

(in the sense that they are not

directly perceivable via the external bodily senses)
SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTATIVE of natural and organic bodily
stimulus-object effects or percepta, in conjunction with
PREVIOUSLY synthesized pure symbolic ideational eventcomponents that ingress into contemporary occasions of
experience

stimulus-object effects,

TIONALLY utilized

can both be INTEN¬

(particularly at mature levels of human

development) for organizing and hence manipulating other
symbolized components of experience.

It is precisely

because of man’s capacity to symbolically comprehend some of
his experience, and to subsequently ELABORATE the CONTENT
and QUALITY of subjective psychological experience in a
way intrinsically transcending the mere perceptual deliver¬
ances of external and internal bodily and emotional modes
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such, that an extensive repertoire of ontalogically unique
(in the sense of being disciplined emotional feeling)
symbolic entities

(possessing unique properties and rela¬

tions) are constructed

that human thinking is rendered

possible: GIVEN ONLY THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF THE EVENTCOMPONENTS THAT CAN CONCEIVABLY CONSTITUTE MENTAL EVENTS.
It will be noted that the term ’ELABORATE4 was used advisedly
to indicate the TRANSCENDENT status of symbolic thinking,
for even at this more, sophisticated level of behavior, all
SYMBOLIC entities, properties and modes of synthetic rela¬
tion are ultimately derived from the essential way that
external bodily perception and internal bodily and emotional
feeling ingress as entities, properties and relations.
Thus human symbolic thinking can be described as the process
of imposing FORM (disciplined ideational organization) on
the MATTER (the CONTRIBUTED natural and internal organic
bodily event-components) of experience.

Stated more

abstractly, it is the process of event-components necessa¬
rily occurring as atomic unities of human experience, BY
THEIR INTRINSIC MATURE A.S SUCH, acquiring self discipline,
and to some extent,

self-direction throughout space-time.

In this process a phenomenon gradually develops described
by Cassirer in the following way:
Man cannot escape from his own achievement.
He
cannot but adopt the conditions of his own life.
No longer in a mere physical universe, man lives
in a symbolic universe.
Language, myth, art,
and. religion are parts of the universe.
They are
the varied threads which weave the symbolic net,
the tangled web of human experience.
All human
progress in thought and experience refines upon
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and strengthens this net.
No longer can man
confront reality immediately; he cannot see it,
as it were, face to face.
Physical reality
seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic
activity advances.
Instead of dealing with the
things themselves man is in a sense constantly
conversing with himself.
He has so enveloped
himself in linguistic forms... that he cannot
see or know anything except by the interposi¬
tion of this artificial medium.^86
To say that every possible human event

(which is

necessarily private or mental in the sense that ONLY vie as
individuals can DIRECTLY experience the percepta that we in
fact DO experience.

This is merely another way of stating

the obvious fact that only *1* can be the subject of ’my1
particular experience, thus demanding the conclusion that
EVERYTHING which vie recognize as ’life’,

’reality*,

etc.,

NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSES INDIVIDUAL STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
This is not to say, obviously,

that the real world which

exists independently of each of us is CONTINGENT on our
particular consciousness for ITS existence.)

is an atomic,

inextricably unified element in the dynamic experience oi
a particular individual at a particular place throughout a
particular temporal duration, and further,

that each of

these particular events can be (PARTIALLY)

REFLECTIVELY

(through logical analysis, for vie cannot directly experi>

ence ISOLATED event-COMPONENTS;

rather, only atomic events)

analyzed into event-components, is to express a fact o^
concrete experience easily overlooked and ox ten mi sunnerstood.

Even a partial summary of the manifold implications

10 'Cassirer,

An Essay....

*

5

op.

cit., p.

25.

of this statement would entail reiterating everything that
has been propounded in this discourse.

Therefore,

let us

ulcace primary emphasis upon the most important EXPERIENTIAL
aspect of this assertion.

The writer maintains that what

each of us directly experiences throughout every particular
conscious atomic (in the sense that our CLEARLY determined
experiences, acquiring symbolic precision because of the
human organism’s capacity to SIMPLIFY IMPORTANT portions of
events, are clarified as ATOMIC IDEATIONAL UNITS,
see the table’,

’The fire is burning brilliantly*,

moment of experience

e.g.,

*1

etc.)

(only a PORTION of which is suoject to

symbolic specification) can be THEORETICALLY analyzed into
EVENT-COMPONENTS.

Of course this theoretical advance is

NOT concretely suggested in direct experience.

A consider¬

able reflective effort is required to formulate constructs
from a backlogue of concrete perceptual deliverance.

Ihus

the notion of ’event—component’ arises only from a hignly
abstract conception of human experience.

It demands a

deliberate, prolonged reflective effort to theoretically
contemplate our concrete experiential moments as synthesized
from a comparatively small number of CATEGORICALLY DIS„.li\Ci
ELEMENTS perceptually appearing and reappearing in both
diverse and similar ontalogical FORMS.

This is to say, on

one hand, that the particular' shade of green observed m a
leaf (an entity possessing a determinate, distincoi've
can reappear in a. green dress

ioj

)

(an entity possessing a form

and properties differing from those of a leaf), for example,
during another event.

But on the other hand,

continuity ana
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coherence in ideational processes are,
rendered possible by the temporal
perception of particular entities.

in great part,

endurance or reoccurring
For example,

this is

merely to say that the green leaf observed by an individual
on two successive days was the SAKE leaf in both occasions.
Here we are bordering on difficult metaphysical issues that
must be avoided for the purposes of this discourse.

Our

emphasis rests squarely upon formulating a subjective
psychological theoretical comprehension of directly experi¬
enced mental events.

The point being made is, it is

conceivably theoretically fruitful to comprehend every
possible experiential event as comprised of basic Pj^RCEPiUAL
ELEMENTS (event-components) which occur and reoccur through¬
out space and time in both similar and different coniigura¬
tional modes.

Let us use as an illustration a moment of

the writer1s experience, loosely defined as a single event
in a therapeutic interaction between a client and the writer.
The more conspicuous event-components througnouu ^ne
particular temporal duration were rougnly the following*
the vague awarenss of books on shelves, manifesting a
multitude of diverse shapes and colors; the vague awareness
of the room as an enclosure;

the vague awareness of furniture

in the room with the many characteristic properties of each ^
piece; the more clear awareness of the overt physical nature
of the client sitting before the writer; a rather clear
awareness of the exchanged verbalizations and their meanings,
in addition to other closely associated benc'.viors sucn -c,s
the client's head occasionally turning from side to side,

the only occasionally achieved

eye contact,

etc.;

a rather

clear apprehension of dynamic patterns of emotional and
ideational

states directly accessible to the writer as the
✓

client-counselor interaction transpired,
feeling of dislike for the client,

e.g. , periodic

feelings of anger,

moments of reflective analysis of certain key phrases
articulated by the client,

moments of reflective analysis

on why the writer had occasionally reacted angrily to
certain client responses,

determined analytically reflective

efforts made by the writer to clearly and concisely express
certain concrete phenomenal occurrences manifested within
the emerging therapeutic interaction,

etc.

These conscious

recollections of a moment in the writer's experience during
a therapeutic event constitute only a very small numoei
the myriad factual details, of that occa.sion,

ox

me illuona¬

tion readily demonstrates the profound complexity of human
experience and the limited success oi

linguistic exposition

in attempting to recapture the inextricable unity

oj.

a

directly experienced event.
Yet even when confronted with the fact that language
has obvious limitations in its usage .as an instrument foi
symbolically portraying elements of previous human experi¬
ence in their original complexity a;nd animation,

it is

possible to present a schematization of ALL the possible
CATEGORIES of perceptual event-components capable of
ingressing,

in principle,

into ANY individual's experiential

. events during ANY particular occasion.

Such an exposition

would be of great value to a subjective psychology f°-
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analyzing both the PERCEPTUAL CONTENTS and MODES 0? IDEA¬
TIONAL SYNTHESIS typically implemented by individuals in
problem solving.

The scientific importance of this cate¬

gorical analysis may not be readily apparent at this point
for its significance must actually be pondered in light of ,
additional constructs to be subsequently developed in order
to appreciate some of the law-like relations demonstrated in
DYNAMIC subjective psychological experience.

Of course this

enquiry must be governed by the constructs presently Lein^
developed for defining the LOGICAL FORm of-mind.

Therefore

each experiential event, logically manifesting with A PRIORI
necessity the essential dipolar FORM of natural or internal
bodily perceptual CONTRIBUTIONS as they are concomitantly
(and synthetically) actualized with SYMBOLIC percepta, must
necessarily be comprised, during any given event, of at
least some of the following THREE CATEGORIES OF EVENTCOMPONENTS OUT OP WHICH ALL POSSIBLE SUBJECTIVE. PSYCHO¬
LOGICAL EVENTS MUST BE CONSTITUTED:
I.

EXTERNAL BODILY PERCEPTIONS:
ftAjqfco. <jo•***-•+■*

1)

- r^r» **•-

*

VISION
a)

ENTITIES
1) SPATIAL PARTICULARITY
2) FORM DEFINING BOUNDARY OF COLORS

b)

PROPERTIES
1 ) PARTICULAR COLORS THEMSELVES

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG FORMS
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OP"PROPERTIES
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a)

ENTITIES
1) SPATIAL PARTICULARITY

b)

PROPERTIES
1) PARTICULAR ODORS THEMSELVES

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG ODORS
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OP PROPERTIES

3) SOUND
a)

ENTITIES
1)

b)

SPATIAL PARTICULARITY

PROPERTIES
1) PARTICULAR SOUNDS THEMSELVES

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMO]NC- SOUNDS
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OF QUALITY OF
PROPERTIES

TASr]
a)

ENTITIES
1) TACTUALLY FELT PARTICULARITY

b)

PROPERTIES
1) PARTICULAR . TASTE S THEHSELVES

c)

RELATIONS

\

1) CHANGE AMONG TASTES
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY OR QUALITY OF
PROPERTIES
TOUGH
a)

ENTITIES
1) TACTUALLY PELT PARTICULARITY
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2) FORM DEFINING BOUNDARY OF ENTITY
b)

PROPERTIES
1 ) THE PARTICULARITY OF PERCEPTION,
E.G., HOT, COLD, WARM, COARSE,
SMOOTH, ETC.

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES
?)

II.

CHANGE IN STATE OF PROPERTIES,
E.G., SOLIDITY, FLEXIBILITY,
HOT-TO-COLD, ETC.

0 BO AMIC BODILY FEELING PERCEPTIONg
a)

ENTITIES
1) ORGANICALLY FELT PARTICULARITY

b)

PROPERTIES
1) PARTICULAR INTERNAL FEELINGS THEMSELVES

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY
’
OF PROPERTIES

III.

IDEATIONAL FEELING PERCEPTIONS
1)

EMOTION (VAGUE, UNSYMBOLIZED IDEATIONAL
FEELING)
a)

ENTITIES
l) EMOTIONALLY FELT.PARTICULARITY

b)

PROPERTIES
1) PARTICULAR DISTINCTIVE AND/OR
QUALITATIVELY UNIQUE EMOTIONS THEMSELVES
2) VERY VAGUE, CONSCIOUSLY FELT QUALITY

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES OR ENTITIES
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY OF
PROPERTIES

2)

CONHOTATIVE SYMBOLIC IDEATIONAL FEELIKG

a)

ENTITIES
1) THE PARTICULAR VAGUS SYMBOLIC UNITY
THAT IS THOUGHT

b)

PROPERTIES
1 ) THE PARTICULAR CONFIGURATION OF
MEANING-AS-DIHECTLY-FELT- RELATEDNESS
2) VAGUELY CONSCIOUS EMOTIONALLY FELT
QUALITY

c)

RELATIONS
1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES
2) CHANGE IN INTENSITY AND QUALITY OF
PROPERTIES

3)

DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC IDEATIONAL FEELING
a) ENTITIES
1) THE PARTICULAR (USUALLY LINGUISTIC)
SYMBOL THAT IS THOUGHT
b)

PROPERTIES
1) THE PARTICULAR CLEARLY CONSCIOUS
SYMBOL ITSELF, (LOGICALLY) DISTINCT
FROM THE CONNOTATIVE SYMBOLIC ELEMENTS
2) PURE SUBLIMATED FEELING

c)

RELATIONS
.

1) CHANGE AMONG PROPERTIES

The above schernatization of the possible CATEGORIES
(hereafter simply termed

'the Categories') Or rvTL:r-

COMPONENTS is intended to be ansexhaustive exposition in
that ALL POSSIBLE ELEMENTS of subjective psychological
experience con be comprehended within these categories.
However,

the specific subcategories contained under

’entities',

'properties',

and 'relations’ do appear to oe

JjO

susceptible to alternate modes of classification,
without question,

and

the Categories are capable of further

subclassification.

The Categories are,

in effect,

an

exposition of the possible types of "matter" that may
receive "form” through subjective psychological experiential
actualizations.
In our discussion of theoretically comprehending the
M.SSAL FORM of human experience,

there is one final step to

be considered that will complete our formulation (at least
ior the present) of this concept.

Thus far, beginning with

a definition of the most inclusive term * experience*,

there

has Deen a determined effort to progressively introduce
constructs that demonstrate the UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE of
experience in ALL its possible modes of concrete occurrences.
Hence the notions of

fevent*,

the Categories* were defined.

9

event-component *,

and finally,

Here the basic principle

upon wnicn our enquiries have been' based is that if an
adequate concept of mind is to be developed,

it appears

absolutely essential that THAT out of which mind is
■'SUBSTANTIVELY" comprised must be clearly elucidated.

For

it is unsaim si actory to contemplate mind as merely a
behavioral PROCmDS" capable of exhaustive comprehension
solely through its MANIFEST effects.
opeatecily argued,

As it has been

this is to deny FACTUAL phenomena known

to us trough direct acquaintance as ideational states.
Since consciousness and reflective consciousness ARE idea¬
tional stated in ^.FOCESS, NECESSARILY having BOTH objective
ond subjective psychological factual manifestations,

it is a

serious error to maintain that the nature of mind is entirely
ascertainable by only an objective psychology or vice versa.
Therefore,

a satisfactory concept of mind must not only

portray mind as PROCESS, but in addition,
to define THAT (viz.,

it is imperative

ideational feeling with its global

behavioral manifestations),

subjective psychologically

speaking, which is in process,

as well.

Particularly in

this chapter, an attempt is being cade to precisely define
the FORM of that which is in process, and later proceed to
partially demonstrate the RELATION of the UNIVERSAL LOGICAL
FORM as it is contrasted with the concrete PROCESS of mind.
This two-fold analysis will yield a basic subjective PSYCHO¬
LOGICAL conceptualization of human experience from which
experimental enquiries may ensue.

At this poinc, howevex,

now that the elements of THAT which is process have been
designated,

constructs must be developed showing the precise

relation shin AMONG mental events collectively comprising, tne
process of mind.

The constructs that can fulfill this

requirement are those of SPAGE and ljl~Mn, u3.icized to deiin^
the theoretical limits of concrete experiential events both
as instantaneous spatia.1 apprehensions ana during temporal
evolvemeniu
Our views with regard to the concepts

01

space and time

will be essentially those formerly articulated with great
clarity and precision by Alfred North VJhitehead.

It

is

impossible to cite a single work of VJhitehead's that deals
exhaustively with his theory of these concepts.

Perhaps it

will not be too much to say that nearly all of hi., worms
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contain a somewhat unique approach to expressing his basic
thoughts on these problems.

The boobs from which we shall

liberally cite quotations would probably be the most suit¬
able ones for those who are unfamiliar with Whitehead s
worbs; particularly as they have relevance for the problem
of mind conceived within our theoretical framework.

A

further point to be made is that our consideration of
Whitehead’s conceptions of space and time will be meieli
introductory.

However,

for those whose primary interest in

the concept of mind, being proposed by the writer is
EXPERIMENTALLY grounded,

a more penetrating study of his

’space-time* is absolutely essential.
Whitehead maintains that there has been a prevailing
misconception in philosophy and science subtly responsible
for creating major theoretical problems in these disciplines
by predisposing mentalities lor an erroneous conc.p c..o..
the essential- nature of tpe material world,

the e-*°^

be expressed as follows:
Thus the origin of the doctrine of matter is the
outcome of uncritical acceptance oj SP-vl
time as external conditions for natural exie
By this I do not mean that any doubt snou~a be
thrown on facts of space and time as mgrecaen •*in nature.
What I do mean is ’the unconscious
presupposition of space and time as.bein^ W
within which nature is set’.
Tnis is exo,
sort of presupposition which tinges^thought _
any reaction against the subtlety 01nation
sop hi cal criticism,
hy theory oi
. ,/b
of the scientific doctrine of mat-cer is bhau
first philosophy illegitimately. uiwwl ^ A‘‘~ en|/a;QV
bare entity /here the term ^enoi^y
p ""
. V .
the same meaning that we had ascnbeu
our former discussions on 1 event—comp i '
*
which is simply an abstraction neu^oO-^
method of thought, into the me tap .ysiHr -
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substratum of these factors in nature which in
various sense's are assigned to entities as their
attributes; and that, as a second step, scientists
(including philosophers who were scientists) in
conscious or unconscious ignoration of philosophy
presupposed this substratum, QUA substratum for
attributes, as nevertheless in time and, space.
This is surely a muddle.
The whole being of
substance is as a substratum for attributes.
Thus time and space should be attributes of the
substance.
This they palpably are not, if the
matter be the substance of nature, since it is
impossible to express spatio-temporal truths
without having recourse to relations involving
relata other than bits of matter.
I waive this
point however, and come to another.
It is not
the substance which is in space, but the
attributes.
What we find in space are the red
of- the rose and the smell . oi the .•jasmine and
the noise of cannon.
We have all told our
dentist where our toothache is.
Thus.space is
not a relation between substances, but between
attributes.
Thus even if you admit that the adherents
of substance can be allowed to conceive substance
as matter, it is a fraud to slip substance into
space on the plea that space expresses relations
between substances.
On the face of it space has
nothing to do with substances, but only with
their attributes.
What I mean is, that if you
choose ~~ as I think wrongly
to construe our
experience of nature as an awareness of the
attributes of substances, we are by this theory
precluded from finding any analogous direct
relations between substances as disclosed in our
experience.
What we do find are relations
between the attributes of substances.
Thus if
matter is looked on as substance in space, the
space in which it. finds itself has very little
to do with the s23a.ce of our experience. - ^ ;
-t is clearly evident from the above quotation that the
'substratum15 view of the material, world generates certain
lighly problematic issues;

one of them embodying a. concept-

>f space that is seriously discordant with our concrete
experiential perceptions of the natural world j. or it ovei-

107
‘

VJhitehead,

Concept of ,

, op*_ cit., pp.

20-21.
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looks the fact that our perceptions are actually of the
natural world appearing to us as attributes
of and relations among entities.

(or properties)

Also the "substratum"

theory deemphasizes the SEPARATIVE, PREHENSIVE and MODAL
characters of space-time:
Things are separated by space, and are separated
by time: but they are also together in space,
and together in time, even if they be not
contemporaneous,
I will call these characters
the SEPARATIVE and the PREHENSIVE characters of
space-time.
There is yet a third character of
space-time.
Everything which is in space
receives a definite limitation of some sort,
so that in a sense it has just that shape which
it does have and no other, also in the same
sense, it is just in this place and no other.
Analogously for time, a thing endures during a
certain period, and through no other period.
I will call this the MODAL character of spacetime.
It is evident that the modal character
taken by itself gives rise to the idea of simple
location.
But it must be conjoined with the
separative and prehensive characters.100
But we are advancing a bit too rapidly in introducing
the concept of time without yet having considered an
EXTREMELY IMPORTNAT ERROR that has traditionally been made
in philosophy and science with respect to the concept

oi

time; an error that has EXTRAORDINARY IMPLICATIONS for
conceiving,

theoretically,

subjective psychological experi¬

ence, and a science thereof.

Whitehead clearly and concisely

delineates this error in the following way:
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accepted
as their natural philosophy a certain circle of
concepts which were as rigid and definite as
those of the philosophy of the middle ages, ana
were accepted with as little critical researon.

10^Alfred. North Whitehead,

(New York: Macmillan, 1925)*

Science and the Modem World

I will call this natural philosophy ’materialism*.
Not only were men of science materialists, but
also adherents of all schools of philosophy.
The
idealists only differed from the philosophic
materialists on the question of the alignment of
nature in reference to mind.
But no one had any
doubt that the philosophy of nature considered
in itself was of the type which I have called
materialism....
It can be summarized as the
belief that nature is an aggregate of material
and that this material exists in some sense AT
each successive member of a one-dimensional series
of extensionless instants of .time.
Furthermore
the mutual relations of the material entities at
each instant formed these entities into a spatial
configuration in an unbounded space.
It would seem
that space ~~ on this theory ~~ would be as
instantaneous as the instants, and that some
explanation is required of the relations between
the successive instantaneousr spaces.
The
materialistic theory is however silent on this
pointy and the succession of instantaneous spaces
is tacitly combined into one persistent space.
This theory is a purely intellectual rendering of
experience which has had the luck to get itself
formulated at the dawn of scientific thought.
It has dominated the language and the imagination
of science since science flourished in Alexandria.,
with the result that it is now hardly possible to
speak without appearing to assume its immediate
obviousness.
But when it is distinctly formulated, in the
abstract terms in which I have .lust stated it,
the theory is very far from obvious.
The passing
complex of factors which compose the fact which
is the terminus of sense awareness /what we have
defined as ‘ stimulus-object’, hence yielding
•stimulus-object EFFECTS’
a term roughly to be
equated with Whitehead’s term, ‘sense awareness* -~
contributed as perceptions participating as eventcomponents in our conscious events/ places before
us nothing corresponding to the trinity of this
natural materialism.
This trinity is composed
(i) of the temporal series of;extensionless
instants, (:ii) of the aggregate of material
entities, and (iii) of space which is the outcome
of relations of matter.
There is a wise gap between these presuppositions
of the intellectual theory of materialism and the
immediate deliverances of sense awareness.
I do not
question that this materialistic trinity embodies
important characters of nature.
But it is necessary
to express these characters in terms of the facts
of experience.., we have now come up against the

question, Is there only one temporal series?
The
uniqueness of the temporal series is presupposed
in the materialistic philosophy of nature.
But
that philosophy is merely a theory, like Aristotlean
scientific theories so firmly Believed in the
Middle Ages.
If... I have in any way succeeded in
getting behind, the theory to the immediate facts,
the answer is not nearly so certain....
On the
materialistic theory the instantaneous present is
the only field for the creative activity of nature.
The past is gone and the future is not yet.
Thus
(on this theory) the immediacy of perception is of
an instantaneous present, and the unique present
is the outcome of the past and the promise of the
future.
But we deny this immediately given
instantaneous present.
There is no such thing to
be found in nature.
As an ultimate fact it is a
nonentity.
What is immediate for sense awareness
is a duration.
Now a duration has within itself
a past and a future; and the temporal breadths
of the immediate durations of sense awareness
are very indeterminate and. dependent on the
individual percipient.
Accordingly there is no
unique factor in nature which for every percipient
is preeminently and necessarily the present.
The passage of nature leaves nothing between the
past and future.
What we perceive as present is
the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipa¬
tion.
This vividness lights up the discriminated
field within a duration.
But no assurance can
thereby be given that the happenings of nature
cannot be assorted into other durations of alter¬
native families.
We cannot- even know that the
series of immediate durations posited by the
sense-awareness of the one individual mind all
necessarily belong to the same family of durations.
There is not the slightest reason to believe that
this is so.
Indeed if my theory of nature be
correct, it will not be the case.
The materialistic theory has all the complete¬
ness of the thought of the Middle Ages, which had
s. complete answer to everything, be it in heaven
or in hell or in nature.
There is a trimness
about it, with its instantaneous present, its
vanished past, its non-existent future, and its
inert matter.
This trimness is very medieval and
ill accords with brute fact.
The theory which I am urging admits a greater
ultimate mystery and a deeper ignorance.
The past
and. future meet and mingle in the ill-defined
present.
The passage of nature which is only
another name for the creative force of existence
has no narrow ledge of definite instantaneous
present within which to operate.
Its operative

y 1 J

presence which is now urging nature forward must
■be sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest
past as well as in the narrowest breadth of any
present duration.
Perhaps also in the unrealized
future.
Perhaps also in the future which might be
as well as the actual future which will be.
It is
impossible to meditate on time and the mystery
of the creative passage of nature without an over¬
whelming emotion at the limitations of human
intelligence ,^9
The clarity and suggestability of this brilliant passage
speaks for itself; hence we shall only briefly reiterate
certain key concepts as they have particular relevance for
our enquiries into the nature of mind,
reference to the notion of time.

specifically with

First it should again be

stressed that PROCESS or the incessant change of things,
whether their perceptions come to us Trom internal or
external environments,
concrete experience.

is a primordial fact of direct
We had formerly explored some implica¬

tions of this fact in our discussions on symbolically
characterizing individual experiential phenomena and
problems inherent in this.endeavor due to the vast multi¬
dimensionality of even a moment of experience.
But the most important aspect, at least for our
purposes in this discourse,

of Whitehead* s criticism of the

' materialistic concept of time is the error

01,

fn-tj

contemplating phenomenal reality as occurring
and time”,

Wliliin space

instead of understanding the notiotio ox

• Pc-

time as intellectually abstracted, DERIVATIVE concepts
resulting from having reflectively pondered concrete

10 9 Whi t e he ad,

Concept of..,.,,

• » PP •

1

0"

1

'''

experience.

Here is an admirable illustration of ‘misplaced

concreteness*.

Next, following from the untenable

materialistic presupposition, and now specifically with
regard to the last quotation, it can be seen that if one
maintains the “within space and time" view, it is a merely
elementary mathematically predisposed inference to assume
that the one-dimensional time series intrinsic to the
materialistic theory can be subdivided into an infinite
number of mathematical points along the temporal continuum.
This is to say that it is possible to logically conceive of
an infinite number of cross-sectional slices of space
r

extending along a temporal axis, each representing an
INSTANTANEOUS, durationless moment of time at which the
entire universe at an instant can in principle be mathe¬
matically defined in terras of ultimate particles and rela¬
tions among particles.

A major portion of Whitehead’s

criticism of traditional concepts of time is devoted
precisely to this erroneous notion of instantaneous durations
of time as being an ultimate fact of nature, for at this
point, it is clear to the reader that no such (perceptual )
phenomenal occurrence is to be found in human experience;
rather, this concept is an idealized (abstract) postulation
that had uncritically been incorporated into scientific and
philosophies.! systems.

Curiously enough, if we recall our

analyses in the first and second chapters, the same criticism
appears to be somewhat appropriate to the Skinnerian notion
of reflex arc.

However, the relevance of the criticism is

not with reference to the instantization of- temporal

durations, but rather, a different though related considera¬
tion.

From the unwarranted concept of instantized time it

would be necessary,

if we were to validate this view in

factual experience,

to concretely experience an instan¬

taneous event,,
however,

But there i s no such experiential occasion;

adherence to this erroneous view has predisposed

many thinkers to devote insufficient attention to concrete
experiential deliverance,

hence the CONCRETE EVIDENTIAL

bases upon which factual and theoretical 'assertions have
been predicated..

This is to say that such assertions

issuing from ANY empirical

scientific enquiry must ultimately

be evidentially verified through some direct perceptual mode,
VJe need only recall the often tedious demand of 11 funda¬
mental! stic" Positivists,

"to present the data ,

to under¬

stand. the importance of this epistemological requirement if
knowledge claims are to be pla.ced upon firm foundations.
Thus the "data" to which Whitehead repeatedly refers are
those of direct concrete experience,
as ’ stubborn facts’.

or often what he terms

Since direct concrete experience

yields no data testifying to the occurrence of instantaneous
moments of time, what information about time is revealed in
direct experience when the problem is reflectively analyzed?
Our perceptions of ANY given occasion, perhaps most
primitively,
change.

informs us concomitantly of permanence amidst

This awareness does not require any epistemological

deliberation at this low intuitive level of understanding.
Therefore if change is perceived amid permanence,
sense for example,

in the

that a perceived chair seems to temporally
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endure as a natural object within a back-drop of changing
sounds,

bodily states,

arises.

etc.,

the notion of succession

At its highest levels of abstract formulation

this concept of succession may be that defined in various
formal scnences,

but one far more profound than the concrete

experiential recongition of time.

At unsophisticated levels

we merely understand that it “takes time” to construct a
house;

it

“takes time” to read a book;

THINK A THOUGHT*

it

“takes time”

TO

This is to say that it directly CONTRA¬

DICTS THE CONCRETE PACTS OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN EXPERIENCE in which conscious lives are lived,
and so on —

theories are verified,

TO CONCEIVE OP AM “INSTANTIZED" CONCEPT OP

TIME AS A BASIC FACT OP NATURE, FOR THE NOTION IS ENTIRELY
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE,
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT OCCUR IN INSTANTANEOUS
MOMENTS,

RATHER IT EVOLVES INTO ATOMIC ENTITIES THROUGHOUT

TEMPORAL DURATIONS.

TO CONCEPTUALIZE ANY PORTION OF A HUMAN

EVENT AS THEORETICALLY-INSTANTANEOUS IS TO SACRIFICE THE
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING INTRINSIC TO MENTAL EVENT,
FOR ACTUALIZING SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING REQUIRES
TIME.

The assertion

*1 see the brown tree5

requires TIME

to subjectively understand and hence articulate.

It is

precisely this "stubborn" fact which demands that a “mind
be conceived as
specifically,

standing over against percepta",

that

’percepta concomitantly come construc¬

tively to bear upon other percepta’..
no‘b presupposed

or more

If consciousness is

a priori in understanding any perceived

Phenomena then the basic notion of

’UNDERSTANDING' becomes

meaningless.

It is for this reason that the writer has

said that ALL events in principle available to human
comprehension roust necessarily be MENTAL EVENTS.
with respect to Behaviorism,

Similarly

although it is obviously

understood that TIME must elapse between a stimulus and a
response,

it becomes wholly untenable to regard a reflex

arc as an entirely satisfactory construct for adequately
explaining the intervening processes for it has been seen
that mind,

even minimally defined as awareness or conscious¬

ness and reflective consciousness,
presupposed A PRIORI

must necessarily be

in order to intelligibly discuss any

matter of concern at all.
respect to Behaviorims,

This amounts to

saying,

that inner ideational

with

states cannot

be regarded as causally inefficacious or epiphenomenalistic
for Behaviorism must logically presuppose A PRIOnI the inner
.states whose reference it must necessarily purge from its
enquiries in order to be consistent with i ts methodological
pronouncementsi
.Our critical remarks on the concept of time can be
briefly summarized as follows:

1)

The thought *1 see the brown tree*, for example,
requires TIME to be meaningfully actualized
for subjective psychological events have a
necessary intrinsic atomicity which can only be
realized in temporal durations.
The direct
testimony of concrete experience necessitates
that this view be held, for all thought or
subjective psychologically meaningful,
experience necessarily occurs in atomic units.
This is merely to accentuate the obvious iact
that we have such thoughts as * I see the brown
tree *, and not * I see*, * the brown *, ’see the*,
’brown tree*, etc.
Moreover, even a single
word "oossessing a, unified meaning j.or persons
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thinking or expressing it (thereby qualifying
as an event) requires time for its actualization ~ brief as the duration may be.
B
certainly there is no such event m direct
experience as an instantaneous event
hence such a notion is an abstract innovation
of reflective consciousness.
The notion of
instantaneity can be of great value to the
formal sciences, but must not be P**edicatec.
from a 1materialistic
viewpoint foi i
presupposes the erroneous "within space and
time"" implication.
In the behavioral science.,
materialism is the basis for an unwarranted
scientific reductionism when conscious
processes are considered logically (analytic¬
al] v) identical with correlative physiochemical process; epiphenomenalism is a
typical erroneous consequent.
Tn the case of Behavioristic theories,
proponents obviously maintain that time is
reciuired to establish stimulus-response
o
error here, however, is that Behavior!sts
denv the causal efficacity of inner men. al
states, hence regarding them as epiphenomena.
As it has been said on repeated occasions,
absurd conclusions are reached in maintaining
that all human thinking is entirely reilexive
to the extent of omitting cne causal efiic, „
of consciousness for it is con.trs,dicto_y
conceive of human behavior without presupposing
a priori, consciousness and consciou- ^
reflective behavior;.phenomena that -re ■
directly accessible to Behavionsts, wnilc
the other hand, phenomena which cannot be •
consistently regarded as causally ine
c cl
Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn_is thet
Behaviorisms cannot provide, in
human behavior because
a complete account of
This is to
narrownes;
of methodological
say .that personal reports testifying
mental and bodily stai.es canno
—',. .
as factual evidence.
Bui. contrary to
- • >
it has been shown in. 'Chapter wro
- _ personal testimonies can acquire a factu.
status IP ascertained under appropiiate_y
controlled experimental conditions
and
interpreted within a suitable theoretical
framework: one presently in the proceoo
being developed, termed a. subjective
- logical approach to studying human
•

2)

3)

Therefore to remain consistent with the concrete
facts of individual perceptual experience <

that domain-In which ALL epistemological certi¬
tude is ultimately grounded — it must be
conceded that the ultimate basis for ALL
intelligent thinking is in particular idea¬
tional events atomically evolving within
temporal durations; durations in which
components of subjective psychological
experience develop into complete conscious
thoughts.
What is immediate for sense awareness is
a duration.
Now a duration has within
itself a past and a future; and the
temporal breadths .of the immediate
durations of sense awareness are very
indeterminate and dependent on the
individual percipient.
Accordingly
there is no unique factor in nature
/or subjective psychological experience,
for that matter/ which for every percipient
is preeminently and necessarily the present
The passage of nature leaves nothing
between the past snct the future.
What we
do perceive as present is the vivid fringe
of "memory tinged with anticipation.
This
vividness lights up the discriminated field
within a duration.
But no assurance can
thereby be assorted into other durations of
alternative families.
We cannot even know
that the series of immediate durations
posited by the sense-awareness of one
individual mind all necessarily belong to
the same family of durations.
There is
not the slightest reason to believe that
this is so. no
It is from these ontalogically unique subjective
psychological occasions that a novel kind 01
causality is born unto the universe, for
unconscious materialistic mechanism has been
transcended.
Intelligent conscious thinking
does not causally result from the same
comparatively simplistic ba,sis an in the case,
for" examp1e, of a thermostat operating as a
function” of temperature variation; or an
organic function that must occur as it does
because of certain glandular secretions.
Bather, the essence of conscious causality is
in the phenomenon of denota.tive symbolic
^
meaning and its profound concomitant, Ht# AN ING¬
AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-BEL ATEDNESS, occurring in their
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interpenetrative relationship (viz., in reflec¬
tive consciousness) with one another and hence
providing an ontalogically unique FRAME OF
REFERENCE from which modes of behavioral
response may be influenced.
In saying this,
we still remain STRICTLY within the realm of
cause-effect functional relations, but relations
as contemplated by a broader FACTUAL; basis.
This is to say that a subjective psychology, can
systematically analyze a. distinct experiential
category(ies) of potentially causally efficacious
factual phenomena that may influence human
behavior, over and above-those phenomena
capable of determinate investigation by an
objective psychology.
Both methodological
systems working in qlose conjunction with one
another can, in principle, provide a complete
account of human behavior.
4)

5)

Finally the basic problem, as we have seen,
with the notion of instantaneous temporal
durations is that it is simply not reconcil¬
able with the intrinsic nature of direct,
concrete experiential events manifesting
an inextricable unified atomicity absolutely
essential to subjective psychologically
meaningful thinking of ANY kind.
Thus to
formally represent an instantaneously
enduring spatial cross-section of a subjec¬
tive psychological'event (apart from the technical impossibility of such a task because
of the incessant temporal passage of reality
as well as the fact that experiential events
are structursJLly too complex to have their
indefinitely numerous components exhaustively
symbolically characterized.
Thus the
illustration is useful only as a discursive
device.) is to destroy an essential feature
of mental events, namely, that in concrete
experience TIME is required to think.complete
thoughts.
The acknowledgement of this poino
is significant primarily for epistemologicai
reasons, particularly with respect to tne
issue of VERIFICATION.
But also it will be
seen that the concept of time as necessarily
grounded in experiential events will have
great importance for developing future constructs
Since it takes TIMS to formulate complete
subjective psychologically meaningful thoughts,
(and as it was at least suggested in our
theory of symbolic thinking) a more careful
scrutiny of particular mental events will
reveal that beyond their primordial character

as PROCESS MID PERMANENCE there are DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES fa concept, however, too
advanced to be theoretically considered in
depth within this discourse) intrinsic to the
emergent character of particular events.
In
effect, this is the wisdom of the relevant
past constructively uniting synthetically with
the present occasion, hence preparing the way
for future cognitive advance.
The past and the future meet and mingle
in the ill defined present.
The passage
of nature which is only another name for
the creative force of existence has no
narrow ledge of definite instantaneous
present within which to operate.
Its
operative presence whhch is now urging
nature forward must be sought for
throughout the whole, in the remotest
past as well as in the narrowest breadth
of any present duration.
Perhaps also in
the unrealized future.
Perhaps also in the
future which might be as well as the actual
future which wi11 be.m
Thus mental events, considered in themselves,
have stages of development capable of being
REFLECTIVELY and experimentally understood
to some extent (but are not subject to DIRECT
understanding, for an entire event is the
minimal unit for our direct comprehension.
An interval during the development of an
‘event will be termed a ’stage*).
$)
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From this it can be readily understood that
a spatio-temporal framework allowing for
only instantaneous specification (i.e., a
three dimensional spatio-temporal system) must
necessarily be inadequate for characterizing
subjective psychological experience for it
cannot comprehend the intrinsic durational
duality of mental events.
This is to say that
a spatio-temporal framework is needed which
can, in principle, include ALL POSSIBLE EVENTCOMPONENTS as they are actualized throughout
developing stages of particular events.
To
meet this requirement a four-dimensional spatiotemporal framework is needed.
Again, our
explorations of this mode for comprehending
relations among entities will be repetitious

of certain elementary principles already
explored in depth by Whitehead.
In order to effectively introduce the concept of a
four-dimensional

spatio-temporal framework and properly

emphasize the capacity of this geometrical device to
attribute appropriate particularity to all possible eventconponents as they occur in concrete experience,

it will be

necessary to quote Whitehead at length for it is through his
ovm words that the intrinsic wisdom of such a scheme becomes
evident.

The following quotations,

i
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first quarter
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although written in
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for contemporary thinking, particularly for those working
in the behavioral
studies,

sciences,

or more generally,

the hu.—n

for in these areas the outmoded theories of

materialistic mechanism still remain powerfully efficacious
in influencing the thinking of many researchers and theorists.
Although only a small portion of the following quotations
deal specifically with an explication oi
properties of space and time per se,

the geome«,ri

highly mpoi uafu.

introductory information is expressed.

Hence the writer

feels that perhaps the most significant objective of
discussion is to present a basic RATIONALE presupposed by
a four-dimensional geometry,

as opposed to devoting a great

deal of attention to technical geometrical considerations.
Those individuals wishing to pursue the moie 1 or,nil
of space-time should refer to any of Whitehead’s earlier

.

works.
Here Whitehead conci

Seiy presents a "brilliant analysis

PUP

issues of fundamental concern to scientific enquiry of
any kind
1.
TRADITIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS. 1.1.
What is
a*physical explanation?
The answer to this ques¬
tion, even when merely implicit in the scientific
imagination, must profoundly affect the develop¬
ment of any science, and in as especial degree
that of speculative physics.
During the modern
period the orthodox answer has invariably been
couched in terms of Time (flowing equably in
measurable lapses) and of Space (timeless, void
of activity, euclidean), and of Material in
space (such as matter, ether, or electricity).
The governing principle underlying this
scheme is that extension, namely extension in
time or extension in space, expresses disconnec¬
tion.
This principle issues in the assumptions
that the causal action between entities separated
in time or space is impossible and that extension
in space or unity of being are inconsistent.
Thus
the extended material (oh this view) is essentially
a multiplicity of entities which, as extended, are
diverse and disconnected.
This governing principle
has to be limited in respect to extension in time.
The same material exists-at different times,
This^
concession introduces the many perplexities,
centering round the notion of change which is
derived from the comparison of various states of
self-identical material at different times.
1.2.
The ultimate fact embracing all nature
is (in this traditional point of view) a distribu¬
tion of material throughout all space at a duration¬
less instant of time, and another such ultimate
fact will be another distribution of the same
material throughout the same space at another
durationless instant of time.
The difficulties
of this extreme statement are evident and were
pointed out even in classical times when the
concept first took shape.
Some modification is
evidently necessary.
No room has been left for
velocity, acceleration, momentum, and kinetic^
energy, which certainly are essential physical
quantities.
We must therefore in the ultimate fact, beyond
which science ceases to analyze, include the notion
of a state of change.
But a state of change at a
durationless instant is a very difficult conception,
It is impossible to define velocity without some
reference to the past and the future.
Thus change
is essentially the importation of the past and of
the future into the immediate fact embodied in the
durationless present instant.

This conclusion is destructive of the funda¬
mental assumption that the ultimate facts of
science are to be found at durationless instants
of time.
1.3.
The reciprocal causal action between
materials A and B is the fact that their states of
change are partly dependent on their relative
locations and natures.
The disconnection involved
in spatial separation leads to reduction of such
causal action to the transmission of stress across
the bounding surface of contiguous materials.
But what is contact?
No two points are in contact.
Thus the stress across a surface necessarily acts
on some bulk of the material enclosed inside.
To say that stress acts on the immediately
contiguous material is to assert infinitely small
volumes.
But there are no such things, only
smaller and smaller volumes.
Yet (with this point
of view) it cannot be meant that the surface acts
on the interior.
Certainly stress has some claim to be regarded
as an essential physical quantity as have
momentum and. kinetic energy.
But no intelligible
account of its meaning is to be extracted from
the concept of the continuous distribution of
diverse (because extended) entities through spa'ce'
as an ultimate scientific fact.
At some stage in
our account of stress we are driven to the concept
of any extended quantity of material an a single
unity whose nature is partly explicable in terms
of its surface stress.
1.4.
In biology the concept of an organism
cannot be expressed in terms of material distribu¬
tion at.an instant.
The essence of an organism
is that it is one thing which functions' and is
spread through space.
Now functioning takes time.
Thus a biological organism is a unity with a
spatio-temporal extension which is the essence of
its being.
This biological conception is
obviously incompatible with the traditional ideas.
This argument does not in any way depend on the
as sumption that biologival phenomena belong to a
different category to other physical phenomena.
The essential point of the criticism on traditional
concepts which has occupied us so far is that the
concept of unities, functioning and with spatiotemporal extensions cannot be extruded from physical
concepts.
The only reason for the introduction of
biology is that in these sciences the same
necessity becomes more clear,
1.5.
The fundamental assumption to be
elaborated in-the course of this enquiry is that
the ultimate facts of nature, in terms of which
all physical and biological explanation must be

expressed, are events connected by their spatiotemporal relations, and that these relations are
in the main reducible to the property of events
that they can contain (or extend over) other events
which are parts of them.
In other words, in place
of emphasizing space and time in their capacity of
disconnecting, we shall build up an account of
their complex essences as derivative from the
ultimate ways in which those things, ultimate
in a science, are interconnected.
In this way
the data of science, those concepts in terms of
which all scientific explanation must be
expressed, will be clearly apprehended.
But
before proceeding to our constructive task,
some further realisation of the perplexities
introduced by the traditional concepts is necessary.
2.
PHILOSOPHIC RELATIVITY. 2.1,
The philosophical
principle of the relativity of space means that the
properties of space are merely a way of expressing
relations between things ordinarily said to be
’in space’.
Namely, when two things are said to
be ’both in space’ what is meant is that they are
mutually related in a certain definite way which
is termed ’spatial’.
It is an immediate consequence
of this theory that all spatial entities such as
points, straight lines and planes are merely
complexes of relations between things or of
possible relations between things.
For consider the meaning of saying that a.
particle P is at a point Q,
This statement conveys
substantial information and must therefore convey
something more than the barren assertion of selfid. entity' ’P is P*.
Thus what must be meant is that
P has certain relations to other particles P’, P5;,
etc,, and that the abstract possibility of this
group of•relations is what is meant by the point Q,
The extremely valuable' work on the foundations
of geometry produced during the nineteenth century
has proceeded from the assumption of points as
ultimate given entities.
This assumption, for the
logical purpose of mathematicians, is entirely
justified.
Namely the mathematicians ask, What
is the logical description of relations between
points from which all geometrical theorms
respecting such relations can be deduced?
The
answer to this question is now practically
complete; and if the old theory of absolute space
be true, there is nothing more to be said.
For
points are. ultimate simple existents, with mutual
relations disclosed by our perceptions of nature.
But if we adopt the principle of relativity,^
these investigations do not solve the Question oi
the foundations of geometry.
An investigation

into the foundations of geometry has to explain
space.as a complex of relations between things.
It has to describe what a point is, and has to show
how the geometric relations between points issue
from the ultimate relations between ultimate things
which are the immediate objects of knowledge.
Thus
the starting point of a discussion on the foundation
of geometry is a discussion of the' character of the
immediate data of perception.
It is not now open
to mathematicians to assume SUB SILENT10 that
points are among these data.
2.2.
The traditional concepts were evidently
formed round the concept of absolute space, namely
the concept' of the persistent ultimate material
distributed among the persistent ultimate points
in successive configurations at successive
ultimate instants of time.
Here * ultimate1 means
’not analysable into a complex of simpler entities’.
The introduction of the principle of relativity
adds to the complexity -- or rather, to the
perplexity ~~ of this conception of nature.
The
statement of general character of ultimate fact
must now be amended into ’persistent ultimate
material with successive mutual ultimate relation
at, successive ultimate instants of time’.
Space issues from these mutual relations of
matter at an instant.
The first criticism to be
made on such an assertion is that it is shown to
be a metaphysical fairy tale by any comparison
with our actual perceptual knowledge of nature.
Our knowledge of space is based upon observations
which take time and have to be successive, but
the relations which constitute space are
instantaneous.
The theory demands that there
should be an instantaneous space corresponding to
each instant, and provides for no correlations
between these spaces; while nature has provided
us with no apparatus for observing them.
2.3.
It" is an obvious suggestion that we
should. ‘amend our statement of ultimate fact, as
modified by the acceptance of relativity.
The
spacial relations must now stretch across time.
Thus if P, P’, Pt?, etc. be material particles,
there are definite spatial relations connecting
P, P\ Pts, etc. at time tx with P, P*, Pw, etc.
at to, as well as such relations between P and P*
and P", etc, at time ti and such relations between
P and. Ps and P”, etc. at time t2.
This should mean
P at time tp has a definite position in the spatial
configuration constituted by the relations
between P, P? , P,?, etc. at t^ .
For example, the
sun at a certain instant on Jan. 1st, 1900 had
a definite position in the instantaneous space
constituted by the mutual relations between the
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flUn and -the other stars at a definite instant on
Jan. 1st, 1800.
Such a statement is only under¬
standable (assuming the traditional concept) by
recurring to absolute space and thus abandoning
relativity; for otherwise it denies the complete¬
ness of the instantaneous fact which is the
essence of the concept.
Another way out of the
difficulty is to deny that space is constituted
by the relations of P, P?, PH, etc., at an
instant, and to assert that it results from
their relations throughout a duration of time,
which as thus prolonged in time are observable.
As a matter of fact it is bovious that our
knowledge of space does result from such observa¬
tions.
But we are asking the theory to provide
us with actual relations to be observed.
This
last emendation .is either only a muddled way
of admitting- that 'nature at an instant’ is not
the ultimate scientific fact, or else it is a
yet more muddled plea, that, although there is
no possibility of correlations between
instantaneous spaces, yet within durations
which are short enough such nonexistent correla¬
tions enter into experience.
2.4.
The persistence of the material lacks
any observational guarantee when the relativity
of space is admitted into the traditional
concept.
For at one instant there is instan¬
taneous material in its instantaneous space as
constituted by its instantaneous relations, and
at another instant there is instantaneous
material in its instantaneous space.
How do we
know’ that the two cargoes of material which load
the two instants are identical?
The answer is
that we do not perceive isolated instantaneous
facts, but a continuity of existence, and that
.it is this observed continuity of existence
which guarantees the persistence of material.
Exactly so; but this gives way the whole tradi¬
tions.! concept.
For a ’continuity of existence’
must mean an unbroken duration of existence.
Accordingly it is admitted that the ultimate
fact for observational knowledge is perception
through a duration; namely, that the content of
a. specious present, and not that of a duration¬
less instant, is an ultimate da.tum for science.
2.5It is evident that the conception of
the instant of time as an ultimate entity is
the source of all our difficulties of explana¬
tion.
If there are such ultimate entities,
instantaneous nature is an ultimate fact.
Our perception of time is as a duration,
and these instants have only been introduced by
reason of a supposed necessity of thought.
In
fact absolute time is just as much a metaphysical
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monstrosity as absolute, space,
-the way out of
■the perplexities, as to the ultimate data of
science in terms of which physical explanation
«o ultimately to be expressed, is to express the
essential scientific concepts of time, space and
material as issuing from fundamental relations
between events and from recognitions of the
characters of events.
These relations ox event.,
are those immediate deliverances of observation
which are referred to when we say that events
are spread through time and space.-1---

'Significance' is the relatedness of timings.
To say that significance is experience, is to
affirm that perceptual knowledge is nothing else
than”an apprehension of the relatedness of things,
namely of" things in their relations ana as
related.
Certainly if we commence with.a knowledge
of things, and then look around for their it.amorio
we shall not find them.
5 Causal connection
is
merely one typical instance of the universal rum
oVrelatedness.
But then we are quite mistaken
in thinking that there is>a possible knowledge
of things as unrelated.
It is thus out 01
h
Question to start with a knowledge of things
antecedent to a knowledge of their relations
The so-called properties of things can always be
expressed as their relatedness to obnei thi ounspecified, and natural knowledge is exclusively
concerned with relatedness,
.
j_
3.6,
The relatedness which is tne subject
of a natural knowledge cannot be understooo
without reference to the general characteristic,,
of perception.
Cur perception of natural events
and natural objects is a perception nom >.1
nature, and is not an awareness contemplating slnature impartially from without
When Dr. Johnson
'surveyed mankind from China to Peru', hegio u
from Pump Court in London at a certain date.
Lv Pumij Court was too wide for his peculiar.. ■ STANDI; he was really merely conscious ox tne
relations of his bodily events to the simultaneous
events throughout the rest of the univtist,
perception involves a percipient object, a
percipient event, the complete event whicn is a__
nature simultaneous with the percipient even
and the particular events whicn aie P^rc .
,
parts or the complete event....
J.he^poin.
be emphasized is that natural knowledge is a
knowledge from within nature, a
_ c,'r"_ .n
a
within naturev and 'now within ijacure

"^Whitehead,
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awareness of the natural relations of one element
in nature (namely, the percipient event) to the
rest of nature.
Also what is known is not barely
the things but the relations of- things, and not
the relations in the abstract but specifically
those things as related.
Thus Alciphron’s vision of the planet is
his perception of his relatedness (i. e., the
relatedness of his percipient event) to some
other elements of nature which as thus recalled
he calIs the planet.
He admits... that certain
other specified, relations of tnose elements are
possible for other percipient events.
In this
way he might be right or wrong.
What he directly
knows is his relation to some other elements of
the universe — namely, I, Alciphron, am located
in my ■percipient event * here and now5 and the
immediately perceived appearance of the planet
is for me a, characteristic of another-event * there
and now*.
In fact perceptual knowledge is always
a knowledge of the relationship of the.percipient
event to something else in nature.
Tnis doctrine
is in entire agreement with Dr. Johnson's stamp
of the foot by which he realised the otherness
of the paving-stone»
3,7.
The conception of knowledge as passive
contemplation is too inadequate to meet the facts.
Nature is ever originating its own development,
and the sense of action' is the direct knowledge
of the percipient event as having its very being
in the formation of its natural relations.
Knowledge issues from this reciprocal insistence
between this event and the rest 01 nature, namely
relations are perceived in the making and because
of the making.
For this reason perception is
always at the utmost point of creation.
vie cannot
■out ourselves back to the Crusades and know their
events while they were happening.
We essentially
perceive our relations with nature because they
are in the making.
The sense of action is that
essential factor in natural knowledge union
exhibits it as a self-knowledge enjoyed by an.
element of nature respecting its active relations
with the whole of nature in its various aspects.
Natural knowledge Is merely the ocher side 01
action.
The forward moving time exhibits this
characteristic of experience, that it is
essentially action.
Thus passage of nature
or, in other words, its creative advance -- is
its fundamental characteristic; the tradition^,
concept is an attempt to catch nature witnout
its was sage. I-- 3

H3-1-, . .

-ml. bid.
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In these quotations Whitehead critically analyzes the
logical implications of certain fundamental presuppositional
concepts used predominately in traditional Newtonian science,
Ke shows that the spatio-temporal piSCONIgCTI^ proclivity
of mechanistic materialism leads to very serious logical and
pragmatic difficulties.

Hence to resolve some of these

theoretical and methodological problems indigenous to
traditional materialism,

Whitehead maintains that a more

appropriate theoretical framework for science,

one demons¬

trating considerably greater concordance with the facts
ascertained in concrete experience,

is that the perceived

facts of nature must be considered, as events .COrdligCTED by
spatio-temporal relations and that these relations are
directly derivative from the factual properties of events.
”...

in the place of emphasizing space and

capacity of disconnecting,

time in their

we shall build up an account of

their complex essences as derivatives from the ultimate ways
in which those things,
connected, V

ultimate in science,

Thus these lengthy quotations have empnasized

three very important considerations for us.
have provided a. concise,
mental conceptual

but penetrating,

first,

Second,

First,

tney

account oi

funda¬

shifts in contemplating certain primitive

or axiomatic presuppositions of
century.

e,re inter¬

science in the twentieth

and this point is a consequent ov

vie have seen that the

* relativity*

the

conception of

space-tame is importantly more in accordance wita tne
directly perceived facts in our concrete experience,
compared, to the

”materialistic*

view of

the univeise.

as

Third,

the quotations have served as a useful recapitula¬

tion for many concepts developed throughout this discourse,
in addition to providing a brief though highly appropriate
introduction to the relativity notion of

space-time.

Now let us once again embark upon a more rigorous
investigation of space-time and its relevant peripheral
issues as they will have direct significance for a subjective
psychology.

As in the immediately preceding instances,

we

shall utilize Whitehead's own words to effect this explana¬
tion for in this way we may be assured of maximal conceptual.
and d efinitional c1arity.
The following quotations suggest in a general way how
what we have defined as event-components may be

spatio-

temporally related in each mental event /our definition of
’event'

as used here is conceptualized somewhat differently

than that of Whitehead’s;

our notion includes,

those percepta ”standing over against” the

in addition,

’contributed*

percepta as they are directly perveived in determinate
configurations.
alone,

The

’contributed’ percepta,

considered

are■equivalent to what Whitehead will term the

Vprehensive unity’

of perception

(as distinct from what he

defines as prehensive unity of a volume^/:
For simolicity of thought, I will first speak of
space only, and will afterwards extend the same
treatment to time.
The volume is the most concrete element of
space.
But the separative ch.ara.cter of sps.ce,
analyses a volume into sub-volumes, and so on
indefinitely.
Accordingly, taking the separative
character in isolation, we should infer that a
volume is a mere multiplicity of non-voluminous
elements, of points in fact.
But it is the

unity of the volume which is the ultimate fact
•of experience, for example, the voluminous space
of this hall.
This hall as a mere multiplicity
of points is a construction of the logical
imagination.
Accordingly, the prime fact is the prehensive
unity of volume, and this unity is mitigated or
limited by the separated unities of the innumerable
contained parts.
We have a prehensive unity,
which is yet held a,pa.rt as an aggregate of
contained parts.
But the prehensive unity of the
volume is not the unity of a mere logical aggregate
of parts.
The parts form an ordered aggregate, in
the sense that each part is something from the
standpoint of every other part, and also from the
same standpoint every other part is something in
relation to it.
Thus if A and B and C are
volumes of space, B has an aspect from the stand¬
point of A, and so has C, and so has the relation¬
ship of B and C,
This aspect of B from A is of
the essence of A,
The volumes of space have no
independent existence.
They are only entities
as within the totality; you cannot extract them
from their environment without destruction of
their very essence.
Accordingly, I will say that
the aspect of B from A is the MODE in which B
enters into the composition of A,
This is the
modal character of space, that the prehensive
unity of A is the prehension into unity of the
aspects of all other volumes from the standpoint
of A,
The shape of the Volume is the formula from
which the totality of its aspects can be derived.
Thus the shape of a volume is more abstract than
its aspects.
It is evident that I can use
Leibnizfs language, and say that every volume
mirrors in itself every other volume in space.
Exactly analogous considerations hold with
respect to durations in time.
An instant of time,
without duration, is an imaginative logica.l
construction.
Also each duration of time mirrors
in itself all temporal durations.
But in two ways I have introduced a false
simplicity.
In the first place, I should have
conjoined space and time, and. conducted by
explanation in respect to four-dimensional regions
of space-time.
I have nothing to add in the way of
explanation.
In your minds, substitute such fourdimensional regions for the spatial volumes of the
previous explanations.
Secondly, my explanation has involved itself
in a vicious circle.
For I have made the prehensive
unity of the region A to consist of the prehensive
unification of the modal presences in A of other
regions.
This difficulty arises because space-
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time cannot in reality be considered as a selfsubsistent entity.
It is an abstraction, and its
explanation requires reference to that from which
it" has been extracted.
Space-time is the
specification of certain general_characters ol
events a.nd of their mutual ordering.
It should be noted that in the second anticipated criticism
expressed by Whitehead,

he is saying that a distinction must

be drawn between the prehensive unification located in the
(percipient,

for example)

region A,

consisting of a specific

configuration of modal presences actualized in A at a given
time,

AND those frames of reference

(viz.,

stimulus-objects

or termini of sense awareness) from which the moaal presences
originate.

Stated more simply,

in order to avoid

sollipsistic view of subjective idealism,
prove that the natural world,

the

Wmtenead must,

apart from mind’s perceptions,

has spatio-temporal extensiveness.

He must show that there

is an external world whose entities can be comprehended m a
relativity spatio-temporal framework.

Although the following

quotation does not embody a rigorous proof for the existence
of the external world - a type which can be found in almost
any of Whitehead's works — it is quite suitable ior our
purpose in that it provides the reader with a more intui¬
tively simple illustration of his spatio-temporal scheme,
for it is not specifically our purpose to prove the spatiotemporal extensiveness of the natural world.
An pn-Mfv of1 which we "become aware in sense
uercSion is the terminus of our act of percep-

11^VJhi behead.,

Sc i

5

on .

cit., pp.

63-64.

tion.
I will call such an entity, a SENSE-OBJECT.
For example, green of a definite shade is a senseobject; so is a sound of a definite generality and
pitch; and so is a definite scent; and a definite
quality of touch.
The way in which such an entity
is related to space during a definite lapse of
time is complex.
I will say that a sense-object
has INGEESSION into space-time.
The cognitive
perception of a sense object is the awareness of
prehensive unification (into standpoint A) of
various modes of various sense-objects, including
the sense-object in question.
The standpoint of A
is, of course, a region of. space-time; that is to
' say, it is a volume of space through a duration of
time.
But as one entity, this standpoint is a unit
of realised experience.
A mode of a sense object
at A (as abstracted from the sense object whose
relationship to A the mode is conditioning) is an
'aspect from" A of some other region B.
Thus the
sense-object is present in A with the mode oi
location in B.
Thus if green be the sense-object
in question, green is not simply at A where it is
being perceived, nor is it simply at B where^it
is perceived as located; but it is present au A
with the mode of location in B,
There is no
particular mystery about this.
You have only got,
"to look in a mirror and to see the image in it °i
some green leaves behind your back.
For you at A
there will be green; but not green simply at A
where you are.
The green at A will be green witn
the mode of having location at the image of the
leaf behind the mirror.
Then turn round ana loom
at the leaf.
You are now perceiving the green in
the same way as you did before, except that now
the green has the mode of being located m cue
actual leaf.
I am merely describing what we ao
perceive: we are aware of green as being one
element in a prehensive unification of sense^
objects; each sense-object, and among them green,
- having its particular mode, which is expressible
as location" elsewhere.
There are various types
of modal location.
For example, sound is
voluminousi it fills a hall, ana so sometime
does diffused colour.
But tne modal location of
a colour may be that of being the remote bounda j
of a volume, as for example is
p ty|e
modal degression of ^ sense-objects.
we
reason why space ana time (if
- . .
por
disjoin them) are given m their ente'
each volume of space, or each lapse of t.me,
includes in its essence aspects of all
1 of snace, or of all lapses of time
The
cultles
of
philosophy
in
respect
to
space
and
culties
of considering them a*
are founded, on the error
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primarily the loci of simple locations.
Perception
is simply the cognition of prehensive unification;
or more shortly, perception is cognition of
prehension.
The actual world is a manifold 01
prehensions; and .a 1prehension1 is a 1prehensive
occasion1; and a prehensive occasion is the most
concrete finite entity, conceived as what it is
in itself and for itself ana not as from its
aspect in the essence of another such^occasion.
Prehensive unification might be said to have
simple location in its volume A.
But this would
be a mere tautology.
For space and time are
simuly abstractions from the totality of prehensive
unification as mutually patterned in each otnexn
Thus a ore hen si on has simple location at t,_e
^
volume A in the same way as that in which a man s
face fits on to the smile that spreads over it.
There is, so far as we have gone, more sense in
saving that an act .of perception has simple location,
for it may be conceived as being simply one
cognised prehension.
„
There” are more entities involvea in nature than
the mere sense-objects, so far considered.
Bu
allowing for the necessity of.revision consequent
on a more complete point of view, we can frame our
answer'"to Berkeley's question as to the character
of reality to be assigned to nature*
He -.tai-e
it- to be the reality of ideas in the mind.
A .
complete metaphysic Which has attained to some
notion of mind, and to some notion of ideas, may
nerhaps ultimately adopt that vie*..
* . 1
_
unnecessary for the purposes oitnese lectures
to ask such a fundamental question._ vie c x
content with a provisional realism m whxc i na
is conceived as*a complex of prehensive unifica¬
tions.
Soace and time exhibit the general seneme
of interlocked relations of these prehensions
You cannot tear any of them out of its conn-~t.
Yet each one of them within its context has al
the reality that attaches to the *hole co^p-w-.
Conversely, the totality has tne reality as ea.cn
prehension; for each prehension uni,th~
modalities to be ascribed,
»
to every part of the who_e.^_A - — ■_
ig &
process of unifying.
Aecorair^y,
^
process of expansive development, necessa^ y
transitional from prehension o p
", “'-k ^
What is achieved is thereby passed beyond, but
it is also retained as having aspects of itsell
present to prehensions whicn
ie
•
Thus nature is a structure ox evolvin__
is
processes.
The reality is the process.^it
The
nonsense to ask if the colou
colour red is ingredient in the proc

JO o

realisation.
The realities of nature are the
prehensions in nature, that is to say, the
events in nature.^5
Little need be said about the lucidity and. profoundity of
this quotation except,

perhaps,

that the highly intimate

relationship between what Whitehead has said in the above
quotations and the various lines of argumentation we have
explored throughout this discourse,

(although beginning from

different points of departure and with somewhat different
purposes in view)

should be readily obvious to the reader.

Next, building upon the foundational concepts already
introduced with regard to space-time and its relationship to
human experience,

let us briefly consider two additional

abstract conceptualizations of this problem as they are
formally developed by Whitehead.

The purpose of this some¬

what more advanced investigation is to suggest to those
readers predisposed to formal scientific enquiry that the
general theory of subjective psychological behavior being
developed in this paper is readily amenable to rigorous
formulation.
First let us contemplate one way in which Whitehead
geometrically schematizes the four-dimensional structure of
events

(here emphasis will- be placed upon what we have

termed.

5mental event*

notion of thinking

which closely approximates Whitehead*s

* heterogeneously *

about nature:

are thinking- heterogeneously about nature when we are
thinking about it in conjunction with thinking either

115lbid

pp.

68-70.

we
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about thought or about sense-awareness or about both.^^).
(i) TliE STRUCTURE OP THE CONTINUUM OP EVENTS
This structure is four-dimensional, so that
any event is a four-dimensional hyper-volume
in which time is the fourth dimension.
But we
should not conceive an event as space and time,
but as a unit from wThich soace and time are
abstracts.
An event with all its dimensions ideally
restricted is called an * event particle*, and
an event with only one dimension of finite
extension is called a * route* or *path*,
I will
not in this lecture discuss the meaning of this
ideal restriction.
I have investigated it else¬
where under the name of * extensive abstraction*.
The structure is uniform because of the
necessity for knowledge that there be a system of
uniform relatedness, in terms of which the
contingent relations of natural factors can be
expressed.
Otherwise we can know nothing until
we know everything.
If P be any event-particle,
a moment through P is a system of event-particles
representing all nature instantaneously contem¬
poraneous with P.
According to the classical
view of time there can be only one such moment.
According to the modem view there can be an
indefinite number of alternative moments through
P, each corresponding to a different meaning for
time and space.
A moment is an instantaneous
three-dimensional section of nature and is the
entity indicated when we speak of a moment of time.
The.aggregate of event-particles lying on
moments through P will be called the region
co-present with P,
The remainder of the four¬
dimensional continuum is divided by the co-present
into two regions, one being P*s past and the other
being•P1s future.
The three-dimensional boundary
between P*s past.and P:s co-present region is P’s
causal past, and the corresponding boundary between
P*s future a„nd P*s co-present region is P*s causal
future.
The remaining portion of P*s future is
P * s kinematic fu ture.
A route lying entirely in one moment is
called a spatial route, and a route which lies
entirely in the past and future of each one of
its event-particies is called a historical route.
... We gain great simplicity of explanation,
without loss of any essential considerations by
confining our consideration of events to routes.

116 Whitehead,

Concept of.

op.

cit.,

p.

5.
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These routes are of course not true events, but
merely ideal limits with only one dimensional
extension remaining.

FIGURE 5

Although this quotation provides an inadequate exposition
of the highly systematic formalized meaning implicit within
the bare geometric construction presented above,

a task that

is largely executed in the third through fifth chapters of
Whitehead*s Concept of Nature,
cient elaboration

11 7
'Whitehead,

it at least presents suffi¬

(which if contemplated in. conjunction with

Principle of.

,o

op.

cit. ,

pp.

29-31..
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the previous exerpts
suggest the great po

from his writings on space and time) to
ssibilities for expressing relations

delivered Initially in concrete experience in mathematical
and geometrical form.
Ii-io Ic.^t quotation concisely demonstrates how spatiotemporal abstract relations can be totally expressed as
direct derivatives from concrete experience.

Here Whitehead

takes concrete external bodily perceptual apprehensions such
)

for example,

^he appa.rent three-dimensionality of our

momentary spatial perceptions and proceeds to demonstrate
how the "appearance of depth" can be geometrically form¬
alized.

Prom this type of exposition geometric proofs may

be proposed for certain fundamental concepts of measurement
such as simultanaiety, parallelity, perpendicularity,
The important point,

however,

etc.

is that these nroofs mav be

snown to proceed from our concrete experiential perceptions
oi natural world phenomena.
When we are conscious of nature, what is it
tnat we really observe? The obvious answer is
that we perceive various material bodies, such as
chairs, bricks, trees.
We can touch them, see
them, 'hear them.
As I write I can hear the birds
singing in a Berksnire garden in early snring.
In conformity with this answer, it is nowfashionable and indeed almost universal to say
tnai/ our notions of space merely arise from our
endeavours to express the relations of these
oodies to each other.
I am sorry to appear
pigweeded; but, though I am nearly in a minority
of one, I believe this answer to be entirely
wrong.
j. will explain my reasons.
Are these material bodies really the ultimate
data of perception, incapable of further analysis?
If they are, I at once surrender.' But I
submit that plainly they have not this ultimate
character.
My allusions to birds singing was
made not because I felt poetical, but to warn you

that we were being led into a difficulty.
What
I immediately heard was the song.
The birds only
enter perception as a correlation of more ultimate
immediate data, of perception, among which for my
consciousness their song is dominant.
Material bodies only enter my consciousness
as a representation of a certain coherence of the
sense-objects such as colors, sounds and touches.
But these sense-objects at once rrocla.im them¬
selves to be adjectives... of events.
It is not
the mere red that we see, but a red patch in a
definite place enduring through a definite time.
The red is an adjective of the red time and place.
Thus nature appears to us as the continuous
passage of instantaneous three-dimensional spatial
spreads, the temporal passage adding a fourth
dimension.
Thus nature is stratified by time.
In fact passage in time is of the essence of
nature, and a body is merely the coherence of
adjectives qualifying the same route through the
four-dimensional space-time of events.
But as a result of modern observations we
have to admit that there are an indefinite number
of such modes of time stratification.
However, this admission at once yields an
explanation of the meaning of the instantaneous
spatial extension of nature.
For it explains
this extension as merely the exhibition of the
different ways in which simultaneous occurrences
function in regard to other time-systems.
I mean that occurrences which are simul¬
taneous for one time-system appear as spread
out in three dimensions because they function
diversely for other time-systems.
The extended
space of one time-system is merely the expression
of properties of other time-systems.
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FIGURE 6

According to this doctrine, a moment of time is
nothing else than an instantaneous spread of
nature.
Thus let t^_, t^>, t^ be three moments of
time; Af'f'.nrnins' to o’no tnme-'sv: tern, and let T-<
rn
rn
j-2?
ig be three moments of time according to
another time-system.
The Intersections of pairs
of moments in diverse time-systems are planes ineach instantaneous three-dimensional space.
In
the diagram each continuous line accordingly
t h re e - d. i men s i onal space; and t he
symbolise
intersections of continuous lines, such as A
Thus t-j and . i2
or B or C, symbolises planes,
are each a three-dimensional soace, and A i s a.
plane in either space.
Parallelism is the reflection into an
instantaneous soace of one time-system of the
Thu s
property of moments of some other system.
since ■1 and
A and B are parallel planes in tg
rJ?2 are moments of the same system which is not
the system to which t-^ belongs.
But when we talk of space we are not usually
thinking of the instantaneous fact of immediate
perception.
We are thinking of an enduring scheme
of extension within which all these instantaneous
facts are fitted.
It follows that we ought to be
able to find a meaning for the idea of a
permanent snace in connection with each time-system.
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This conception must arise from our immediate
observations of motion and rest.
Both rest and
motion have no meaning in connection with one
mere instantaneous space.
In such a space every¬
thing is where it is and there is an instantaneous
end to it: to be succeeded by another instantaneous
space.
But motion and rest at once warn us that
our perception involves something more.
The instantaneous moment is merely an ideal
limit of perception.
Have you ever endeavoured
to ca.pture the instantaneous present? It eludes
you, because in truth there is no such entity
among the crude facts of our experience.
Our
present experience is an enduring fact within which
we discriminate a passage of nature.
Now within
this enduring fact we observe rest and motion,
A body at rest in the space of our observation is
tracing out a certain historical route intersecting
the moments of our time-system in a sequence ofinstantaneous points.
This route is what we mean
by a point of the permanent space of our timesystem.
Thus each time-system has its own space
with its own points, and these permanent points
are loci of instantaneous points.
The paradoxes of relativity arise from the
fact that we have not noticed that when we change
our time-system we change the meaning of time,
the meaning of space and the meaning of points
of space (conceived as permanent).
Now the route of a small body at rest in the
space of a time-system, that is to say, a point
of that time-system, has a certain symmetry in
respect to the successive instantaneous spaces of
that system, which is expressed, for us by the
perception of. lack of change of position.
This
symmetry is the ba.sis of the definition of
rectangularity.
If the body be at rest in the space of the
time-system t, it is moving in a. straight line
in the space of another time-system T.
This
permanent straight line intersects any moment of
T, say Tp, in an instantaneous straight line Ip
(say).
Then Ip is perpendicular to the series
of instantaneous parallel planes in which.the
moments of system t intersect Tp.
In other words
the planes to which motion is perpendicular are
the planeS'of intersection with the moments of
that time-system for whose space and motion would
be represented as rest.
We have thus defined both parallelism and
perpendicularity without reference to congruence,
but in terms of immediate data, of perception.
Furthermore, the parallelism of the moments of
one time system enables us to extend parallelism

J ( J

to time as also expressing the relation to each
other of permanent points of the same time-system.
It thus follows that we now possess a structure
in terms of which congruence can be defined.
This means that there will be a class of qualities
L one and only one of which attaches to any
stretch on a straight line or on a point, such
that matching in respect to this quality is what
we mean by congruence.
This completes our sequence of quotations about spacetime articulated in various works by Whitehead.

Again as

it was previously mentioned, the writer makes no pretense
that an exhaustive understanding of these quotations can be
achieved merely through studying the relevant information
on space-time presented in this discourse.

To achieve this

end would- require a meticulous and laborious examination of
/

the original source materials.

However,

even ’with the

limitations of the method of introduction, the writer feels
that readers can,

through a reflective effort, gain a

substantial understanding of Whitehead's criticisms of
traditional concepts of space and time, and the limitations
and even distortions of concrete experiential xacts tnau
traditional materialistic-mechanistic theories impose upon
our direct experience of the nabural world and our inner
bodily states.

In fact,

it is not over-stating the case to

maintain that it is an understanding the importance and
hence NECESSITY of admitting the fourth (e.g.,

temporal)

dimension Into our spatio-temporal characterizabion oi
mental events -- theoretical units logically and expon¬
entially fundamental to a subjective psychology.

Ibid., pp. 53—57•

This fact
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clearly reveals the primary reason for devoting prolonged
attention to scrutinizing Whitehead’s basic views on space
and time.

Also,

it is not too much to say that all of

Whitehead’s discursive examinations of these concepts,
regardless of the advanced nature of some of his speculative
investigations, are essentially attempts to systematically
show that all spatio-temporal conceptual formulations
ultimately have their grounds in the perceptions of concrete
experience.
The quotations examined with respect to space and time
were primarily concerned with explaining the banis upon
which the relations amongst NATURAL entities may be validly
(formally) established.

But for our purposes we also are

interested in exploring some fundamental considerations
involved in ascertaining possible relations among directly
accessible event-components that collectively constitute
\
complete unified durations of subjective psychological
experience,
an event

. If we a.re to take Whitehead’s general notion oi

(here conceived as thinking ’homogeneously1 aoout

any given natural or bodily occurrence) defined as,

T,Wne never

and whenever something is going on1',"^ then it must be
conceded that such phenomena as ideas, for example, are
events,

m

Eence ideas, now conceived in our dipolar concep¬

tion of mind, has been proven to have a. 11 substantial
intrinsic na.ture defined as disciplined ideational feeling.
Further, we have seen that all ideational states have a

^Whitehead,

Concept of. .

°P»

C-Vjb ? P*

?u*

y/s>
universal form theoretically•characterized as the LOGICAL
FORM of subjective psychological experience, generally
comprised of perceptual

'contributions*

from stimulus-

objects concomitantly actualized with denotalive and
connotative symbolic meaning.
thoughts,

Therefore,

since individual

regardless of their intellectual content,

as complete units of meaning,

occur

they can be conceived as

particular events that embody a logical form.

Since the

actualization of subjective psychological events occurs
throughout temporal durations,

and because such events are

comprised, of event-components ascertained through exercising
a reflective effort, it is possible to (directly)
consciously locale and hence formally RELATE these components
within a four dimensional spatio-temporal scheme.

In this

way mental events occurring within individuals can be
spatio-temporally related to any other relevant components
of reality whether located within or externally from the
individual's bodily organism, and in addition, analyzed
according to their uniquely human developmental stages of
origination.

Let us now discuss some of the elementary

considerations regarding this schematism.
In figure 5 Whitehead suggests a model in which an
event (now conceived as thinking homogeneously about
nature) can be ideally restricted,
natural sciences,

for the purposes of

to a single mathematical point, and that

the point abstractly conceived in this way can be contem¬
plated in terms of their spatial and temporal routes,

as

these routes must be determined in conjunction with other

3?6

relevant spatially and temporally separated entities.
This idealized restriction does not, however,

entail a

distortion of the directly observable facts of nature as
they have importance for the natural sciences because
certain quantitative attributes of natural entities remain
FORMALLY constant regardless of the extent to which restric¬
tion is effected.

The arguments supporting this assertion

are presented, as it was mentioned,

in the third through-

fifth chapters of Whitehead*s Concept of Nature.

But it

must be kept in mind that his concern is primarily with
demonstrating that the mathematical end sta-tistical proce¬
dures for establishing certain relations among theoretical
entities of the natural sciences are,

in fact,

capable of

being derived from the perceptual deliverances of the
natural world if we admit the relativity conception of
spa.ce-time, a notion which is itself ultimately an abstract
derivative from the intrinsic nature of concrete experience.
However,

our interest in four-dimensional space-time is

primarily with the fact that it provides us with a theo¬
retical framework in which the relevant relations manifested
among (in principle) all possible event-components
CONSTITUTING PARTICULAR MENTAL EVENTS can be ascertained as
they evolve throughout temporal durations.

Thus our center

of interest is presently focused upon the intrinsic universal
structure of mental events as atomic ENTITIES in distinc¬
tion from Whitehead*s principal concern (in the quotations
cited) which is in demonstrating the necessary RELATEDNESS
among entities as a FACT directly perceived" in concrete

experience.

Therefore,

instead of representing mental

events as particular mathematical points (i.e.,

event

particles) as in figure 5? we shall characterize them as
four-dimensional rectangular solids in which eventcomponents can be related to one another in their modes of
emergence throughout given temporal durations.

The model

can be simply illustrated in the following way:

FIGURE 7

—
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A COMPLETE 4-DIMENSIONAL- 'SPECIFICATION OF
AN ATOMIC UNIT OF SPACE-TIME

From the four-dimensional schmatism,

three dimensional

slices of theoretically restricted spatial moments can be
abstracted in thought.

It will be recalled that these

spatial routes have instantaneous duration.

Thus
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• FIGURE -8

Abstracted spatial routes may be used for specifying given
reflectively ascertainable event-components constituting a
moment in order to systematically study the relations among
event-components within given events, and between mental
events (i.e.,

as mental events occur in relation to

stimulus-objects located in the natural world or the
percipient’s bodily organism).

FUMEBICAL EQUIVALENTS of

event-components occurring at given moments can be
specified as follows:
FIGURE 9

It should be mentioned that, In principle, all possible
event-components capable of spatio-temporal specification,
apart from their unicue mode of ingress!on,

are elements of

J l 7

THE CATEGORIES.

Also it is not difficult to see that from

this very simple four-dimensional spatio-temporal framework,
considered in conjunction,

for example, with such elaborate

systems as Whitehead’s geometrical and mathematical schemes,
a great many variations from this basic model can be
formulated in subjective psychological research.

This

completes our systematic analysis of the concept of an
’event’; we have seen that the four-dimensional schematism
offers the greatest possibility for rigorously ascribing
particularity to all conceivable concrete components of
human experience.

Section J4;
The task to be undertaken in this section is to
initially reconsider certain previously introduced constructs
developed to systematically define mind, and then submit
them to moderate revision.

In doing this we shall in effect

be enhancing our understanding of originally formulated
constructs through elucidating certain additionally important
implications of the concrete experiential components that
they represent. • This constructive possibility arises from
/
the fact that concrete experience is more extensively complex
than human intellect’s ability to subject it to exhaustive
exposition.
Heretofore we have been using a definition of mind
simply defined, as ’percepta concomitantly coming construc¬
tively to bear upon other percepta1.

From our previous

discussion it is readily apparent that this deceptively
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elementary definition has an indeterminate number of
ramifications.

But apart from this,

its great utility

results from the fact that it demonstrates an important
principle fundamental to our entire discussion on developing
a concept of mind as it issues from the structure of
directly perceived

subjective psychological experience.

Basically this principle necessitates that mind be regarded
as "more" than a refined compounding of sense data that
originate from- the natural world and as organic bodily
feeling.

It accentuates the fact that EMOTION,

specifically,

and more

HIGHLY DISCIPLINED SYMBOLIC EMOTION (idea¬

tional feeling)

is also a crucial factor in constructively

generating human thought.

Thus beyond the sensory deliver¬

ance of percepta testifying to the sheer contemporaneity
of the natural world and
emotional feeling,

states of pure organic and

there is also a clans of Qualitatively

more sophisticated percepta that symbolically represent
previously acquired

(learned) wisdom (logically conceived

to have correlative physio-chemical
in principle,

"storage" equivalents,

capable of empirical confirmation)

spatio-temporally endures,

that

and comes constructively

(synthetically) to bear upon any relevant contemporary
stimulus-occasion so as to profoundly enhance the subjective
'psychological meaning of that event.

This last class of

percepta with their CONSTRUCTIVE characteristic will be our
predominate concern in the remainder of the chpater.
ever,

How¬

the problem to be initially confronted regarding this
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historically problematic issue is in DESCRIBING accurately
the UNIVERSAL manner in which the constructively intrinsic¬
ally characteristic of human thought is accomplished.
However,

the successive task of presenting a plausible

EXPLANAT10N of the subjective psychological ‘’mechanics“
of constructive cognitive synthesis,

or stated differently,

of providing a possible explanation of how synthesis is
accomplished during thought-in-process, must be postponed,
to the next chapter.

Moreover,

emerge that our ‘descriptive*

the striking fact will

endeavor will also yield a

final formulation of the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psycho¬
logical experience,

or that essentia.! structure universally

embodied, within all possible human experience.

This will

be our completed concept of mind.
In the second chapter,

the extraordinary nature of

MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS was emphasized
specifically by accentuating the logically distinguishable
portion of our subjective psychological experience which
fills out consciousness with the strange but undeniably
efficacious classes of percepta' CONSTITUTING subjective
psychological MEANING.

It was argued that the ontalogical

emergence of this unique realm of MEANING from intrinsically
unconscious physio-chemical mechanisms is the result of
organic concrescence Involving the appearance of large
numbers of relevant organic propensities that synthetically
unite, hence yielding novel emergent phenomena termed
EEELING that permeates the human physiology.
increases,

As concrescence

it was further argued, qualitatively more

sophisticated levels of feeling also emerge,

the highest

grade being achieved in ideational feeling.

This feeling,

due to its intrinsic symbolic character,

can,

in turn,

promote progressively higher-ordered ORGANIC concrescence
even tnough mental processes themselves operate in accord¬
ance to a logically distinct (non materialistic-mechan¬
istic) mode of causality from that of physio-chemical
phenomena.

This is to sa,y that IDEAS cam cause higher-

ordered physio-chemical synthesis,

and vice versa.

Consciou

causality is rendered, possible because of MEANING-ASDIRECTLY-FELT- RELATEDMESS.
formerly been said:

This is to reiterate what has

that consciousness adds a new DIMENSION

to reality over and above the unconscious physio-chemical
domain.

MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS arises from

the possibility of human organisms to experience qualita¬
tively distinct emotional states, and further,

of imposing

a disciplined organization upon emotion by transforming it
into an elaborate system of disciplined symbols.

The

essence of these symbols Is the fact of their extensive
INTERRELATED^SS with one smother.

At primordial levels of

symbolic development a triumphant achievement is made by
each human organism-when it discovers that relevant groups
of undisciplined but familiar emotion conjured by a given
stimulus-object effect can be subsumed to a single symbolic
utterance that REPRESENTS the amorphous experiential unities.
*Tom

this,

the next equally important discovery occurs when

the organism realizes that symbols can be organized into
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configurations that -represent elements of experience; and
eventually, learns that symbols can be used to GENERATE,
hence IN THEi'lSELVICS BECOME novel experience.

Obviously an

immature mind comes to understand these extraordinary
developmental advances on a level commensurate with its
infantile capacities.

The point in all this is that

MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS experienced as a major
PORTION of symbolic meaning is primarily a vast, vaguely
conscious network of relevant symbols synthetically actu¬
alized into an atomic unity QUALIFYING a clearly conscious
focal point of denotative symbolic meaning.

The enormous

aggregation of CONNOTATIVS symbolic wisdom is conjured
almost instantaneously to consciousness -- hence filling-out
consciousness with a highly sophisticated yet vaguely
conscious sense of far-reaching meaning -- in the dynamic
process of thinking where denotative symbolic components
have only ephemeral temporal duration.

Thus the intrinsic

nature of conscious experience with its unique mode of
causality springs from the inextricably unified synthesis
of myriad vague symbolic ideational propensities that
reflexively accompany clean denotative symbolic components,
the collective actualization of which is CONTINGENT upon the
CONCOMITANTLY appearing stimulus-object EFFECT ingressing
into the consciousness of a human organism.

Conscious

understanding IS IN ITSELF the indivisible, directly
experienced net result of a bewilderingly complex configura¬
tion of ideational propensities synthetically emerging as
its constitution.

Since the TOTAL INTEGRATED unity IS

conscious experience

or more specifically, what we have

defined as a mental event —,

all of the logically possible

const!tuatire ideational propensities (or considered from
a physio-chemical perspective,

all of the logically possible

constituatrve organic propensities),

even if it were tech¬

nically possible to formally express these conditions,

could

not capture the exact subjective MEANING embodied in the
original, ontalogically particular occasion during which
the event was actualized.

This must be concluded for we

have previously proven that only the individual within whose
organism a given mental event occurs can,
(DIRECT) IMMEDIATE access to the event.

in principle, have
We are merely

saying that only individuals themselves can be the subjects
of their own experience.

However,

stated more rigorouslv
-a s

two dimensions of this issue-become evident.

First,

it has

been seen that from even a theoretically possible complete
physio-chemical specification of the organic propensities
underlying a given mental event, definitive statements of
the correlative mental state could not be analytically
deduced, hence rendering this mode of factual acquisition
a matter of empirical enquiry.

From this it follows that

there are two logically distinct phenomenal domains,

and

also since it was shown that ALL phenomenal ascertainment
necessarily presupposes a priori a, mind to perceive the
phenomena,

it must be concluded that mental events are

causally efficacious in that minds cause knowledge,
example.

Here we have, among other things,

for

an argument

demonstrating the impossibility of ANY behavioral science
becoming capable

(through intersubjectively verifiable

means, or otherwise) of knowing the EXACT nature of any
individual's mental event throughout any given temporal
duration.

Although the argument for this view was presented

in terms more appropriate to physiological sciences,

it

also is perfectly applicable to a Behaviorism in that the
latter dead.s with more macroscopic behaviors, but never¬
theless,

it methodologically accepts ONLY those phenomena

directly perceivable through the external bodily senses.
Secondly,

an argument predicating the PARTIAL PRIVACY of

mental events will be propounded by the writer; but one, as
we will see in later chapters, which shall have very
important implications for subjective psychological research
procedures.

Even if all the ideational, propensities (event-

components) participating in a given mental event could be
objectively ascertained through analyzing verbal reports
made by a subject (and as it has been shown,

this is an

impossible feat because (l) of the different spatio-temporal
locations of individual percipients,

(2) experience is more

extensive than mind’s capacity to symbolically represent
its components,
events,

(3) of the transitory nature of mental,

(4) there are emotional components of experience

that are presymbolic),

the exact nature of the mental event

could not be exhaustively objectively characterized.

Apart

from perhaps the fundamental recognition that direct
perceptual apprehension as experience-in-process is the
ultimate indubitable basis for the FACTUAL dictum ’that
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which is the case*,

there is the additional important

consideration that the subject’s verbal reports — the best
INDIRECT (and hence, practically the ONLY) means that we
have for coming to know about his inner states

are

perceived by external observers solely as SPOKEN DENOTATIVE
SYMBOLIC COMPONENTS.

This is to say that the HEARD

verbalizations are the intersubjectively (directly) vermable factual phenomena.

However, Behavioral scientists

(i.e., objective or subjective psychologists) do not, and
cannot in principle,

have direct perceptual access to tine

CONNOTATIVE or MEANING-AS^DIRECTLY-F^1>^LATED^,SS
COMPONENTS OF THE SPOKEN SYMBOLS.

IN ESSENCE, THEY CAN

DIRECTLY PERCEIVE ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF A SUBJECT’S
SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE FOR THEY HAVE DIR^Ci
ACCESS TO ONLY DENOTATIVE AND NOT CONNOTATIVE ASPECTS OF
SYMBOLS.

THEREFORE IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT BEHAVIORAL

SCIENTISTS CAN ONLY COME TO KNOW SUBJECT’S SPOKEN SAnKlS
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SCIENTISTS AS INDIVIDDALS ASCRIBn
THEIR OWN PERSONAL CONNOTATIVE MEANING TO THE ^UBJLCi^
’ CONT RIBUTED ’

(and. t he re f o r e f unc t i oni ng as s t i mulu s-OD]ect

EFFECTS in the individual minds of observational ^ClENil^iS)
DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC UTTERANCES.

THUS OBSERVERS’ ACCURACY OF

UNDERSTANDING IS A FUNCTION OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH TESIR

-

INDIVIDUAL CONNOTATIVE IN^RPREMTION OF SUMECT^S
CONTRIBUTED DENOTATIVE SYMBOLIC COMPONENT DEVIATES *R°SUBJECT’S CONNOTATIVE ASCRIPTIONS.

The implications of this

conclusion have enormous importance for any discipline
studying the meaning and usage of language and
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symbolic modes.

Without belaboring the obvious ramifications

of this issue, vie have only to recall our past discussion
on the meaning and method of SYMBOLIC DISCIPLINE,

and the

diagramatic representation of a hierarchy of symbolic
endeavors,

each manifesting an increased amount of symbolic

discipline as one proceeded to higher hierarchical levels
(see figure 1).

From an organic point of view it was seen

that increased symbolic discipline in a given system of
enquiry is a matter of the participating human organisms
developing reasonably close concordance among the configura¬
tions of organic propensities that are constructively
brought to bear to MEANINGFULLY enhance the bare contributed
contemporaneous stimulus-object effects.

From the perspec¬

tive of conscious experience this is to say that considerable
concordance is achieved by individuals with respect to their
interpretative ideational propensities,
ally,

or more specnic

the CONNOTATIVB meaning implicit within given

denotative symbols.

Practical instances of this disciplined

state of affairs are evidenced in operational definitions,
axioms, postulates, etc.

All these are devices designed to

effectively facilitate the extent to which individuals cam
develop similarity in their personal understanding oi
symbols and transformation rules.
The argument demonstrating the impossibility of exhaus¬
tively coining to know the intrinsic nature of subjective
psychological meaning from an external observational
perspective can be carried a step further.

Since,

over and

above the information that could be derived from an ideally
complete objective analysis of all the organic and idea¬
tional propensities capable of participating constituitively in any given mental event,

there would be

(in

addition) a class of information referring to the subjective
psychological states of individuals as they are known
through DIRECT acquaintance by the individuals themselves,
it ms b be concluded that this additional information
results from the EXPERIENCED UNIQUE NEXUS of propensities
as the;y are novelly a,ctuali zed in ontalogically pa,rticula.r
events, and are thereby directly perceived in their full
synthetic unity by individual percipient minds.
nexus,

Unique

referring to particular actualized configurations of

propensities uniting during given occasions,

is merely a

term again accentuating the fa,ct that the emergent elements
oi conscious experience cou3.d not be completely understood
in their full synthetic unity from even an exhaustive
specification of all relevant ORGANIC and IDEATIONAL
Propensities involved in a mental event.

Therefore,

to

scientifically study propensities ABSTRACTED from their
total unified nexus is to necessarily delimit,

and hence,

in varying degrees the COMPLETE FACTUAL ITY of any
Given occasion.

However,

on the other hand,

way that science progresses,

it is in this

for otherwise a discipline

would be required to comprehend theoretically "all relevant
Variables" before it could proceed with its enquiries; a
stipulation that is obviously unsatisfactory.

Now any given
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human organism has privileged (direct) access to his mental
states in the sense that since it requires TIME for complete
thoughts to become formulated,

and further, because even in

simple mental events beyond the fact that there may be many
denotative symbolic elements clearly evident in conscious¬
ness,

there are also a. multiplicity of substantive connote,-

tively meaningful ideational propensities ANY of which ma.y
SUGGEST a new mode of thought.

By this time it should be

perfectly evident to the reader that CONSCIOUSNESS is an
ontalogically necessary condition for ascertaining ANY of
the possible ideational VARIABLES that may causally influ¬
ence the direction in which any thought may develop
(although most of our thoughts are consciously habituative).
Thus to seriously think that a behavioral science could have
DIHSCT access to the many possible variables that influence
the course of a developing behavior is rather ludicrous.
Kowe'ver,

since our Behavioral patterns are most frequently

habitual, whether in silent thought or in manifest behavior,
a Behavioral science can make important determinations about
human behavior.

. The distinction cited with regard to the

many possible variables that can influence Behavioral modes
was made to emphasize our quite primitive understanding of
what creative thinking is, let alone understanding the
cognitive processes involved in its actualization.

It must.

"bo clearly understood that in an individual's privileged
Position with respect to his subjective psychological
experience,

ANY DENOTATIVE and CONNOTATIVE element of his
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vague-to-clearly conscious symbolic resources can operate
constructively in clear consciousness by being considered
in contrast to an extensive backlogue of accumulated
WISDOM,

thus,

resuit antiy generating novel synthetic idea¬

tional products capable of serving as stimulus-objects for
promoting further thinking,

or merely being stored in

memory pending conjuration on a more propitious occasion.
Therefore over and above the denotative symbolic components
periodically capable of direct intersubjactive verification,
there is an entire HISTORY of potential stimulus-objects
serving as the predominate private frame of reference from
which individuals can make cognitive Behavioral determina¬
tions.

Because psychologists frequently contemplate human

behavior as habitual and reflexive,

this may well be a

symptom (as it seems to be, as we have repeatedly shown in
this paper) of their unwarrantedly narrow conception of such
behavior.

It appears that with our importantly broadened

view of human behavior as considered by subjective psycho¬
logical theory,

,JUNPBEDICTABLS!!, hence constructively

reflective modes of behavior ought to be ENCOURAGED through
Behavioral engineering, not necessarily denounced as a
weakness in the power of scientific explanation,

for we have

only to consider the large number of stimulus-object vari¬
ables that are DIRECTLY accessible to individuals on given
occasions, while we as observers have only (often at best)
indirect accessibility.

This is a fact of'present human

Behavioral research that ought to be recognized and
oxpeditiously capitalized upon, not merely repressed.
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We have been briefly reconsidering the nature and
significance of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS as a
distinct class of percepta.

Our predominant concern in

analyzing this phenomenon has been in designating its
essential characteristic as being the "substance'5 of
subjective psychological, experience*

in this section,

beyond the fact that connotative symbolic meaning (arising
from the synthetic actualization of innumerable mutually
«

relevant ideational propensities occurring in response to
correlative stimulus-object effects) is the EXPERIENTIAL
essence of subjective psychological MEANING,

there is the

equally important fact that it executes a CONSTRUCTIVE
hence CAUSAL function*

It has been repeatedly argued that

the wisdom of the past is brought constructively to bear
upon the present occasion so as to enhance its psychologic¬
ally experienced MEANING.

This, in effect,

is to say that

previously established organic propensities (prior learnings)
having relevance for given contemporary stimulus-object
effects are REPLEXIVELY and' SYNTHETICALLY activated when
stimulated.

The mechanistic basis for this possibility is

in the physio-chemical STRUCTURE of the human organism and
is subject to experimental investigation.

But also an

emergent manifestation of this remarkable physio-chemical
synthesis occurs as subjective psychological experience.
Rowever,

in many of our preceding enquiries a reoccurring

conclusion has been that emergent psychological phenomena
are intrinsically different from their physio-chemical
correlates.

Therefore, with regard to previously learned
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wisdom (occurring as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS),
if it consists of ontalogleally unique,
symbolic feeling, and moreover,

emergent, disciplined

since it synthetically

infuses contemporary perceptual deliverances with symbolic
MEANING that would otherwise not be intrinsic to these
contributions,

the conclusion may be drawn that connotative

meaning CAUSES contemporaneously contributed percepta
(i.e.,

stimulus-object effects) to be MEANINGFULLY UNDERSTOOD

as intelligible actuality.

Here we have a conclusion that

is in need of considerable explication if it is to be
rendered systematically intelligible, however, because of
some further introductory remarks that have yet to be made,
it is necessary to postpone an elaboration for a brief
period.
One of the most fundamental assumptions upon which
our entire concept of mind rests is that in a reflective
analysis of concrete subjective psychological experience it
will be found that the COMPONENTS of mind-in-process can be
distinguished into logically and experientially distinct
classes of percepta, ultimately reducible to THE CATEGORIES,
which if their intrinsic perceptual nature and relation to
one another are carefully scrutinized,
theory of mind.

can yield an accurate

More specifically some implications of

this statement are as follows:
s.)

In the analysis of conscious experience
performed heretofore it was discovered that
to isolate the possible distinct CLASSES of
percepta that could participate in the
constitution of ANY given mental event was
in a. rude sense to comprehend the LOGICAL
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FORM of subjective.psychological experience.
This is to say that ANY possible mental event
must necessarily be a synthetic product of
*contributed* perceptual components issuing
from stimulus-objects located in the external
natural or internal bodily (viz,, as organic
bodily feeling, emotional feeling,.or idea¬
tional feeling) environments, a. connotative
symbolic perceptual component (including both
vague symbolic and emotional percepta), and
in MOST cases a denotative symbolic perceptual
component,
b)

Also an analysis of the percepta (’contributed*
directly as entities, properties, and relations)
comprising concrete experience, over and above
revealing the concept of a LOGICAL FORM that
is inherent■to all possible human experience ~r
a term implying PERMANENCE in that the FORM
is universally constant throughout all time
can yield an understanding of the concrete
SYNTHETIC PROCESS demonstrated in any given
particular event.
We have talked little of
how mental events may be synthesized out of
their basic possible components, for such
investigations must presuppose a clear
conception of the LOGICAL FORM of subjective
psychological experience.
This means that
before a discussion of mind-in-PROCESS can
successfully transpire, it is necessary to
develop an accurate understanding of THAT
which is in process.
It is the purpose of
this chapter to provide a final specification
of the possible perceptual components of mind
and the LOGICAL FORM revealed in their distinc¬
tive modes of ingression.
Therefore it is
only after this latter problem has been
resolved that an enquiry into the concrete
SYNTHETIC PROCESS of thinking can be success¬
fully undertaken; an investigation of the
PROCESS of thinking will be executed in
immediately following chapters,

c)

Hence a subjective psychology aspires to
give its account of human behavior by
initially indicating the LOGICAL FORM in
which human experience concretely occurs, and
the classes of perceptual contents with their
unique properties that embody the FORM; and at
a. second successive stage, to determine the
conditions from which possible laws of idea¬
tional synthesis may be established to system¬
atically characterize the PROCESS of thinkingbehavior.
This latter stage must rely upon both
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*

the powers of logical analysis in developing,
theoretical constructs and experimental enquiry
for validating hypothetical assertions.
It has been seen that all. possible percepta synthetic¬
ally constituting mind throughout ANY given temporal dura¬
tion can be classified as ’contributed* percepta or stimulusobject effects,

connotative -and

symbolic meaning.

(almost always) denotative

In their experientially actualized state,

the basic dipolar distinction characteristic of mind
(viz.,

’percepta concomitantly coming constructively to

bear upon other percepta’) is in evidence.
dipolar character,
specificity,

This essential

as it will be seen with increased

is on one hand an apparently naive view of

cognition; yet on the other hand,

it demonstrates an

ultimately important principle that will underlie all our
enquiries regardless of their technicality.
The format for the remainder of this chapter will be
largely one of ascribing new names to previously developed
concepts,

the principal modification being that the meaning

of certain concepts will be EXTENDED,

thereby rendering them

more inclusive in their power to explicate certain subtle
dimensions of concrete human experience.

An illu.stra.tion

of this was suggested in saying that, for example, we snail
broaden the concept of ’MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS *
by not only stressing its crucially important experiential .
quality of FELT symbolic relatedness, but also the equally
important property,

that this class of percepta actually

CAUSES our. personal awareness of reality to be subjective
psychologically MEANINGFUL!

Concisely stated, then,

the terra
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•presentationally immediate percepta*

will "be used inter¬

changeably with the term * contributed percepta*;
efficacious percepta’

will

supercede the terms

symbolic connotative meaning’ and
RELATEDNESS’;

1

causally

’vague

* MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-

’emotional feeling’ will be replaced by the

term ’causally efficacious emotional percepta’

and will

generally be regarded as implicitly contained within the
notion of can sally efficacious percepta unless stated other¬
wise;

finally,

percepta’
meaning’.

the term ’causally efficacious conceptual

will be used in place of

’denotative symbolic

A further important consideration is that

presentational immediacy

(PI),

causal efficacy (CE),

causally efficacious emotion (CEE),
conceptual perception
PERCEPTUAL MODES,

and causally efficacious

(CEC) are to be hereafter regarded as

whereas PI,

CE,

CEE and CEC PERCEPTA will

be considered as the classes of perceptual contents that
ingress via these modes.

Therefore the notion of a percep¬

tual mode merely indicates the WAY in which given classes
of perception participate as event-components of particular
mental events.

Finally,

although Whitehead in his later

writings used the terms presentational immediacy and causal
efficacy (and another term to be later introduced as
’symbolic reference’),
Lode,

his definition of each perceptual

while having much in common with those to be introduced

"by the writer,

should not be considered as identical in

Leaning with the writer’s formulation.
Once again,
to the reader,

although its restatement may seem redundant

it should be remembered since our concept oi
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mind follows directly from a careful analysis of the PERCEPT A
(occurring in inextricably unified configurations defined
as events)

that constitute conscious experience,

and

because these percepta reveal themselves such that they can
be subsumed to homogeneous or categorical classification,
then it must be clearly understood that in our analysis of
distinct CLASSES of percepta (viz.,

PI,

CE,

CEE,

CEC) we

shall be discussing their intrinsic natures in ABSTRACTION
from their concrete modes of occurrence.

This is merely to *

say that SINGLE classes of percepta NEVER occur in purely
homogeneous independence;
of mind as

that is,

the general definition

’percepta concomitantly coming constructively

to bea.r upon other percepta’ necessarily. demands that
perceptual actualization must at least occur in DIPOLAR form.
Thus we can never in mature intellect experience,

for

example, pure presentationally immediate percepta. without
its perceptual concomitants
and

’causally efficacious emotion*

* causally efficacious perception*,

as they ass synthetic¬

ally ingress into the contemporary emergent occasion.,

To be

consciously AWARE AT ALL demands that more than one percep¬
tual mode be constructively activated;

this is the principal

implication of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.

PRESENTATIONALLY IMMEDIATE PERCEPTA
An effective method for coining to accurately understand
the distinct classes of percepta that synthetically consti¬
tute conscious experience is in pondering AT LENGTH the
Mature of each class IN ITSELF AS IF TEE PERCEPTA WERE TO
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OCCUR IN COMPLETE HOMOGENEITY,
FROM OTHER CLASSES.

AS UNMIXED WITH PERCSPTA

This may appear to be a rather-question¬

able analytical procedure to some, but in fact,
a typical act of critical,
example,

constructive

it is merely

REFLECTION.

For

the method involved is no different than that

operating when a geometer conceives of a perfectly straight
line,

or a mathematician defines a point as that conceptual

entity having no extension through which an infinite number
of lines may be drawn.

Similarly we must conceive of PI

percepta as CLEARLY and DISTINCTLY appearing in conscious¬
ness during the ever-emerging PRESENT experiential occasion
Further,

these PI percepta are to be regarded as referring

to stimulus-objects LOCATED in either the external natural
world or internal bodily organism.

Also,

since PI percepta

are stimulus-object EFFECTS,, and we have said that these
effects

* conjure1

relevant organic and hence ideational

propensities to the present occasion so as to bring the
wisdom of the past constructively to bear upon the present
occasion,

the CONCOMITANT appearance of OTHER classes of

percepta (over and above PI percepta)

is NECESSARILY

CONTINGENT upon the occurrence of PI percepta.

inis is to

say that PI percepta are LO^ICJbLY PRIOJ to other classes of
perce-ota in that

* GIVEN PI percepta,

at least CnE and Cm

percepta must also Synthetically occur’
’logical antecedence*
cedence*

(this matter 01

in distinction from 'temporal ante¬

is a difficult one,

consequently we shall give

careful consideration to this distinction m future discu
for. it is basic to many problematic, philosophical and

'*

398

psychological issues').

Finally,

as percepta ’CONTRIBUTED*
located stimulus-objects,

PI percepta must be viewed

from externally or internally
Therefore,

there are five

criteria that delineate PI percepta from other classes of
percepta., namely

•

1)

clarity in conscious awareness

2)

distinctness in conscious awareness

3)

contemporaneity of occurrence

4)

logical antecedence in occurrence

5)

contribuity.

The first criterion implies that entities and their
CONCRETELY perceived properties and relations participate
VIVIDLY in consciousness such that their presence as
elements of given events is unmistakable in their partici¬
pation as self-contained'event-components.

For example,

to

SEE a green leaf as such in intuitive primordial experience,
INDEPENDENT of linguistic characterizations,
biochemical or botanical theories,

light wave,

is an indubitable percep¬

tual fact that will endure in self-evident truth value beyond
the CHANGING theories that have

(and will) be developed to

explain Its BELATEDNESS to other factors in nature;
the words

even

* green leaf* are an ABSTRACT portrayal beyond

the

more primitive subjective psychological experience of the
stimulus-object EFFECT in Itself,

However,

all PI percepta

do not manifest the vivacity of visual percepta.

In fc,c,u,

it is possible to designate three general levels of vivacity:
• a) those percenta delivered via the external bodily senses,
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b) those percepta delivered as internal organic feeling
(e*S*5 pains,

throbs,

etc. ),

c) and those percepta occurring

as ideational

stimulus-object EFFECTS,

generally occurring

as denotative symbolic components or causally efficacious
concepts formulated in PREVIOUSLY actualized experience -thus acquiring the status of becoming stimulus-objects -that enter into contemporary events as PI percepta (this
matter is quite technical,

therefore it will be developed

with increased precision as we proceed).
The second criterion ’distinctness in conscious aware¬
ness’

is closely related with clear awareness but in the

sense that perceptions of entities, properties and relations
ingressing through the PI mode can be perceived as distinctly
SEPARATE factors

(APART) FROM the more complex CONTEXT (the

entire factual circumstance of an event that is far broader
than mind’s ability to symbolically represent it) within
which such factors necessarily occur.
vividity of PI perceptual occurrence,
conjointly with the criterion clarity,

Thus apart from the
while conceived
is the recognition

that stimulus-object effects appear as discernably unto
themselves.

This is simply to say,

for example,

that we do

perceive chairs as distinct entities from the immediately
proximate table-,

floor,

wall,

and so on; we may hear a sound

a-s a distinct interruption in an enduring silence;
are distinctly variable in their felt intensity;
concept of

’green’

the concept of

throbs

a clear

is clearly recognized to be distinct from

’automobile’

/here we could once again

arrange these illustrations of distinctness-into a

hierarchical ordering in that,

for example,

the concrete

perceptual distinctness "between a table and a chair is more
readily evident than the concepts of 'wisdom* and
as they apply to human Behavioral states (e.g.,
raised m the Socratic dialogues^'/.

the issues

Thus distinctness as

it is in evidence in our perceptual experience,
higher levels,

'virtue'

and at much

in our cognitive discriminations among the

disuinct denotative meanings of various ideational stimulusobjects,

is intimately related to the human organismfs

abilicy to Discern CO NTRAST»

The fact that we perceive

coauras ting perceptions is of course largely contingent
on tne structure of our bodies as well a.s the heterogeneity
inurinsically characueristic of PI percepts..

This is merely

to say that if human organisms perceived only the colors
black and write, many visually contrasting instances of
perceptual differentiation would never Iiave been made.
But a discussion on the topic of contrast is quite complex
and would. 1 ead us far afield.
Since ’process’
nature of reality,

is a fundamental fact testifying to the

the concept of an immediate perceptual

presentation becomes somewhat problematic,
logical grounds.

at least on

We have seen that the ultimate considera¬

tions upon which our entire concept of mind is based are the
perceptions revealed in concrete experience.

More specific¬

ally we have theoretically analyzed experience into its
constituent atomic components, namely events.

Although

events can be analyzed into their constituent elements,

it

Was stressed that this is only achieved through critical,
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analytical and constructive reflection.

This is to say that

we do not experience' event-COMPONENTS as distinct atomic
unities,

ratner we experience complete EVENTS within deter¬

minate spatio-temporal durations.

The relevance of this for

PI percepts is that concretely speaking, such perceptions
’

E e s into subjective psychological experience "OVER TIME":

we do not typically contemplate PI percepta as occurring in
instantaneous temporal synthesis with concomitant CE,
percepta.

Bather,

this latter conception is a product of

theoretical imagination,
example.

as is the notion ’atom’,

Haring our experience, mind's gross,

apprehension of percepta,
permanence,

CEC

for

imprecise

occurring generally as change amid

reveals nothing of the "knife's-edge" of the

absolutely instantaneously occurring present JUST as it has
emerged from the past and is JUST about to proceed into the
iuture as a newly emergent present.
phenomenon that we,
particular event,
process,

-Bather an experiential

in retrospect, neatly characterize as a

is actually comprised of undercurrents of

localized permanence, groups of elements readily

amenable to symbolic characterization (thereby surviving to
constitute our recollections and characterizations of former
experiential occasions),

and finally vast expanses of only

vaguely apprehended percepta which because of this quality
frequently escape contemporary recognition.

Thus it should

be understood by the reader that the basis for the criterion
°f 'contemporaneity' as well as the other four criteria are
wot to be found as immediately evident properties of EVENTS,
i0}: these criteria designate universally characteristic
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propei^tics oi

classes of event-components,

througn careful analytical reflection.

formulated only

Therefore,

these

criteriological considerations essentially permit us to
construct a hypothetical model accurately comprehending,
an ideally immutable frame of reference
model itself,

(i.e.,

from

from the

functioning as an instrument for facilitating

validity and logical consistency in our reflective analyses),
the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience.
As a result of this theoretical possibility we are enabled,
for example,

to CONCEIVE of human Behavioral circumstances

(i.e., with regard to thinking behavior) in which any given
thought can be analyzed into its instantaneously concomitant
components, whose LOGICAL FORM can be analyzed into PI, CE,
CEC and

CEE perceptual deliverances, and the EXPERIENTIAL

PARTICULARITY of which can be EMPIRICALLY ascertained by
consulting the subject in question.

But since ALL perceptual

components of an event occur CONCOMITANTLY, how does the
\

criterion of

* contemporaneityf apply to PI perception?

This

problem may partially be resolved by saying that this
criterion stresses the spatio-temporally unique character
of the ever-emerging PRESENT OCCASION .ingressing into
individual organisms as NOVEL PI perception from external
natural and/or Internal bodily environments.

More will have

to be said about this criterion as additional qualifications
are made in defining the nature of PI perception.

The topic

will again be considered in the section of this chapter
entitled

“Causally Efficacious Conceptual Percepta".

•

Bey°nd what has been said about the criterion of

1logical antecedence1 we nay simply mention that its chief
utility is in accentuating the fact that we bring meaning
to bear upon a stimulus-object only (logically) AFTER the
efiects 01

tne stimulus object have ingressed into

consciousness.

This priority distinction is one of LOGICAL

NOT temporal significance in that given stimulus-object
effect A,

relevant wisdom A’

accompaniment) follows.
poinc is,

i or example,

(as a temporally concomitant

A simple illustration of this
tha.t we

(subjective psychologically)

MMI^i^fULLY recognize the ’green grass’
we are standing if we are,
natural perception.

of the meadow where

in fa.ct, directly experiencing the

Thus given the perception of a grassy

meadow, a subjectively meaningful awareness of the fact
issues from the CONCOMITANT actualization of percepta
ingressing into a percipient’s consciousness via the modes
of PI, CEC, CE,

and CEE.

We do not, unless there is an'

incidence of hallucination, directly perceive meadows that
are not,

in fact, before our eyes (however,

that is being developed,

in the theory

even such hallucinatory experiences

can be reconciled with the criterion of logical antecedence).
The reason for laboring over the issue of logical ante¬
cedence is that we are bordering closely upon the philo¬
sophical problem of ’causality*; certain aspects of which
we are compelled to consider in the problem of mind as it is
being conceptualized.

However,

it is inappropriate to discuss

the causality issue at this time for our concept of mind has
not yet been adequately developed, hence deferring the
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problem to future analyses.

However,

the logical ante-

ceaence issue will again arise in explicating the nature
of CEC percepta.
Finally,

it merely has to be mentioned at this stage of

argumentation that the criterion of 'contribuity' aeknovrledges the fact that percepta referring to natural and
organic bodily stimulus-objects /revealing themselves as
entities, properties and relations, and considered theo¬
retically as UNSXHBOLIZED (UNINTERPRETED) deliverances? are
— CAUSED (in the sense

of

being onta.logically brought into

existence) or CHEATED by mind..
EFFECTS,

They are obviously

or classes of percepta logically

distinct from those termed denotative symbolic meaning or
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-PELT-ESLATEDNESS.
qualification, however,

Some additional

is required in this distinction bv

showing

uhat causally efficacious conceptual percepta,

/having

(ALREADY) in the PAST been actualized,

and hence

ingressing into temporally successive events as stimulusobject EFFECTS ~~ THEREBY PARTICIPATING IN EVENTS AS
LOGICALLY PRIOR TO OTHER CONCOMITANT PERCEPTA7 must also
qualify as PI percepta for it fulfills the five relevant
criteriological requirements.

This matter shall be

r

elaborated as we proceed.
In a more general consideration of presentationally
immediate percepta, though still in light of the above
criteria,

it can be said that these perceptual data as

directly presented in their barren UNINTERPRETED state
(viz., logically prior to ANY symbolic characterization;
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antecedent to even emotional familiarity) would be mere
transitory flux.

- Process would incessantly manifest itself

amid permanence in the ever-emerging present.
explicitly,

however,

More

this is to say that PI perceptual

configurations which mature intelligence entitled as trees,
sounds,

specific shapes,

written words, pains,

ideas,

certain changes of state among entities and properties,
so On,

conceived logically in their pure state,

and

could never

be MEANINGFUL objects of consideration APART- from mind’s
symbolic power of representation (it will be recalled that
our definition of

'symbol'

also includes emotion whether

disciplined or undisciplined).

In fact,

it is logically

contradictory to even raise the question of whether pure
PI perceptual oojects can be KNOWN apart from mind's ability
to know them,

for the concept of knowledge necessarily

presupposes a system of symbolization to "be organized as
KNOWLEDGE which in turn presupposes A PRIORI minds that
gain intelligent organization via symbols.

The question of

whether stimulus-objects EXIST independently of mind can be
resolved3

as we have generally seen, by understanding that

stimulus-object EFFECTS are EVENT-COMPONENTS, but components
that are "given" or ’contributed1 from internal or externally
LOCATED regions.

Thus since mind does not CREATE,

sense of "bringing, into being",
minds do not create colors,

these components,

sounds, pains,

etc,,

in the
or that

in the sane

sense that minds CREATE or CAUSE subjective psychological
MEANINGFUL definitions and concepts,

it can be concluded

that there are stimulus-objects that correspond to the

k06

EFFECTS that are contributed to our minds as perceptions
(Note:

the writer does not consider this terse analysis of

the issue of stimulus-objects and their effects to be
adequately discussed,
careiully analyzed
Objects,

by any means.

The

topic will be more

in a later chapter entitled

Their Effects,

and

"Stimulus-

Subjective Beallsm").

We are

justified in considering PI percepta as LOGICALLY distinct
from other possible classes for this class is
(and also,

of course,

'contributed*

as a result of the other criteria

that distinguish them as a. unique class of percepta),

and

the class may be conceived as logically distinct without
necessarily being compelled to deny the independent existence
of minds,

or am external world,

possible pe?:*ceptual mode,

and

or consider PI as the only

so on.

Presenuationally immediate percepta,

then,

are those

contributions issuing from the ever-emerging PRESENT,
completely devoid of any element testifying to -’stored’
learnings from the past.

But considered LOGICALLY in their

independence as pure contributed percepta,

they are by no

means the entirely formless sensory "given" of which Kant
speaks.

For Kant,

pure sensuous intuition delivered

through the determinative modes of space and time demanded
with A PRIORI necessity that such intuition be subsumed to
his Categories before the perceptual matter could
INTELLIGIBLE form at all.
that our concept of

acquire ANY

But we differ from this view in

’contribution’

definitionally implies

tnat external natural and internal bodily PI percepta come
to us as event-components with their OWN INDEPENDENT
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(perceptual)

MATTER AND FORM,

and

thereby do NOT rely upon

MIND for their characteristic properties.

This is to say

that an immediately and directly perceived

(PI) perception

of a table or a pain,

APART FROM OUR SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬

LOGICAL SYMBOLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THEM* are

CONTRIBUTED

to mind with AN INTRINSIC NATURE OF THEIR OWN PROM WHICH
THOSE ENTITIES ACQUIRE PARTICULARITY IN THE SENSE THAT THEY
ARE ULTIMATELY THE ENTITIES THAT THEY ARE AND NO OTHER,
lor example,

the

’matter*

of a table considered as a VISUAL

presentation would by the array of colors that distinguish
it f.L0;:i oinner entities.

However,

the table is delivered

as visually “more” than a mere haphazard patch of colors;
rather the colors arc presented in an organized, permanent
'FORM*,

Again in the case of a FELT pain,

the

♦matter*

would be its occurrence as a PAINFUL FEELING as opposed to
a. PLmA.SURABLe feeling,
hand

on a hot stove,

for example.

Thus by placing our

the perceptual consequences would be

such that the essential experience of the burning, painful
perception would be intrinsically undesirable whether we
came to symbolically characterize the brute PI sensation as
a 'painful burning sensation*
’form*

or a ’cooling breeze*.

The

of a padnful perception would be its uniquely

characteristic quality,
piercing*
temporal

pain,

e.g.,

a

etc.

pain,

a ’dull persistent* pain,

(durational) property,

momentary,

’hot*

a * sharp or

etc,;

and its

e,g,,. as sporadic,

throbbing

The point to be made in the two above

illustrations is that

the direct PI EXPERIENTIAL properties
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of the two perceptual states are INTRINSIC to the percep¬
tions as DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED and are not,

thereby,

dependent for their MATTER - FORM characters upon any
constructive power of mind,

even though of course,

it is

contradictory and hence meaningless to speak of percepta
occurring

witnout yninds to stand concomitantly

against them'L

Further,

!,over

this conceptualization of the

nature of contributed PI percepta also establishes a funda¬
mental epistemological fact,

that all our knowledge,

existing psychologically as symbolic entities,
properties and

with their

relations ultimately acquires its logical

form from the entities,

properties and relations perceptually

ingressing into our subjective psychological concrete
experience as external natural perceptual deliverances,
internal organic bodily feeling,

and. emotional feeling

originally contributed via presentational immediacy.
Since throughout each of our personal conscious lives
we CONSTANTLY entertain perceptions from our external and
«

internal environments,

then it must be concluded that PI

percepta. ALWAYS pa.rticipa.te as event-components in subjective
psychological experience.

Generally most of these percepta

are so typical or matter of fact to cur daily experience that
they are rarely symbolically represented due to their
subtlety of occurrence and unimportance.
all

But nevertheless

such percepta must be understood as legitimate event-

components.
(undoubtedly)

Also as a further technical distinction,
it is only during the stages of early infancy

that anything approaching a ''pure” experience of PI percepta
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Is ~u--'1c''nPy possible,
* stored wisdom*

for at this level of development

is unquestionably minimal, with behavior

manifesting itself as predominately reflexive; wholly a
function o±
located

externally (natural) and internally (organic)

stimulus-objects.

Beyond this early level of

development the progressive disciplining of emotion
commensurately reduces the possibility of PI perceptual
purity.
In our analysts of the first criterion that distin¬
guishes PI percepta from other distinct classes,
the VIVICITY of conscious perceptual awareness,

emphasizing
the point

was made that although PI perception is EXPERIENTIALLY the
mosb clearly manifested class of the four possible classes
of perception it is nevertheless possible to discriminate
even more precisely among the levels of clarity manifested
by the percepta. specifically appearing through the mode of
PI.

A hierarchy of presentational vividity was posited in

that percepta- delivered via the external, bodily senses
were more clea.rly and forcefully distinguishable than those
occurring as organic bodily feeling,

and certainly idea¬

tional feeling experienced as stimulus-object effect.

To

these levels we may simply assign the definitional terms
*natural PI percepta*,

’organic PI percepta’, and ’ideational

PI percepta! thereby formalizing the within-mode distinc¬
tions to not only designate their particular degree of
vividity, but also to increase the specificity of the term
*PI percepta’.

Moreover,

in analyzing the first criterion
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an area in need of further clarification was mentioned,
namely,

that clear denotative symbolic percepts.,

or what

will be discussed in detail as
caiwonv a-p-p*
ctt> causally
ei ficacious
concepts

(CmC)

concents
"Rttat'iv v,
•
—~ concepts ALREADY having been synthetic-

ally actualized as such (or stated differently,

CEC whose

emergent particularity during the PEE SEN!' occasion is LESS
NOVEL clue to the fact that they were synthesized as
genainely unique ontalogical eaergents in a SPATIO-TEMPOHALLY
ANTSCEDENT events? can, after their indication,
ideational stimulus-objects.

function as

Although the reader (hereto¬

fore) has had little explanation elaborating the nature of
PI, Ci, CiC, ana CeE percepts.,

apart from the information

pertaining to the previously developed concepts from which
the present ones are refined derivatives -- thereby
rendering the following questions and the ensuing discussion
somewhat premature

the explicative benefits to be

derived from now analyzing the status of ideational PI
percepta as stimulus-objects will outweigh the difficulties
resulting from postponing the issue.

If the enquiry should

impress the reader as being obscure, it is not of great
consequence for we shall have ample opportunities for
reconsidering the matter .in various other contexts through¬
out this chapter.
The question to be analyzed is the following: If
■£j^ATIONA_L PI percepta are actualized CEC percepta functj-0 Hal 1 y o c cu r r i ng as s t i mulu s-objects AFTER ( SPAT 10_TEMPORALLY following)

their ORIGINAL inchoation as parti-

cular ideational entities,
as PI percepta,
are NOT

for it can be rightfully argued that they

*CONTRIBUTED*

in the same way that natural and

organic PI percepta appea,r:
rather,

can they legitimately be regarded

ideational PI percepta are,

synthetic PRODUCTS OP mind,

butions TO mind?

This question,

highly abstract way,

not INDEPENDENT contri¬

although stated, in a

is of fundamental importance in theo¬

retically demonstrating how subjective psychological
thought achieves COHERENCE and
again,

CONTINUITY in its processes;

two considerations that can be partially resolved

through a reflective analysis of the LOGICAL FORM of human
experience.

A first step in answering this question,

in

order to clearly designate wham we mean by ideational PI
percepta,

is to ask how it is possible,

for example,

to

distinguish between the PI perceptual event-components
ingressing into the two different mental events to which
the following two statements refer:
ca,se 1)

fThe house is brown*.

case 2)

* My concept of virtue caused me to...*.

In case 1) we may assume that the stimulus-object effects
of a house directly observed by an individual are ingressing'
into his consciousness,
(linguistically)
ment #1.

and he chooses to generally

characterize the effects by means of state¬

Thus a perception which we term *brown1

is

participating as a constitutive component of the individual’s
mental event.

But contrastingly in case #2,

there is NO

natural or- organic PI percepta such as those linguistically
v *

REPRESENTED as

* brown'1

or 'throb*

ingressing into the
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individual•s conscious experience;

rather there is a

FORMERLY LEARNED CONCEPT OF VIRTUE INGREELING AS AN IDEA1IONAL PI PERCEPTUAL EVENT-COMPONENT THAT, IN EFFECT,
PARTICIPATES IN THE PRESENT EVENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
5^™

m

£ATU|ffi OF THE CONCOMITANT CE, CEC, AND CEE

PERCEPTA THAT WILL BE SYNTHETICALLY UNITED WITH THE LOGICPI PERCEPTION TO PRODUCE A COMPLETE MENTAL
EVENI.

The ramifications of this conclusion are extremely

complex and numerous,

and actually, can only be adequately

understood after having completed this chapter and retro¬
spectively pondered the preceding conclusion at length in
light of the maze of argumentation presented throughout this
discourse.

For example,

even though the ideational PI

perception of *virtue* DETERMINES the nature of the addi¬
tional necessarily concomitant CE,

CEC,

and CEE percepta

that will be synthetically conjured as the RELEVANT IDEAilONAL PROPENSITIES (hence,

ORGANIC propensities) required

to produce a complete mental event,

the PI percept ITSELF

is contingent upon MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS (or
more appropriately,

what will be defined as CE percepta) for

its principal attribute of being clearly and distinctly
discernible in consciousness;

as it would be the case if the

percept was occurring as a denotatively clear CEC perception.
This merely means that ideational PI percepta must originate
as

'projected',

symbolically SIMPLIFIED (thereby consciously

clear and distinct) event-components in the same way that
ANY denotatively clear symbolic components must arise from
MEANIN'G-AS-DIRSCTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS or CE percepta, for if
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o-bjecls of understanding could not be clearly and distinctly
symbolically conceptualized,

human thought would not be

possible at all.

in the case of ideational PI

percept a,

Similarly,

if we could

not conjure clearly to consciousness

those concepts that have been FORMERLY learned,
thinking could not occur.

human

This is precisely the point of

our complex discussion heretofore.

,

Thus the problem still before us is to prove that
ideational PI percepts can validly qualify as PI percepts
m the sense of being legitimately
ANTECEDENT event-components.
with the definition of mind as

'CONTRIBUTED',

LOGICALLY

If we are to remain consistent
'percepts concomitantly

coming constructively to bear upon other percepts',
stated differently,

as

or

'CONTRIBUTED' percepts coming

concomitantly to bear upon the SYMBOLIC resources of mind,
then we must show that the bipolar definition when applied
to 2SM COGNITION -- that is, mental events containing NO
NATURAL OR ORGANIC PI PERCEPTUAL COMPONENT _

still remains

consistent with this type of human behavior (a mode of
behavior having NO directly intersubjectively verifiable
features indicative of its intrinsic nature as subjective
psychological experience,
thinking).

IF the behavior occurs as

silent

The primary importance of this issue is in

demonstrating in a logically consistent way that the
numerous IDEATIONAL CONCEPTS that we develop,

constituting

a large portion of subjective psychological experience,
in fact CAUSAL DETERMINANTS (stimulus-objects)
thinking-behavior.

ARE

in intelligent

The argument to be presented will

essentially follow from the five criteria designating PI
percepta as a logically and expertentially distinct clas
of percepta.

1)

Stimulus objects have been generally defined as
those ontalogical factors that are INFERRED to
yield.stimulus-object EFFECTS.
These ARE the
evenu-components or perceptions that constitute
our subjective psychological experience.
Stimulus-objects can yield ANY of the EFFECTS
encompassed within the domain defined as The
Categories.
Further we have DIRECT perceptual
access to EFFECTS of stimulus-objects for they
are known to us only through their possible
modes of ingressing into our mental events.

2)

The following schematism is a model that we
sha.ll frequently use hereafter to simplify and
more lucidly illustrate concomitant perceptual
deliverance in any given mental events.
Again, although we have not yet discussed in
detail the precise-meaning of CE, CEC, and CEE
percepta. the reader may for the present
discussion rely upon their understanding of
connotative and denotative symbolic meaning
as an adequate basis for the following model.

FIGURE 10

Figure 10 can diagramatically represent ANY
fully actualized mental event, thus
a)

PI are those percepta contributed by
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stimulus?-objects located in the contemporary
natural world, or bodily organism.
As we
have said they can appear as natural,
organic, or ideational PI percepta.
Also
they must meet the demands" of the five
relevant criteria designating PI percepta.
b)

CEC percepta .are what we have defined as
clear and distinct denotative symbolic
components in that they are the bare symbols
(usually linguistic) or groups of symbols
conceptually embodying a single IDEA
(e.g.j the concepts, 'Alfred Parker1, 'the
blue sky', *a feeling of happiness',
'a 1- b^ = c2, etc.), and conceived in their
barren symbolic form a.s logically separated
from MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS
or CE and CEE.

c)

CEE and CE percepta are the VAST configura¬
tions of VAGUELY APPREHENDED SYMBOLIZED
percepta reflectively understood and
IMPLICITLY FELT to infuse CEC percepta
with subjective psychological meaning.
In fact, this infusion of relevant percepta
CAUSES the subjective psychological meaning
of_a mental event in that symbolic
RELATEDNESS is the essence of CLEAR
CON CSPTU ALIY, AT I ON.
Moreover (since symbols -whether clear or vague -- are disciplined
EMOTIONAL feeling) to say that CE percepta
CAUSE subjective psychological meaning for
intelligent conscious awareness, MEANS that
the necessary conditions have been orovided
for SYMBOLICALLY UNDERSTANDING a given
occasion as CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE.
Thus
CE.percepta stand in concomitant"relation to
ideational PI and CEC percepta by CAUSING
their clear symbolic FORM as HIGHLT'sfldPLIFIED
symbolic focal points of clarity that enable
mind to reduce the extraordinary complexity
of a present moment ~~ THUS SACRIFICING A
GREAT MANY EVENT-COMPONENTS, THOUGH ALSO
RETAINING IN GREAT PART MYRIAD RELEVANT
(occurring as connotative•symbolic meaning)
SYMBOLIC COMPONENTS AS THEY CO-EXIST WITH CEC
PERCEPTA BY VAGUELY THOUGH POWERFULLY FILLINGOUT THOSE DENOTATIVE PERCEPTA WITH MEANINGAS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS -- to a SIMPLIFIED
symbolic focal point of clearly conscious
meaning.
This cognitive capacity enables
thought to CONSTRUCTIVELY PROCEED or ADVANCE
as conceptual development (constituted, of
course, of clear components accompanied by
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vague peripheries of symbolized-tounsymbolized meaning that recedes from each
ideational PI and CEC perceptual focal
point of clarity).
d)

CEE percepta are those highly nebulous
emotionally felt percepta that are too vague
to be symbolized.
However, when these
percepta ARE symbolized by analytical,
constructive reflection, they are thereby,
by definition, relegated to the status of CE
percepta.
CEE percepta are POWERFULLY
EFFICACIOUS by intuitively suggesting novel
modes of thought, , but they are a.lso
conspicuously efficacious with reference to
the highly nebulous though genuine perceptions
CONSTITUTING FEELINGS /in contrast with the
greatly intellectualized (hence clarified),
. precise LINGUISTIC DEFINITIONS/ of happiness,
love, sorrow, qualitatively distinctive
asthetic feelings, and so on.

e)

The above model, as it is graphically
illustrated, generally indicates the rela¬
tionships among distinct classes of percepta,
regarding the DEGREE of VIVIDITY or CLARITY
and DISTINCTNESS intrinsic to their charac¬
teristic nature as event-components.
This
is simply to .say, for example, that the
perception of a * red house’ as visually
perceived through PI is considerably more
clear and distinct than a perception of
one1s ’feeling of hopelessness’ perceived
via. CEE.
However, on the other hand, there
are instances where, for example, an idea¬
tional PI perception of ’virtue’ may be
less clear and distinct than its concomit¬
antly emerging CEC symbolic definition (with
its accompanying CE and CEE perceptual
components that "fill-out" „the definition
with substantive meaning) which may far
exceed in definitional precision a former,
more limited concept of virtue.
Finally the
AREA included within each concentric domain
is not proportionate with- the NUMBER of
event-components (i.e., symbolic and
emotional) functionally involved in each
class of perception.
This is to say, for
example, that the statement, 'The apprecia¬
tion of beauty is the source of by greatest
happiness in life', requires only thirteen
words to be stated as a CEC.
Yet undoubt¬
edly the many hundreds of symbolized concepts
concomitantly delivered as CE percepta

i
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constitute the connotative meaning that
fills-out the CEC percepta; hence CAUSING
the emotional-intellectual FEELING OF MEANING,
intrinsically characteristic of subjective
psychological experience.
Consequently, if
proportionate peripheral AREA was an
important consideration, then the area
included by CE percepta would be many units
larger than that of CEC percepta, for example.

3)

We shall now easily demonstrate the basis for the
conclusion that what we have defined a.s denotative
symbolic or CEC components, initially synthesized
as clear, distinct concepts on given determinable
spatio-temporal occasions, CAN THEREAFTER (AFTER
their original actualization as" particular —
i.e., CEC
ideational entities, hence acquiring
a legitimate ontalogical status among other
possible types of entities) REAPPEAR in THREE
distinct ways:
as essentially the " SAMEt! CEC /although
strictly (LOGICALLY) speaking, "sameness” is
impossible, if only because of the
DIFFERENT spatio-temporal location of the CEC7,
roughly discerned through reflection as
reappearing in spatio-temporally different
mental events.
There is nothing problematic
about this notion in that, for example, we
commonly RETHINK thoughts that have not
changed fundamentally over the years.
However,
again in a strict sense, CSC that are "roughly
similar" over time DO undergo modification
that IS determinable via critical reflection.
In this type of analysis it will invariably
be discovered that our entire conceptual
scheme of things constantly undergoes gradual,
though (regretably enough) not necessarily
important change.
Technically stated, this
slight but persistent change is a modifica¬
tion in the CS emotional and vague symbolic
(propensities) perceptual configurations
that constitute the MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT
RELATEDNESS causing the substantive meaning
of. CEC.
In .fact such notions as ideational
habituations (positive and negative) and
organic and ideational propensities are
grounded in the possibility of REPETITION
(within general limits) of Behavioral modes.
This is to say that CEC can reappear as
similar in the sense that the "sane" PI
perceptual stimulus conditions can conjure
the "same" relevant CE percepta which in
turn PROJECT the ’‘SAME" SIMPLIFIED causally

j
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efficacious conceptions (CEC percepta),
all of which ingress into spatiallytemporally DIFFERENT occasions from the one
of their ORIGINAL inchoation.
b)

as perceptually TRANSFORMED into a CAUSALLY
.EFFICACIOUS PERCEPT, in part filling^uT
the substantive connotative meaning of some
OTHER CEC.
Here the obvious fact is that
ANY causally efficacious perception —
vague by DEFINITION — has the" POTENTIALITY
of emerging as a clear, distinct CEC
providing it has relevance for a PI percept
(stimulus-object effect).
Thus a given PI
percept, occurring logically prior to its
concomitantly appearing classes of percepta
and ^functioning as a stimulus-object,
conjures relevant CE percepta as substantive
meaning, and from these CE*percepta a CEC
emerges as a clear synthetic product.
Conversely, if a once clear (by definition)
CEC js not raised to a clea.r and distinct
status upon a given successive occasion it
is obviously conceivable that it may have
some relevance for another- CEC appearing
concomitantly in a present occasion, and
thereby achieve the less consciously
distinct status of a CE percept.

c)

as an IDEATIONAL PI PERCEPTA, in that AFTER
their ORIGINAL synthesis as a CEC, CSC
percepta may REAPPEAR as ideational PI
perception occurring LOGICALLY PRIOR to .
other concomitant classes of percepta., hence
functioning as a stimulus-object that
determines WHICH Ideational propensities
(occurring as CE, CEE and CEC percepta)
will be conjured as relevant to symbolically
characterize the PI perception (Note: here
the RELATIVITY in meaning of the terms
1 stimulus-object1 and '*stimulus-object effect*
are in evidence, namely, that LOGICALLY
speaking from the perspective of *CE, CEE, and
CEC percepta any PI percepta are stimulusobjects to the extent that they DETERMINE
WHICH OTHER configurations of percepta will
be conjured as RELEVANT symbolic meaning.
But from the perspective of concrete subjective
psychological experience, PI percepta are
experienced as stimulus-object EFFECTS arising
from natural or bodily stimulus-OBJECTS that
cannot IN PRINCIPLE be directly known EXCEPT
through their EFFECTS.
This is a rather
complex issue that will be discussed in detail
in the next chapter).

i
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Thus we are remaining consistent with the
position that stimulus-objects cannot be
directly known in themselves (with the excep¬
tion of mind, however), but rather only as we
directly experience their effects as perceptions,
where the perceptions themselves are eventcomponents,
But in saying this what meaning is
to be understood by the concept of ’ knowing
things in themselves’?
It seems to the writer
that knowing things by their EFFECTS means
possessing an awareness of their mode of ingression
or participation in individual consciousness
(a view held by A. N. Whitehead, for example).
Consciousness, then, is comprised of eventcomponents each of which has a TERMINUS that
DETERMINES their ingressed character as
presentationally immediate or ’contributed*
perceptual components.
This is to say that our
thought does not cause the independently
contributed (thus unsymbolized) PI perception of
’green', for example; rather,'thought determines
how.’green’ will be symbolically characterized.
The case is similar for internal organic
bodily phenomena such as pains, throbs, etc.
Therefore, if our thought does not cause the
ingreSsed nature of stimulus-object effects,
and moreover, if the intrinsic nature of these
effects are determined by correlative termini
often located spatially apart from mind, hence
existing independently of mind, then if may be
concluded that these termini are the stimulusobjects that yield corresponding perceptualeffects matters such as halucination are
special cases — although still capable of
consistent comprehension by our formulations —
that will be considered later).
Therefore,
the issue of 'knowing things in themselves’
(’knowing* is used here more specifically in
the sense of 'experience through direct
acquaintance’) would seem to mean somehow BEING
the subjective psychological experience*of
stimulus-objects.
But if this means perceiving
internally and externally LOCATED stimulusobjects through their EFFECTS, as in the case
individual human beings, then we have made no
progress in understanding this problematic issue.
In any case, the notion of subjective psycho¬
logical experience with organisms less developed
than man seems purely a speculative issue for
man has NO PERCEPTIONS of such phenomena (exceut
INDIRECTLY, i.e., inferentially, in those few
instances in which we OBSERVE the behavior of
dogs, apes, etc,).
The reader may have noticed that the case
in which ideational PI percepta function as
)
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stimulus-objects was not considered..
This was
done so that special attention could be devoted
to the problem, for it demands a moderate
tempering*5 of the *contribuity* criterion.
a)

.

b)

•

c)

Ideational PI percepta are stimulus-objects
to the extent that they determine WHICH
RELEVANT IDEATIONAL PROPENSITIES will be
concomitantly conjured to meet the at
least dipolar criteriological standards
required for actualizing a complete atomic
event.
This is to say, for example, that
a formerly understood concept of 1 virtue*
CAN ingress into the present occasion as
ideational PI percepta, and therefore
ACQUIRE TEE STATUS OF A SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬
LOGICALLY MEANINGFUL CONCEPT BY BEING
SYNTHETICALLY UNITED WITH MEANTNC— ASDIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS OR CAUSALLY
EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTA.
But in this capacity as a unique class of
stimulus-objects, ideational PI percepta
do not possess the same DEGREE of
INDEPENDENCS Intrinsically characteristic
of"natural and organic PI perceptions, for
the former are synthetically CONSTRUCTED
by MIND in a long process of symbolic”
discipline.
Thus the subjective psycho¬
logical MEANING of the concept ’virtue*
a,s a ’contributed* event-component may
have undergone an important oefinitionaA
(evolutionary) modification, while ba.re
•natural and organic PI percepta are not
subject to this type of contingency on
mind: they ARE as they are directly percep¬
tually experienced and this is the stubborn
fact of the matter.
It is in this sense,
then -- in terms of the DIMINISHED^INDEPEND¬
ENCE of ideational PI perception compared to
its other two counterpart's as they relate to
mind — that the criterion of ’contribuity*
is somewhat tempered.
Since the LOGICALLY antecedent appearance
of ideational PI percepta functioning as
stimulus-objects determines the relevant
CEs CEE, and CEC percepta that will be
conjured to actualize a complete mental
event, we may raise the question. Because
ideational PI stimulus-objects are known
intrinsically, through direct PERCEPTION,
how is it that we do not DIRECTLY UNDER¬
STAND their causal DYNAMICS, involving the
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ACTUAL PROCESS OE 1 CONJURING* relevant
propensities?
Generally, the entire
conjurational process is DIRECTLY EXPERI¬
ENCED as REFLSXIVELY ACTUALIZED.
More
specifically, the problem may be resolved
by saying that it IS true that ideational
PI percepta are known DIRECTLY as STIMULUSOBJECTS, thereby rendering our RELATION
with these stimulus-objects as different
from natural and organic bodily stimulusobjects in that we directly experience
the EPFKCTS of the latter, but in the case
of ideational PI stimulus-objects we
perceive the stimulus-objects IN THEMSELVES.”
The question, then, is why do we not
similarly perceive the dynamics of conjura¬
tion?
Apart from physio-chemical
considerations which are IN PRINCIPLE
inaccessible as direct perception, it caw
be said that conjuration is a TEMPORALLY
COMPRESSED ASSOCIATIVE PROCESS refined to
such an extent that it is REFLEXIVELY
accomplished in tbought, thus obscuring
conjurational dynamics from conscious
awareness.
However, as a TEMPORALLY
EXTENDED COUNTERPART we need only refer to
typical reflective thinking-which is not
reflexively actualized.
Since reflexiveconjuration is too rapid for reflective
ascertainment, although its associated
elements must be regarded as ELEMENTS of
ATOMIC thoughts, it may be concluded that
we CANNOT IN PRINCIPLE EXCLUSIVELY (directly)
perceive SINGLE ideational PI stimulusobjects for they are event-COMPONENTS, while
mind is actualized ONLY as COMPLETE EVENTS.
Thus in this sense, ideational PI stimulusobjects are rendered as singularly unknowable.
The ideational PI percept is directly experi¬
enced within the ENTIRE CONTEXT of a complete
mental event, and can only be isolated as a
distinct EVENT COMPONENT through analytical
reflection.
Therefore it must be concluded
that COMPLETE MENTAL EVENTS occurring within
the minds*” of individual human beings are the
ONLY cases in which STIMULUS-OBJECTS or
THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES can be known through
DIRECT ACQUAINTANCE, and therein be CONCRETELY
EXPERIENCED AS CAUSALLY GENERATING OTHER
'NOVEL STIMULUS-OBJECTS
NAMELY”CEO PERCEPTA WHICH CANNOT SINGULARLY IN THEMSELVES BE
UNDERSI'OOD AS CAUSAL AGENTS. '
d)

Another problem reveals itself at this point
for it has been maintained that ideational
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PI percepta occur logically prior to other
concomitant CE, CEE, and CEC percepta because
these latter classes of percepta ACQUIRE
their unique conjurational determination as
a group of synthesized propensities FROM
ideational PI percepta occurring as a
stimulus-object, thus designating WHICH
propensities our of the potentially vast
available resource will be selected as
RELEVANT.
To illustrate this function of
PI percepta, using a NATURAL PI stimulusobject, when the contributed color ’red7,
for example, ingresses into our consciousness,
the subjective psychological MEANING that is
REFLEXIVELY ascribed to the ingre s sed stimulus~
object effect is certainly not that defining
’clog7, or the color ’blue’, or the ’face of
God:; it is obviously the symbolic charac¬
terization, ’RED’.
This simple illustration
demonstrates the DETERMINATIVE effect of PI
percepta in terms of WHICH propensities will
be reflexively deemed RELEVANT.
From this,
the problem at hand can be clearly formulated.
In past discussions on symbolic development
it has been repeatedly affirmed that denota¬
tive meaning or what is now also termed CSC
are SIMPLIFIED, EMERGENT, CLEAR SYMBOLIC
ELEMENTS that have been SYNTHETICALLY
‘PROJECTED’ from MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELTRELATEDNESS or what we presently define as
CE percepta.
Therefore CEC percepta
LOGICALLY FOLLOW the appearance of CE rercenta,
for they are CAUSED BY CE percepta.
Also we
have argued that ideational PI percepta are,
in effect, CEC percepta occurring spatiotemporally AFTER their ORIGINAL actualization.
Thus the problem is the following one? we are
compelled ALSO to say that ideational PI
percepta are CAUSED by CE percepta., in the
sense that as clear and distinct percepta
they are SIMPLIFIED, ’PROJECTED’ PRODUCTS of
CE percepta.
Consequently, CE percepta must
be regarded to occur LOGICALLY PRIOR to^
ideational PI percepta, apparently leading
us into a serious contradiction (for it violates
the fourth criterion designating PI percepta).
To refer to our former illustration, how
could it be that it was NOT the Ingression
of ’red’ PI percepta that caused us to
symbolically characterize the directly
perceived phenomenon as, in fact, ’red’?
Similarly, using an example specifically
involving ideational PI percepta, how could
it NOT be true that in the train of thought
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1 My name is John Stevens’, for example, the
subjective psychological MEANING experienced
by an individual in the initial stages of the
event -- viz., ’My name is’ — did not ingress
into the later state -- viz,, ’John Stevens' -in such a way as to DETERMINE THE FACT THAT
* JOHN STEVENS’ WOULD BE THE NAME DESIGNATING
* MY NAME IS5.
It is a concrete FACT of
experience that COHERENCE and CONTINUITY in
thinking are evidenced in our thought
processes, and that these rational properties
result from the FACT that individual MINDS
are CONSCIOUSLY and INTELLIGENTLY AWARE of
their subjective psychological proceedings.
This is to say that an individual does not
forget that his name is 'John Stevens’, for
example, when he has progressed to articu¬
lating the phrase, 8My name is’.
More
generally speaking, if vie could, not conjure
relevant portions of past knowledge in their
CLEAR CONCEPTUAL FORM (viz,, as ideational
PI percepta) thought could not advance at
all.
Because, for example, is it not our
PREVIOUSLY established conception of ’VIRTUE’
that, in effect, provides the preparations!
basis for the MORS CLEAR or LOGICALLY REFINED
CONCEPT (of virtue) which springs into
consciousness as a newly synthesized CSC
perception.
Thus the problem to be resolved
and it must be resolved, for logical ante¬
cedence of PI percepta is required to coincide
"with the concrete facts of experience -- has
been formulated.
The resolution may be stated
as follows:
1)

It LS true that ideational PI percepta
presupposes the synthetic ’projective’
power of CE percepta, thereby rendering
the latter class of percepta logically
prior to the first.

2)

But the crux of the matter lies in the
fact that the CE percepta necessary for
generating the ideational PI percepta
in question were 'CONTRIBUTED5 by a
temporally ANTECEDENT mental event which,
in effect, OVSREAP S the contemporary
event, consequently ingressing into it,
and thereby contributing the ideational PI
perceptual component (functioning in the
contemporary event as a stimulus-object)
determining WHICH propensities will be
deemed relevant for completing the
contemporary event'.
In this way the
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ideational PI perceptual component can
STILL be regarded as LOGICALLY prior to
its concomitant CE, CEF, and CEC components
for it arises from,- so to speak, a more
PERVASIVE, or SPATIO-TEMPORALLY ENDURING
op CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS “PERCEP¬
TION THAT CAN TEMPORALLY EXTEND OVER MANY
PARTICULAR EVENTS:
This ~^7hirin“
substra/tum’ of CE percepta will be analyzed
and schematically represented j.n the
section entitled ’’The Theory of Layers’*.
It may be argued that this solution is an
unsatisfactory one for it involves us in
an infinite regress, logically speaking.
This is true stated as such for the solu¬
tion has been inadequately developed; a
condition, in turn, resultanting from a
heretofore insufficient exposition of the
nature of^ CE percepta.
It-will be shown,
however, In future chapters that the
durational characteristics of CE percepta
and their modes of appearance are typically
sporadic in their occurrence, primarily
as a result of the unpredictable schedule
in which external and’ internal stimulusobject effects ingress into human
organisms thus commensurately disrupting,
or on the other hand, intruding novel
factors into subjective psychological
thought processes.
Therefore from a
purely logical point of view ~~ at this
point in the discussion --- our prouosed
solution to the ’logical antecedence’
issue seems to lead to an infinite regress.
The writer, however, maintains that
unwieldly concrete experience does not
always avail itself to the neat system¬
atization of our often overly simplified
logical edifices.
Thus the writer holds
that the apparent logical difficulty
will be resolved through a more compre¬
hensive exposition of relevant concrete
experiential facts which we shall endeavor
to present in future chapters.
)

Now with respect to the problem originally
raised to which this argument is addressed
(namely, to prove that ideational PI percepta,.
in the sense of being legitimate ’contri¬
buted’, LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT event-components,
can qualify as genuine PI percepta similar to
those presented immediately as natural and
organic bodily PI percepta), it seems as though
we are close to a solution.
The issue is an
important one for although it is readily
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obvious to most of us that the ingression into
our conscious experience of a ’tree* or
’throb1 stimulus-object effect, for example,
is the causal basis for symboli colly charac¬
terizing each as ’the tree’ or ’the throb*,
it is not so readily apparent that a.
FORMERLY established CONCEPT (an ideational
PI percept functioning as a stimulus-object)
of ’virtue’, for example, should be the
CAUSAL basis for the emergence of an
intellectually more suitable CEC of ’virtue’
originating in a SUCCESSIVE mental event,
into which the less adequate concept of
’virtue’ ingressed as an ideational PI
perception.
From the arguments presented
above, we ma,y now arrive at a conclusion by
saying that:
1)

We have tempered the ’contribuity*
criterion by showing that ideational PI
percepta fulfill the DIPOLAR standard
necessary for a mental.event in basically
the same way as natural and organic PI
percepta do, except with the warranted
qualification that ideational PI percepta,
do not possess the rigid ontalogical
INDEPENDENCE — in the sense that their
intrinsic nature as ’contributed’ percepta
is contingent upon the synthetic power
of mind ~~ characteristic of natural and
organic PI percepta.

2)

Ideational PI percepta conceived as
stimulus-objects cannot be directly
■perceived SINGULARLY AS SUCH for theyare COMPONENTS of EVENTS and therefore
must be understood (in their function of
causally determining WHICH CE, CEE, CEC
propensities will be conjured to fill-out
the subjective psychological meaning of
an event) as COMPONENTS, consciously
ascertained ONLY within the far broader
perceptual context in which they occur;
viz.,'the entire mental event.
This is
to say that ideational PI percepta can
’ only FUNCTION as stimulus-objects within
the consciously intelligible context
of a complete mental event.
It means
that the precise manner in which ideational
PI percepta determine WHICH propensities
must be conjured as relevant cannot be
explained at this time for we have not yet
discussed the nature of CE percepta, their
dynamics of synthesis, and moreover, we
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must introduce the ’Theory of Layers’.
Hence at this point, the ultimate appeal
for determining the cogency of our
theoretical formulations is concrete
experience.
The ’logical antecedence’ issue was
resolved by saying that ideational PI
arises from pervasively enduring CE and
.CEE percepta capable of persisting (as
substrata constituted of vague yet
powerfully efficacious percepta)
throughout many events.
Again the
ultimate ground for verifying this
contention is concrete experience (the
theoretical explanation for this view as
it has relevance for mental events,
conceived as concomitantly comprised of
PI, CSC, CE and CEE percepta, will be
presented as ’The Theory of Layers’).
Specifically, for our present analysis,
this means that it is possible for
previously actualized event-components to
ingress into contemporary events by over¬
lapping them, thereby entering into the
present occasion in a LOGICALLY antecedent
manner as an ideational "Pi element that
can DETERMINE WHICH ADDITIONAL PROPENSI¬
TIES MUST BE CONJURED, while yet remaining
. DISTINCTLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE CE, CEE,
and PARTICULARLY CEC percepta that
LOGICALLY SUCCEED the ideational PI
percepta. ■ Therefore the original problem
which we had undertaken has been resolved.
The resolution although complex and often
abstract is, however, in direct concordance
with the testimony of concrete experience
in that it is QUITE CONSCIOUSLY EVIDENT TO
US THAT OUR PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED, CLEARLY
CONSCIOUS CONCEPTS ARE FOREMOST IN
IMPORTANCE AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MENTAL
EVENTS, BUT THEN LOSE THEIR POSITION OF
PROMINENCE AS THIS COMPONENT FLOWS INTO
ITS DISTINCTLY UNIQUE SUCCESSOR (FOR
WHICH'IT~ HAS PREPARED THE WAY) THAT EMERGES
IN A LATER STAGE OF THE SAME MENTAL EVENT.
A major reason for considering this
phenomenon in such great detail is that we
want its logically ascertainable basis
clearly explicated so that the rigorous
constructs to be developed for explaining
this transformative process may rest upon
a firm, logically consistent foundation.
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f)

In this last stage of our argument, a summary
remark will be made particularly with
reference to how the resultant solution
manifests itself in concrete subjective
psychological experience.
Hence it should
be realized from the preceding analyses that
the term ‘CEC percepta’, by definition and
through experiential verification,
PRESUPPOSES that it is only as a result of
ideational PI percepta determinately
conjuring relevant propensities that
symbolically enhance and thereby make
possible its CLEAR, MEANINGFUL actualization
as a subjective psychological event-component,
that CEC can SYNTHETICALLY EMERGE AS A
LOGICALLY SUCCESSIVE EVENT-COMPONENT AT ALL.
In short, this is in a sense demonstrating
the LOGICAL FORM for the CONSTRUCTIVE ADVANCEKENT for PROCESS) OF THOUGHT during' future
spatio-temporal occasions..
Stated differently,
if overlapping CE percepta did not FREQUENTLY
(NOTE; NOT necessarily ALWAYS) synthetically
project CLEARLY and DISTINCTLY ascertainable
ideational PI percepta (thus functioning as
stimulus-objects) into consciousness during
the initial'stages of mental events, thenthought could NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY PROCEED AT
ALL.
Simply stated, this means, for example,
that if the linguistic symbols ‘My nam.e is*
could not be clearly conceptualized, the
subjective psychologically meaningful phrase,
‘John Stevens*, could never be MEANINGFULLY
articulated.
From this we can conclude that
CEC acquire their emergent actualization, as
it has been formerly said with reference to
denotative symbolic meaning, by being
synthetically ‘projected* (in coalescing
organic propensities as transcendent
concrescence) from that configuration oj CE
percepta designated as relevant to the idea¬
tional PI percepta which LOGICALLY PRECEDED
its clear emergence as a stimulus-object.
Of course an analysis- of the theoretical
mechanisms needed to explain this synthetic
emergent -process must be postponed to future
discussion until sufficient theoretical
preparation has been made to systematically
analyze such notions as ‘projection’, ‘layers’,
‘overlap’, and so on.
But again, lest the
reader think at this point that we are
ens’p'ainp’ In mere irresponsible speculation,
a concrete undeniable fact of experience is
simply that THOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVELY ADVANCES AS
A FUNCTION OF THE CONSCIOUSLY -REFLECTIVE
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DETERMINED EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING c
Yesterday’s thoughts do not EXACTLY repeat
themselves in the future.
Granted, human
thinking does too often fall into seriously
stagnant habituative modes when the problem
is viewed macroscopically, but a meticulous
scrutinizalion of the problem reveals that
such is not the cane.
Any new learning is
evidence of intelligent, consciously reflec¬
tive ideations.! advancement.
Theoretically
conceived, our personal experience is
necessarily unique with the passing of each
moment if only because of the dynamic ingressed
perceptual effects of the natural world and
our bodily organisms as they a.re concomitantly
actualized, AS our experience, into coherent
and continuous atomic events.
But stated so
generally, this fact can hold true for many
high-ordered organisms.
In a sense we
obscure the uniquely distinctive nature of
man by this partial characterization.
For
man experiences, more specifically, the
ingressional effects of ideational PI percepta
synthetically accompanied by the SYMBOLIC
wisdom of past learning (as CE percepta)
which in its extraordinary capacity for
INTERRELATION provides the powerfully lucra¬
tive grounds for generating novel CEC, clearly
pointing the way for further cognitively
constructive advancement.
Thus to not recog¬
nize that our past SYMBOLIC learnings
(occurring as CE and ideational PI percepta)
enter into the present subjective psycho¬
logical experiential occasion in such a way
that there is the possibility of finding a
novel solution to a given problem as a result
of one’s reflectively determined efforts
during the temporal lapse of the contemporary
occasion (or event), is to overlook one of
the most obvious facts about human existence.
However, to attempt to theoretically EXPLAIN
how this constructive endeavor specifically
occurs is an undertaking of enormous diffi¬
culty and complexity -- as our enquiries
we11 indIcate.
The AB ST RACTNESS of this
task is a necessary consequent of a tacit
unwillingness to deny the fact that the
conscious thoughts of individual human beings
play a causally determinative role in
influencing their behavior.
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CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTA
It is obvious by now that CE and CEE percepts, s,re in
evidence in our experience as event-components and are
thereby accessible to direct reflective conscious analysis.
Also as we.have recently seen PI percepta are the meaning¬
fully bare,

symbolically uninterpretedimmediately presented

contribution from the external natural world or the internal
organism;

and further,

fact that their clean,

indirect reference was made to the
distinct,

and contemporaneous mode

of occurrence was also characteristic of CEC percepta.

Thus

it is in CONTRAST with PI and CEC perceptions that CE
percepta will be analyzed.

Cur method of explanation shall

be one that will systematically elaborate the concept of
vague symbolic connotative meaning by introducing appro¬
priate theoretical constructs emphasizing the CAUSALLY
CONSTRUCTIVE or synthetic character of this class of
percepta as well as that of RELATEDNESS.

It is this idea-

tionally synthetic aspect of mental experience, whereby vast,
previously learned relevant symbolic resources infusively
enter consciousness as ideational propensities synthetically
uniting with PI and CEC percepta as coherent and continuous
mental events occurring in spatio-temporal succession,
that contributes (beyond the FELT CEE perceptual character)
the intellectually innovative quality to human experience.
MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS was a term specifically
designed to accentuate and hence define the ontalogically
unique phenomenon of consciously intelligible emotionalsymbolic awareness,

invariably exceeding the limits of human
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understanding in terms of its subtle experiential breadth.
But in our present analysis vie must transcend this basically
descriptive characterization and explore the constructive
nature of meaning-as-directly-felt-relatedness,

that is,

the manner in which it CAUSES SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
LEANING must be investigated.
important function,

Because of this additionally

the term 'meaning-as-directly-felt-

relatedness’ was redefined as

* causally efficacious

perception1.
Minimal,

dim conscious awareness is the first emergent

appearance of what is definitionally regarded as CEE
percepta.

At this very low presymbolic,

amorphous emotional

level conscious awareness essentially means that primordially
PELT subjective psychological experience is such that given
constituent components are directly perceived as being in
some sense sufficiently IMPORTANT to gain an organism’s
attention.

Thus it is in becoming AWARE that experiential

components have variable (perhaps)

CONSPICUTTY,

and there¬

after, becoming capable of making gross discriminations
among components that the sense of IMPORTANCE arises.
doubt the INTRINSIC primitive desirability of
the undesirability of
emerging recognitions.

’pain’

No

’pleasure’ and

is a guiding factor in these

This developmental process was

discussed in moderately greater detail in our previous
analysis of the

’sign stage’ of symbolic acquisition.

Another way of conceiving ’minimal awareness*

is to concep¬

tualize a given stimulus-object as being of sufficient
ingressional intensity in its EFFECT upon an organism that
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the stimulus-object effect is neurologic ally stored for
future recollection.

Of course it is impossible at this

time to empirically verify this storing process;

however,

from rough observation of organisraic behavior it is easily
determined that prior learnings do in fact effectively
influence presently emerging behavior.

The primitiveness

of this learning process as it is INFERRED to represent
infantile subjective psychologies.! experience cannot be
overly stressed.

We are engaging in the difficult and often

erroneous endeavor of crudely portraying presymbolic subjec¬
tive experience in which the only degree of consciousness
that can be supposed to exist is a sporadic emotional class
of percepta predominately determined, with regard to its
differential qualitative states, by the nature of natural
and organic PI percepta that are themselves,
dimly evident.

at best,

only

This domain lies far below the realm of

symbolically disciplined emotion,

and yet v-ie are exposition-

ally constrained to the instrument of language in attempting
to accomplish this explanation.

Thus much unavoidable

linguistic sophistication permeates our analysis merely
because we are using language as a means to conduct cur
speculations, but nevertheless, vie still have some diminutive
understanding of infantile states through both careful
observation and reflective analysis of our personal inner
states.

It is not being maintained that an immature human

organism makes "intentionally aware efforts

to

see>v out

meaningfully important" elements to make certain that the
important elements are "rationally committed

to memoiy for

the

"specific purpose of utilizing them for future intelli¬

gent enquiry".

These,

obviously,

are Behavioral acts

characteristic of mature symbolic intelligence.

Rather,

the primitive recognitions are undoubtedly far more
consciously indeterminate and grounded in basic reflexive
capacicies spontaneously operative merely due to the human
organism's intrinsic STRUCTURE.

It would, seem at this low

level of conscious awareness that the perceived effects of
objects of .importance are frequently UNWITTINGLY stored in
an automatic, undeliberated,
At the * sign stagef5
unsymbolized,

subtle and cumulative manner.

the mere process of recording both

and 1ater,

symbolized data appears to be

exclusively in evidence, while the more advanced concern
for RELATING the collected

(and hence stored.) data must

await the next major maturational advance.
The possibility for MEAN!NGFULLY relating neurologically stored perceptual information,

as this phenomenon is

contingent upon conscious experience,
of REFLECTIVE consciousness.

is solely a function

This mext major intellectual

advance in human organ! sia * s symbol i c und erstand ing entai 1 s
that an organism is capable of entertaining presently
ingressing PI percepta while concomitantly recollecting an
infusion of conscious perception pertaining to information
learned in the past.

Since PI percepta function as

stimulus-objects -- and this' is clearly evident in concrete
experience, whether in terms of natural,
ideational

organic,

or

(including emotion) PI percepta -- all relevant

stored ideational and/or emotional propensities are

ESFLEXIVELY CONJURED to the ingressed

effects thereby

providing the grounds for reflective conscious synthesis;
resultantly,

a more complex emotion or concept emerges

(typically as CSC).

At infantile presymbolic levels an

infant would visually experience the ingression of

’mother*

stimulus-object effects while an infusion of concomitant
CE percepta corresponding to the linguistic terras
ness*,

* exci tement1,

feeling of hunger1,

5

security*',

etc.

ential encounters with

’happi¬

’resolution of the painiul

— all learned in many prior experi¬

’mother*

stimulus-object -- would

reflexively and SYNTHETICALLY come to bear upon the PI
perception;

hence ENHANCING ITS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL

EMOTIONAL MEANING FAR BEYOND THE MEANING OF THE PI PERCEP¬
TION CONSIDERED SOLELY IN ITSELF
would be inherently meaningless).
ment,

(which,

strictly speairing,

At this stage 01

develop¬

vaguely conscious FAMILIARITY of a given PI perception

js the crude origin of reflective consciousness because
conditions for synthesis are in evidence.
PI

uhe

No longer is the

o
’mother* perception an undifferentiated percept amon?cr

innumerable others;

rather,

infusion of CE percepta,
ADDITIONALLY,
hauniness,
security",

the

due to the concomitant reflexive
’mother perception*

is,

CAUSED to be experienced as "mother-is-

"mother-is-pleasant excitement”,
"mother-is-pleasure",

these many RELEVANT associations,
with the bare PI

and so on.

Thus when

in concomitant conjunction

’mother’ perception,

UNDERSTOOD AS RECIPROCALLY RELATED,
SYNTHESIS has occurred.

"mother-is-

have been CONSCIOUSLY

REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS

This same principle holds true for

ALL subjective psychological experience regardless of its
level of sophistication.
From our immediately preceding analysis,

it can be

seen that the emergent subjective psychological states in
which infants experience the emotional URGES of 11MPORTANCE*
and later ’FAMILIARITY*

are possible in their functional

capacity as emotional stimulus-objects because of a backlogue
of slowly accumulated experience which,

after a necessary

amount of physiological maturation has occurred,

is brought

constructively upon PI percepta in such a way as to CAUSS -—
in the sense of 'bringing into being as an original,
ontalogically unique

(symbolic) entity* -- the phenomena

of IMPORTANCE and FAMILIARITY.

Again,

an illustration of

this synthetic process is when an infant experiences the
pleasurable feeling and taste of consuming food,

and after

repeated similar experiential feelings, the process becomes
increasingly pleasurable,

in addition,

as a result of having

experienced feeling on many previous occasions.

This is to

say that each successive feeding experience is not an
entirely new one for the infant because similar past
instances,

as CEE and CE percepta or wisdom,

synthetically

unite with PI percepta thereby increasing the IMPORTANCE and
FAMILIARITY of the ever-emerging present.

The crude,

emotionally embodied information haphazardly recorded in
past feeding experiences is constructively associated with
present feeding-percepta ultimately as a result of tne
organism!c physio-chemical structure which lends itself to
the uromotion of concrescence due to its interpenetrative

relationship with inner and outer environments.
higher-ordered, case of

’ familiarity *,

In the

increased precision

in conscious emergence is demonstrated when infants become
excited in ANTI ClPATION,

for example,

will be experienced during feeding.

of the pleasure that
Such anticipatory

manifestations may be provoked by the natural PI percepta
(i.e.,

the sight of)

’mother1,

or ’sight of bottle1,

ingressing into the infant’s consciousness.

etc,

This example

shows that CE percepta. or past wisdom is playing an
increasingly more powerful role in causally determining the
subjective psychological meaning that is ascribed to bare
PI percepta,

FOR IN BOTH SITUATIONS THE PI PERCEPTA HAD NOT

YET EFFECTED THE CONCRETE BODILY FELT IMPACT THAT WOULD
CAUSE PLEASURABLE EXPERIENCES AS A DIRECT RESULT OF ACTUALLY
TOUCHING MOTHER AND TEE BOTTLE AND TASTING MILK.

THE

SPATIALLY DISTANT PERCEPTUAL APPEARANCE OF MOTHER OR THE
BOTTLE WERE VERY ABSTRACT IN THEIR MEANINGFUL IMPLICATIONS
IN CONTRAST TO ACTUALLY TASTING FOOD OR TOUCHING MOTHER.
Conscious awareness,

then,

at all levels of sophistica¬

tion is essentially the Behavioral act of
*'taking account of",
OP REFERENCE,

(in some sense)

FROM A SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAME

any given event-component of IMPORTANCE as it'

occurs in spatio-temporal passage;

this ’important’ awarenes

is in some way transformed into a physio-chemical analogue
that cam be stored for future recollection, whereby it will
subsequently either be conjured through a REFLECTIVE effort
or emerge REFLEX!VSL Y a,s am event-component,

Recorded

awareness may be theoretically conceptualized as lying on a

continuum of recognitional clarity and distinctness.
components of infant experience,
vague;

however,

mastery.

As

they are indeed consciously

clarity increases with greater symbolic

In reflective conscious awareness the situation is

basically similar.

When relevant previously learned CE

percepta synthetically unite with contemporary PI and/or
CEC percepta so as to causally determine the subjective
psychological meaning attributed to the clear contemporary
event*-components,

AND FURTHER, WHEN THIS CONCOMITANT PERCE?-

TUAL EMERGENCE CAN BE MEANINGFULLY UNDERSTOOD AS SYMBOLIC¬
ALLY INTERRELATED,

THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN

FULFILLED FOR REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS SYNTHESIS;

A PROCESS

BEGINNING ON AN UNCONSCIOUS LEVEL, AND THEN WITH INCREASED
CONCRESCENCE, EMERGING INTO CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE AS NOVEL
COGNITIVE ASSOCIATION.

Thus the DEGREE to which relevant

wisdom can be clearly consciously RELATED in its concomitant
appearance with contemporary event-components — the
necessary condition for reflective conscious synthesis ~~
is a phenomenon that can also be conceived to occur on a.
vague-to-clear continuum.

In both categories! instances of

conscious recording and reflective conscious synthesis the
crucial factor to understand is that of ’CONSCIOUSNESS*,
for this represents the emergent ontalogical FRAME OF
REFERENCE from which uniquely human SYMBOLICALLY MEANINGFUL
determinations can be intelligently made;

hence TRANSCENDING

the lower-ordered realms of reflexive and physio-chemical
causality (i.e., mechanistic,
behaviors).

* pre-sign *,

and

* sign *,
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As it has been frequently said,

emotional feeling,

its myriad, degrees of discipline ranging from dim,
emotion to emotion assuming the stable,
of symbolic forms,
phenomena,

in

sporadic

determinate character

is the "substance” or "medium” of mind-

He have also seen that the essence of intelligent

mental behavior is in linguistic ideational forms or those
ENTITIES that can be consciously orga.nlzed. into an indefinite
number of RELATIONS,
properties,
percepta,
are,

But in contrast to the entities,

and. relations contributed to us as na.tural PI

Ideational entities, properties,

to be sure, very strange phenomena.,

and. relations
Apa.rt from the

intuitively compelling "materiality-spirituality1’ issue,
it is evident that ideational PI and CEO perceptual entities,
LOGICALLY conceived, in themselves as spoken sounds,
words,

or silently conceived thoughts,

distinct symbolic components.
'tree*,

5 red *,

* happines s *,

written

are clear.and

This is to say that the words

etc,

are cle arly and dis tinctly

formulable (i.e,, when they are SPOKEN, WRITTEN and

silently

THOUGHT) as simplified symbolic elements.

in this

However,

act of abstracting the DENOTATIVE symbolic component from
its CONNOTATIVE meaning, hoping thereby to accentuate the
nature of the remaining clear and distinct element,

a. serious

ERROR is committed IP our efforts are interpreted to mean
that denotative symbolic elements can be MEANINGFULLY
understood in disassoelation from their NECESSARILY conco¬
mitant connotative elements.

An excellent example of this

Is when one is amidst individuals wno a.re spea.-Aag an
unknown foreign language.

Here is an instance where the

in
'3&

unknowledgeable listener is entertaining nearly pure
DENOTATIVELY clear’ symbolic percepta.

Hence the spoken

words are regarded by the listener as a mere unintelligible
series of natural PI perceptual sounds,

for NO CAUSALLY

EFFICACIOUS PERCEPTUAL MEANING CAN BE SYNTHETICALLY BROUGHT
TO BEAR UPON THE NATURAL PI PERCEPTUAL SOUNDS SO THAT THEY
MAY BE RENDERED INTELLIGIBLE AS SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL
MEANING,

This illustration roughly reveals the biploar

nature of mental process.

On one hand there are the

unintelligible natural PI sounds,
case)

and in contrast,

(in this

there is an ABSENCE of what in normal intelligible

linguistic communication would be defined as CEC,

CE, ana

CEE percepta that fill-out bare contributed PI percepta with
■substantive subjective psychological meaning,
above example,

Again tre

an it roughly isolates the PI perceptual-

domain from the

(unknown) concomitant symbolic realm,

forcefully demonstrates the fact that causally efficacious
percepta truly do CAUSE symbolic meaning.
in this way,

However,

stated

it is not yet evident that CEE and CE percepta

are LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT to the final clear,

distinct and

siurolified emergent or projected CEC perceptual produce,
A.

keeping in mind of course that the whole logical chain of
development as it occurs in its uniquely meaningful way is
originally initiated by PI percepta functioning as a
stimulus-object.

But in any case,

the particular class of

perception to which our analytical attention will be devoted
in this section has been rather clearly delineated, namely,
the reader is asked to critically ponder those percepta
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contemplated as LOGICALLY separate from all PI percepts, and
moreover those symbolic components defined as denotative or
CnC percepts,.

We are left,

of course,

with symbolic

components-termed connotative meaning or MEANING-ASDIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED NESS;

terms more recently defined as

CE and. CEE percepts..
Causally efficacious percepts manifest themselves as
bewilderingly complex,

integrated configurations of very

vague-to-moderately conscious symbolic meaning concrescently
yielding concise emergent symbolic components functioning
as denotative,

clearly consciously accessible focal points

from which their multitudinous constitutive vague symbolic
and emotional components can be raised to a CEC status
through conscious reflection.

Staled differently,

this

means that highly succinct- or abbreviated ideational PI or
CEC percepta can representatively organize VAST COMPLEX
SYMBOLIZED Pi STORIES OF RELEVANT (in response to a given
stimulus-object,

that is) LEARNED HUMAN EXPERIENCE, PORTIONS

OF WHICH CAN BE RECALLED BOTH HEFLEXIVELY AND THROUGH A
REFLECTIVE EFFORT 9 THEREBY BEING SYMBOLICALLY RE-ENJOYED IN
TRIE PRESENT,

Every denotative symbolic element ephemerally

appearing as an event-component has an accompaniment of
immediately implicit though vaguely comprehended symbolic
and emotional meaning (potentially capable of partial
reflective explication,

as CEC,

in successive events)

requiring years of learning for its development and
efficacious implementation in intelligent problem-solving.
The extensive storage and hence synthetic capacity of human

cerebral mechanisms enables relevant accumulated wisdom of
the past to constructively enhance the meaning of
contemporaneously contributed perception.

The essential

meaningful nature of conscious and reflective conscious
EXPERIENCE is NOT predominately in its PI and

CSC perceptual

aspects ~~ although these dimensions 'are the most
conspicuous facets of our experience, with the exception o±
natural PI perception;

and of course,

denotative symbolic

components are ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL for high-ordered
intelligent behavior

it is rather the IMPLICIT CE

perceptual concomitants emerging as experiential components
out of ar. enormous resource of relevant,

disciplined past

experience that HEFLEXIVELY INFUSES clearly conscious
symbolic components with MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS,

Although this issue ha.s been discussed in. some deta.il

on past occasions the distinction is so subtle that it .
warrants reconsideration in order that the reader may be
quite clear on the point being ma.de.
The Issue concerns specifically what has been analyzed
as MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS.

Cur position is

that the PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON of CONSCIOUSLY AWARE
MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING as It is actualized by any
individual human mind in any given conscious experience
arises from gradually subsuming originally primitive,
unwieldly, nebulously conscious EMOTIONAL experience to
extensive disciplining, hence transforming infantile pri¬
mordial experience into highly sophisticated symbolic
subjective psychological behavior.

Further,

at mature

levels of intelligence,

symbolic behavior is such that it

gains its conscious clarity, precision,

and enormous

flexibility in its power of REPRESENTATION from denotative
symbolic simplification, but in saying this,
immediately understood,

it must be

on the other hand, that the positive

merits of denotative feeling are wholly contingent upon the
concom.ita.ntly appearing, more vague symbolic components,
and

CE percepta.

CEE

This is to say that denotative under¬

standing is possible because in its occurrence as CEC
percepta an accompaniment of CE and CEE percepta. IMMEDIATELY
and HEFLEXIVELY INFUSE denotative percepta with the relevant
meaningfully enhancing wisdom of the past.

The essence Oi

this wisdom is in the CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVABLE quality of
VAGUELY (because of its MANY contemporaneously delivered
svmbolic and. emotional CE components) PnRCLlVABLB RnLAxnD—
NESS that renders CEC (or ideational PI) perception
EXPERIENTIALLY MEANINGFUL.
elementary level,

This distinction,

is precisely the subjective psychological

difference between Cassirer's 'sign'
At the

'sign'

on a far more

stage,

and

it will be recalled,

1 symbol'

stages.

a child is capable

of verbally responding to given stimulus-ooject effects
(e.g.,

the word 'mama').

word 'mama',

Thus when mother articulates the

the child reiterates the sound.

But here there

is not yet any manifestation of anything that could be
regarded, as MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING for the child's
behavior is essentially REFLEXIVE with NO CONSCIOUSLY
ACCESSIBLE INTERVENING SYMBOLIC COMPONENTo CAPABLm, 0*
FUNCTIONING AS IDEATIONAL PI

STIMULUS-OBJECTS

FOR CONJURING

RELEVANT WISDOM IN ORDER TEAT CONSTRUCTIVE,
THOUGHT MAY TEMPORALLY EVOLVE.

In short,

INTELLIGENT

there is as yet

no evidence of SYMBOLIC RELATEDNESS INFUSING BARE NATURAL
PI PERCEPTUAL UTTERANCE (of the child) with subjective
psychological meaning,

hence transforming the occasion into

a meaningful mental event whereby the ingress!on of PI
perception is synthetically united with CEC perception
carrying with it a relevant history of CEE and

CE perceptual

wisdom that resultantly fills-out the event with DIRECTLY
EXPERIENCED SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING.
at the
stage),

’symbol’’stage

In contrast

(or perhaps even'the late ’sign*

the child initially DISCOVERS that bare reflexive

utterance do have significance beyond mere playful,
pleasurable vocal activity.

Rather,

they are concise

representations of all the previously recorded
experiential

(relevant)

(emotional) meaning that the child has derived

from interacting with given stimulus-objects.
as it has been staled in our former analyses,

For example,
the uerm

* mama’ becomes a means of collectively subsuming under a
single utterance such meaningful experiences as ’mamapleasure 1,

’mama-food’,

'mama-warmth?,

etc.; and moreover,

these experiences can be re-enjoyed and projected as a
passionate emotionally expressive urge toward the stimulusobject to which they refer.

But more important,

stages of symbolic development,

children,

aiter na'vin^

established a repertoire of symbolic Hags",
highest linguistic achievement, namely,
the "tags"

a. g lamer

can attain ohe

they DISCOVER that

(which they have been using as devices for

re-enjoying past experience, categorically designating
homogeneous experiences, and "projecting” emotionally
meaningful expression, etc, ) have MEANINGFUL RELEVANCE FOR
ONE ANOTHER IN THEIR UNIQUE EXISTENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT
SYMBOLIC REALM; ONE TEAT CAN BE COGNITIVELY MANIPULATED
APART FROM A DIRECT DEPENDENT ASSOCIATION WITH IMMEDIATELY
INGHESSING NATURAL AND ORGANIC PI PERCEPTION.

At this point

the child has discovered the phenomenon of SYMBOLIC RELATEDNESS (of course the child may also discover a less abstract
version of the phenomenon of RELATEDNESS in his more
concrete experience involving the physical manipulation of
natural objects).

Beyond this triumphant discovery, the

matter of further symbolic development becomes essentially
one of learning additional symbols and developing an
increased SOPHISTICATION in their usage.

Therefore, during

the ? sign’ and ’symbol* stages the groundwork for subjective
psychological MEANING as an EXPERIENCED phenomenon, and
fruther, as an ontalogically unique CAUSAL FRAME OF REFERENCE
is provided..

In symbolically MEANINGFUL awareness we

transcend reflexivity for words are no longer bare meaning¬
less sounds, because one now becomes CONSCIOUSLY AWARE that
.REALITY in its appearance as entities, properties, and
relations is being SYMBOLICALLY UNDERSTOOD in a DISCIPLINED
WAY; a way that can be SUBJECTIVELY COMPREHENDED and
ACTIVELY MODIFIED through a subjective effort.

All this is

possible from acquiring a number of symbolic "tags" and then
discovering that the tags possess the potentiality for being
INTERRELATED,

The symbols can thereby be used to

descriptively REPRESENT reality as it is PI perceptually
contributed,

and moreover, portions of internal and externa],

environmental states can be MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE TO
INTENTIONALLY PREMEDIATED, NOVEL,
CONFIGURATIONS.
of

Thus,

INTRINSICALLY SYMBOLIC

for example,

the organic PI perception

* thirst* promotes the successive utterance ’’May I have

a glass of water?*5;

here is a simple example of a human

organism intelligently
internal state of

(actively) endeavoring to modify his

*thirst*.

However,

even more basic,

is

the CONSCIOUS SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING that the denotatively
clear symbol

* water*,

for example,

MEANS something at all.

Hence the subjectively understood, MEANING RESULTS from a
REFLEXIVE INFUSION of CE percepta such that the individual
IMPLICITLY UNDERSTANDS that the term *water* has a
presymbolic * taste *,
appearance *,
’cool’,

etc.,

’wet’,

immediately,

’tactile quality*,

and the symbolic attributes,

’fluid’,

etc.

’good*,

These many properties are

though vaguely consciously, present in the usage

of the term ’water*

and constitute the wisdom that reflex-

ively accompanies ANY symbolic term.
however,

’distinctive

Equally as important,

is the fact that the many qualifications (which

define and

SET LIMITS to the meaning of words) occurring as

CE and' CEE percepta also EXPEDIENTI ILLY CAUSE the subjective
psychological meaning of symbols in their emergence as the
symbolic entities-in-process constituting mind.

It is this

phenomenon which we shall consider next.
In analyzing the concept of
it refers to CE and CEE percepta,

’causality*

speciiically as

although t-liis concept/ will

have to be repeatedly scrutinized with increased care as we
proceed, to future chapters,

a crude distinction is necessary

at this point in order to distinguish between what might be
loosely regarded as

•natural* and

•ideational*

Natural causality will be considered

causality.

(FOB ARGUMENTATIVE

PURPOSES ONLY) in the Humian sense of *perceived temporal
succession of phenomenal occurrence’.

Ideational causality,

however,

will be defined in stronger terms; namely,

sense of

’bringing into being or creating*.

in the

Thus in

speaking of CE and CEE percepts, as they come constructively
to bear upon PI percepta thereby generating projected
causally efficacious concepts

(CEC),

it is our view that the

former two classes of percepta CAUSE CEC to be subjectively
psychologica.lly MEANINGFUL,

Of course,

in saying this,

it

is evident that all mental percepta are emergents from
underlying correlative physio-chemical processes and. are in
this sense comprehended in terms of
Therefore the concept of

1

’ideational*

natural *

causality.

causality applies

EXCLUSIVELY to the conscious and reflectively conscious or
the subjective psychological domain.
then,

The latter domain,

has a mode of causality that can be delineated as

occurring in three ways: first,

there is the way indicated

in our previous analysis on PI percepta whereby ideational
PI perception can function as stimulus-objects,

hence

CAUSALLY determining WHICH CEE, CE, and CEE percepta will be
deemed as relevant for its symbolic elaboration;

secondly,

there is the type of causality that is our present concern,
where CE and CEE percepta RSFLEXIVELY INFUSE CEC percepta

in such a way as to CAUSE thorn to be subjective psycho¬
logically meaningful;
CE and

and finally,

there is the way in which

CEE percepta (Because of the STRUCTURAL nature ox

human organism,

concrescence involves,

initially,

uhe

synthetic¬

ally uniting sensation with relevant preestablished organic
propensities and then steadily proceeding to levels where
physical processes yield emergent SIMPLIFIED PERCEPTUAL
stimulus-object effects that constitute and thereby
efficaciously influence the evolvement of mental events
through their unique MODE of ingression, ) CAUSALLY operate
in PROJECTING ideational PI and
considered in later chapters.

CEC percepta: a topic to oe
Also it ought to oe said

mac

in our analysis of the three types of ideational causality
vre are obviously talking of an S-O-H concept of human
behavior as distinct from a Behavioristic S-R viec,
' concept of mind is,

in effect,

101 our

an elaborate exposition of the

possible types of INTERVENING VARIABLES that can possibly
causally operate between ’S’
point is less evident,

and

'R'.

Further,

and this

the net effect of an 'ideational'

causality view is that a materialistic-mechanistic concept
of causality (what has been termed here as
causality)

'natural'

such as that maintained in all exact empirical

sciences and some Behavioral sciences in an inadequate
concept for,
behavior;

the Empirical Identity thesis also implies this

conclusion.
■

in principle, yielding a full account of human

However,

it does not follow that a subjective

psychology can also "somehow" generate "extra" cause-effect
explanations of human behavior..

Bather, as it is becoming

apparent,

our view is specifically designed to yield cause-

effect explanations, but explanations involving different
types of ENTITIES (viz,,
the natural sciences.

IDEATIONAL entities) than those of

Again this point will be subjected

to additional exposition in future chapters.
To more clearly demonstrate the nature of, particularly,
the SECOND type of ideational causality,

let us envisage a

circumstance where a man * A’ upon having read in a newspaper
about the death of a close friend, proceeds to write a. letter
of condolence to a. widow ' B *.

Die causal sequence of the

entire act may be expressed for clarifications.! purposes in
the following cumbersome manner#

The newstype embodying the

»

death notification ingressed into
tion,

fA? as nature! PI percep¬

hence conjuring relevant CEE,

CE and CEC REFLEXIVE

INDUS!VE percepta actualized'as a subjective psychological
'symbolic understanding of the death-phenomenon.

Then,

the

CONSCIOUS UNDERSTANDING ANTECEDENTLY emerging most conspicu¬
ously as CEC percepta is successively transformed into
IDEATIONAL PI perceptual, clarity functioning as a stimulusobject that conjures various relevant

(CEE and CE perceptual)

ideational propensities which,

in turn,

the PI perception with wisdom,

thereby rendering the occasion

INTELLIGIBLEs and moreover,
1

great surprise*,

for the widow* ,
these that

RSPLEXIVELY INFUSE

raising such event-components as

ssorrow from losing a friend *,

etc.

1sympathy

It was from considerations such a.o

* A’ was prompted to write to

’B*.

Initially we

can say that the CSC CLEARLY SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTING the
natural PI percepta issuing from the newstype,

and further,

the CEC CLEARLY SYMBOLICALLY REPRESENTING the ideational PI
percepta (now occurring as stimulus-object EFFECTS)
* surprise1,

’sorrow1,

’sympathy1,

etc., later when

TRANSFORMED to function as ideational PI perceptual
STIMULUS-OBJECTS are functioning in accordance to the first
type of ideational causality.
’projective1

Also the third, type 01

causality is efficacious in yielding the aooee

ideational PI and CEC percepta.
causality

But there is yet

’INFUSIVE’

(the second type) which marks a decisive

TRANSCENDENCE beyond materialistic-mechanistic or ’’blindly”
reflexive causality such as that manifested by physiochemical process,
Here,
(viz.,

thermostats,

electronic devices,

ano. so on.

over and above the fact that stimulus-object EFFECTS
the PI perceptions of

’sorrow1,

’sympathy’,

’newstype-1,

’surprise1,

etc,) issuing from stimulus-objects

LOCATED in.different environments (viz.,

in the natural

world and the organism’s own internal.physiology) are
efficaciously influencing the process of

'A' writing to

B ,

there still remains the fact that both the first and third
causal modes are NECESSARILY CONTINGENT UPON THE POSSIBILITY
OF INFUSIVE CAUSALITY.'
L , , .n-fT-i-.

The two key terms to be understood

.

in explaining this phenomenon are H-IISDON’ and

’INFUSE1.

In- considering the nature and function of infusive causality
we are discussing a matter that has been repeatedly
contemplated in one way or another on many occasions in this
paper; perhaps the most relevant analyses were those
pertaining to MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATED;®Sc-.

Tnus it

is our present purpose to specifically characterize tee

phenomenon of infusive causality now that a great deal of
preparatory explanation has been constructively developed.
The illustration of man ’A?
friend,

acknowledging the death of a

thereby prompting him to communicate his sympathies

to widow ’B'

is in fact a very complex causal circumstance;

one that we need, not at this time exhaustively explicate in
order to elucidate the problem at hand.

Infusive causality

represents the essence of all subjective psychological
MEANING as it ontalogically occurs as sequential atomic
human EXPERIENCE.

We have seen that this experience is an

ever-emerging synthetic product of perception analytically
classifiable into the three
accessible elements.

(general) Categories of directly

Also it has been demonstrated that

these perceptual, elements can ingress into consciousness
through diverse modes

(viz., PI, CSC, CE, and CEE), partially

distinguishable in terms of the degree of perceptual cla.rity
manifested by the percepts, as they appear in consciousness.
V

Thus in any given experiential occasion percepta from
different modes CONCOMITANTLY emerge as an inextricable unity
termed an event,

A remarkable feature of mental events is

the multitudinous number of percepta that synthetically
constitute these conscious unifications.
criterion of

Beyond the

’degree of perceptual clarity1, perceptual modes

are also characterized by indicating tne WAY in which tneir
perceptual products FUNCTION in generating mental events.
Tip s i s to say that PI percepta function a.s stimulus-objects
in determining WHICH propensities will be conjured as
substantive event-components;

CEC percepta function as the
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simplified emergent products projected out of relevant CE
and CEE percepta as a testimony of CREATIVELY ADVANCING
thought processes;

and finally ~~ and here we come to the

issue of infusive causality ~~ CE and CEE percepta function
in mental events in such a way as to CAUSE HUMAN EXPERIENCE
TO BE SUBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL.

These latter

two perceptual modes define those .directly accessible
products whose essential attribute is their vaguely conscious
RELATEDNESS to one another.

In this sense relatedness is

wisdom and wisdom is all the relevant past-learning that has
been physio-chemically stored in such a way that it functions
REFLEX!VELY,

and through REFLECTIVE CONJURATION to

INTELLIGENTLY ACTUALIZE ALL our myriad ideational Behavioral
endeavors.

Metaphorically speaking,

this creative,

causally

infusive process has been described as the * relevant wisdom
of the past concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon,
the present occasion*;

or more technically defined as *the

concomitant actualization of PI, CEC, CE, and CEE percepta
during a, particular* event

Also,

logically analyzeci In

terms of previous argumentation, let us say that physiochemical or natural causality,
causality,

does not entail

in contrast to ideational

(nor does it admit) the inclusion

of MENTAL factors or variables in proposing various func¬
tional explanations for natural phenomenal occurrences.
This is merely to say that scientists need not introduce
psyches as efficacious variables in explaining the behavior
of sinole-cell organisms,
important,

thermostats,

etc.,

and nore

they do not have to introduce subjective psycno-

logical considerations in establishing these explanations:
this latter point is,
definition of thinking
However,

in effect,
1

made by Whitehead in his

homogeneously' about nature.

for reasons formerly discussed in detail,

such is

not the ca.se in explaining human behavior; mental, phenomena
DO intervene as causal Behavioral determinants.

This is to

say tha.t human behavior cannot be exhaustively explained in
the same methodological ways that natural phenomena are
explained.

In fact ALL explanations of physical phenomena,

and intelligent cognitive behavior in general must presuppose
A PRIORI subjective psychological behavior FOR THEIR VERY
POSSIBILITY OF OCCURRENCE,

Basically,

this is grounded in

the fact that human intelligent behavior necessarily entails
efficacious consciousness and reflective consciousness whose
intellectually constructive powers result from their
intrinsic SYMBOLIC nature.

Therefore a discussion of

symbolic behavior necessarily leads to the subjectma.tter of
a subjective psychology.

The ONLY facets of subjective

psychological behavior that are LEGITIMATELY accessible to
an objective psychology are ideational presentationally
immediate

(PI) and causally efficacious conceptual (CSC)

perceptual event-components WHEN THEY ARE VERBALLY ARTICU¬
LATED, GSSTURALLY EXPRESSED,

OR MANIFESTLY WRITTEN.

Thus an

objective psychology cannot in principle have THEORETICAL
AND METHODOLOGICAL access to what we have defined as CE and
CEE event-components in their CAUSALLY INFUSIVE CAPACITY
(or to the other types of ideational causality,

for that
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matter).

fte extraordinary importance of this can be

concretely understood with reference to our former example
involving subjects
that subject

-A- and
JlCl

>pi
B •

r+lt was absolutely necessary

'A* was capable of CONSCIOUSLY UNDERCTANDIKG AS

?J5ychologically MEANINGFUL EXPERIENCE the
•printed death notification-,
•sunrise-,

-sorron',

and his expert enoTs of

-sympathy-,

condolences to widow 'B'.

etc.,

in order to commun-

Thus the INDETERMINATELY

large number of mental (perceptual,) event-components
(occurring as PI, CEC, CE, and

CEE percepts in their

INEXTRICABLY RELATED ACTUALIZED STATES) that were NECESSARY
ior -ACl'‘1'’"

to write to

of

-B-

represent a COMPLETELY UNIQUE

CAUSAL DETERMINANTS THAT DO NOT IN

~"~I— INTERVENE IN NATURAL CAUSAL RELATIONS.
the subjective psychological meaning,
WORD in the death notice and of
sympobny ,

etc,

Therefore,

for example,

-surprise-,

of EACH

-sorrow-.

are infused through and through with a

listo../ o. previously acquired relevant wisdom that CAUSES
the words,

individually and in their collective form,

possess the meaning that they do.
word

-sorrow-,

More specifically,

to
the

for example, occurring as a bare transitorily

enteitainea CEC perceptual event-component in a given train
Of thought- may IMPLICITLY contain in Its moment of
subjectively meaningful actualization in the mind of
suoject

A

the CL percepts ’ great sadness’,

* waning enthusiasm about living’,
losing a. loved-one’,
no longer be shared’,

’oersonal loss*

’the recollection of

’many enjoyable experiences that will
etc.

All of these vaguely conscious,

implicit CE perceptions

(and undoubtedly MANY more similar

cognitive factors) would concomitantly accompany the mere
thought of

’sorrow'.

inner state termed

Further,

subject

'A' in pondering his

’sorrow’ would be simultaneously gripped

by highly vague but powerfully efficacious substrata of
experientially potent CEE percepta that may yield sporadic
(uncontrollable) fearful,

despairing,

attitudes about his own existence.

or compassionate

This illustration

merely hints at the profound complexity and existential
uniqueness of HUMAN experiential phenomena -- whether
intense or matter of fact -- that arises from causally
infusing CE or ideational PI percepta with relevant CS and
CEE perception.

Thus it is in this way that what each

human being understands through direct acquaintance as
subjective psychological EXPERIENCE is CONSTRUCTIVELY
SYNTHESIZED,

thereby yielding an ontalogically unique realm

of phenomena possessing their own characteristic entities,
properties,

and mode of re1ation whose DYNAHIC COONITIVE

CONFIGURATIONS ARE STRUCTURALLY symbolically CONCORDANT with
those of natural,

organic and emotional presentational

immediate perceptual deliverances.

Anyone who ponders these

distinctions will understand that the notion of natural or
materialistic-mechanistic causality can have only limited
applicability in systematically investigating human behavior
unless the presuppositional basis upon which this theory is
predicated ' (with respect to the nature of its entities,
properties,

and relations) is modified to consistently

i nc orporate tho s e e ntitie s demanded by ideational causality,

efficaciously operative within a subjective psychological
framework.
In our preceding discussion on infusive causality,
hopefully it is clear at this point that even what we may
rega,rd as the simplest of linguistic concepts are thoroughly
infused with vaguely conscious CE and CES percepta,

over and

above their merely denotatively evident symbolic form.

Thus

CE and CEE percepta in their infusive function are so
numerous and synthetically potent that originally amorphous
emotional experience can become subsumed to such extra.ordinary discipline that MEANINGFULLY INTELLIGENT subjective
psychological experience can gradually emerge.

Moreover,

CE and CEE percepta. can be said to CAUSE subjective psycho¬
logically MEANINGFUL experience in that,
NESS among symbols

due to the RELATED¬

the intrinsic property that enables

linguistic symbols to be subjectively meaningful at all -these percepta infuse denotatively clear symbolic components
in a way that renders the clear elements personally meaning¬
ful by UNITING them with OTHER (though vaguely conscious)
RELEVANT linguistic symbols.

Thus,

denotative clarity is

synthetically co-existent with connotatively vague symbolic
and emotional meaning.

But in saying this we are actually

maintaining that denotative symbolic components acquire their
substantive subjective meaning from -- OR ARE CAUGmD TO Bp
PERSONALLY MEANINGFUL AS A RESULT OF — a concomitant
INFUSION of previously learned WISDOM.
this

In conjunction with

’infusive’ process it was previously implied that

infusion occurs in two distinct ways,

name3.y;

cnrougn

REFLEXIVE and

REFLECTIVE conjuration.

The most conspicu¬

ously apparent distinction to be made in distinguishing the
two types of functions from one another is their TEMPORAL
DURATIONAL DIFFERENCE;

that is,

occurs almost instantaneously,

the former synthetic proces
while the latter requires

time for consciously reflective analysis.

For example,

keeping in view our discussion on reflexive causality, let
us ponder the interrogative statement,
nature ? *

’What is man’s true

in light of REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE infusive

causality.

First,

it Is evident that the SUBJECTIVE

PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING OF EACH PARTICULAR WORD is understood
almost instantaneously merely upon consciously attending to
the linguistic terms.

Mature readers typically do not have

to exert as great an Intellectual effort to understand the
term. * man1,

for example

(in its common-sense usage) as it

WAS required of them when INITIALLY learning the word as a
child.

Therefore,

CE, CEE and CEC percepta are almost

instantaneous actualized when PI perceptual printed words
ingress into consciousness.

The case is quite similar when

comprehending the words collectively•as a complete question
although this requires a somewhat longer durational elapse.
Again,

the CEC ’man’

is immediately infused by the CE

percepta ’a term designating human beings’,
children conceived collectively',

’all men at all time’,

an intelligent suedes of animal ’,
generally possessing two legs,

’men, women and

’a class of creatures

a head,

two hands,

etc.’,

and so on, not even to mention many possible CEE percepta.
There is little discernible consciously deliberate effort
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"required for UNDERSTANDING the words individually or
collectively.
process,

However,

in contrast to this easily executed

essentially involving conjuring past wisdom to come

to bear upon the present occasion,

there is the far more

complicated (but in principle SIMILAR phenomenon;

that is,

of conjuring iormerly established wisdom to the present)
process entailing TEMPORALLY PROLONGED analytical reflec¬
tion.

Inio is a situation in which ^solutions",

standings",

etc.

are NOT REFLEXIVKLY yielded;

I!under-

rather,

cd,..e_ul, giadually constractive deliberation is psQuirod
for problem solving.

The two experientially distinct ways

in unich Cmb and. CL percepta, may be conjured as being
causally infusive can also be understood by saying that
reflexively infusive causality characterizes

those percepta

wmose ingression as event-components is so spontaneous s.nd
massively pervasive
uninterrupted,

chao they provide an end.uring5

qualitatively suggestive flow of perception

which we directly perceive as MEANINGFULs FAMILIAR.
subjective psychological experience,
this way5

Gf course,

TYPICAL

stated, in

we cannot precisely discriminate amongst PI,

CE and CEE perceptual event-components.

CEO,

Hence we must make

a ae cerminea eiiort to focus our analytical attention uuon,
particularly,

the causally Infusive dimension of experience,

Ue must develop a deep and accurate sensitivity to the truly
profound complexity of our personally conscious events,
understand how experientially barren (and,

in fact,

and

logic¬

ally and psychologically unintelligible) our awareness would
be,

devoid of past wisdom.

Again,

in contrast to reflexive

infusive causality which enables us to understand our many
matter-of-fact event-components as spontaneously intelligible
because of automatically conjured wisdom that enhances
conscious awareness with an enduring substratum of experi¬
ential intimacy with our inner and outer environments,
reflective imusive causality yields an overriding stratum
of CEn and CE percepta lacking the property of spontaneously
enaming

(symbolically) meaningful enhancement characteristic

of CSC and PI perceptual event-components.

Bather,

tive infusive causality is far more sporadic,

reflec¬

meaningfully

unpredic taole, Qualitatively variable in its perceptual
enhancement,
conjure.

and moreover, difficult to CONSTRUCTIVELY

Reflective infusive percepta are,

transcendent crest of

in fact,

the

organic concrescence a.s direct"! v

perceived in subjective psychological experience.

But this

frontier of ideational synthetic emergence NECESSARILY
PRESUPPOSES the faithfully enduring substratum of reflexive
infusive causality,

for it Is ONLY from this subordinate

PRECONDITIONAL CONSCIOUS FRAME OF REFERENCE that reflective
synthesis can be fruitfully actualized at all.
ally speaking,

Metaphoric¬

it is only in light of past wisdom that we

may intelligently understand the present and hence imagina¬
tively proceed into the future.
this means that higher-ordered

In our more technical terms
conjuration of reflectively

infusive CES and CE percepta can emerge only IF reflexive
infusive causality has previously MEANINGFULLY elucidated
CEC perception so that it can be transformed into ideational
PI perceptual stimulus-objects thereby designating WHICH CE,
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CEC and CEw percepta will be regarded as its relevant
propensities — AND FURTHER, WHICH CE AND CEE PERCEPTS WILL
IN A TRAN SC END ENT REFLECTIVELY INFUSIVE CAPACITY.
We are now discussing some of the causal dynamics of mental
events

une only stimulus-objects that can be known in

themselves ~~ in their ontalogical 1 y unique function as
stimulus-objects.

It has been proven by the EMPIRICAL

IDENTITY thesis that mental events are NOT logically
identical to their correlative underlying physio-chemical
processes.

One extremely important implication of this

conclusion is that mental events can function a.s a, logically
distinct class of stimulus-objects over and above those of
materialistic mechanism.

We have formerly shown that this

distinct type of ideational causality arose from the
phenomenon of MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT-RELATEDNESS
operating in synthetic conjunction with denotative meaning
in their actualized SYMBOLIC,
More recently,

essentially linguistic state.

it was shown that connotative symbolic

meaning has also reflexively and reflectively infusive
causal characters'.

It is primarily through these latter two

factors that mental events acquire their ontalogically
unique ideational causal status,
chemical or natural causality.

hence transcending physioBriefly stated,

this means

that the less consistently productive though synthetically
potent mechanism of reflective infusive causality must
necessarily function resultantly from preconditional
reflexively infusive causality which,

through GEE and CE

perceptual enhancement, provides a basic subjective

psychological frame of reference that initially C 0 H S CIQh'SLY
isolates an object of IMPORTANCE for human organisms.

!he

significance of this seemingly trivial point is that if an
object of concern could not be clearly and meaningfully
conceptualized at the outset of its apprehension,
profoundly analytical,
possible.

then more

successive thinking would not be

Since human beings can,

however,

easily

conceptualize many objects of importance as a result o±
gradually developed reflexively infusive causality,

and

because clear initial conceptualization of Pi perceptual
phenomena is a, necessary precondition for higher-ordeied
reflection,

it follows that conscious understanding is a

logically requisite factor

OVER AND ABOVE (in fact,

onerative) NATURAL CAUSAL CONSIDERATIONS

in producing

humanly intelligent Behavioral responses to given stimulusconditions.

In the latter section of "Chapter Two” in was

argued that although conscious events were necessarily
contingent upon underlying physio-chemical correlates for
their possible emergence,

on the other hand,

increased organic concrescence

furtner

(or intellectual development)

was also contingent upon the synthetic power of conscious
events IN TBEMSELVES through their capacity to function as
stimulus-objects,

i.e.,

with regard to promoting intelligent

awareness which is to say that mental events can additionally
CAUSE physio-chemical synthesis in the transcendent process
of concrescence.

Therefore,

in clearly and meaningfully

initially conceptualizing a given object of importance —
an elementary action whose very possibility rests in great
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part upon ohe fact that the PI perception can be thoroughly
ref leAL vely infused nith CPS, CE and CEC perception — we
are

(in.effect) conjuring a multitude of relevant organic

propensities that consciously emerge as our meaningful
apprehension of an object of concern.

In the more

sophisticated process of reflecting analytically upon the
object3

we are,

roughly speaking,

conjuring all those

relevant organic propensities that will yield us a spon¬
taneous understanding of the object; but moreover,

there are

also addiuional propensities that consciously emerge as
reflectively infusive CEE and CE percepts, corresponding to
A!\iY POSSIBLE CONSCIOUSLY DETERMINABLE jREL ATI ON S that the
object of concern may have WITH MY PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED
RELEVANT WISDOM.

Reflective infusive causality (in its

sporadically fecund and temporally prolonged mode of
cognitive productivity) is clearly in evidence when,

in its

appearance as determinately transcending a stratum of
subordinate reflexive infusively meaningful awareness,

it

occurs in consciously evident distinction from the former as
CEE and

CE percepta .representating NOVEL or ATYPICAL,

INFUSIVELY CONJURED (AS A RESULT 0? AN OFTEN LABORIOUS,
PERSISTENT, CONSCIOUSLY DETERMINED REFLECTIVE EFFORT)
RELATIONS WITH OBJECTS FORMERLY UNNOTICED TO HAVE POSSESSED
RELEVANT MUTUAL RELATIONS.

Again as it had been expressed

in the latter portion of "Chapter Two",

high-ordered

reflectively infusive causality has its originative basis
ultimately in UNCONSCIOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL processes.
means, more specifically,

This

that when a reflective effort is
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devoted to some object of concern,

a large number of

reilexively mfusive ideational propensities are conjured to
consciousness; but frequently as the reflective effort
persists,

mi increasing number of ATYPICAL propensities

begin to consciously emerge,
-2^1:54.5 objects.

indicative of novel modes for

THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL MANIFESTATION OF

MSgmmi INFUSIVE CAUSALITY.

Our theory of cognitive

synthesis implies that when objects of importance are
reflectively contemplated, the objects (perceived as PI
stimulus-object effects and hence successively functioning
in conscious experience as stimulus-objects which conjure
all relevant symbolic wisdom rendering the bare
consciously intelligible) activate,
conscious understanding,

1 effects*

concomitant with

correlative physio-chemical

processes which when PERCEPTUALLY ENTERTAINED IN CONSCIOUS
EXPERIENCE (AS A RESULT OF REFLEXIVE INFUSION, AND MOREOVER,
BECAUSE OF THOSE CORRELATIVE STATES CORRESPONDING TO
fPERSISTENT REFLECTIVE EFFORT’) BEGIN TO PROGRESSIVELY
ENGAGE IN PHYSIO-CHEMICAL CONCRESCENT SYNTHESIS;

STARTING

INITIALLY AT AN UNCONSCIOUS LEVEL OF PURELY ORGANIC CEREBRAL
FUNCTIONING, AND AS THIS MODE OF INTEGRATION BECOMES
STEADILY MORE COMPLEX AND INTERRELATED WITH OTHER PREVIOUSLY
ESTABLISHED RELEVANT PROCESSES, THE NEWLY SYNTHESIZED
PRODUCTS EMERGE INTO CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE AS REFLECTIVELY
INFUSIVE CE AND CEE PERCEPTA.

The typical concretely

conscious manifestation of this complex underlying process
occurs when,

for example,

after having reflected upon a

matter of concern for periods of time, much to our surprise

h62
the answer s-oro -no* a ^
x
°°

_.
to consciousness,

analyze this "matter nr
maviei-oi-fact

Now if we carefully

,
phenomenon it will be seen

that we DO NOT l^MTIQNALLY CAUSE A SPECIFIC NOVEL
IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS;

HATHER THROUGH THE ABILITY TO

^ISSISUSLY FOCUS ATTENTION UPON A SPECIFIC OBJECT OF
CONCERN (i.e,,
lilUUiPii!

the problem) AS A RESULT OF REFLEXIVE

Ai'jD FURTHER, BECAUSE OF THE ABILITY TO CONSCIOUSLY

^1,e,j

conjure wisdom to the present) UPON THE

PROBLiin AS A RESULT OF REFLECTIVE INFUSION, THE NECESSARY
Zi^c_WI?,ITiqNS FOR EMERGENT IDEATIONAL SYNTHESIS (ORIGINATING
lu MniiSCIOUS PHYSIO-CHEMICAL REGIONS)

HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.

This is the-process of "setting the stage" for creative
ideational emergence AS RENDERED POSSIBLE BY THE PBSCONDIilONAL FACiORu Or

CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

as well as operative physio-chemical mechanisms.

Thus we

do NOT personally cause ideational synthesis in the sense of
knowing precisely "which elements" will be synthesized by
liunGj

and thereby proceed to “deliberatelyunite them as

though it were a carefully controlled chemical experiment
where components are known and hence' the synthetic results
can be accurately predicted.
mine is to ”set

The causal role of conscious

che stage’1 for cognitive synthesis,

readily available

havina

(as reflexive and reflective infusive CE

and CEE percepta) all the relevant wisdom that can be
contemporaneously conjured for constructively
problematic circumstances.

resolving

We cannot rid ourselves of the

classical Greek notions of functional harmony or virtuous
behavior (in conceiving our model for mind) as an important

ctor in the global execution of intelligent behavior and
the resultant enjoyment of genuinely humane personal
experience.
The phrase

'persistent reflective effort' was used

above as the general consciously experiential correlate to
a large group of physio-chemical process that,
with those corresponding to

in conjunction

'reflexive infusive percepta',

were theoretically alleged to unite in concrescence so that
ultimately,

NOVEL reflectively infusive perception would

spring into consciousness,
advance#

thereby promoting cognitive

He must at this point devote our attention to

clarifying the notion of exercising a 'persistent reflective
ei fort5,

for after all,

this is a. central dimension of the
>

CONoClOUSLY DELIBERATE BEHAVIOR of intelligent problem
solving.

Formerly it was said that the reflexive infusion

of percepta is a process readily capable of being perceived
as providing a basic,

temporally enduring substratum of

MEANINGFUL FAMILIARITY in response to our direct experience
of reality.

This was said to be the case for reflexivelv

infusive percepta caused the possibility of symbols
with respect to linguistic symbols)

(primarily

those instrumental

ideational devices enabling primitive" emotional feeling to
be subsumed to discipline,

hence rendering intelligent

behavior possible ~~ by enabling PI perception to be
concomitantly united with denotative symbolic components,
reflexively infused by numerous connotative components.
Therefore it can be said that reflexively infusive perception
as it synthetically unites with clear and distinct symbolic

perceptual components together constitute a major portion
of the event-components comprising complete mental events
at aay given time.

In fact,

the only possible components

that remain available to fill-out complete events are
natural and organic PI percepta,

and those defined as

reflectively infusive perception that must actually be
regarded as ATYPICAL OR NOVEL CEE arid CB percepta which
emeige in .CONTRAST to those deemed as reflexive infusively
relevant by PI perception functioning in their capacity as
stimulus-objects.

Prom this,

it was previously maintained

that reflective infusive perception, becuase of its
contrasting, unpredictably novel,
character,

sporadic ingressive

concomitantly transcended its consistently

enduring reflexively Infusive perceptual .substratum (with
respect to its conspicuously novel ideational character).
V/e saw that this synthetically transcendent mode of ingression
was,

so to speak,

the crest of novel concrescent emergence as

it manifests itself in conscious perception.

The two

concomitantly occurring contrasting modes of reflexive and
reflective infusive CEE and CE perception may be diagramatically expressed as follows:

FIGURE 11

Figure 11 represents the topology of a complete event
(tp M 5) involving the regression of reflexive
reflective

(line A) and

(line B) infusive perception as they function in

CONSCIOUSLY ASCERTAINABLE CONTRAST with one another during
reflective conscious behavior.

Line A represents the

spontaneously understood meaning that is brought to bear
upon PI perception as the meaning symbolically participates
in consciousness as reflexively infusive perception.
Line L represents the sporadically occurring, potently
(novelly)

suggestive CEE and CE perception,- symbolically

ina.ica.clve 01 novel ways for RELATING objects of concern
to other relevant KNOWN objects in order to promote a more
intelligent comprehension of the former's nature,

as they

originate in consciously ascertainable contrast to the
reflexively infusive perceptual substratum necessarily
persisting during conscious reflection.

In answer,

then,

to

the original problem of technically defining the mental ac

-L

‘

of exercising a ’persistent reflective effort*,

t,

as this

behavior could be regarded as a particular configuration of
event-components having,
chemical correlates,
in the CONCOMITANT,

in principle,

determinate physio-

let us say that it essentially consists
consciously ascertainable

(contrasting)

ingress!on of REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE PERCEPTION
Into our mental events.

More specifically this is to say

that what we directly experience In reflective consciousness,
over and above PI and. CEC event-components,

is a consciously

distinguishable VARIABLE AMPLIFICATION OF MEANINGFUL UNDER¬
STANDING (EMBODIED WITHIN REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE AND CE
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PERCEPTION) CONSISTING OF THE NOVEL .RELATIONS PERCEIVED AMONG
GIVEN OBJECTS OF CONCERN (AS THIS INFORMATION EMERGES INTO
CONSCIOUSNESS FROM UNCONSCIOUS SYNTHESIS), AS THIS TEMPORALLY
PROLONGED AWARENESS IS VIVIDLY ACCENTUATED IN CONTRAST TO A
SUBSTRATE OF SPONTANEOUS (REFLEXIVELY INFU3IVE) UNDER¬
STANDING ISSUING FROM THE CONSTITUTIVE LINGUISTIC SYMBOLS
NEEDED TO CONCEPTUALIZE THE REFLECTIVE EFFORT THROUGHOUT ITS
DURAiIOnAL EXISTENCE.

Essentially,

vie a,re emphasizing the

cognitively experienced CONTRAST between REFLECTIVE and
REhLeXIVE INFUSIVE perception a,s they are concom.ita.ntly
actualized with relevant PI and CEC percepts, during a
complete event.

Thus.it is from this CONTRASTING, THE

PRECONDITIONS OF WHICH NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSE A PRIORI THAT
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUS REFLECTION BE CONSIDERED AS
CAUSAL DETERMINANTS IN PRODUCING HUMAN BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES,
that perceptual testimonies of NOVEL RELATEDNESS'among
objects of concern are permitted to emerge into conscious
experience.

Within this phenomenon lies the SYNTHETIC POWER

of human intelligence.

All this was metaphorically implicit

within the ‘often mentioned, phrase,

'the wisdom of the past

is concomitantly brought constructively to bear upon the
present occasion so as to enhance its meaning’.
In our distinction between ’natural’ and

’ideational’

causality it was said that we know the former type in the
sense of
point,

’perceived temporal succession1,

the latter type of causality,

and at this

specifically as it is

embodied within subjective psychological phenomena, a.s
REFLEXIVE and REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE and

CE perception,
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can be DIRECTLY PSRCEIWD AS CREATIVELY CAUSAL in the sense

SM:L§.?Ii5 DI and CEO perceptual deliverances to be subjec¬
tive psychologically MEANINGFUL (i.e.,
of

bringing into being1').

causality in the sense

This is to say that we DIRECTLY

CAUSALITY as it refers to the modes of synthesis
by which event-components are actualized as complete events,
DDOK directly experiencing temporal succession.
In tne former case we directly experience causal synthesis
m the sense of having direct intelligible awareness of
reflexive and reflective infusive CES and CE percepta

M UNIQUE NEXUS with PI and CEC percepta.
Our analysis

01

causally efficacious perception,

for

the present time, may be concluded by saying that from an
early concept of regarding the subjective psychologically

1 substantive * portion of linguistic symbols as constituted
by fconnotative meaning',

then MEANING-AS-DIRECTLY-FELT¬

ED A IE DU n S S,

causally efficacious and causally

ano. finally,

efficacious emotional

(fee eping in view our former charac¬

terizations of emotional feeling) perception,

it must be

clearly understood that the very possibility of humanly
conscious,

intelligible experience as an ontalogically

unique class of phenomena is heavily contingent upon the
possibility of reflexive and reflective infusive causality
as being operative factors in human behavior.

This asser¬

tion still remains in full concordance with a fundamental
assumption underlying our entire analytical enterprise,
namely,

that the intrinsic nature of mind as a unique

entity,

and thereby thought,

can be exhaustively explicated.
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in principle, by reflecti vely analyzing its perceptual
constitution and then the various ways in which percepta
ingress into consciousnes s;

an analytical process princip¬

ally revealing the LOG I CAL NORM of subjective psychological
experience that,

in effect, universally characterizes the

structure all possible mental events.

This initial stage

oi analysis provides the ba.sis for a logically successive
soage of enquiry involving a systematic investigation of the
actual CONCRETE experiential modes of RELATION among eventcomponents during PARTICULAR spatio-temporal occasions
occurring within given individuals and. groups of individuals
This latter stage of enquiry enta.ils two distinct types of

METHQDOIiOGICA.L invesligation:
1)

a philosophical psychological mode of analysis,
similar-to the first stage of enquiry, that will
systematically explicate the (reflectively)
consciously ascertainable modes of relation
among the components of complete events in
response to given stimulus-conditions.

2)

a subjective psychological, genuinely EXPERI¬
MENTAL approach to investigating modes of
relations among the components of complete events
in response to given stimulus-conditions.
Subjective psychological enquiry will have
frequent occasion to draw upon the theoretical
constructions devised through philosophical
psychological analysis for formulating testible
hypotheses, as well as draw upon its own
unique resources in pursuing (in conjunction
with an objective psychology) the ultimate ideal
goals of presenting a complete explanation of
human behavior, and moreover, developing effec¬
tive means for promoting Behavioral functional
virtue.

Reflexive and reflective infusive CEE and CE percep¬
tion can only be understood as causally functional or
operative within the context of complete unified mental
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events,

and it is only in this mode of perceptual synthetic

actualization that mental events can be regarded as a class
of stimulus-objects that are directly knowable in themselves.
Complete mental events are stimulus-objects in the sense that:
a)

Because of reflexive infusive causality,
subjective psychologically MEANINGFUL concepts
can be consciously entertained spontaneously
as CEC with accompanying substantive CEE and
CE perceptual wisdom when- they come synthetic¬
ally to bean upon PI percepta.
This
establishes the first precondition of
CONSCIOUSLY ATTENDING TO A MATTER OF CONCERN,
Tn itself an ontalogically unique phenomenon
capable of occurring only within the context
of mental events.

b)

The second precondition is met'when executing
a. 'persistent reflective effort' based upon
the emergent occurrence of reflective infusive
percepta whose suggestive implications are
sporadically meaningful, and mode of occur¬
rence is time consuming because these percepta
embody novel suggestions for RELATING relevant
objects that are NOT MANIFESTLY OBVIOUS, hence
demanding that all relevant perceptions be
wondered at length in their CONCOMITANT
CONCEPTUAL PROXIMITY with one another' ' Due to
this FACT of ’limited obviousness', reflective
infusive percepta are not habitually or ■
■ spontaneously implicit within CEC as-in the
case of reflexive infusive percepta (although
if reflective'infusive percepta are repeatedly
entertained and hence critically pondered,
they are frequently transformed into reflexive
infusive percepta.
This is a NECESSARY
condition for intellectual development,
i«e., where f o rmerly dif ficult c on cents are
later understood with intuitive ease as a,
function of intervening growth promoted
through reflect!on),

c)

Fulfilling the two preconditions "sets the
stage" for the emergent occurrence of
ADDITIONAL NOVEL REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE and
CE percepta, over and above preceding reflective
infusive percepta, suggesting constructively
unique ways for RELATING relevant objects with
one another.

d)

In fulfilling condition "c" above, ,a single
developing event demonstrates the following

CONCOMITANT properties:

e)

1)

PI percepta are functioning in their ideationally causa.! role as stimulus-objects,
hence conjuring conditions- cl, 2 - 5 below.

2)

CSC percepta, functioning as simplified
clear and distinct consciously symbolic
focal points, are projected (a process to
be explained later) from logically ante¬
cedent CEE and CE perce'ota, and in their
denotative clarity GENERALLY symbolically
REPRESENT conditions d, 3 ~ 5 below.

3)

CEE and CE percepta. arise as reflexive
infusive event-components,

4)

CEE and CE percepta arise as reflective
infusive event-components.

5)

NOVEL reflective infusive percepta. whose
synthetic origin begins In unconscious
physio-chemical processes a.nd hence emerge
a.s ideationally unique event-components.

When conditions d, 1 - 5 have been concomitantly
actualized in the development of a. single event,
the requirements have been met for novel idea¬
tional synthesis or transcendent concrescence;
mind proceeds to a new level of understanding,
Thu s
1)

due to the fact that factors cl, 1-5
developed to a state of CONCOMITANT CONSCIOUS
PROXIMITY with one another,

2)

and because the occurrence of these concomit¬
ant conditions was in great part due to both
a long-term preparational as well as a.
contemporary enactment of conscious aware¬
ness and reflective conscious analysis,

3

or generally, as a result of the view that
underlying physio-chemical conditions or
correlates provide the basis for .ALL
consciously emerging event-components, and
further on the other hand, that mental events
also cause transcendent organic concrescence
(a point that we are presently attempting to
demonstrate FOR CLARIFICATIONAL REASONS ONLY,
because FORMAL proofs of the 'tenet have
already been propounded) ~~ which is to say
that as DEVELOPING CONSCIOUS AWARENESS,
promoted by conscious reflection, achieves
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the state posited in cl, 1 - 5 — the under¬
lying physio-chemical correlates are ALSO
BEING SPAT 10- TEMPORALLY HE SYNTHESIZED'
until state cl,
-A 5 i*s 'achieved.
4) Thus it may be concluded that when state d,
1-5 has been actualized in a given
developing event, the entire configuration
of components ~~ each with their unique
perceptual properties and functional mode
of Ingressing into events -- enter into a
CONSCIOUSLY UNIQUE NEXUS 0? RELATIONS such
that XlfEW’“ASSOCIATIVE' UNDERSTAIDING ' (often
termed as an '^INSIGHT”) IS"CONSCIOUSLY
REALIZED.
Further, this newly synthesized
idea, clearly understood as a CEC, is hence¬
forth capable of functioning as an ideational
PI perceptual stimulus-object.
5) But the synthetic process, understood from
a physio-chemical concrescent perspective,
more fund ament al1y indicates that CONSCIOUS
and REFLECTIVS CONSCIOUS processes were
neces sariTy"Tnstrumental in ORDERINGcorrelative physio-chemical processes to the
extent that state d5 1 - 5 was attained
THEREBY PROVIDING TEE REQUISITE SPATIOTEMPORAL PROXIMITY AMONG "ORGANIC PROCESSES
SYNTRESlsr which f roll a "perspective of
conscious experience, yielded the
"insightfulunderstanding,
6) To understand the way in which CON SCIOUSNESS
can '0RDEH* empi ri cal 1 y i d ent I cal* cofrefat ive
PHYSIO-CEEMICAL processes so that their
spatio~temporal (physical) PROXIMITY i s
propitious for concrescent synthesis, one
must at once possess an'acute, integrated
conceptualization of all of the various
arguments presented heretofore; which are
merely contrived' to explain the INTRINSIC
nature of the subjective-psychological meaning
■ available to almost ANY human being during
ANY moment of their lives.

CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS EMOTIONAL PERCEPTA
Our characterization of CEE percepta will be brief for
the nature of this class of perception was adequately — at
least for our oresent purposes in this chapter; viz.,

to

rather clearly designate the possible

CLASSES_of percepta

(with their principal modes of ingression)

thao can "become

CONCOMITANTLY actualized as MIND during any possible

spatio-

temporal occasion — explicated, in previous discussions on
’ emotional feeling'
("Chapter Three”);
tion,

("Chapter Two”);

’storing mechanisms’

and in our previous analysis of

CE percep¬

at least with respect to reflexive and reflective

infusive causality.

Therefore,

to avoid redundancy,

let us

merely enumerate the most important features of CmE pe^ceptc.•
In the following chapter, however,

as we proceed to analyze

and hence devise constructs that to some extent ic v eal t.,e
synthetic

"mechanics" of conscious reflection /thus in

"Chapter Four” our analytical interests will be extende
the PROCESS of thinking as distinct from our PRlvopuP concern
with defining the perceptual ENTITIES that are in process,
and moreover,

to provide an optimal formulation o±

^ne

LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience as it
is UNIVERSALLY characteristic of all possible configurations
of

(mature) perceptual entities in process/ it will be

seen

that CEE percepta play'a crucially important role in
establishing ENDURING COHERENCE and
thoughts,

CONTINUITY among our.

as well as provide an indeterminately rich resource

for NOVEL reflective Infusive perception that often suggest
new ways to promote ideational relatedness.
From the perspective of mature intelligence,
tionably the most indigenous

(directly)

unques¬

experiential

property of CEB perception are their extraordinarily
•

-

T) e rvasi ve,

vpt -no^e-rful] y efficacious, }VVjJiIT-:Y FELT
y e u P° •1 U-L-

o

J

presence.

These percepta unite with other more high-ordered

percepta to concomitantly form inextricable units of experi¬
ence termed, mental events.

Subjective psychological theory

demands that Cm'S percepta be PRE-linguiStic.
on purely logical grounds,

This is to say

that if the profoundly subtle

experiential Quality of these percepta. a.re adequately
linguisticaJLly represented,

then it would be concluded of

necessity that they were CE percepta,

hence potentially

capable of achieving the status of ideational PI and CEO
percepta..

This,

of course,

is a. possibility that in fact

portra.ys the INTRINSIC process of symbolic development.
The transformational process of CEE acquiring symbolic
discipline is particularly evident in infantile linguistic
acquisition where children proceed through the
1

symbol’

stages.

fsign*

But the. question may be raised,

and

How is it

possible to linguistically designate the nature of CEE if it
is by definition PRE-linguistic?

This question prompts us

once again to reconsider a formerly introduced illustration
in which it was shown that the direct experience of consuming
a fine steak dinner could not be linguistically communicated
to another with sufficient adequacy such that the listener
could vicariously grasp the full implication of what is
intrinsically an EXPERIENTIAL UNDERSTANDING DERIVED THROUGH
DIRECT PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE.

Also this is ultimately

the grounds upon which the view is propounded that ALL
mental events are private in that percepta of ANY type can
only be known through direct acquaintance.

Further,

the

tenet that mental events are the only possible stimulus-objects

that

can be known in themselves by trie individual

whose

organism the phenomena occur,

privacy.
that

These

conclusions arise

ONLY individuals

their own experience.
our perceptions,
that

"minds

themselves

and more

can be

is

come

other percepta1finally,
present form,

as

the undeniable

into

CEE,

CE,

together providing the necessary and

reveals that

event’.

The

human organisms
and

CEC percepta,

sufficient

'HAVING DIRECT EXPERIENCE*

experience

conditions

steak dinner example

gorically distinct phenomena in the
the

fact

or better stated,

and

ANOTHER DESCRIBE BIS OWN DIRECT EXPERIENCE’

of

sense

’LISTENING TO
are

that

two
the

cate¬
subject

has percepta directly available

to

his

consciousness that are not-in principle available

to

the

listener.

Thus,

assuming

subject

steak,

Is informing percipient

steak,

about

way

the

experience,

’having direct

ence

’A’,

’B’,

who is

own direct

eating a

who has never eaten a

let us proceed to

experience’

another describe his

differs

from

experience’.

show in what

’listening to
This differ¬

can be designated through a rough enumeration of

possible

by ’A*
1)

classes of percepta that

and

to

our formulation exists in its

conjuring

for a complete mental

access

constructively to bear upon

’PI percepta ingress

concomitantly

of

subject of

have privileged

important,

fact

obvious fact

the

stand over against percepta";

*percepta concomitantly

hence

follows from the

from the

Each of us

within

are

the

directly experienced

*B'.

It may be said that •A* has direct acce
the following classes of percepta: ^

to
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a)

natural PI percepta that are defined as
* taste of steak1, and also the organic PI
percepta characterized as * the internal
feeling of consuming food*.

b)

CEE percepta defined as ’deep satisfaction,
enjoyment and/or pleasure*, derived from
the eating process.
These percepta are
pre-linguistic and, rather, intuitively
felt or experienced in a way which was so
subtly extensive and experientially forceful
that the domain of linguistic comprehension
is exceeded.
Vie have previously discussed
this issue in analyzing the nature of mencal
events, saying that ’experience is broader
than the capacity of individuals to fully
symbolically characterize it’.
Further,
the matter may be explained by saying onat
in ou^ present illustration ’A’s’ experience
roughly' involves BOTH ’eating a steak' AND.
’verbally describing the experience^of eating
the steak'; hence it would be'a mistake.to
say, as linguistic philosophers have main¬
tained, that 'experiential facts as tney
are expressed within verbal statements, can
be understood exhaustively by analyzing tue
way that we USE words in given contexts, for
words (intersubjectively used symbolic
instruments) are the only means by which we
can come to organize and thereby understand
While
is
true that words
experience .
- it
. .
are the basic means we have for organizing,
communicating and explicating our.experience,
it is not, however, correct to maintain t*_at
our”statements about reality can be exhaus¬
tively understood by analyzing the way in
which words are USED to make factual asser¬
tions.
The writer does not deny the value
jn alternating to encourage clear and precise
statement's of fact that are subject to
-rceatable procedures for verification.
But to devote EXCLUSIVE interest to the usage
o-f words as they occur in statements oi xact
and hence in their commonly acceplen modes
of usame
is to DEEMPKASIXE the basic facu
that words ABE used to organize, clarify ano
reuort on our experience.
Words are linguisti
instruments designed to HEP BE SENT ATIJ/hmY
CHABAC1EBITE° THeTENTITIEST^PBOPEBTlES AND
RELATIONS OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE.
This As to say that CEE, CE and CEC percepta
tvnicallv regarded as linguistic symbols
CONCOMITANTLY COM2 TO BEAR UPON PI
PERCEPTA which CONTRIBUTE data about tne
ture of entities, properties and relations;
na

4?6

data, in the cases of natural and organic PI
percepta, that exist wholly independent from
symbols with respect to their intrinsic
contributed character.
Therefore, to increase
the precision of word usage and statements of
fact, we ordinarily BEGIN by very carefully
scrutinizing the presentationally immediate
perceptual portion of our experience to make
certain that our words accurately REPRESBNTIVELY CHARACTERIZE what we directly perceive
as”'pT”percepta.
This cannot be adequately
ascertained through mere analysis of verbal^
statements regardless of the way in which they
are used.
Of course, the latter type of
analysis is very useful for ensuring deal
ve rb al e xp o s i t i on,
The r e a re many sub u 1 e
ramifications to the methodology of linguistic
philosophers, thus we have by no means
presented at this time an adequate statement
criticizing their position.
CSC percepta equivalent to ’A’s’ clear and
distinct (denotative) concepts of the complex
Of vwhat is being
steak-eating experience, e.g
e>» 5
consumed5 the taste of the food, the feeling
of consuming the food, the properties of what
is being consumed, how the experience may b<
and so on.
best communicated to *3’
d)

CE reflexive and reflective infusive percepta
equivalent to all the relevant past wisdom
symbolically referring to *1, a - c* above;
e*g., eating steaks, usage of language as a
descriptive and communicative insurunencs,
previously relevant occasions, etc.

On the other hand, listener *B’ has ONLY the
articulated sounds of * A1 embodying his verbal
report to ’B’, and ’A*s’ manifest Behavioral
movements or gestural expressions as these
phenomena ingress into B as -NATURAL Pi perceooa
(NOTE: what are natural PI percepta for ’B ■
would be CEO percepta in the mind of ’A’), from
which to make VICARIOUS (i.e., inferential)
determinations about the DIRmCT experience oi
consunn ng a, steak, using ’A* s’ communication^
as a basis for inference.
These percepta would
generally consist of:
a)

The natural PI percepta embodying the verbal
articulations and other manifest behaviors
of

b)

A'

CE percepta corresponding to the connotative
meaning of ’A’s’ verbalizations THAT WOULD BE

ATTRIBUTED TO f A* s f WORDS BY '3' FROM f B* s*
PAST EXPERIENTIAL LEARNINGS, NOT 'A's\.
c)

3)

CEE percepta embodying fB’s! past pleasurable
experiences of eating food (steals excluded),
and other relevant types of PELT meaning.

Thus in terms of even the very crude preceding
Dl of
DIRECT
JJ
o
perceptual analysis of both * A* and
PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE as the two domains of
experience related to the steah-eating pnenonenon,
it can be easily understood that if *B» had never
eaten a steak.then it would be impossible for
!B! to have a very clear concept of fA's» steak¬
eating experience (in fact, it is in principle
impossible, obviously under any circumstances,
for
to fully understand ’A*s’ experience
because this demands knowing through direct
acquaintance, hence necessitating the contra¬
dictory condition of *Bv BEING ’A*)•
Tt may ce
concluded, then, that ’B’sr understanding of
»A* s* direct experience is necessarily constrained
to * B * s ? NATUPiAL PI perceptions (stimulus-object
effects of "stimulus-object * A*) of * A*sf mami e s t
behaviors AS THESE NATURAL PI PERCEPTIONS ARE
CAUSED — THROUGH fB’s* REFLEXIVE AND RSFLECTITO
TNFUSIvE CEE AND CE PERCEPTA
TO BE SUBJECTIVE
’PSycxOLOGICALLY MEANINGFUL THROUGH THEIR
CONCOMITANT SYNTHESIS WITH JB/ s1 PREVIOUSLY
LEARNED WISDOM.

4)

Also there is the fact, over and above the one
that *Bf can understand merely a very small
portion of the subjective psychological meaning
inherent in ’A’s’ words through their manifest
effects as natural PI perception, that 1 A’,
himself, can clearly and distinctly linguistically
characterize only a comparatively small portion
of his directly accessible experience of eating
a steak for as we have previously argued experi¬
ence is broader than our capacity to exhaus¬
tively characterize it in linguistic terms.

5)

Now we are in a position to deal with a question
formerly raised regarding the methodological
analysis to which the class of CEE perception
is being subjected, viz., How is it possible to
linguistically designate the nature of CEE if
it by definition is PRElinguistic?
The answer
to this problem is suggested in steps 1 - 4 above.
a)

As the problem specifically refers to THIS
discourse, the reader presently has only the
bare printed words on white pages as a means
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to understand the writer's concept of CEE
percepta, for example,
fa)

The printed words are, in effect, NATURAL
PI percepta embodied in a permanent medium
(viz., as print on a page) and are therefay
directly accessifale to BOTH readers and the
writer (who, if the natural PI percepta were
not immediately available, would have to
entertain the words more haphazardly in
THOUGHT as ideational PI perception).

c)

But the vastly important DIFFEBENCB in
subjective psychologically COUP RE HEND1NG the
intersufajectively ascertainable natural PI
perception (as printed words), however great
or minimal it may be among any given percip¬
ients (assuming they all knew the language
embodied in the natural PI nerception), arises
WHOLLY from the fact that ALL INDIVIDUAL* S CEE
and CE perceptual domain are ontalogically
unique as they are concomitantly actualized
with PI perception as subjective psycho¬
logical experience.

d)

The WRITER'S reflexive arid reflective infusive
percepta infuse natural PI perception with a
distinctive type of wisdom-that embod.ies a
disciplined way or theoretical predisposition
for understanding mental phenomena; one
gradually developed from many hours of reflec¬
ting upon personal experience and the wn rings
of numerous thinkers who address themselves
to similar problems.

e) The READERS in contrast, although many of
whom may have read extensively and pondered
at length the nature of mind or ideational
. phenomena, will infuse the SAME NATURAL PI
percepta with importantly DIFFERENT reflexive
and reflective infusive percepta, primarily
because they are unique individuals with
highly personalized mentalities, developed
as a function of greatly dissimilar expedi¬
ent i al backgrounds, physiological differences,
and unique modes of perceptual synthesis during
subjective psychological experience.
Hence
with all these sources of variability as
operative factors in influencing personal
understanding of identical natural PI percep¬
tion, it is not at all unusual to expect
significant difference in conceptualizing or
interpreting phenomena that given individuals
directly experience (e,g., as natural PI
percent!on) in common.
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f)

Steps 5> a - f are mere prefatory remarks that
must be kept clearly in view- before we proceed
to consider the problem of how we are to
(methodologically) linguistically conceptualize
that perceptual domain which is in principle
PRS-linguistic.
Let us now proceed to
accomplish this task.

g)

In coming to understand the nature and
efficacity of CEE perceptual states, the writer
reflectively analyzes his subiective psycho¬
logical experience.
Thus after having
classificationally subdivided and hence
definitionally explicated the most conspicu¬
ous perceptual classes constituting mind as
PIs CEO and CE percepta, the writer'is yet
aware that there still remains a very subtle
and powerfully efficacious aspect of subjective psychological experience that is not
comprehended by the preceding perceptual
classifications.
This remaining perceptual
clans includes a very intimate portion of the
writer* s experience (and any human beings’
experience if they exercise a. sufficiently
precise reflective effort within the theoretical
framework proposed in this paper) which is
immediately (reflexively or intuitively)
EMOTIONALLY FELT, possessing such EXPERIENTIAL
AUINIENTI Cl T Y AND EFFICACITY AS A SYNTHETIC
AGENT (in the sense of directly apprehending
mental events as inextricable experiential
UNITIES; it is herein that CEE plays its
decisive role an a cl.ass of synthetic percep¬
mextual agents that infusively cause th<
tricable * quality) in consciousness that to
deny its efficacious perceptual presence would
be to regard subjective psychological experi¬
ence a.s an unreal or a mere delusion.
Thus the
term ’direct concrete experience’ seems to
appropriately character!ze the inextricable
unity of our conscious apprehensions of
reality, but this holds true only if an
individual possesses a deep sensitivity to
the definitionally imprecise CEE perception
providing the intimate experiential basis for
EFFECTING THIS PROFOUNDLY FELT UNITY.
This
mo a e of designation may appear as logically
unrigorous in contrast to sound operational
definition, and yet, we must necessarily appeal
to such INDIRECT LINGUISTIC methods; placing
great emphasis upon intuitively evident illus¬
trations similar to the previously cited steak¬
eating example.
Directly perceived moments
of intense experience resulting from conditions
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yielding unmitigated happiness, deep hatred,
successful therapy, powerfully humane
communication with another human being, etc.
all include the extraordinary CEE perceptual,
passionate dimension of human experience.
In fact, one does not come to initially achieve
an understanding of these percents merely by
argumenta.tively isolating them as components
of experience; rather one has many opportunities
to intensely perceive these components long
before they are reflectively isolated within
a theore tic al framework as CEE, for examp1e.
We have only to ponder the many implications
of the theory of symbolic development proposed
in ’'Chanter Twon to understand the present
issue; it will be recalled that two major
tenets were that subjective psychological
experience during infantile levels of development IS PURE causally efficacious emotion,
and further, it is only through the human,
organism's capacity for conscious reflective
behavior (the*intellectual efficacy of which
must obviously be regarded as commensurate
with the organism’s level of development)
that amorphous, unwieldly, primordial CEE can
be subsumed to symbolic discipline.
Thus all
acts of creative intelligence■can be conceived
as rendering more clear and distinct —precisely in the sense of generating causally
efficacious CONCEPTS (CSC) — certain aspects
of our perceptual experience.
Therefore if
CEE is contemplated as an indeterminately
complex (in that is IS often highly vague
novel reflective infusive percepta) and hence
profound domain of suggestibility, containing
innumerable possibilities for establishing
unique modes of cognitive RELATION, then its
functional relevance and enormous importance
for intellectual growth, when pondered in.
conjunction with the mechanism of reflective
consciousness, becomes manifestly apparent.
The concepts that are presently being analyzed
are very closely related with John Dewey’s
.thesis of inteliigentthinking: the human
organism after having reflectively formulated
a sound hypothetical program ox activity for
solving a given problem, based upon the best
available factual information (what we have
metaphorically designated as bringing the
relevant wisdom of the past constructively to
bear upon the present occasion), then proceeds
to the~overtly active phase of intelligent
encuiry where the hypothetical program is
experienttally and/or operationally implemented
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to test its pragmatic efficacy.
In this
second crucial phase the organism has an
opportunity to EX PE HIENCB the reciprocal
IMPACT of his conceptual efforts as their
efficacity is determined through concrete
implementation.
Cnee again, the relevance of
this latter phase for our view can be easily
understood because we maintain that experience,
specifically with respect to CEE perception,
must be contemplated as broader than man’s
capacity to subject it to exhaustive symbolic
characterization; this fact, considered in
conjunction with the possibility for indeter¬
minately great ideational BELAT5DN5S3,
provides'the basis of mind’s commensurate
capacity for development.
Although some of the examples used, to
illustrate the nature and efficacity of CEE
perception (e.g., extreme happiness, rage,
etc.) were atypical in contrast to our daily
matter of fact experience, this is by no means
to imply that CEE perception occurs exclusively
in occasions of intense emotional activation.
Rather, this class of perception is the funda¬
mental source of consciously FELT inextricable
Thi
unity in mental event S ,
j-iij. s
^ giro s s *o erceutua.1
discrimination is indicative of an experiential
substratum whose efficacious presence is the
most experientially vague and subtly pervasive
dimension of MEANING-AS-DIHECTLY-FELT-RELATED¬
NESS, a theoretical concept characterizing
a level of understanding including BOTH CEE
and CE percepta.
CEE perception, then,
.introduces an undeniable FELT UNITY to
concrete exoerience, hence rendering consciousness INCAPABLE OF DIVTSIBILITY WITHOUT
DESTROYINGTTS INTRINSIC'NATURE AS A STIMULUSOBJECT CAPABLE OF BEING KNOWN IN ITSELF* THROUGH
ITS CONCOMITANTLY UNIFl'ED"‘?ERCEPTUAL CONSTlTUTI
h)

Thus the writer, in attempting to communicate
his systematic understanding of mental experi¬
ence (specifically now with respect to CEE
perception), can ultimately rely only upon
linguistic symbols as instruments to effect
this communication, endeavoring to organize
them in a. way that will accurately suggest,
over and above the clear and distinct natural
P.i.

rectly acces c* ible
n essence
CE and CEE perception whi
leaning of th O
constitutes the substanti
->_
Thi s; is to say t a o
manifest printed words,
the nrinted words must be
;anized such t hat,
1.3
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functioning initially as natural PI stimulusobject effects arid then as IDEATIONAL PI
PERCEPTUAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS IN THE MENTAL
EVENTS OF HEADERS, they will conjure relevant
reflexive and reflective infusive wisdom in^
READERS reasonably concordant with that of the
writer*s (this, of course, is a subjective
psychological principle that holds true for
ALL POSSIBLE intersubjective communication).
Thus the PRElinguistic perceptual domain is
designated, though unquestionably inadequately,
by attempting to present the reader with
highly systematic theoretical framework that
comprehends human experience in terms oi
UNIVERSALLY applicable categories (collec¬
tively defined as the logical from of subjec¬
tive psychological experience) that refer to
directly' accessible perceptual components
constituting mental events.
Then each percep¬
tual category is explicatively characterized
in a way amenable to precise analysis until
the LAST category of perception is reached;
one whose nature and efficacy can only be
subtly FELT as primordial subjective psycho¬
logical experience because of its extremely
vague mode of occurrence.
Therefore, by
rigorously defining those perceptual classes
that CAN be rendered linguistically deter¬
minate, we are able to analyze mental events
in such a way that sufficient uniformity can
be achieved among the reflexive and reflective
infusive perceptual.domains of individuals
who have learned subjective psychological
terminology.From this they can partially
reflectively ISOLATE the presence of CEE
perception as DISTINCT from their under¬
standing of Pi / CEC, ' and CE percepta, and
then use their own personal conscious experi¬
ence as an ultimate basis for FEELING the
unique nature and efficacy of CEE.

CAUSALLY EFFICACIOUS CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTAAs it has been said,

the notion of CEC percepta can be

regarded as a refined derivative from the concept of denota¬
tive symbolic meaning;

therefore,

ensuing discussion about

CEC perception should be pondered in light of the latter
consid eration
The most distinctive experiential property of CSC
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percepta are their CLEARLY and

DISTINCTLY perceivable

occurrence as DISCREET CONCEPTS OR IDEAS.

Of

course,

is the case with all other classes of percepta,

as it

this charac¬

terization is the product of reflective analysis,

hence

indicating that we cannot in principle directly perceive

CEC

as PURE clear and distinct perception apart from concomit¬
antly occurring

CEE,

CE and PI perceptual event-components.

The natural PI perceptual
ideational PI perceptual

spoken sound of
thought,

’red*,

the word,

or the

conceived JIN JL:LlA~l4.

AS A BARE ENTITY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO REFERENCE TO TEE NATURAL
PI PERCEPTION OF RED UNLESS CONSIDERED lid CONJUNCTION WITH
REFLEXIVE AND REFLECTIVE INFUSIVE CEE AND CE PERCEPTA WHICH
RENDER THE SPOKEN WORD OR SILENT THOUGHT SUBJECTIVE PSYCHO¬
LOGICALLY MEANINGFUL.

The extraordinary importance of

linguistic RELATEDNESS was emphasized

in the preceding

section on "Causally Efficacious Percepta".
present

section,

Thus in the

we are concerned with accentuating the

ONTALOGICAL STRANGENESS of symbolically REPRESENTATIVE
phenoneria where spoken,

written,

silently thought,

wise manifested HIGHLY ABBREVIATED,

or other-

ST
INTRINSICALLY PISCREE

CEC ENTITIES serve as clearly and distinctly SIMPLIFIED
m» <-»r n » ill

«!£•

conscious focal points from which vast amounts of concomit¬
ant,

connotatively implicit WISPON can be consciously

REPRESENTED and hence

CONSTRUCTIVELY MANIPULATED with

EXTRAOEDINARY facility,
possible.

rendering thought and

communication

It is unnecessary to elaborate the numerous

implications, that are

involved in characterizing this sub¬

jective psychologically MEANINGFUL mental phenomenon for,

AST

in effect,

our entire foregoing discourse has been dedicated

to this end.

Let us merely emphasize,

that CEO are the most highly REFINED,

instead,

the tenet

DISCIPLINED emergent

ideational entities of transcendent concrescence for,
was mentioned in discussing the onset of the

’symbol

as it
stage’,

an enormous intellectual advance is made when an organism
discovers that symbols can !Itagn or represent large
quantities of generally relevant past and present direcu
experience
’mama*

(e,g„,

where a child discovers that the utterance

can represent a great deal of pleasurable experience

shamed with ’mama stimulus-object*,

and further,

that the

newly acquired term enables previous enjoyable experience to
be partially re-enjoyed in the sense that by merely
expressing the word

’mama,’,

a large number of vague though

powerfully efficacious CEE percepta can be contemporaneously
experienced).
ments in the

Subsequently,
’symbol stage’

of course,

further develop¬

enable human organisms to

establish RELATIONS among linguistic symbols.

To better

appreciate these two necessary conditions for intelligent
behavior we have only to imagine

(as in the case of animals,

for example) circumstances where the deceptively ”simple”
capacity to meaningfully "tag" a brute natural PI perception
with an abbreviated symbol is absent.

Speculation of this

type emphatically accentuates the incredible linguistic
RELATEDNESS that implicitly accompanies even the mere utter¬
ance of a single meaningful verbalization;

in this simple

fact lies the essence of subjective psychological experience
and thereby the possibility of all genuinely intelligent
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enquiry.

If the human brain lacked some of its complexity

and interrelated character,

consciousness would be forever

destined to vague CEE perceptual awareness of external
natural and internal organismic states.

Concrescence would

never achieve the level where reflective awareness trans¬
cends the

* sign. stage * ;

the level which, only a few species

of animals below man achieve.
In analyzing the distinctive nature of PI perception a
moderate INDIRECT understanding of CEC percepta was derived
from the exposition.

That is, upon several occasions

laborous efforts were made to demonstrate that ideational
PI perception were logically distinct from CEC percepta.
The preponderance of this analysis was conducted from a
criteriological frame of reference.

PI perception were said

to embody the properties designated by the following five
criteria!
1)

clarity in conscious awareness

2)

distinctness in conscious awareness

3)

contemporaneity in occurrence

4)

logical antecedence in occurrence

5)

contribuity.

Although,

as it was seen,

there are important differences

between PI and CEC percepta,

it will be instructive to

briefly consider CEC perception in terms of the five
preceding criteria in order to promote a clearer under¬
standing of CEC.
With respect to the'first two-criteria of clarity and
distinctness of conscious awareness,

CEC percepta would

manifest these properties to at least the same extent as
IDEATIONAL PI percepta,
perception.

but not natural or organic PI

This is merely to maintain the distinction

made by Hume when he stressed the obvious fact that directly
perceived sensory impressions are more vividly clear and
distinct than our ideas of direct impressions.

Thus the two

criteria as they apply to CEC a.re perhaps more in accordance
to the Cartesian definition of clarity and distinctness,
namely,

that CEC can be clearly entertained in conscious¬

ness and conceived as distinct from other CEC.
Again,

with the third criterion,

CEC percepts shares

much in common with ideational PI perception.

But the

commonality refers to the LIMITED discriminative power of
the

’contemporaneity9

criterion.

In a previous section-

entitled. ”Presensationally Immediate Percepta’5,

the problem

was raised, that since ALL perceptual components of mental
events occur concomitantly in a LOGICAL FORM,
criterion of 1contemporaneity*

how does the

apply to PI perception?

The

reply indicated that the criterion emphasized the SPAT10TEMPORALLY UNIQUE,

INDEPENDENT CHARACTER of the EVER-EMERGING

PRESENT OCCASION Ingressing into organisms as NOVEL PI
perception from the external natural and internal bodily
environments. . A satisfactory answer to the problem was not
provided at that time for it had not yet been demonstrated
that PI perception also included ideational PI perception;
a distinction requiring a moderate relaxation of the
1contribuity’

criterion.

Moreover,

the concepts of

CEE perception were not considered at that time.

CE and

The point
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to be made is that with respect to natural and organic PI
perception,

the criterion of

*contemporaneity5

does strictly

hold true in that these perceptual deliverances DO IN FACT
testify to the spatio-temporally unique,
of ever-emerging,

independent character

contemporary natural world and internal

bodily felt states.

These two subclasses of PI percepta

portray relevant Ingres sing reality as it contemporaneously
exists, but does not in any way refer to past occasions.
However, beyond this point,

as the criterion applies to

ideational PI perception and, more recently,

to CSC percepta,

vie discover that these latter two modes of perception do not
necessarily (nor do they in most instances)
circumstances.
point of view,

LOGICALLY speaking,

testify to NOVEL

from our theoretical

we must concede that ALL percepta -- PI,

CEC,

CE and CEE percepta -- are ontalogically unique during
EVERY emerging occasion simply due to the fact that they are
spatio-temporally separated.

But there is also the consid¬

eration that CE and CEE perception, by definition,

are

percepta testifying to the learned wisdom of PAST experience.
This is to say, while It is true that percipient
a, ’throb'

and sees

’AN

feels

’green grass’ that-ARE organic and

natural PI percepts indigenous to contemporary reality
(hence appropriately complying with the criteria of
’contemporaneity’),
CE and

and further,

that the reflexive infusive

CEPC percepta enabling the two recognitions to be

intelligently UNDERSTOOD ALSO occurred concomitantly with
the PI percepta,

the fact remains that the subjective
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perception was NOT LEARNED DURING THE PRESENT OCCASION,
rather,

in PAST occasions.

but

From this the conclusion

follows that the criterion of

* contemporaneity’ disqualifies

(at least in this narrow sense)

CE and

CEE perception from

being regarded as PI perception for they are CONTRIBUTED
da,ta NOT UNIQUELY intrinsic to the present occasion.

But

vie may quickly indicate that ALL IDEATIONAL PI percepta are
(temporally) PREVIOUSLY FORMULATED CEC,

(temporally)

SUCCESSIVELY RETHOUGHT IN THE SENSE OF ENTERING INTO PRESENT
OCCASIONS AS IDEATIONAL PI STIMULUS-OBJECTS.

This,

of

course, means that the ideational PI ideational entities are
NEVER UNIQUE perceptual contributions from contemporary
reality,

t houg h neve r t he less,

we mu s t ne c e s s a.r i 1 y persist

in regarding them as legitimate PI perception for they DO
function as ideational

stimulus-objects determining WHICH

CSC, CE and CEE percepta will be concomitantly conjured to
render contemporary events subjective psychologically
meaningful,.
of

The point to be made,

’contemporaneity*

then,

is that the criterion

has limited applicability for desig¬

nating causally efficacious concepts, because CEC also often
occur as repetitions of past thoughts.

There is,

however,

the

not infrequent situation when engaging in reflective analysis
that NOVEL reflective infusive percepta may prompt the
projected synthesis of a NOVEL CEC;

hence in this case the

criterion of ’contemporaneity* would ALSO STRICTLY apply to
CEC perception for the novel synthesis would be a creation
o c cu rring du ring t he contemporary (inne r environmental)
occasion.
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For our present purposes,
~

*u

the foregoing remarks

#

presented in the section on ’’Presentationally Immediate
Percepta" with respect to the criteria,
in occurrence*

and

* logical antecedence

*contribuity*, .will sufiice to indicate

the relevance of these two criteria (of which they actually
have little)

to CEO percepta.

It will be recalled,

that CSC were said to be synthetically

’projected*

however,
from

causally efficacious percepta originally conjured by PI
perception functioning as stimulus-objects.
notion of

'projection*

Since tne

refers to the DYNAMIC or

dimension of mental activity,

as distinct froru our present

concern which is with explicating the nature of the
that are in process,

an analysis of

tnis theoretical

construct must be postponed to the next chapter,

Yec in

terms of the CEC experiential mode of ingression it is well
to mention at this time that the process of projection is a
REFLEXIVE one in TYPICAL conscious awareness of reality.
That is, when we perceive familiar stimulus-object efiecus
such as a chair,

the taste of sugar,

feeling of nausea,

etc,,

the odor of smoke,

the

CEC are spontaneously representa¬

tively ascribed to them without a reflective eifort
(e.g.,

as the linguistic terms ’chair*,

’ill*,

etc.).

’sweet*,

’smoke*,

Our discussion of the nature of CEC percepta

may be concluded, by saying that in the vast majority of
instances CEC are those components of symbolic meaning that
LITERALLY embody our thoughts as MANIFESTLY SPOKnN ana
SILENTLY THOUGHT BARE LINGUISTIC FORMS,
as completely devoid

of all PI,

logically conceii'eo

CE and CEn perception.
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SYMBOLIC'REFERENCE
It has been emphasized many times that PI,
CEE percepta occur CONCOMITANTLY,

in principle,

CEC,

CE and

throughout

EVERT possible instantaneous spatio-temporal moment during
which conscious experience is actualized
mind

(although as we

shall

see later,

not always necessarily present,

components are present,

1 at least bipolar'
terra

a CEC component is

and moreover,

infancy it seems that only natural and
perceptual

in ANY given human

organic PI and

CEE

thereby reaffirming our

characterization of mind).

'symbolic reference*

during

Therefore

the

will be used to define the

phenomenon of ACTUAL-1 LED C ON CO MI T AN C Y amongst given classes
of percepta during any theoretically possible instantaneous
moments of space-time.

Symbolic reference places greater

emphasis upon the ACTUALIZED CONCOMITANCY of percepta that
constitute mind at an instant than the previously defined
concepts,

’experience*

or

’mental event*.

As a directly

perceivable phenomenon within a mental event,
reference would 3E subjective psychological

experience in

its evolving inextricable durational unity.
concrescent experience,

symbolic

It is emergent

or the subjective psychological

perspective of unique nexus among relevant organic proensitie
occurring as the physio-chemical empirical
mental

events.

Stated still differently,

is perceptually unified

occasion

symbolic reference

direct apprehension or experience of

symbolically disciplined understanding
percepta)

correlates to

(CEC,

CE and

CEE

coming constructively to bear upon the present
(ingressed PI perception)

so as to id nationally
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enhance the present with the relevant wisdom of
Speaking now with a mechanistic emphasis,

the past.
we have

seen

that when stimulus-object effects ingress as PI perceptual
event-components,

they concomitantly conjure relevant CEE,

CE and CEC'(as reflexive infusive and reflexive projected)
perception that,

in effect,

renders the stimulus-object

effect initially intelligible.

Further,

temporal occasion evolves into the future
the primordially perceived * PROCESS1
experience),

as the spatio(now streo^into

character of human

the PI stimulus-object effect,

OCCURRING WITHIN

THE INEXTRICABLY INTEGRATED CONTEXT OF'THE COMPLETE
CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE MENTAL, EVENT-IN-PROCESS (hence
meeting the necessary conditions of a stimulus-object
can be known directly in itself),

un&.t

is transformed into a PI

stimulus-object concomitantly determining WHICH CEE, Cm and
CEC /now occurring a.s reflexive and reflective
and novel) infusive percepta and reflexive

(reoccurring

(reoccurring ana

novel) nrojected*/ perception will be deemed as relevant to
enhance its meaning.

It must be understood that throughout

this complex reflective experience -~ a Behavioral act that
human organisms can generally execute with ease — we may
theoretically conceive of an UNCHANGING BASIC GEjiU^^LURL
(demonstrated in spatio-temporally CONCOMITANT PERCEPTUAL
ACTUALIZATION) persisting throughout each possible successive
instant during' an event.

This consideration should be kept

clearly in view because it is of fundamental importance to
our final formulation of the LOGICAL FORM OF SUBJECTIVE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE,

for the construct’s that will be
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developed in future
elaborated
* NATURAL*

chapters,

and later,

uo an

exposition of the distinction drawn between
and

1 IDEATIONAL’

CAUSALITY.

in reference to the issue of causality,
of mind will

Let us briefly say
that our concept

seriously call into Question the habitually

accepted notion

(as it applies to uniquely HUMAN behavior)

that- a *stimulus*

can be conceived as spatio-temporally

PRECEDING a * response*

in the Skinnerian sense,

It will be seen that our concept of
TION*

with regard

for example.

* CONCOMITANT ACTUALIZA-

.

shall provide the basis for what will result as a

severe criticism of traditionally conceived stimulus-response
theories of human behavior.
It might also be well to reemphasize,
tically speaking,

again mechanis¬

that although the preponderance of

analytical attention was' devoted to our DIRECTLY PERCEIVABLE
experience,

it was implicitly maintained

that,

at least,

LOGICALLY PRIOR to the emergence of conscious perception
there exists the vast organic functional domain of UNCONSCIOUS
physio-chemical processes.

This is merely to

say that

fundamental preconditions for conscious emergence are that
QUANTITATIVELY sufficient

(activated)

organic mechanisms in

QUALITATIVELY adequate INTEGRATION are C0N0^i;iI_TApTLY
ACTIVATED to yield

conscious perception,

sophisticated the events may be.
the term * EMERGENT CONCRESCENCE*.
domain of,

however minimally

This is what is meant by
In the massively complex

IN PRINCIPLE, UNCONSCIOUS /I.eh,

possibly have as a direct perception,

we cannot

for example,

chemical

A* s "subjective experience*' of the ingressional E1FEC1 of
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stimulus-object
conceive,

(chemical) BT processes,

we may nevertheless

as is the case in physiological scientific

enquiry,

of concrescence beginning with SmMSATIOm,

example,

from light impinging upon the retinal region of an

individual’s eyes
EFFECT),

for

(the beginning of a stimulus-object

and hence ultimately emerging as the consciously

intelligible PERCEPTION of a particular color and form.
However,

in saying this it must be admitted that in

consciously perceiving,

for example,

intelligible object of concern
as a complete event),

a red apple as an

(the phenomenon now regarded

the original physio-chemical change

occurring as a modification in retins,! states,

had

initiated

an extraordinarily complex (SYNTFETlC) concrescent process
whereby the resultant CONSCIOUSLY INTELLIGIBLE PRODUCT
(occurring as a complete event) presupposes ALL the physio—
chemical correlates underlying PI, CEC,

CE and CEE perception

Circumstances are now reasonably appropriate,

while

ore sun "oo sing our ENTIRE foregoing intricately evolving
argument,

to present a concise theoretical formulation of

the LOGICAL FORM of subjective psychological experience or
KIND.

A final brief argument,

accentuating a consideration

that was perhaps only implicit in our preceding analyses,
sea'll now be propounded,
optimally simple

consequently bringing us to our

(but not overly simplified) formulation of

the LOGICAL FORM of MIND.
once again the concepts,

The argument entails utilizing
'form'

and

'matter',

contemplated

■ as universal principles of organization in tneir application
to the.entities, properties and relations of our perceptual

,
.
a
^ rtpme’ota issuing from
experience of reality (comprised o* p.
,
LOCATED in BOTH inner and outer environ
stimulus-oi)3ects LOCAinoj J-nments).

It may Be stated as'follows.
i -i
r- vi +- rnii Qf "necessarily
Any possible mental event
struoture with
demonstrate at le®“1 ‘ : 4 CLASSES of perceptual
regard to its o°n‘ ^
" it may te assumed that
event-components
"£s merely of
early infant mentali j
oet,tiorlj concomitantly
natural and orgaai
\*
jn their mature,
occurring with Can pe^ts generally embody
functional state, men ^
cEC, Ca and
the concomitant structure ox ri,

1)

CEE perception.
. rl
natural and organic PI
It has "been sai^
3 • '
snatio-teni'oorally
perception are unique, spa
^ in that their ^
contemporary COhUoUii ■
not contingent

2)

^are

J^Instinctive

.

XLctei as pressed perception.

3)

•
notiire of natural and
The intrinsic perceptual natur^er aBalyzed

organic PI perception ma^oe

to say,

pn tPrms of HATTER ana FOR^
*
in
el
en we nerceive a
1 - -for example, Wt -rce-otion of ’red*
apple’, the natural PI ^ directly perceived
fi.e., matter) cannot be direcuxy^. foim)<
apart from its
More generally,

VITALLY perceived
the entire V
_u
a

natural world is, thro ^ 6eterminate colors
kaleidoscopic. PR^|_.
forms.
This type
included within a .
''* -sfmiXarly to the
of analysis may be
^ puHTKER;
remaining external b ‘ fJperceptual experience
to the internal mode. 01 N
*
ideational
yielding ALL
be demonstrated, shortly)
PI perception
-L
”■

4)

• i-oa
ViovrQver, that ideational
It was further ^f^s-’esfTthe same degree of
PI percepta no not P
”
& CEE percepta
• INDEPENDENCE’ from C^C, C. a.
and m0reas natural and flf^rcLtl necessarily
over, ideational *X o£e 0ntalogical existants
originally emerge- (functioning in their
FHOI'l CE ana CEE percept
\
,proJeoted’ CEC during
’infusive’
occasions.
But we had
spatio-temporally „—.——
the * contrihuxt^y

demonstrated that even thou&h^t^e^^^ in th

casc

criterion had to he - •
,
it, was snown
of-«««.»! ri rotoo.„ot
•that this sub-class 01 *1
..

strictly as uniquely independent as contempora¬
neously
-- - VI.'-' - — W contributed
V' v * J. vr —
V. --- as
-- natural
—---'- and
- organic PI
perception), ideational PI percepta does FUNCTION
IN MENTAL EVENTS AS IDEATIONAL STIMULUS-OBJECTS,
EFFECTIVELY DETERMINING WHICH CEE, CE and CEC
percepta will be conjured as relevant for
actualizing a complete event.
Therefore, the same MATTER-FORM distinction
deemed appropriate for natural and organic PI
perception (in step three, above) is suitable
for ideational PI percepta occurring as
stimulus-objects.
That is, for example, the
subjective psychologically entertained IDEA of
* red * has as its FORM the DENOTATIVELY clear and
distinct spoken sound, written word, bare silent
thought or Behaviorally manifest gesture
representing the linguistic symbol, ’red* (hence
designating the symbol * red * as uniquely distinct
from any other linguistic symbol).
Further, the
subjective psychological IDEA of *redc has as
its MATTER the myriad CONNQTATIVELY meaningful,
or more specifically, the CE and CEE percepta
that constitute its substantive meaning.
Thus far we have only considered ONE HALF of the
BIPOLAR character of mind, viz., PIperception,
and "have not therefore devoted attention to the
second portion, viz,, CEC, CE and CEE, collectively
conceived as UNITARY symbols, concomitantly brought
to bear upon PI perceptual contribution.
Stated
differently, when we see a*red apple* the.
stimulus-object effects participate in our
consciousness as directly perceived natural PI
perception to which we concomitantly (as reflexive
infusive percepta) ascribe the linguistic terms
5 red apple*
(terms constituted by CEC, CE and CEE
percepta).
In effect, from what has been said
above, the CEC perceptual component of unified
symbols could be regarded as the symbol's FORM,
and the CE and CEE perceptual components could
be contemplated as the symbol's MATTER.
The conclusion, then, is that our bipolar concept
of mind implies a TWO-FOLD FORM-MATTER distinction,
namely, with regard to PI perceptual eventcomponents /the latter three classes conceived
as unified /typically) linguistic symbols enter- '
taihed in subjective psychological experience/ as
they concomitantly come to bear upon PI perceptual
stimulus-object effects (functioning also as
PI stimulus-objects designating WHICH CEC, CE,
CEE percepta will be relevant for actualization
into*a two-fold form-matter relation).

8)

BOTH form-matter units are concomitantly actu¬
alized in ex-perience throughout space-time (as
a UNIVERSAL LOGICAL FORM for all possible mental
eventsj as symbolic reference.
All our previous
argumentation reduces to this concept of mind;
a view that shall be defined as the 1 DQUBLn
FORM-HATTER THEORY1.

9)

Again it should be noted that our concept of
mind, in principle, entirely follows from, an
analysis of the direct perceptual deliverances,
actualized as subjective psychological experience.

DOUBLE FORM-MATTER STRUCTURE OF MIND
Vie have arrived at a stage in our argumentation where
a highly formalized, specification of mind,
tofore defined,
consequent.

beyond that here¬

follows as the next logically successive

The deduction as such will be an important

instrument for facilitating a complete understanding of the
concept of mind propounded

in this discourse.

The following

schema!ization essentially embodies the basic formula
developed early in our discourse,

namely,

’percepts,

concomitantly coming constructively to bear upon other
percepts’.

Once again,

it ought to be mentioned

that*the

DOUBLE FORM-MATTER schematazation cannot be understood
means for avoiding careful reflective
arguments.

Rather,

scrutiny oi

preceding

the writer earnestly hopes that the

reader will also come to regard it as a criminative
auent of an understanding,
as vague,

initially,

and then cyclically,

-oer si stent reflective effort,

conse-

recognizing problem

tnrough exercising a
proceeds to progressively

higher levels of clear understanding.
attitude,

as a

Hence,

with this

the ensuing greatly simplified formalization oi

the LOGICAL F ORM of subjective psychological experience i

4^7

merely a preparatory-measure for future,

more elaborate and

precise investigations of the intrinsic STRUCTURE and
PROCESS of mind.

This is to say in a very definite way,

that after having been presented the schema and pondered
its nature,

innumerable implications suggesting areas in

need of further clarification,
tioh will undoubtedly arise.

reconciliation and elabora-

THE STRUCTURE

FIGURE 12

uPERCEPTA STANDING
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OF MIND
OVER AGAINST PERCEPTA”
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ing o
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th

previous train of argumentation, let us reflect briefly upon
che msij'-r points that the writer has attempted to make«

It

vrao seen that the principal claim* to be refuted was that
human we navi or could be exhaustively explained, In principle
in terms of its intersubJectlvely directly accessible
manifestations occurring within natural environmental
r\
w
oh texts*

Urus if it is true that all c

, .1 factors under-

lying human c-ohavior are directly accessible to scientific
observers, than psychologists need not introduce "mentaliatlc‘? 0T intervening variables into their behavioral models
for they would bo extraneous, and moreover, confusing to
behavioral enquiry due to the fact that they are not
directly perceivable by scientists.

In holding this posi¬

tion, proponents are necessarily compelled to. an eplphen ~
menialistio conception of mind-body; ise*, that "mind" can
i-9 G-vhciu$ tivd«y explained in terms of physical and/ov
reflexive processes,

She writer has held that this is

certainly an extreme view, indeed, for it demands, as it was
shown in an earlier illustration, that the thoughts or mental
states occurring in our heads particularly'during silent
meu.iifotron *•••«* tne(- is, wnon wo are personal3.y demonstr«etinc
merely neutral overt behavior — are,
(1 ♦ e*, as it

m

on a Behavioristic

consistently used throughout

this

B* P. Skinner * s) account for example, rot to be

■"

>

N-“ * s •!>

r.-v-w

^

* \ r*t
t- O

Caus:al factors in the production of human behavior!
Tm.nld.ns la to bo equated with solely lntcrsubjectively
manifest behavior, and more specifically, with verbal!sa.n-...c

c<*a oe heard aloud*

Hence there is no mors to

human behavior; it is literally what it "appears" to be
Insofar as the needs of a Behavioristic psychology are
T,,^ oiily tiQ’.-a suitable for psychological enquiry
&re those

rectiy ascertained through the external bodily

senses of psychologists.

Such a view seems seriously

diowrut-ut i'fii/h tne facts of concrete experience, for its
implications carried to their extreme demand — since the
benaviors of observational psychologists as wall, for
example, cannot be conceived as involving anything more
than their mere appearances

that the notion of human

subjective perspective or subjective understanding be purged
from psychological vocabulary.

Surely this is error for tho

obvious fact is that individuals* experience in one definite
sens® Ems':

ba-

minimally vaia .. :.tooa

s ■

:

:

extended sequence of conscious awarenesses, each sequence
colj.s.-elively comprising single life histories.

It will be

recalled that this latter concept of human experience is a
fundamental fact from which Whitehead•s and hence tho
writer’s position followed.
The writer developed a view diametrically opposed to
that of Behaviorism; for example, insofar as it was main-.
tained that all humanly perceivable .events must necessarily
regarusd us mental events to the extent that an indlas rb’rf
'

lEilld

l..U£5G ut:'. ,LO£5i CSLvly pl‘53 SUppGS0d ‘to

A.

«*. ■*.

‘-’“fly

^ V

r

WJ, 4.4 V &*&

possible phenomenal occurrence.

This is to say that it is

unthinkable to speak of a hitman organism having an
intelligible awareness of an e:.k.

a uat'.»v,ki

iyyyyryl

bou.!,...^ occurrence unless we presuppose a consciousness and
reflective consciousness that directly perceives the
*

rri/i'i tnls, uhe metaphorical expression of "mind

suanaing over against percepts" followed.

In this

dichotomized portrayal, the writer did not maintain that a
tteuj.i w> w.s implicit} rather the converse was emphasized.
1 ucv-or was conceived to include the two
general classes of percepta ~ denotative and connotative
per^piuai. meaning — that constituted the personal percepvaal contribution necessarily ascribed to heard verbal
utterances by both the subject articulating the utterances
a.b- v.oVlX as those hearing the natural world sounds a

Thus the

•'mind* factor and the 1 percepta® factor were regarded as
ij.iCx.^2 i.o&oly ^xs.ced components in producing manifest
■verbal

Tnen the traditional subject—object

relationship was refor olateu to th

degree that stimulus-

objects wei-e said to yield stimulus-object effects; the
ef.(ecvs were zhen conceived to BE the perceptual elements
entertained by an individual consciousness.

Therefore nuind”

was metaphorically posed as Standing over against” stimuluso.ojccv c.:. fecus*

o<■;imuius-object effects can be regarded as

occurring from two different spatial regions? frora stimulus'

j oats J

/ . &D 3: ■ th 5 external natural t

r] d

stimulus-objects LOCATED in an individual9s personal bodily
organism,

from this, the conclusion followed that

intersubjeotlve verification of phenomenal occurrence is
based on the fact that Individual percipients have direct
po.o^.'ua! &C06SS t0 the effect0

stimulus-objects located

111 the ezberaa;' natural world, while conversely, those
CffeCtS °CCUmKg wibhi» individual*s own organism were in
principle directly INACCESSIBLE to externally located
percipients.

two categorically distinct spatial regions

or stimulus-objects lead to the division of two methodologic¬
ally distinct approaches to psychological enquiry* one
BXX Objective ,0«Vf*h<V1 nertr /" 4 ^

--0v C-v * o« $ &. non**epiphanotnenaX~

J'^

XBtiC Beh&YiO'*** sm )
.-a*,-* ♦
..} -'-sl-wg %-tj.vh human behavior as it appears

bodily senses of
thS °ther a Objective psychology utilizing a system of
hypothetical constructs designed to represent the dynamics
of subject's internal bodily (essentially ideational)
experience.

It was noted that since internal behavioral

dynamics are directly inaccessible to externally located .
observers, the constructs must ultimately be subject to
verification through phenomenal occurrences directly intersubjectively confirmable,
Tha principal objection that a critic could raise to
vhe writer's view would bo in questioning the nature of the

"entity1* — namely, a “'mind" or consciousness and reflective
consciousness

that is metaphorically &tle»»d to

ovor against" percepta or what has also been defined as
s t1 mi il« a-ob j e c t e f f e c t1 laft-• ,a

Hie writer. argues that

o *v ^ j £ CX.no more generally,
y&bolio
r XA j. such beh
avlor has &•
U

v

rh - -

O

U t/ O

ititersuojeclively manifest dimension (it should be noted,
however, that in the ease of silent think! ns, there is often
no inter*mbjeotive&y accessible manifestation of linguistic
behavior,

Thus obviously this class of behavior cannot

serve as data for scientific psychology for it is directly
access!ole only to those'individuals within whose organisms
the states occur)♦

There is the dimension that is directly

ascertainable by externally located observers, as in the
ease of aiiy natural world phenomenon*

But also there is a

very complex dissension to symbolic (and particularly

1d.

otic) behavior directly accessible to only individual

subjects themselves*

This dimension :1s essentially equiva¬

lent to the highly complicated relevant, personal history of
1 information ILLICITLY ASSOCIATED with each *

v

l-

lated linguistic (i,e,, natural world) sound heard by
listeners located spatially separate from subjects.

These

IMPLICITLY CONTAINED MEANINGFUL COMPONENTS of linguistic
symbols, which are reflelively and synthetically associated
with subjects5 vocal utterances, are directly accessible to
only subjects themselves for they arise as internal bodily
ideational perceptions.

Due to the fact that there is

relatively high concordance in the definitional meaning
aeorib, h to el on outs of gii

3

guages shared in common

by groups of indlvidtusls, Intersub jo ct 1 ve communication is
readers:! possible.
z

11

-

rightf

fch

These two aspects of linguistic behavior
. t1 J g :f m 11 r of

p ychology «*- tc

ether c&pal

i

• -

a coirrolotc account of human behavior.

. ob; ct3
y ■

To better understand

4..K, ~

A,..,..

th0 “aoeeslty for admitting the two-perspective approach foi

linguistic behavior — the phenomenon which
fche ,'rrlfcer «>«Shly equates with mind .... let us briefly
reconsider the line of argumentation developed in preceding
chapters.
In Chapter One it was argued that since Skinner doe
‘^S
not hold that mental states have a causally efficacious
status in determining human behavioral modes, these states

d;as eplphenomena.

Bui it

i be

that

t

this view must necessarily logically presuppose as part of
i-w fc2*Oj!.iavlo uaSis that mental states do possess causal
em-cacity, for otherwise the system as logically proposed
becomes seriously contradictory.
criticisms t

: . ■

. bs er

The essence of these
foil

ptrsfe

b-;. v^ii only those behavioral phenomena delivered through the
exoarnal boai 1 y perc8ptu&X mode s of Behaviorl st 1 o ob sorvsrs*
*•’ >*

demonet rated that a full account of human

behavior can9 in principle* bs experimentally established,
-Unis was made evident in the example of subjects engaged in
tne typical act of silent thinkings while exhibiting the
appearance of mere neutral behavior to onlookers.

Observers

i'sruulci ha.v-3s in t’ii.hs casej no way of knowing what events were
occurring in the head of subjects unless subjects themselves
verbally described the personally experienced phenomena.
Mo:

,

the limitations of Behavlo

stie methodology oan

be more importantly seen in investigating linguistic
:

<

*1

. C

'

•

utte:

.

of .

i ipl e 9 all that is strictly heard by observers are the

■_

'

;

'

>rld

;

■ '

■ < f

words, In th<m

aning apart from a coi
being(s) to UNDEHSTATED the
words
■
v‘ **■rab *

; ■
-sly airaro human

tm* , say tnat. ovar
A«i s 34, s- to

aud above being BABE NATURAL WORLD SOUNDS, spoken words
fenfculate MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDINO IN PERCIPIENTS who both
c-i.it! hear the words.

Therefore in order. for

subjaotiire under standi rig to be aeeoEpllshed by (or aotnallzed
a“'v “ndlTidl'!als» it; is necessary that each person makes
& PSH.SONAjj

TKm?pDT?T-mA rn¥m

rTWTOwn

-<=» AIid^^lATIvE LINGUISTIC CONTRIB

T7lth tne natuml

ION C

C

sounds as they are either subject

or directly heard by externally 1c
percipients,

However, it is essential to note that the

jEXA^..L

whether time, false, vaguely expressed,

eloquent, etc.) of the personal contribution to the natural
**'jTxa

-shared In common is directly accessible only to'

the subject emitting the verbal utterances*
rafcuxu

Hence

at concordance or discordance among the personal

interpretative contributions ascribed to the heard verbalinations by listeners, in contrast with the subject's
personal contribution.
t’n~-;o '

:

1:a

This condition also indicates that
tc ray

■_ lAVvlti e...el bli

; int rw

-

supjaorively NOtf-manifest variables operating in the personal
production ox' linguistic behavior as wall as in understanding
h

‘

;

-

r

;

^

^be •

y c

-y

fc 3

h

■

cauiiut, **•’& principle, directly ascertain all the variables
causally operative in human behavior solely through the
idexternal bodily senses*

i».»^ c*iucpxx S-J ii'tvii

(Furthermore, since the Behaviorand all intelligent hu^un

nt!

o^.

•

for

matter

is

dependent upon the usage of

linguistic e2 tools, i b uusfc olo..> l ,

lira vh:.

iiitea,u*illy states which It presumes to msthodologicolly
cxolwe from its procedures are necessarily logically
presupposed (a priori) and operationally implemented for
it.tv possibility as a systematic node of enquiry.)
iw 0i’u';'r t=o theoretically elaborate upon the writer’s
Wiat liaSWistio symbols when overtly expressed have
both aii i»t®rsubjactively accessible dimension — l.e.,
istmertu.ry as natural world sounds -- and an aspect directly
aoeessii.lo oeiy
whevnar

each individuals entertaining the sound,

he personally generates the Utterance or merely

hears It

i.e., the personal relevant history of meaning

to ra.il6.£ively and reflectively brought constructively
l-v vil&x upon the natural world linguistic' CO&POHEHIS.
J

hence, actualizing a collets ME/uXWSFUI, verbal utterance
l'ny vle~s of Brnst Cassirer and Alfred Worth Whitehead were
introduced•

Explicitly .contained in each thinker's position

is the .notion that emotion, as it is directly accessible to
individual human toeings, is a crucial factor in acquiring and
cmiect-is/s.1,1/ using language*

*fhat is, Cassirer and Whitehead

B&a£j.cu±# ho.!.v. shat subj ee*sively exqq-r!encod emotion during
acquisition of speech in early life undergoes a radical
oiSivj/pllnad Iranmoriaation whereby linguistic behavior is
essdx2uia,?.i..,v .K^^xiod., consequently enabling human organisms
to characterise and successively meaningful^ v
experience.

-:n-n-

hsro expoidenoe Is regarded as an inextricable

synthesis of external and internal bodily perception.

feconeay, it can be shown that from sclent mi stateabout behavior generated by a Skinnerian Behaviorism
.^xO-vj relevant sciences which provide human behavioral
accounts in physio-chemical terms — since both approaches
uan 138 ^-S^rcied generally as delivering data via the
axvax-i.i.ut boc.ily senses or scientific observers •*»,

statementb' O

referring to mental phenomena cannot be deduced AN£L YTXCALL!
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m mental events and physio-ch..
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to underlie the mental events must be established by
'■

'v

'

•

- ‘

■■ .

s \ cm cl t e rnafee
i. ? propoi

11;
**?> • r-? -•* w
-

:

■ •

xo -

Cvv*

m ci

.

< c

v .1. x;W
- ■-

in the Faigl art!
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importance for the behavioral sciences in that they clear the
nay for wo logically distinct procedures for systematically
• stigatlag human behavior,

Pirnf,,

id••la ;i-: maw mb

co&AgH&teu ussen^xaJ.ly by traditional Behavioristic methods$3 f>
S
•’■ *■ '* s xnvfOi\>o.:.g^«.*liig biioso bsnavioraX phenomena that can be
asourcanned Dxx&iCiJui via 'ch© external bodily senses of
i>c-hc?.vierx&cxo psyenviogrscs*

Also there 5.s the second

approach aorxrwd as a subjective psychology, investigating
thosa pheneman . j er( eiv

3 dire

:

^ <. LY by ii

beings themselves* hence perceived imiHEei’LY by subjective
psychologists.

These Inner states are. classifiable into

three distinct types of perceptions
1)

bodily feelings| i.e., pains,, etc,

2}

emotional feelings

*

3)

in.

ide&ttcmal feeling.o ,J ♦

1 ^jectlTO psycho:Logy, although not having the
'01 c CI c al ad ran t ag $ of a Be}

d / ; sm in that

phenomena with which it deals are HOI Intersubjeotlvely
oireotly ascertainable by subjective psychologists, CAN deal
Tfitn inne" behavioral elements primarily through an analysis
0x

reports of subjects referring to their inner

stares*

primary
x
*v

^
in unxs approach rroni a

•Behavior! sa is that a different j^OBEgZCAI, IMS BPHEiA'iloh
'

;

:

th

■ '*

1 reports (i. ».. t.. £

vhtjoxy developed in “Chapters Two" and ”Threen).

Thus the

i. procedure of collecting data having reference
fco subjects’ inner perceptual states that are not directly
experienced by subjective psychologists, in light of an
appropriate explanatory theory and carefully controlled
experimental conditions is not a serious methodological
handicap,

^be exact science of physios (as it was stressed

iu *'b® introduction), for example, cannot DIRECTLY observe
theoretically postulated entities
(e.g., atoms, el otro:

I, x

\

lies, etc.), ta

yot, through

th® tttlll23ti0n of W8l~ formulated theoretical constructs,
penetrating Investigations are conducted Into th<=* ra'hv^ c?
hypu t/iatioal entitles that ere in principle unobservable*

In -Chapter Two", a model for conceptualizing human
behavior is presented which is consistent with the aim of
'both ap objective and subjective psychological approach to
.nvestisating human behavior? that is, in developing a
system for explj ning th

dj

. human behavior in
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u L,“ ia9atxoaed ««» again that the writer is
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k a > a behavioral science can
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generality* in order, to comprehend the vast number of
ohyo»c-tern iced systexas involved in behavioral processes.
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bonce demon uo ! ■ J.' ■ul»l
bodily meoh
processes*

42f?3> 4*•/ T £?s
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on operate

This is to say th.

given, for *FJWml f»

a set of

statements referring to states said to underlie a parti
rhi cniar
>

mental state (a feat which is logically possible for a vsr*
highly developed neurophysiology)? it is HOT LOGICALLY
possible to deduce
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bodily processes.
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n.o Sw.oMt;*.fioally irrelevant because of
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-tv
yot importantly different), but
tnsorewieal and methodological «ro/«>.-iu-<*e3
Eoro in accordance with those of the natural
sciences.

Ttes fraa a subjective psychological point of view, a
concept of mind is advocated arguing that mental phenomena
G0 in ;'aot ®a®sS® *»» taderlying physlo-ehemleal oondit~ons*

Bat slM0S statements referring to the two classes

G
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&« are not logically

equivalent, the correlations to be established between the
two domains (a logically possible feat of a highly sorbicfloated neurophysiology) must necessarily be EMPIBXCAL
oo.vx^lat:ions*

£h£s situation leads to the concision that

in the emergence of a logically distinct mental perceptual
domain from a correlative physio-chemical domain, there
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Chapter Three“ it t?as seen that because the domain

Of inner bodily perception had been demonstrated to be a
causal 1-e£ilM distinct from the physio-chemical realm, yet
obviously working in conjunction with it In producing
individual behavior, it was possible'to devise a system of
constructs suitable for experimentally investigating the
dynamics os' personally accessible conscious and reflective
ounsoxoas processes,

A theory was subsequently presented

snowing tnat given the human organism with its capacity for
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